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5MOTHER COURAGE:
“That must be a rotten general.”
THE COOK:
“He’s ravenous all right, but why rotten?”
MOTHER COURAGE:
“Because he’s got to have men of
courage, that’s why. If he knew how to plan a proper campaign
what would he be needing men of courage for?
Ordinary ones would do. It’s always the same; whenever
there’s a load of special virtues around it means something
stinks.”
THE COOK:
“I thought it meant things is all right.”
(BERTOLT BRECHT)
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9English Summary
The author addresses a recent force employment concept called effects-based operations. It first
appeared during the 1991 war against Iraq in which the incredible potential of advanced
technologies such as stealthy platforms and precision weaponry, was in the global media. The
new concept emphasised the primer of achieving effects on the enemy and disregarded large-
scale destruction. Soon effects-based operations became a buzzword in the military lexicon and
synonymous with Western, especially American, technological superiority. Over the years the
concept proved so durable that it increasingly permeated military and political thinking. The
attributes of effects-based operations can be grouped around three common, but interrelated
elements such as effects focus, advanced technology, and systems thinking.
The characteristics upon which the common elements are built, such as causality/deduction for
effects focus, intangibles/control for advanced technology, and categorisation/analysis for
systems thinking bear dangerous simplifications regarding the nature of war. It is certainly true
that differences in weapons systems and scientific standards can shift the relative balance to
one’s favour and often in a decisive fashion. However, the attributes of effects-based operations
are in sharp contrast with war’s frictional nature as outlined by Clausewitz. According to him
effects in war cannot be traced back to single causes, as several concurrent causes are normally
at work. Investigating the relationship between causes and effects becomes easy only if they are
closely linked. An effect that appears correct at one level can become objectionable on a higher
level and imply a new basis for judgement. The distance between causes and effects is
proportionate to the number of other factors to be considered.
Thus friction is not a technical problem that can be eliminated. Novelty must always be expected
in war, which indicates that effects are never predictable with a high degree of certainty. Friction
always dims expectations in terms of causality and the ability to achieve desired effects. The
consequence is that in war we must be satisfied with understanding certain general features in
terms of correlation, rather than attempting to discover a mechanism that links causes with
effects directly. The author suggests an organic approach to address the challenge posed by
war. According to him the emphasis must shift towards learning and adaptation, instead of
planning for desired effects. Although this approach does not allow for perfect solutions, it can
guarantee an alignment in terms of external demand and internal variation. There is simply too
much going on in war that does not allow every move to be orchestrated from the top, but often
require uncontrolled and parallel actions.
Consequently, in war the central challenge is to manage change, which requires a certain
amount of flexiblity. Wars happen on multiple levels ranging from the top at headquarters to
below at the front lines.Addressing the challenges posed by the enemy requires more than
causal assumptions imposing unnecessary constraints. This way it becomes possible to exploit
friction’s uncertainty and complexity that Clausewitz associated with war. Friction indicates that
often it is more important in war how we do things than what things we do, which has a clear
practical limitation for the concept of effects-based operations.
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Dutch Summary
Een recent concept voor het gebruik van militaire macht is effects-based operations
(effectgebaseerde operaties). Dit concept werd door de Amerikanen voor het eerst in 1991
tijdens de oorlog tegen Irak toegepast. Het potentieel van geavanceerde technologieën zoals
‘stealthy’ platformen en precisiewapens werd onderwerp van een wetenschappelijk en politiek
debat, vooral omdat het nieuwe concept zicht bood op het bereiken van een effect op de
tegenstander zonder grootschalige vernietiging. Het concept van de effects-based operations
werd daardoor synoniem voor de Westerse – met name de Amerikaanse – technologische
suprematie. Het bleek uiteindelijk zo duurzaam dat het zich wortelde in het Westerse militaire en
politieke denken. De kenmerken van effects-based operations kunnen worden gegroepeerd rond
drie met elkaar samenhangende elementen: focus op effect, geavanceerde technologie en
denken in systemen.
De karakteristieken waarop deze gemeenschappelijke elementen zijn gebaseerd, namelijk
causaliteit/deductie voor de focus op effect, ondefinieerbaarheid/controle voor geavanceerde
technologie en categorisering/analyse voor het denken in systemen, brengen echter ten aanzien
van de aard van oorlog een gevaarlijke versimpeling met zich mee. Het is zeker waar dat
verschillen in wapensystemen en wetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen de relatieve balans in het
voordeel van één van de partijen kan doen doorslaan en zelfs beslissend kan zijn. Maar de
kenmerken van effects-based operations vertonen een scherp contrast met de natuurlijke frictie
in oorlogen zoals die door Von Clausewitz is beschreven. Volgens Von Clausewitz kunnen
gevolgen in een oorlog niet worden teruggevoerd op enkele oorzaken, omdat normaliter
verschillende samenvallende oorzaken in het spel zijn. Daardoor is er een groot verschil tussen
oorlog in theorie en oorlog in de praktijk.
Het onderzoeken van de relatie tussen de oorzaken en de gevolgen is alleen goed mogelijk
indien deze expliciet met elkaar verbonden zijn. Een gevolg dat op het ene niveau juist lijkt, kan
op een hoger niveau van analyse onjuist zijn en leiden tot een nieuw oordeel. De afstand tussen
oorzaak en gevolg staat in relatie tot de andere factoren die moeten worden meegewogen.
Daarom is frictie niet slechts een technisch probleem dat kan worden geëlimineerd. In oorlog
moet voortdurend met nieuwe, onvoorspelbare ontwikkelingen rekening worden gehouden. Dit
betekent dat de gevolgen van oorlogshandelingen nooit met een hoge mate van zekerheid
voorspelbaar zijn. Door frictie zoals gedefinieerd door Von Clausewitz, is de verwachte
causaliteit en het vermogen om de gewenste effecten teweeg te brengen daarom per definitie
onduidelijk. Derhalve moeten wij ons bij oorlogsvoering tevredenstellen met het begrijpen van de
correlatie tussen algemene kenmerken in plaats van het ontdekken van een mechanisme dat
oorzaken en gevolgen logisch met elkaar verbindt.
In deze studie wordt een organische benadering voorgesteld voor deze uitdaging van de
oorlogsvoering. In de visie van de auteur moet de nadruk worden verschoven naar leren en
aanpassing in plaats van planning om de gewenste effecten te bereiken. Hoewel deze aanpak
geen perfecte oplossingen biedt, geeft deze wel de garantie dat de externe vraag en de interne
variatie op één lijn worden gebracht. In een oorlog gebeurt er te veel, zodat niet iedere stap
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hiërarchisch kan worden gedirigeerd en er vaak ongecontroleerde en parallelle acties
plaatsvinden. Als gevolg hiervan is de centrale uitdaging het managen van verandering. Dit
vraagt om een zekere mate van flexibiliteit. Oorlog vindt op verschillende niveaus plaats, van de
politieke en militaire top tot de mannen en vrouwen in de frontlinie. Om de uitdagingen die door
de vijand worden gesteld aan te kunnen is meer nodig dan causale aannames die onnodige
beperkingen opleggen. Op deze manier wordt het mogelijk om de onzekerheid en complexiteit
van frictie die Von Clausewitz met oorlogvoeren associeerde te benutten. Frictie toont dat het in
oorlog vaak belangrijker is hoe we dingen doen dan welke dingen we doen. Dit leidt tot een
duidelijke praktische begrenzing van het concept van de effects-based operations.
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Introduction
“… military has no constant form, just as water has no constant shape –
adapt as you face the enemy, without letting them know beforehand
what you are going to do. Therefore, assessment of the enemy is in the
mind, observation of the situation is in the eyes.”
Sun Tzu
Waves of History
The social wave-front analysis regards history as a succession of three waves of change. The
basic assumption is that human social development has been interrupted by innovations and
breakpoints generating waves moving at a certain speed.1 The social wave-front analysis also
explains how wars have changed as the waves accumulated their force. A thorough
understanding of the waves is of utmost importance, since the general conclusion is that every
time the waves clash, bloody wars erupt, as tensions between the representatives of different
waves accumulate.2 It is commonplace to say that the West is biased towards the instrumental
dimension of war and regards it as a means towards an end. In contrast, most challengers are
driven by war’s existential dimension and regard it as an end in itself.3 It appears that the
technology-driven warfare of the West increasingly faces an ideologically driven warfare which
partly explains why troops of the coalition still fight in Iraq. Although President George W. Bush
declared the war to be over in 2003, efforts to harvest peace cost the United States billions of
dollars each month.4 This bias towards the instrumental dimension indicates that the West is
unable to understand the existential dimension and its expressive elements. It is not able to see
violence in a social context, and ignores that cruelty and destructiveness of war express basic
social conditions. According to the social wave-front analysis, the way we generate wealth and
the way we wage war are connected. War is part of our social existence, and reflects the society
with which it evolves in consonance. Understanding the social context is critical. Throughout
human history wars were mostly waged by social entities other than states, fought by social
organisations other than armies, and with the involvement of combatants other than soldiers.
1  Toffler, Alvin: The Third Wave, Bantam Books, 1980, pp. 10-12.
2  Toffler, Alvin/Toffler, Heidi: War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Little, Brown
and Company, 1993, pp. 19-25.
3  Coker, Christopher: Waging War Without Warriors, The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, IISS
Studies In International Security, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2002, pp. 6-13; Ho, Joshua: The Advent
of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operations, Working Paper Series No. 57,
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, December 2003, pp. 23-24.
4  Lind, William S. et. al.: The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette,
November 2001, pp. 66-68; Crawley, James W.: Rising War Costs, Monthly War Spending Passes $
5.8 Billion, Media General News Service, Internet, accessed 01. 12. 2004, available at
www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/041119-iraq-burn-rate.htm.
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Clausewitz acknowledged that in war nothing is eternal and there could be “little doubt that many
previous ways of fighting [would] reappear”.5 Due to its instrumental bias the West assumes
wars to be short, decisive and rational. As Hobbes pointed out, time simply increases suffering
and destruction. The essence of war was for him, not battle or the act of fighting, but the
consumption of time. Consequently, the longer the duration, the greater the enemy has to suffer.
The more he suffers the less he has to lose, and the greater his determination that the suffering
not ought to be in vain.6 Time stands for destructive effects, which possess significance on all
levels of war. Iraq has shown so far that what matters is not the way the West sees victory, but
the way the enemy understands defeat. Military involvements of the recent past have been
elongated as the emphasis slowly shifted from winning the war towards winning the peace.
Paradoxically, hearts and minds campaigns demonstrate that military performance on the
battlefield is less and less relevant as involvements tend to be lengthy, measured in years, not
days, weeks or months.7 According to the social wave-front analysis, during much of human
history wars tended to be non-decisive, protracted engagements fought for limited objectives and
by limited means. Thus they were a permanent way of life, mostly conceived as a natural
phenomenon. Most enemies the West faces represent earlier waves and see war from a
different perspective. They fight for different aims and by different means.8 It appears that the
West employs its military force in a way, geared to maximize lethal efficiency, as their capability
to kill is unparalleled. However, political effectiveness often counts more than military efficiency
and in some cases indicators of theoretical efficiency might be irrelevant to battlefield
effectiveness. Despite the technological wizardry of the Western armed forces, we should bear
in mind that continuity in war is at least as important as change.9
Characteristics of the Last Wave
Unlike the symmetric threat of the Cold War, military involvements of Western armed forces in
the outgoing 20th century were confusing, distant, and squalid, rather than decisive or heroic. In
the framework of the social wave-front analysis we can say that similar conflicts held off large
armies during the First Wave when the price to be paid seemed too high, or the gain too small
for empire builders. Western expansion and colonialism during the Second Wave proved that
primitive or imperfect warfare could not defeat modern armies supported by advanced
technologies and organisation. In the context of the Third Wave political and psychological
5  Coker, p. 6; Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, Everyman’s Library, 1993, pp. 84, 101, 173; Hammes,
Thomas X.: The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 2004, p. 3;
Toffler/Toffler, p. 64; Creveld, Martin van: The Transformation of War, The Free Press, 1991, p. 73;
Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 624.
6  Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 84; Creveld (1991), p. 144.
7  Clausewitz, p. 246; Hammes, pp. 208-209.
8 Wegman, Yehuda: Israel’s Security Doctrine and the Trap of “Limited Conflict”, Military Technology,
March 2005, pp. 86-89; Clausewitz, p. 608.
9  Hammes pp. 16-32, 207-215; See also Wilson, G. I. (Col.)/Sullivan, John P. (Sgt.)/Kempfer, Hal (Lt.
Col.): Fourth Generation Warfare, It’s Here, And We Need New Intelligence-Gathering Techniques For
Dealing With It, Armed Forces Journal, International, October 2002, pp. 56-62; Wilcox, Greg/Wilson,
Gary I.: Military Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan, Internet, accessed 23. 09.
2002, available at www.emergency.com/2002/4gw5may02.htm; Knox, MacGregor/Murray, Williamson:
The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 192; Biddle,
Stephen: Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003, p. 46.
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factors often predominate over traditional military ones.10 The West’s instrumental bias
approaches war mainly in terms of ends/means rationality. It assumes that through analysis and
deduction it is possible to detect causal relationships that can be exploited by the application of
superior military technology. This logical and essentially scientific image of war focusing on the
efficient application of scarce resources explains the West’s preference for a concept such as
effects-based operations. Unfortunately, the social wave-front analysis indicates that wars the
West wants to fight and wars it will have to fight might not fully overlap.11 The international
political system of the Third Wave is often described as the age of complexity or post-modern. It
is characterised by several parallel revolutions in information related technologies, a continuous
geo-strategic restructuring, and the diminishing role of national governments. Globalisation also
indicates that traditional poles of attraction are braking down as the boundaries and dividing lines
in the international arena evaporate. The Second Wave allowed for discernible principles and
boundaries, but the Third Wave stands for a constant fragmentation.12 There are many actors of
different types who display a wide variety of relations including both alignments and enmities.
Globalisation also demonstrates that many issues lack a dominant axis in terms of co-operation
and conflict. Various patches on global and regional scales emerge constantly, thus featuring
both enclaves of order and disorder. Power is distributed in a manner in which allies on one
particular issue might be adversaries on another. This dynamic is extremely war-prone and
contains highly anarchistic enclaves outside the traditional boundaries of the nation state.
Various forms of violence flourish, which are often accompanied by the inability of governments
to satisfy the requirements and expectations of their citizenry. The Second Wave stood for a
multitude of conventional wars between ambitious and capable states. In the Third Wave the
West will be increasingly required to wage mainly unconventional wars against failed states with
populations fuelled by a rage born from the triumvirate of hopeless poverty, wealth
discrepancies, and various religious motives. The majority of conflicts in which Western armed
forces fight are already asymmetric. Unconventional enemies such as Al Qaeda indicate both
new and hybrid forms of violence, which pose tremendous problems. Enemies do not look, think
and fight like us and it is extremely difficult to understand their motives and behaviour. Fighting
such enemies can not only negate the West’s technological advantages and its analytical skills,
but also dangerously stretch available resources. More and more Western soldiers must engage
with the enemy on his ground and according to his rules.13
Asymmetric and Unconventional Conflicts
The majority of security challenges usually occur in failed states with collapsed institutions. They
tend to unfold in the less developed parts of the world displaying the characteristics of earlier
10  Gray, Chris H.: Postmodern War, The New Politics of Conflict, Routledge London, 1997, pp. 21-23, 81,
155-158, 168-177, 196.
11  Liotta, P. H.: Chaos as Strategy, Parameters, Summer 2002, pp. 47-56.
12  Binnedijk, Hans: A Strategic Assessment for the 21st Century, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1996, p.
67; Lyotard, Jean-François: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, University of
Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 14-17; Kumar, Krishan: From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society, New
Theories for the Contemporary World, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 101-104.
13  Brown, Seyom: The Illusion of Control, Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, Brookings
Institution Press, 2003, pp. 67-69; Peters, Ralph: Fighting for the Future, Will America Triumph?
Stackpole Books, 1999, pp. 1-17.
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waves. The armaments and tactics of low intensity conflicts rarely allow for the involvement of
regular armies. This fosters a blurring of the traditional distinction between war and crime and
poses a significant challenge to the West, who traditionally makes a distinction between civilized
and savage forms of warfare. Whereas the former is assumed to be rational, directed and
essentially non-violent, the latter is often seen as irrational, aimless and bloody.14 Thus waging
war depends for the West more on technology and wealth, rather than manpower and ideology.
The focus on short and sharp campaigns resulting in few casualties also explains why Western
armed forces are not driven by religious or ideological motives. Unfortunately, in asymmetric and
unconventional conflicts, the traditional understanding of war as the clash between regular
armed forces fighting for secular political reasons, does not apply. The proliferation of technology
enables non-state actors to play an increasing role in international politics. The growing number
of ungoverned territories within a number of weak states easily provides for safe haven for
international terrorist and criminal organisations.15 The collapse of the World Trade Center in
2001 meant that war and terrorism merged. They pose a constant and considerable threat to
international security and raise the chance to have diametrically opposed civilisations. Although
the challengers might appear as representatives of earlier waves, their intention bears serious
political consequences. Their aim is to remove alien influences from their world and change the
basic constellation of the international system. The character and nature of such challengers is
best described as anti-systemic terrorism, which refers to the unconventional, but world-wide use
of force by non-state or state-sponsored actors. This sort of terrorism aims at destroying and
killing civilian and government facilities and personnel in order to induce changes in the
international system. Taking advantage of the accelerating globalisation, representatives of
earlier waves try to make their impact global, as they increasingly use the technological arsenal
of the emerging Third Wave.16 The declaration of the American President George W. Bush on 20
September 2001 made war a general phenomenon fought interminably and on a global scale,
which will end only if every terrorist group of global reach has been found and defeated. The
global effort to fight international terrorism turned war into a perpetual and indeterminate
phenomenon with no clear distinction between the state of peace and that of war. Waging war
against such asymmetric and unconventional enemies indicates that war’s traditional dimensions
are about to blur geographically and temporally. The enemy is elusive and operates outside the
traditional boundaries of the nation state. He is no longer a comprehensible and localisable
entity, but one whose nature is fleeting and difficult to grasp. He is mostly unknown, unseen and
yet ever present. He poses a constant threat in which legitimate violence, criminality, and
terrorism merge and become indistinguishable from another. Fighting and defeating him means
that war is not the final element in the sequence of power, but by merging with the other
14  Laroque, Emma: The Metis in English Canadian Literature, The Canadian Journal of Native Studies,
Volume III, Number I, 1983, p. 86.
15  Nye, Joseph S. Jr.: U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, pp. 62-63,
Hooker, pp. 11, 14.
16  Dorff, Robert H.: Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability, Parameters,
Summer 1996, pp. 17-23; Barber, Benjamin: Jihad vs. McWorld, The Alantic Monthly, Volume 269,
Number 3, March 1992, pp. 53-65; Wijk, Rob de: The Art of Military Coercion, Why the West’s Military
Superiority Scarcely Matters, Mets & Schilt, 2005, pp. 170-184; Kaplan, Robert A.: “The Coming
Anarchy” and the Nation-State Under Siege, Peaceworks, Number 4, United States Institute of Peace,
1995, pp. 5-12; Kibble, David G.: The Attacks of 9/11: Evidence of a Clash of Religions?, Parameters,
Autumn 2002, pp. 34-45.
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elements it can become the very foundation of politics.17 Waging such wars is both demanding
and difficult. Operations require the co-ordination of multiple actors, and contain a multitude of
challenges and tasks. Asymmetric and unconventional enemies stand for complex
contingencies, which can be understood as much by what they are as by what they are not.
Thus detecting decision points can be very difficult.18 This attribute resembles similarity with a
never-ending decision tree. Asymmetric and unconventional enemies tend to appear in
networks, which are variable, uneven and indefinite. Although they have no clear centre at all,
their nodes can exchange information directly, which makes possible for them to appear
anywhere and strike anytime. The bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 showed that
an enemy acting as an amorphous multiplicity or swarm can strike at any point, from any sides
and at any time, and disperse so as to become nearly invisible.19
Existential Dimension, Expressive Element
Fighting such networks is similar to that of guerrillas, but on a global scale. As one senior U.S.
general remarked it is inherently difficult, in some cases impossible. It can drag soldiers easily
into “vague, confusing military actions” in which they have to master “each messy situation and
pull everything together.”20 The conduct of asymmetric and unconventional warfare is not only
confusing, but also paradoxical. It contains fragments of older forms including modern, ancient,
and even ritual war. As various types of vacuum and cluster bombs have already displayed,
even conventional weapons can have unconventional effects.21 Increased dependence on
technology can mean that even actions that are regarded insignificant in traditional terms, often
need political preparation and justification. Despite the asymmetry of technological capability,
often the best Western armed forces can achieve is not to lose militarily. Asymmetric warfare is
inherently political in which victory often means hurting, rather than defeating, a superior
enemy.22 As various guerrilla wars of the 20th century showed, wars can be lost militarily, but
won politically. Western military thinking still does not understand why, that given its
technological superiority, the outstanding education and training of its military personnel, do
enemies fight wars they cannot win based on rational calculation? The tides seem to change and
it appears that in a globalised world, traditional factors such as gross national product, research
and development capabilities, organisational and management skills are becoming less and less
17 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, United States Capitol, Washington
D. C., Internet, accessed 03. 08. 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010920-8.html; Hardt, Michael/Negri, Antonio: Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of
Empire, Penguin Press, 2004, pp. 3-21, 30-32.
18  Byman, D./Lesser, I./Bruce, P./Benard, C./Waxman, M.: Strengthening the Partnership, Improving
Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations, RAND MR-1185-AF,
2000, pp. 7-11.
19 Ibid., pp. 54-58; Edwards, Sean J. A.: Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, RAND
MR-1100-OSD, 2000, pp. 53-63 and Edwards, Sean J.: Swarming and the Future of Warfare,
Dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2004, pp. 99-113.
20  Zinni, Anthony C.: A Commander Reflects, What will be the operations of the future? Proceedings, July
2000, pp. 34-36 (quotations p. 34).
21  Kellner, Douglas: Postmodern Military and Permanent War, in: Boggs, Carl (ed.): Masters of War,
Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire, Routledge, 2003, pp. 229-244.
22  Hanson, Victor D.: Postmodern War, City Journal, Winter 2005, Internet, accessed 08. 03. 2005,
available at www.city-journal.org/html/15_1_postmodern_war.html.
22
the decisive factors for victory in war.23 The social wave-front analysis indicates that
technologies come and go, but the primitive endures. Most enemies Western armed forces face
resemble a basic human archetype. Warriors thrive on disorder, and any confrontation with order
makes them shrivel. They have no stake in peace and see no advantage in the status quo.24 The
waves indicate that new styles of war might emerge, but they coexist with old and almost extinct
ones. The most striking paradox of the Third Wave is that unlike earlier waves, the outdated, the
poor and the obsolete can defeat a strategy that exploits all the means advanced technology and
analytical skills can offer. The Third Wave seems to end an era of traditional wars in which the
actual use of military force was the central element of statecraft. We witness mixed wars in
which both non-military instruments of national power and the non-traditional use of the military
force are dominant.25 For much of the world’s population, fighting wars and living as warriors is a
step up rather than a step down. The old rules of interstate warfare do not apply to them as they
fight for shadowy and loose organisations requiring a tribal-like identity, rather than any form of
citizenship. Fighting asymmetric and unconventional wars means that we face an enemy who is
less disciplined, more spontaneous and resembles attributes of criminal gangs. This mix makes
it extraordinarily hard to achieve any sort of decisive victory in traditional terms. At the turn of the
21st century, the warrior is back globally, and as brutal as ever, but better-armed. He prefers to
fight asymmetrically without written and customary rules. War provides him with leisure, wealth,
recognition and camaraderie. He wages wars for their own sake, interwoven with various moral
and religious ideas. Consequently, wars will become more flexible, more mobile and filled with
tacit elements. Decreasing temporal and spatial limitations indicate that fighting warriors can
become virtual from a technological point of view, and bodiless from a military point of view.
Thus traditional advantages of Western armed forces may be negated.26
Research Framework
After the collapse of the Soviet Union armed forces had to refocus from fighting possible major
theatre wars to operations that have little similarity with traditional war-fighting. Most military
operations in the 1990s such as Somalia and the Balkans were aimed at fighting irregular forces,
including warlords and various criminal gangs. However, after the turn of the millennium armed
forces had to once again re-adjust. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in
23  Huntington, Samuel: The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49; Handel,
Michael I.: Clausewitz and the Age of Technology, in: Handel, Michael I. (ed.): Clausewitz and Modern
Strategy, Frank  Cass,  1986,  pp.  82,  85;  Tomes,  Robert  R.: Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,
Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 16-28.
24  Chisholm, Donald: The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War, Parameters, Winter 2003/04, p. 115;
Peters, Ralph: Our New Old Enemies, Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 22-37; See Josephus: The
Jewish War, Penguin Books, 1959, pp. 263-339.
25  Tucker, David: Fighting Barbarians, Parameters, Summer 1998, pp. 69-72; Foster, Gregory D.: The
Postmodern Military, The Irony of “Strengthening” Defense, Harvard International Review, Summer
2001, pp. 24-25.
26  Ehrenreich, Barbara: Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War, Metropolitan Books,
1997, p. 227; Kaplan (1994), pp. 72-74; Gilbert, in: Peters (ed.), p. 15; Peters, Ralph: The New Warrior
Class, Parameters, Summer 1994, pp. 16-26; Peters, Ralph: The Culture of Future Conflict,
Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-25; Gray, Colin S.: Weapons for Strategic Effect, How Important is
Technology?, Occasional Paper Number 21, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air
University, January 2001, pp. 3-15, 31-36.
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September 2001 made it clear that Western armed forces need to go through a very thorough
transformation if they want to address the challenges of an increasingly fluid and difficult-to-
decode global environment. As the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq showed, most
NATO countries did not possess adequate capabilities and could not respond to the missions as
desired.27 The 2002 Prague Summit called for a thorough transformation process with more
balanced and effective military capabilities. NATO must be able to send forces on short notice,
and sustain operations over distance and time even in environments in which nuclear, biological
and chemical threats are likely. The summit also ended an old and painful out-of-area debate
within the Alliance by stating that NATO forces must become able to operate outside Europe.28
The emphasis moved to more mobile and swiftly deployable forces, more special operations
forces, better precision strike capabilities and modernized command structures. The participating
heads of states and governments also called for a program on specific, near-term capability
improvements. Instead of attempting to sustain interoperability across the full spectrum, they
emphasised the importance of creating niches of excellence in critical combat shortfalls.
Proposals included areas such as defending against chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear attacks; ensuring command, control and information superiority; improving
interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid
deployment and sustainment of combat forces. NATO defined the areas of adaptation in order to
become able to perform fundamental security tasks and to carry out the full spectrum of
operations more effectively.29 Two interrelated concepts were born in Prague, both allowing for
reductions in infrastructure and offering the advantage to carry more capabilities:
· The first emphasises expeditionary capabilities and means that future armed forces must be
able to project power over a large distance without limitations regarding sustainability.
· The second emphasises modularity, which means that national militaries must posses a
structure that enables a smooth rotation among national and co-operation between various
international force elements.30
Although the Declaration outlined the framework in general terms, the way ahead still appears to
be vague as NATO faces a bewildering array of threats. Combating various sorts of irregular
forces poses a serious challenge, which cannot be approached in traditional terms based on
sustained focus and predictable scenarios. Attempts to address this complexity of tasks resulted
27  Fact Sheet: NATO: Building New Capabilities for New Challenges, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, For Immediate Release, 21 November 2002, Internet, accessed 16. 09. 2004, available at
www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/02112111.htm.
28 Prague Summit Declaration, NATO Press Release 127, 21 November 2002, Internet, accessed 12. 04.
2004, available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p-127e.htm; The Transformation of NATO, Opening
speech by President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel at the Conference organised by Host
Committee and the Aspen Institute of Berlin, 20 November 2002, Internet, accessed 16. 09. 2004,
available at www.nato.int./docu/speech/2002/s021120c.htm.
29 Remarks by the President of the United States, George W. Bush to the Atlantic Student Summit, 20
November 2002, Internet, accessed 20. 11. 2004, available at www.nato.int./docu/speech/
2002/s021120f.htm; The United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, Prague Capabilities Commitment, 11
July 2003, Internet, accessed 20. 08. 2004, available at www.nato.int/uk/docu/capa2.htm.
30  Cebrowski, Arthur: Planning a Revolution: Mapping the Pentagon’s Transformation, a lecture presented
to the Heritage Foundation on 13 May 2003, Internet, accessed 18. 05. 2003, available at
www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm292.cfm.
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in many competing force employment theories from which effects-based operations or the
effects-based approach to operations has become dominant. The central tenet of which is that
operations must be guided first and foremost by desired effects achieved on the enemy. The
Quadrennial Defense Review issued by the Department of Defense in 2006 emphasises
explicitly the need to make the shift “[f]rom massing forces – to massing effects” and “[f]rom
focusing on inputs (effort) to tracking outputs (results).”31 NATO officials also state that the
effects-based approach represents “a new and innovative way of looking at battlefield
operations” and allows for putting “military operations … into a wider context”.32 Undoubtedly,
most publications detailing the concept read like a hosanna and praise the incredible potential
and advantages of effects-based operations. Among others it is claimed that wars can be won
cheaply in terms of money and men. It is also stated that wars can be waged without involving
large scale destruction in traditional terms. Focusing on desired effects makes possible to control
the enemy, thus shortening the duration of conflicts. During recent effects-based exercises,
officials claimed that the concept represents “a fundamental way of thinking that focuses on the
efficient and effective achievement of desired effects in the operational environment, vice a
primary focus on the completion of assigned tasks.”33
Research Question
In sum, effects-based operations or the effects-based approach to operations seem to offer an
excellent framework for the full range of possible missions for three simple reasons:
· Comprehensive – it is not domain-specific since it includes both lethal/non-lethal and
kinetic/non-kinetic application of force. Thinking in terms of effects is a comprehensive
approach that does not rely solely on technology, precision strike, air power or any other 21st
century war-fighting tool.
· Coherent – it stands for a broad view that transcends service boundaries and offers a
coherent framework for various force planning activities.34 The concept  makes it  easier  to
find unequivocal metrics that quantify the justifications in strategic planning, force structure
and budgets.
31 Analyzing Effects-Based Operations, Workshop Report 29-31 January2002, MORS, 2 January 2003,
Internet, accessed 24. 12. 2005, available at http://www.mors.org/publications/reports/EBO_Report.pdf;
Quotation in Department of Defense: The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006,
pp. v-ix, 5; Skinner, Tony: NATO endorses effects-based approach, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 April
2006, p. 5.
32  Quotation in Huval, Joel: Exercise Allied Reach 2005 Concludes, SACT introduces Effects-Based
Approach to operations during exercise in Norway, ACT Public Information Office, 15 February 2005,
Internet, accessed 21. 02. 2006, available at www.act.nato.int/multimedia/articles/2005/
021505jwcar05.htm.
33  Quotation in Barnes, Marvin: Effects-based concepts face test in Turkey, ACT Operational
Experimentation, 14 February 2006, Internet, accessed 21. 02. 2006, available at www.act.nato.int/
multimedia/articles/2006/060214mne4.html.
34  Mann, Edward (Col.)/Endersby, Gary (Lt.Col.)/Searle, Tom: Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint
Operations, Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2001, Internet, accessed 27. 09. 2002, available at
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/vorfal01.html; Williams, Brett T. (Col.):
Effects-Based Operations: Theory, Application and the Role of Airpower, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, 09 April 2002, pp. 6-12.
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· Human – it accords with the wide-spread assumption that modern warfare has become so
debated in the more economically developed societies that large, bloody campaigns are
regarded as a thing of the past, and not tolerated by the majority of the population and the
world population.35
The assumed advantages of effects-based operations have put the concept into the centre of
discussions regarding the proper employment of force. Effects-based operations put unilateral
emphasis on outputs articulated as effects in which exploiting causal relationships play a great
role. However, war appears to be a paradoxical activity as it is composed of constant, universal,
and inherent qualities such as violence and chance – all pointing towards uncertainty.36 Due to
the contradiction between the concept’s focus on causality, and the uncertain nature of war the
research question is: To what  extent  is  it  possible  to  focus on causal  relationships in  an
uncertain and violent phenomenon such as war? The relevance of the research question is
supported by the fact that despite the overwhelming popularity of the effects-based approach,
we found inconsistency and dangerous simplifications regarding the nature of war. The concept
displays war as a process that can be waged in a clinically clean manner by focusing only on the
ends in terms of carefully selected desired effects. We have the impression that with effects-
based operations, the proverbial frictional mechanism of war as outlined by Clausewitz can be
solved through analysis and deduction.37 Given this contradiction to the traditional Clausewitzian
school of thought regarding war’s nature, the thesis functions to elaborate on the difference. It
uses effects-based operations as basis for reflection on Clausewitz’s eternal work On War,
especially those parts in which he elaborates on friction and the way causal relationships
develop. The literature survey on effects-based operations in 2002/2003 made it clear that the
concept rests only on scattered approaches, but there was no general theory available. Scientific
examination however, requires a general theory at hand. In fact, constructing a general theory of
effects-based operations offers many advantages. It promotes the systematic study and an
analysis in broader terms. It makes possible to identify the concept’s origins in the form of similar
theories and allows for the systematic search and detection of hidden or obvious inconsistencies
within the theory. The elimination of detected and identified inconsistencies makes it possible to
upgrade the existing theory, and allows for generalisations to give the theory a certain normative
power. Only through the elaboration of a general theory of effects-based operations can we
make a direct comparison between the frictional mechanism of war as outlined by Clausewitz,
and the analytically solvable causality-focused mechanism of effects-based operations.
Research Design
The thesis can be seen as a descriptive, reflective and explanatory study. It is descriptive in a
sense that it describes effects-based operations and the way the concept is widely advocated. It
35  Lynch, Hugh: The Changing Character of Warfare, Internet, accessed 22. 08. 2005, available at
www.nwc.navy.mil/srd/Documents/Changing%20Character%20report.htm.
36  Sheehan, Mike: The Changing Character of War, in Baylis, John/Smith, Steve/Owens, Patricia (eds.):
The Globalisation of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 213, 216; Kolenda D.
Christopher (Maj.): Uncertainty in War: Exploring the Nature of Combat and Conflict, Advanced
Research Project, Naval War College, February 2002, pp. 46-56.
37  Clausewitz, pp. 138-142.
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is also reflective since by evaluating the theory in terms of consistency and coherence we use
On War as its basis. It is explanatory since inconsistencies are discovered we identify and
explain the contributory factors in detail. The thesis consists of three parts and aims at
developing a coherent framework that departs from effects-based operations and details the
nature of cause-and-effect relationships in war.
Part One – Constructing the Theory
The first part of the thesis can be seen as a theoretical framework. In Chapter 1 we systematise
various approaches to effects-based operations in order to establish a general theory. For this
reason we introduce seven publications that can be seen as most fundamental in the discussion
of effects-based operations. It was our decision to use sources that had been completed before
the official beginning of the research in March 2003. Chapter 2 details the evolution of the
concept and the way how it has penetrated up to the highest echelons of American political-
military leadership. For this reason the contents of fundamental documents such as the Defence
Reviews and the Joint Visions are explored in detail. The first mixed reactions of the services to
effects-based operations are also introduced here. Based on the comparative analysis of the
publications in Chapter  3 we construct a general theory of effects-based operations based on
common elements and characteristics. The three common elements of effects-based operations
such as effects-focus, advanced technology and systems thinking, are central to the thesis. This
chapter also puts effects-based operations into a metaphysical framework in order to discuss the
problem of cause-and-effect relationship in detail. Chapter 4 addresses an interesting aspect of
effects-based operations: most publications mention that the concept is not new as successful
commanders through all ages have already applied some sort effects-based operations. Based
on the three common elements identified we can examine the truth behind such assumptions.
Serving as a vehicle for content analysis, the three common elements help explore the works of
past significant military theorists such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Jomini, and Clausewitz. This
content analysis aims at detecting to what extent their works contain references to effects-focus,
advanced technology and systems thinking. Another benefit of a general theory of effects-based
operations is displayed in Chapter 5. The three common elements and the characteristics help
us relate effect-based operations to similar force employment theories. Most air power theories
advocating military coercion share obvious similarities with the common elements and
characteristics of effects-based operations. In a similar way also they focus on achieving effects
on the enemy, advocate the application of advanced technology in war, and rest on systems
thinking that dissect the enemy into various analytic categories. In Chapter 6 we introduce two
classical schools of military coercion, punishment standing for large-scale aerial bombing and
risk, which represents the nuclear weapon and the effects it generate. Here we also explain in
detail to what extent the theories worked in reality. Chapter 7 contains two more sophisticated
schools of military coercion such as decapitation, which can be seen as a direct origin of effects-
based operations. Denial, the other school, advocates a joint approach to employing force and is
also more in lieu with the Clausewitzian frictional nature of war. The chapter ends with an interim
conclusion in order to make a smooth transition into the next passage.
Part Two – Reflecting the Theory
The first part revealed that despite the increased complexity of challenges, the multitude of
players and motives involved the three common elements of effects-based operations accord
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with the inherent Western bias to war. Thus it is seen in terms of causal linkages between
actions and outcomes in which the strategic is emphasised over the tactical. Advanced
technology is put first, and the human dimension second. The whole is regarded and the
particular mostly neglected. Despite the frequent reference to Clausewitz, war is addressed
mostly in analytic terms in which combat is seen as a rational activity. The second part of the
thesis reflects the general theory of effects-based operations on a background, which can best
be described by friction as outlined by Clausewitz. Chapter 8 first elaborates more on the
mechanism of denial in order to examine war’s proverbial friction in detail. It also identifies the
very sources of friction to put it into a contemporary context. In Chapter 9 we  deliver  an
explanation for the preference to use scientific principles and analytic explanations for complex
real-world phenomena. We also detail the relationship between friction and unpredictability
together with consequences such as incompleteness and instability. In Chapter 10 we  use  a
structural analysis to better understand the attributes of causality. The explanatory framework
set in this chapter explains the various sorts of relationships that exist between input and output,
causes and effects in war. The four types of relationships are identified as simple, complicated,
complex and chaotic, and reveal war to be a complex adaptive system in which unpredictability
reigns. Complex adaptive system demands war to be seen in an organic framework, which is
detailed in Chapter 11. An organic approach shares similarity with biological evolution for which
it appears to be a useful metaphor for examining war. The military has always loved metaphors
as frames of reference for facilitating discussion and developing ideas. In Chapter 12 we use
Clausewitz’s Dynamic Law in War, which helps us see war in an evolutionary framework. As a
tool, we employ a metaphor commonly known as the fitness landscape. It is an approach that
has both heuristic and analytical values, and can visualise properties of real-world phenomena
by means of statistical features. Chapter 13 outlines our approach to conceptualise effects-
based operations in an evolutionary framework. The proposed effects landscape allows us to
see effects-based operations as a high-dimensional search process that seeks to identify an
optimum combination of effects, in order to occupy high spots on the landscape. Part two also
contains an interim conclusion, which leads us to the last part of the thesis.
Part Three – Applying the Theory
The evolutionary framework we proposed in part two helps us understand the underlying
mechanism of war’s proverbial friction and unpredictability, which both work against the three
common elements of effects-based operations. However, using the vocabulary of any given
scientific field requires that we take all its theoretical and practical consequences into account
with equanimity. For this reason, Chapter 14 examines the consequences of our evolutionary
approach in terms of strategy development. Here we contrast the traditional military approach to
strategy, which emphasises thorough planning on all levels with an approach that is more
organic and open, thus taking the unpredictability of war into its proper context. We suggest war
to be seen as an Organic Strategic Ecosystem. In Chapter 15 we examine in a similar fashion,
the consequences of our evolutionary approach for command and control. The biological
analogy of war helps us propose command-by-evolution, which is in accordance with the
constantly changing character of war. In Chapter 16 we examine the issue of military
effectiveness from a biological perspective. It demonstrates that regardless of the manner in
which effectiveness is approached, we have to deal with a multitude of factors. Any attempt to
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get a grip on the issue of military effectiveness means that practical benefits go together with a
certain analytical convenience. Chapter 17 concludes with the findings of our research.
Third Wave and Effects
The research made it clear that war is a conflict laden task full of temporal and spatial
constraints in which it is very difficult to strive towards predefined objectives and desired effects.
The attacks on 9/11 made also clear that constructs capitalising on traditional responses can run
the risk of being costly, slow and unnecessarily destructive. Terrorist organisations herald a new
type of asymmetrical and unconventional enemy, who is capable of confronting the West on a
global scale. By being dispersed and avoiding decisive engagements, he continually takes
advantage of the globalised world.38 Whereas the West still relies on overwhelming force based
on technological sophistication, terrorist organisations use intellectual capital and successfully
discover vulnerable niches. The most important consequence of such asymmetry is that there is
“an increasing disparity between [the] traditional vision of a “kinetic kill” and the remaining effects
to be achieved.”39 In a similar fashion, war conceptualised in an evolutionary framework
suggests a phenomenon in which both sides are simultaneously attacking and defending. The
aim is not so much to seek a direct head-on annihilation, but to cause confusion through
constant learning and adaptation. In other words, success comes as the result of quick and fluid
movements rather than achieving desired effects. The evolutionary analogy emphasizes
improvisation, which is based on bottom-up local knowledge often without any direct assistance
from the top. Planning, which is at the very heart of effects-based operations, is important, but
not too important or detailed. Seeing war this way requires loosely organised, fairly autonomous
and dispersed units that often carry out individual actions in an unsynchronised way.
Consequently, war is an interactive process requiring continual effort and commitment over a
long period of time. Effects-based operations stand for synergy of capabilities with a focus on
achieving various types of desired effects on the enemy. Thus the concept indicates the
possibility to synchronise all available means in order to achieve desired outcomes at all levels
of war. Consequently, at least in theory it offers a good framework for confronting one's
advisaries.40 However, the thesis indicates that the three common elements such as effects-
focus, advanced technology and systems thinking stand in sharp contrast not only with the
attributes of the Third Wave, but also with war’s frictional and unpredictable nature. Both work
against the possibility to detect exploitable causal links in order to achieve quick and affordable
victories.
38  Pendall, David P. (Maj.): Effects-Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power, Military Review,
January-February 2004, pp. 20-21.
39  Quotation in Read, Robyn: Effects-Based Airpower for Small Wars, Air & Space Power Journal, Spring
2005, Internet, accessed 17. 08. 2005, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/
apj05/spr05/read.html; See also Toffler/Toffler, pp. 69-80; Dunlap, Charles J. (Jr.): 21st Century Land
Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths, Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Chisholm, Donald: The Risk of
Optimism in the Conduct of War, Parameters, Winter 2003/04, pp. 114-131.
40  McCrabb, Maris “Buster” Dr./Caroli Joseph A.: Behavioral Modeling and Wargaming for Effects-Based
Operations, Internet, accessed 14. 05. 2003, available at www.mors.org/meetings/ebo/ebo_reads/
McCrabb_Caroli.pdf.
29
Effects Focus
The focus on effects indicates that we can take advantage of direct causality in war. Effects-
based operations emphasise the ability to directly translate strategic objectives into tactical
actions. Simple causal mental constructs are always helpful in guiding the decision-making
process. However, as soon as wars start, plans evolve very rapidly and become fluid. Military
activities have a dynamic nature and are shaped by changing tactical actions, which defy most
assumption regarding direct causality.41 Direct causal relationships aimed at achieving desired
effects assume a certain continuity or stability in terms of objectives. Clausewitz warned the the
“original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change
entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences”.42 Deductive
thinking can be helpful and iterative cycles might help optimise for achieving desired effects. In
case the enemy is a nation state, which depends on a well-developed, modern and vulnerable
infrastructure, the search for direct causality aimed at certain leverage points might make sense.
When confronting asymmetric and unconventional enemies, especially terrorist organisations
that do not possess such attributes, relying on an exclusively deductive strategy as basis for
actions is both time-consuming and does not address the dynamic and fluid character of
challenges.43
Advanced Technology
The second common element concerns enabling technology, which often reflects unproven and
optimistic assumptions about what they can deliver in war.44 Although technology advances and
opens unprecedented opportunities, it is not yet clear whether it changes war’s nature or just its
form. Advanced computers, sensors and other data processing tools always coexist with
subjective filters as decisions come mostly as a result of individual judgements.45 Operations
aimed at controlling the enemy’s will and behaviour might sound better than deferring to blunt
destruction, and are more politically palatable. Nevertheless, killing the enemy is sometimes
more effective than any careful attempt to influence his mind. We have to acknowledge that
41  Cordesman, Anthony H./Burke, Arleigh A.: Understanding the New “Effects-based” Air War in Iraq,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 March 2003, p. 3, Internet, accessed on 31. 03. 2003,
available at www.csis.org/burke/mb/iraq_airwar.pdf.
42  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 104; Polumbo, Harry D. (Col.): Effects-based Air Campaign Planning: The
Diplomatic Way to solve Air Power’s Role in the 21st Century, Air War College, Air University, Air Force
Academy, April 2000, pp. 18-24.
43  Barlow, Jason B. (Maj.): Strategic Paralysis, An Airpower Theory for the Present, School of Advanced
Airpower Studies, Air University, May 1992, pp. 9, 39-45; Centre of gravity is often a floating concept.
See Lee, Seow Hiang (Maj.): Center of Gravity or Center of Confusion, Understanding the Mistique, Air
Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Wright Flyer Paper No. 10, December 1999,
pp. 7-22.
44  O’Hanlon, Michael: Technological Change and the Future Warfare, Brookings Institution Press, 2000,
pp. 107-142; Hammes, pp. 190-206. Tenner, Edward: Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the
Revenge of Unintended Consequences, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1996, pp. 3-25.
45  Echevarria, Antulio J. II (Maj.): War, Politics, and RMA – The Legacy of Clausewitz, Joint Force
Quarterly, Winter 1995/96, pp. 78-79; De Greene states that growing dependence on technology
reconfirms the status quo rather than increases effectiveness. De Green, Kenyon B.: Field-Theoretic
Framework for the Interpretation of the Evolution, Instability, Structural Change, and Management of
Complex Systems, in Kiel, L. Douglas/Elliott, Euel (eds.): Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences,
Foundations and Applications, The University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 290-291.
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under certain circumstances it is simply not possible to realise psychological end-goals based on
influence and control. As the second war in Chechnya displayed, should the enemy have a
“deep and persistent antipathy … it will be impossible to achieve victory without a decisive
confrontation and military conquest.”46 Thus attrition and annihilation aimed at achieving physical
effects still have relevance. In Iraq the enemy prefers asymmetric warfare fought on the tactical
level in the form of car-bombs, kidnapping and other sort of assaults and ambushes. Focusing
on enemy behaviour on this level of war is often meaningless. The tactical level mostly stands
for physical effects in the form of attrition and annihilation, and is fought with blood and gut, but
not in abstract terms.
Systems Thinking
The third common element is a systems approach. However, it is still unclear how a mechanical
system-of-system understanding that decomposes the enemy into ever finer details, can coexist
with a more organic complex adaptive system approach with a holistic focus. There is a
difference between thinking in terms of passive complicated systems, or complex systems that
have the ability to learn and adapt. Whereas the first allows for a deductive methodology
assuming clear boundaries, the latter emphasises unclear and shifting boundaries that require
both deduction and induction.47 According to the mechanistic approach control is possible.
Unfortunately, an organic approach in which the enemy is seen as a complex adaptive system is
less ambitious and allows only for coping. Effects-based operations indicate the simultaneous
application of all means intended for a given action and assume symmetry as the enemy’s
elements of power are addressed. However, Al Qaeda is the best example that virtual, non-state
enemy organisations without traditional elements of power, deny the usability of analytic
categories in traditional terms. This problem is often magnified by the fact that the complexity of
challenges, even within a single mission, can limit the range of applicable means. Thus armed
forces are often constrained and have to adjust to as a part of a larger operation.48
46  Burridge, Brian: Technical Development and Effects Based Operations, 2004 Trenchard Memorial
Lecture, RUSI Journal, October 2004, pp. 26-28; Thomas, Timothy L.: The Battle of Grozny: Deadly
Classroom for Urban Combat, Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 87-92 (quotation p. 91).
47  Smith, Edward A.: Complexity, Networking and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations, CCRP
Publication Series, May 2006, pp. 36-40.
48  Clausewitz, p. 241; Alberts (2003), p. 48.
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Part One – Constructing the Theory
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1 A New Concept is Born
“…treat war as a drama that it is rather than constantly reducing it to a
science of marching tables and tonnage calculations. I do not decry the
necessity for the scientific end of education, I merely think that too
many officers develop their thinking more and more along the lines of
mathematical calculations rather than realizing that calculations always
go wrong.”
Dwight Eisenhower
1.1 Effects-Based Operations
The term effects-based operations first appeared during the 1991 war against Iraq in which the
American-led coalition forces achieved a victory that surprised even the most optimistic analysts.
The world, expecting a rather bloody and protracted campaign against Saddam Hussein’s armed
forces, witnessed a war fought at lightning speed with limited coalition casualties. The incredible
potential of advanced technologies such as stealthy platforms and precision weaponry, was in
the global media. The new force employment concept emphasised the primer of achieving
effects on the enemy and disregarded large-scale destruction. Soon effects-based operations
became a buzzword in the military lexicon and synonymous with Western, especially American,
technological superiority. Over the years the concept proved so durable that it increasingly
permeated military and political thinking. Terms such as effects-based thinking, effects-based
targeting, effects-based approach, effects-based planning, effects-based execution and effects-
based assessment are almost commonplaces now.49 Armed forces outside NATO also started to
move towards this direction as the Israel Defence Force chief of staff, General Moshe Ya’alon
emphasised in an interview. According to him, force transformation issues must focus less on
force and power, but more on effect.50 Most assumptions regarding effects-based operations are
promising such as campaigns can be kept short, destruction and casualties limited. Thus effects-
based operations make possible to save precious resources. Unfortunately, despite the
abundance of publications there is neither a common understanding of the meaning of effects-
based operations, nor a widely accepted definition of the term. In order to address this
shortcoming, we first introduce seven significant and influential publications representing
different approaches. Every publication, regardless its logical and theoretical merit, is assigned
equal weight. The introduction of the documents helps us create a detailed taxonomy to
understand the characteristics of effects together with the way they interrelate. This comparative
49  ACT identified three objective areas with one focusing on achieving coherent effects. Goals include
command for effective engagement, effects-based operations, and aspects such as effective
engagement and joint manoeuvre effects. See Allied Command Transformation: Integrated Project
Teams, 7 September 2004, pp. 1-2.
50  Hughes, Robin: Interview, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya’alon, Israel Defence Force Chief of Staff,
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 November 2004, p. 34.
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analysis will serve as foundation for us to construct a general theory of effects-based operations
in which we can both clarify the meaning of the term and deliver a definition.51 The documents
include papers written by an American Air Force general (USAF), the Research and
Development Corporation (RAND), the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), the United States
Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), the
Air Combat Command (ACC) and the Air University College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research
and Education (AU CADRE).
1.2 Enthusiastic Approach
General Deptula from USAF can be seen as the earliest promoter of effects-based operations.
According to him, the successful air campaign of the 1991 Gulf War was the birthplace of the
concept. However, effects-based operations are not original since excellent military commanders
have always known superior alternatives to attrition. The concept is a methodology, a different
way of thinking that capitalises on the causal relationship between action and outcome.52
Technological superiority in the form of stealth technology and precision guided munitions make
it possible to attack more separate targets at once than ever before in history. In effects-based
operations, it is not the sheer number of sorties that is important, but the way operations are
planned. Instead of focusing on simple and utter destruction of targets, the intention is to achieve
specific effects on the enemy. At the core of effects-based operations are simultaneous attacks
on high value objects that result in surprise, influence, fewer casualties, paralysis, and controlling
the enemy in a shorter time span. Consequently, effects-based operations fully exploit the
temporal and spatial dimensions at every level of war.53 Not destruction, but control, across the
breadth and depth of the entire theatre is important. This eradicates the enemy’s strategic
freedom. Control demonstrates that effects-based operations make it possible to attain security
objectives without destruction or visible disruption. In effects-based operations the enemy must
be understood as a system-of-systems in which essentials such as leadership, population,
industries, transportation, and military forces are affected in order to achieve system
ineffectiveness.54 This requires a high rate of attack that deprives the enemy the ability to adapt
or find alternatives. Central to the concept is precise weapons delivery, the relative low number
51  Officially the British prefer the expression strategic effect of air power. Ministry of Defence: British Air
Power Doctrine, AP 3000, Third Edition, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1999, pp. 2.6.1-1.6.10; Ho,
Joshua: The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects-Based Operations, Institute
of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, December 2003, pp. 5-10.
52  Deptula, David A. (Brig. Gen.): Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare, Aerospace
Education Foundation, Defense and Airpower Series, 1995, p. iii; A Dialogue on Analyzing Effects
Based Operations (EBO), led by Dr. Jacqueline Henningsen, SES, MORS Fellow of the Society,
Director Air Force Studies & Analyses Agency, Internet, accessed 31. 03. 2003, available at
www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/mar02/Lead2.htm; Deptula, David A. (Maj. Gen.): Effects-Based
Operations: A US Perspective, World Defence Systems, The Royal United Services Institute, Volume 6,
Number 2, August 2003, p. 37.
53  Deptula, David A. (Brig. Gen.): Firing For Effects, Air Force Magazine, Volume 84, Number 4, April
2001, Internet, accessed 21. 03. 2003, available at www.afa.org/magazine/April2001/
0401effects_print.htm.
54  Deptula (2003), p. 37; Deptula: Air Force Transformation, Past, Present, and Future, Aerospace Power
Journal, Fall 2001, Internet, accessed 02. 04. 2003, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/phifal01.htm.
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of resources needed to suppress enemy air defences, and an operational level force
employment concept that focuses on effects. Stealth and precision contribute to the ability to
achieve control over parts of the enemy’s systems, which leads to paralysis during a specific
period. The result is harmony between the efficiency of hitting individual targets and the
effectiveness to achieve campaign objectives. This enormous leverage makes the traditional
concept of war, focusing on destruction and exhaustion useless. A paralysed enemy equals a
destroyed enemy. Important in effects-based operations is the application of a deductive top-
down approach in which strategy is decomposed into specific objectives down to specific tasks
at the tactical level. This methodology makes it possible to directly relate lowest-level tasks to
highest-level objectives.55 Planning for effects is complex and planners must carefully determine
which effect on what system can best contribute to the stated political and military objectives.
Although parallel attacks are aimed at all targets in each target system simultaneously,
campaigns may involve more than one set of force application. No intelligence delivers perfect
information on the enemy, his intentions and attempts. Although effects-based operations reduce
the time requirement relative to previous wars, the maturation of certain effects might take a
finite, but indeterminate time. Thinking in systemic effects is superior to individual target
destruction as it shifts the focus from annexing territory towards controlling deviant behaviour.
Effects-based operations stand for a coercive concept that requires the co-ordinated application
of all elements of national power in order to force enemy compliance. Applied properly it
becomes possible to expand the strategic options, avoid attrition-oriented encounters, and to
achieve integrated, specific operational and strategic effects.56 Unfortunately, General Deptula
did not deliver a definition of effects-based operations or a taxonomy to help categorise effects.
Jay M. Kreighbaum, a former student of the Air University built on his ideas and developed a
detailed taxonomy based on the order of effects, their dimension of time, their intention and the
levels of war.57 Almost all effects start as material ones and produce non-material, second-order
effects, thus implying a continuum characterised by physical and psychological effects as end-
poles. Physical refers to those first-order, direct effects that result immediately after an action
and equal physical destruction. These effects possess a strong physical component and are
associated with affecting the enemy’s war-making capability. Second-order, indirect effects, are
downstream results of first-order effects and have some sort of systemic or psychological
influence that can either be within a system or between systems. Systemic effects can also be
seen as functional effects that disrupt a specific system or systems. Psychological effects
attempt to affect the will of the enemy and require mostly an indirect approach. Regarding the
temporal qualities of effects, they vary in time as their influence depends on the duration needed
to mature. Whereas direct physical effects at the tactical level have a short life-span, effects
desired on the strategic level need more time to mature, and have a longer life-span. Despite the
planned intent, actions can result both in intended and unintended effects, which can either be
adverse, neutral or supportive to the original intent.58 In terms of properties there are strategic,
operational and tactical level effects:
55  Deptula (1995), pp. 3-6, 7-10; Deptula (2003), pp. 39-40.
56  Deptula (1995), pp. 15-16.
57  Kreighbaum, Jay M. (Maj.): Force Application Planning: A System-and-Effects-Based Approach, School
of Advanced Air Power Studies, Air University, June 1998, pp. 74-78.
58  Ibid., pp. 78-82.
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· Strategic effects influence the war as a whole by affecting major functional areas such as
war-will and war-sustainment. They require considerable time to mature and have a long
duration.
· Operational effects refer to campaigns and major operations. They influence functional
areas such as war sustainment and war making. These effects are intermediate in terms of
maturation, influence and duration.
· Tactical effects deal with individual battles and engagements. They influence the war-
making capability since their generation, maturation and influence is rather short.59
1.3 Analytic Challenge Approach
Paul K. Davis from RAND emphasises that effects-based operations are not new, as successful
commanders of the past, have also striven for objectives and related effects. The origins of the
concept are rooted in the revolt of the war-fighting community against two interrelated failures.60
The first is the poor force employment strategies of past wars, which focused on servicing
targets. The war against Iraq was the first major war in which joint fires resulted in decisive
effectiveness on enemy systems. Thus origins of effects-based operations can be found as
much in the work of air power theorists as in the modern U.S. manoeuvre theory of the 1980's.
The second failure comes from poor standard models and analytical tools, which focus on simple
number crunching and do not accord with battlefield reality. As inappropriately structured
conceptions they rest on an inadequate mechanistic view of warfare, and ignore important soft
factors such as will and cohesion.61 Effects-based operations require a much broader approach
and a more realistic analytical toolset. The concept does not focus ultimately on traditional
considerations since it emphasises aspects such as collapsing the will and unit cohesion, and
defeating enemy strategy. Enablers are qualities such as speed, agility, parallel warfare,
decisiveness, and shock and awe. Despite the promises of effects-based operations, war also
stands for attrition, destruction and occupation, all indicating that the more traditional aspects of
war fighting cannot be excluded entirely. Although the valid essence of effects-based operations
is the systemic view and the focus on desired effects, a certain amount of attrition and
annihilation, and the occupation of territory cannot be ruled out entirely. Consequently, some of
the most decisive military operations might still be personal and up-close experiences. Effects-
based operations have physical and behavioural aspects, but further distinctions can be based
on networking, the character of the target system, timescale and the levels of the conflict.62
Whereas physical aspects include the disruption of enemy manoeuvre, damaging enemy assets
and killing enemy personnel, behavioural aspects aim at demoralising fighting capability, slowing
down enemy actions, confusing and deceiving enemy commanders and influencing the decision-
making process. The high-goals of effects-based operations focus on the cognitive domain, the
decision-making process of political and military key personnel, or an entire population.
Nevertheless, a strong re-calibration in terms of common sense is important. It has always been
59  Ibid., pp. 85-88.
60  Davis, Paul K.: Effects Based Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community,
RAND MR-1477, 2001, pp. 1-3.
61  Ibid., pp. 4-8.
62  Ibid., pp. 11-18.
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difficult to understand and model enemy leaders on the strategic level, and in most cases there
are no vulnerable elements at the operational level that can be attacked successfully. Human
activities occur in complex adaptive systems, which often behave in unpredictable ways. The
enemy has attributes that are observable only indirectly and after a certain time delay. Cause-
and-effect relationships are influenced by numerous internal and external factors for which there
is never a single discernible variable on hand. Davis’ definition of effects-based operations
emphasises the importance of probability as such operations are “conceived and planned in a
systems framework that considers the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects, which
may – with different degrees of probability – be achieved by the application of military,
diplomatic, psychological and economic instruments.”63 Consequently, effects-based operations
require changes in the current mindset concerning conflicts and war. New theories and methods
are needed, together with a new empirical base in order to improve existing analysis and
modelling tools.64 In terms of taxonomy Davis did not define an effect, but gave a simple
taxonomy that describes effects in a hierarchical order. Thus effects can either be physical or
behavioural in nature. Further distinctions can rest on duration, level, and type. In terms of
duration, effects can be permanent or temporary as they can last for the course of a war, an
operation, or a task. Their level mirrors the traditional hierarchy of war as effects can occur on
strategic, operational, tactical, and engagement levels. The type of effect can be direct physical,
systemic and psychological/behavioural.65
1.4 Decision Superiority Approach
For Gleeson et. al. from IDA, effects-based operations produce desired futures with a focus on
the entire continuum and not just the conflict itself.66 The concept makes it possible to exploit the
overwhelming amount of data provided by advanced information, surveillance and
reconnaissance technology. It means winning both war and peace, in which the emphasis is on
higher order effects and complex adaptive systems. Effects-based operations make it possible to
focus on operations more coherently, by exploiting the potential of new technologies and
capabilities such as stealth, precision munitions and information operations.67 The concept
stands for assessment and adaptation at every level of warfare, and the involvement of all
elements of national power. Thus effects-based operations explicitly and comprehensively link
actions with outcomes at all levels of a conflict. Although fog and friction of war can never be
eliminated, effects-based operations make it possible to learn how to work with uncertainty,
ambiguity and risk. The concept requires a clear linkage between strategic outcomes, desired
effects and tactical actions, in which military actions must be consistent with, and complementary
to the stated political, diplomatic and economic goals. A successful co-operation and co-
ordination across all elements of national power direct the focus from the traditional attrition-
63  Quotation in ibid., p. 26.
64  Ibid., pp. 7, 21-28, 79.
65  Ibid., pp. 17-19.
66  Gleeson, Dennis J./Linde Gwen (Col.)/McGrath, Kathleen/Murphy, Adrianne J./Murray,
Williamson/O’Leary, Tom/Resnick, Joel B.: New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations: Annotated
Briefing, Institute for Defense Analyses, Joint Advance Warfighting Program, June 2001, p. 2.
67  Ibid., pp. 2-5.
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oriented warfare, and enable a more efficient and focused employment of force. Effects-based
operations rest on rich interactions between operational level commanders and other key actors
in a campaign. Centres of knowledge can enable an understanding of the strategic and
operational environment, the possible effects and their impact, and suggest ways to assess and
reassess the enemy. Effects-based operations stand for a continuous process similar to the
classical observe-orient-decide-act loop as outlined by Boyd, but the concept’s strategic focus
makes the loop broader and deeper in terms of effects and time. The concept can be seen as a
mixture that comes from precision engagement, dominant manoeuvre, and information
operations in which all elements of friendly national power address all elements of the enemy’s
national power.68 Although the concept is extraordinarily difficult and requires hard thinking,
capable commanders throughout history have always tried to implement effects-based
campaigns. Success in effects-based operations depends on understanding what the enemy
values together with his beliefs and cultural motives. Effects-based operations do not lift the fog
of war, but exploit information advantages throughout the conflict. An important requirement of
effects-based operations is to shed the practices of mirror imaging and the projection of our
culture, values and perspectives onto the enemy who always acts in unexpected ways. Effects-
based operations also mean that military forces will probably be tasked in a supporting role to
other agencies and will be only one element of a national-level effects-based approach. The
concept requires the ability to alter and adapt assumptions and rules when confronted with a
complex and adaptive enemy on the battlefield. Even perfect effects-based operations will not
yield peace, allow conflicts without any drop of blood, or guarantee that wars will be won quickly
and easily. The concept, however, can offer campaigns with greater coherence in which victory
is achieved faster and cheaper in terms of money and men.69 For taxonomy, Gleeson et. al. do
not deliver a definition of effects, but identify and examine three major categories such as
desired, undesired and unexpected:70
· Desired effects address either enemy capabilities or decisions in order to change actions,
but not will. Desired effects on enemy capabilities depend on the actions taken, and mean
that we change the situation and options in a way that they become unfavourable for the
enemy. Desired effects on decisions depend on the enemy’s reaction and attempt to change
his assessment of the situation and the resulting options.
· Undesired effects are easier to recognize than to predict, and can lead to difficult and costly
conflict termination. For undesired effects, time plays an important role and may potentially
support or hinder a lasting peace.
· Unexpected effects are the result of the fog and friction of war. However, such effects do not
always represent problems, but can contribute to new and exploitable opportunities.71
The most important aspect of the taxonomy concerns the relationship between effects and time.
The assessment and importance of effects can change over time as new trends emerge and
68  Ibid., pp. 6-11; On John Boyd’s observe-orient-decide-act loop see more in Osinga, Frans: Science,
Strategy and War, The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, Eburon Academic Publishers, 2005, pp. 268-
279.
69  Gleeson et. al., pp. 13-15, 24, 36-39.
70  Ibid., p. 18.
71  Ibid., pp. 18-20.
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various indirect effects occur. Actions that result in planned and desired effects at a particular
time can result in different effects later. Whereas some effects can work well together and create
synergy, others interfere and negate each other’s impact. Planning for effects should be guided
by the effort to synchronise the timing of effects with actions. This makes it possible to put
pressure on the enemy’s decision-making process to make his decisions and actions irrelevant.
However, even with the most careful planning uncertainties of any kind will still remain.72
1.5 Jointness Approach
Members of the USJFCOM J9, Concepts Department regard effects-based operations as an
enabler for the concept of rapid decisive operations with far reaching consequences for the
conduct of war.73 Effects-based operations cover the entire spectrum of operations including all
levels of war, and require the application of all instruments of national power involving political-
military relationships, and various interagency activities. The concept provides a comprehensive
insight into enemy capabilities, environment characteristics, and our own strengths and
weaknesses.74 Effects-based operations can be defined as “a process for obtaining a desired
strategic outcome or “effect” on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of
the full range of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict.”75 The definition
emphasises the ability to facilitate desired effects through all available capabilities, assessment
of the outcomes and the requirement for rapid adaptation through continuous and iterative
planning and execution cycles. The required comprehensive knowledge comes from networked
and interrelated expert teams that conduct a systems analysis of the enemy. Desired effects are
stated in the commander’s intent, which focuses on the cohesion and behaviour of the enemy by
causally linking tactical actions to desired strategic objectives. Effects-based operations mean
that the full range of capabilities is applied in order to threaten, render useless or destroy things
the enemy values most. Technological innovations and analysis tools make it possible to exploit
causal linkages between effects and objectives.76 Effects can be seen as the results of actions
that support objectives through causal linkages. Effects-based operations not only provide the
institutionalised process of planning and assessment, but acknowledge that a single action can
produce more than one effect. Thus effects-based operations require flexibility to consider all
potential consequences of the actions taken. There is also a difference between an effect and an
objective. Whereas an objective includes only the desired results, an effect can both be
undesired and unexpected. Effects are hierarchical in nature and can be characterised by focus,
scope, scale, timing and visibility. Although effects can work well together or interfere, they aim
at degrading the enemy’s decision-making process. Effects-based operations rest on a cohesive
picture that includes information on political, military, economic, social, information and
infrastructure factors. The concept requires the study of the enemy as a complex adaptive
72  Ibid., pp. 21-22.
73  USJFCOM J9: A Concept Framework for Effects-Based Operations, White Paper Version 1.0, as of 18.
10. 2001a, p. i.
74  Ibid., pp. 1-4.
75  Quotation in USJFCOM J9: A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations, Whitepaper Version 2.0, as of 22.
08. 2001b, p. 6.
76  USJFCOM J9 (2001a), pp. 5-8.
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system with the aim to identify key links and nodes to get a better grip on his war-making and
war-fighting ability. This system-of-systems analysis determines the courses of action in order to
bring the enemy’s behaviour towards the desired end state. Consequently, the focus is on
pressure points to constrain and canalise enemy actions.77 The historical focus in military
operations was on direct, first-order effects. Effects-based operations mean that the focus has
moved towards follow-on effects and other potential consequences. The concept relates all
tactical actions to the overall desired outcome in which effects are traceable back to higher order
strategy. Victory in war depends largely on the assessment of actions in order to determine to
what extent desired effects have been achieved.78 Effects-based operations require an
understanding of the full spectrum of capabilities that the instruments of national power offer with
the aim to modify enemy behaviour. It is important to target the will and perception of the enemy
together with the capability of his military forces.79 As to taxonomy, an effect can be defined as
“the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from
specific military or non-military actions.”80 Effects can also be characterised in terms of duration,
speed and synchronicity. The most important attribute of effects is their hierarchical or nested
relationship, which means that they can be either top-level/supporting or cumulative/cascading.
The cumulative attribute indicates that not the sum of the effects achieved is important, but
rather the synergy achieved through them which is more applicable to the higher levels of war.
Cascading stands for the way higher order effects move downward through common and critical
nodes of the enemy’s system. Effects can work well together if they complement, or amplify each
other, or they may interfere, dampen and even cancel out each other’s impact. Although effects
can be anticipated, the ability to anticipate all effects is beyond human capability.81 There  is  a
difference between desired, direct and indirect effects. A desired effect can either be physical
damage to material or a casualty effect inflicted on personnel. Whereas a damage effect can be
light, moderate or severe, a casualty effect can be immediate, prompt or delayed. Direct effects
are the immediate, first order consequences of military and non-military actions that can be
recognised easily, as there is no intervening event or mechanism between the act and the
outcome. Indirect effects may be physical and psychological in nature, but are always delayed,
follow-on consequences of actions, and difficult to recognise.82
1.6 Network-Centric Approach
Edward A. Smith from CCRP examines the relationship between effects-based operations and
network-centric warfare.83 The latter indicates military operations conducted in a previously
unreachable region of the information domain. The result of network-centric warfare is a new
type of information advantage characterized by significantly improved capabilities for sharing and
77  Ibid., pp. 8-11, 12-17.
78  Ibid., pp. 18-22.
79  Ibid., pp. 23-25, 32-37.
80  Ibid., p. 5.
81  Ibid., pp. 5-11.
82  Ibid., Appendix B, pp. 2-3; For operational level effects see USJFCOM J9 (2001b), Appendix A, p. A-4.
83  Smith, Edward. A.: Effects Based Operations, Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and
War, CCRP Publication Series, 2002, p. 1-12.
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accessing information. It is widely assumed that network-centric warfare dramatically increases
combat power on the tactical and operational levels of war. According to Smith, in an abstract
sense network-centric warfare focuses on achieving effects on the enemy. Through the
combination of both concepts war-fighting effects can be achieved at a higher operational tempo,
which locks-out adversary courses of action. However, this is not entirely new since good
generals, admirals and statesmen have successfully applied military force to shape the
behaviour of both friends and foes.84 Effects-based operations represent the ability to alter the
enemy’s thinking and behaviour through political, economic and military actions. The concept
stands for coercion by forcing the enemy to take a certain course of action. Through effects-
based operations, it is possible to see military operations as a cohesive political, economic and
military effort. Unlike attrition-oriented campaigns that aim at degrading the physical capability of
the enemy, effects-based operations aim at achieving psychological effects in the cognitive
domain. The goal is to influence the enemy’s behaviour to the extent that he does not want to
continue with his resistance. Although achieving physical effects will remain a factor in effects-
based operations, the true focus is on achieving psychological effects in which destruction is not
the central factor or is to be avoided. Effects-based operations can be defined as “coordinated
sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, neutrals, and foes in peace, crisis,
and war”.85 Interactions between stimulus and response motivate the enemy towards a particular
behaviour. The easiest way to do this is to destroy certain capabilities through physical actions.
Successful effects-based operations rest on a superior knowledge of the enemy and the
situation in order to influence the decision-making process. The aim is to disrupt his observe-
orient-decide-act loop, which limits the ability to take coherent actions.86 Consequently,
destruction is only important in terms of its impact on the enemy’s will and psychology, but not
on his physical capabilities. Effects-based operations together with network-centric warfare make
possible to create a condition in which the enemy re-observes, re-orients and re-decides
continually with the result that he cannot act coherently or cannot act at all. Effects-based
operations place a premium on achieving effects on the enemy’s decision-making process for
which Smith suggests three different approaches:
· The first multiplies the number of opportunities that lead to desired effects since the
employment of frequent stimuli increases the chance that these effects will occur at the right
time. This however, requires shortening the time needed for our own decision-making in
order to multiply our impact on the enemy.
· The second exploits self-synchronisation and shared situation-awareness by launching more
numerous, but smaller operations in order to affect the enemy’s decision-making cycle.
· The third rests on the multiplication of cycles and the compression of the time needed for the
execution. The last two options are analogous with the attack of a bee swarm. Due to the
amount of such stimuli, the enemy can no longer act coherently and be driven into shock
and chaos.87
84  Gartska, John J.: Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory, Joint Staff Directorate for
C4 Systems, Internet, accessed 30. 05. 2006, available at http://www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/
dec00/feature.htm; Smith, pp. 1-2.
85  Smith, pp. 103-108 (quotation p. 110).
86  Ibid., pp. 108-116.
87  Ibid., pp. 117-133.
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Effects-based operations rest on the ability to create situations in which a relatively small
application of force results in disproportionate and decisive impacts on the enemy. Operating
beyond the enemy’s edge of chaos may cause a state of despair in which further resistance
appears to be futile.88 Effects-based operations represent an asymmetric contest in which the
forces involved are dissimilar in character and the respective courses of actions are different.
Consequently, there may be two edges of chaos that cross each other and produce a second
asymmetric zone. This zone can reverse the advantage achieved in the first or common zone of
the contest as the enemy is able to define a niche within which he successfully competes. A
network-centric force employed in effects-based operations can act as a complex adaptive
system with the ability to mass superior effects on the will of the enemy. The result is not only an
improvement in combat efficiency, but also an increase in effects-based efficiency.89 For
taxonomy Smith acknowledges that the term effect has a destructive meaning, and often implies
nearly everything in military research. A more general operational connotation might be helpful in
delivering a definition in which an effect can be defined as “a result or impact created by the
application of military and other power.”90 The definition includes kinetic and non-kinetic effects,
and is equally applicable to physical and psychological/cognitive effects. Effects can also come
from military power without the involvement of destruction or the application of other power
sources. Effects are cumulative in nature since they interrelate and never appear in a vacuum.
Consequently, the ultimate effect is a cumulative overall outcome that rests on various cycles of
interactions.91 Effects are mainly produced by physical actions and fall into two general areas
characterised by predominantly physical or psychological attributes. Both sorts of effects alter
behaviour in the end, but whereas physical effects work through the application of physical
means, psychological effects work by affecting the enemy’s cognitive process. Physical effects
include destruction, physical attrition and chaos/entropy that incapacitate enemy forces and
capabilities. Psychological effects are chaos/entropy, active and passive foreclosure, shock and
psychological attrition aimed at the domains of reason and belief. Direct physical effects can
provoke a chain of subsequent, indirect events that may eventually change the enemy’s
behaviour. The initial impact of physical effects can grow and cascade through the enemy, and
eventually spread into the psychological dimension. Physical effects can also initiate higher
order physical and psychological effects, which again can cascade into even higher order
psychological effects.92
1.7 Methodology Approach
According to members of ACC effects-based operations are not new, since the concept has
always been applied throughout history with various degrees of success.93 However, even today
it is only sporadically discussed in military doctrines and there is no methodology available for a
systematic application. Consequently, it is not yet clear how effects and mechanisms relate to
88  Ibid., pp. 134-141.
89  Ibid., pp. 145-152.
90  Quotation in ibid., p. 111.
91  Ibid., pp. 110-112, 213-215.
92  Ibid., pp. 256-274, 302-318.
93  Air Combat Command: Effects-Based Operations, White Paper, May 2002, p. 1-2.
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objectives and strategy. Effects-based operations can be defined as “actions taken against
enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects that contribute directly to military and
political objectives.”94 The concept is an evolutionary step that takes objectives-based planning
and the strategy-to-task approach further. Although effects-based operations examine the
conditions and causal linkages between actions and objectives, it is not the action itself that is
important, but the causal linkages that determine whether or not a desired effect is achieved.
Thus, the focus in effects-based operations is on follow-on effects, and not on the probability of
achieving the desired result as no action creates only one outcome.95 In effects-based
operations target destruction is still important, but only to the extent the destruction contributes to
the achievement of various functional, systemic and psychological effects. An effects-based
methodology might also mitigate negative collateral outcomes and other unwanted
consequences. Although the fog and friction of war cannot be eliminated, a thorough
examination of the causal linkages can improve the probability of success. Effects-based
operations stand for a much broader approach than sheer military application. The requirement
is to link all elements of national power explicitly and comprehensively across the full spectrum
of activities. Victory in war comes from the harmony between the effects desired, the
consequences of actions, and the means necessary for an assessment of the effects in
question. The concept stands less for a conquest based on attrition and annihilation, but more
for controlling the enemy’s operational level systems and capabilities to limit his options at each
level of war. This way it becomes possible to better integrate all elements of national power and
exploit the advantage provided by modern technology. The result is less cost in resources and a
transformation, which extends far beyond military operations. Although compliance through brute
force remains an option to effects-based operations, operations of the 21st century should
attempt to influence decisions and change behaviour with measures being systemic and
psychological, rather than physical.96 Complex interactions with the enemy and rapidly changing
conditions require a continuous adaptation enabled by an interagency and multidisciplinary
approach. A methodology to successfully apply effects-based operations can come from existing
joint publications. The emphasis is on tightness in terms of planning, execution, and analysis that
flows down from the national strategic to the tactical level. Enemies represent adaptive human
organisations in which the challenge is to out-think and out-adapt adversaries. Effects-based
operations replace the simple application of military force with the application of all elements of
national power in an integrated and focused manner.97 Although ACC does not provide a
detailed taxonomy of effects, the glossary contains a thorough terminology.98 Thus effects
include the full range of outcomes, events or consequences that result from a specific action.
The terminology suggests that it is possible to differentiate between intended and unintended
effects, and between direct and first-order, and indirect and higher-order effects. Effects can also
be cascading, collateral and cumulative depending on the way they penetrate through the
94  Quotation in ibid., p. 4.
95  Ibid., pp. 1-9.
96  Ibid., pp. 10-17.
97  Ibid., pp. 18-26.
98  Air Combat Command, 2002, Glossary of Effects Terminology (no page numbers).
44
enemy’s system. Regarding their nature, effects can be physical, functional, systemic and
psychological as they appear on the operational and strategic levels of war.99
1.8 Success Paradigm Approach
According to Mann et. al. from AU CADRE effects-based operations neither focus on conquest
nor represent the displacement of current forms of warfare.100 The concept  can be seen as  a
refinement of the objectives-based methodology and the strategy-to-task approach. It allows
planners to better examine conditions in terms of causality, in order to define the relationship
between actions and objectives. Through the application of all elements of national power across
the full spectrum of a conflict, effects-based operations explicitly and comprehensively link
strategic and operational objectives with tactical actions in a continuous and iterative fashion.
Consequently, the focus is on desired effects that help achieve assigned objectives, which
indicates a refocus from achieving pseudo-objectives like destruction.101 Effects-based
operations span across the full spectrum of political, military and humanitarian engagements. As
a systematic approach, effects-based operations focus on outputs instead of inputs by
emphasising national goals, and not capabilities or prerequisites of individual services and
organisations.102 The concept is a new paradigm, according to which military actions are an
extension of politics and diplomacy. In other words, military efficiency is often sacrificed for
political concerns. The U.S. Air Force has always attempted to do effects-based operations, but
only piecemeal without recording or codifying the lessons learned through its experiences. In
effects-based operations, the destruction of targets is just means to achieve ends since physical
destruction is only one desired effect within a wide spectrum. The emphasis is on the output
through the application of both lethal and non-lethal means at the tactical level, which result in
pre-determined direct and indirect effects at the operational and strategic levels. Due to their
dual nature effects ripple and cascade through the enemy system as the effect of any given
action may induce further changes. Virtually no part of the enemy system is truly isolated and the
cumulative and cascading character of effects means that it becomes increasingly difficult to
predict and measure higher-order effects.103 In the framework of effects-based operations
traditional approaches such as attrition and annihilation are specific types of outcomes, which
might be useful only in some cases, as the real goal is to achieve high-level psychological
effects. Effects-based operations can be defined as “actions taken against enemy systems
designed to achieve specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and political
outcomes.”104 The definition emphasises the importance of conditions and causal linkages
99  Ibid.
100  Mann, Edward (Col., Ret.)/Endersby, G. (Lt. Col., Ret.)/Searle, Tom: Thinking Effects, Effects-Based
Methodology for Joint Operations, College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Air
University, Maxwell AFB, CADRE Papers No. 15, October 2002, p. 1; Mann, Edward (Col.,
Ret.)/Endersby, G. (Lt. Col., Ret.)/Searle, Tom: Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations,
Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2001, Internet, accessed 27. 09. 2002, available at www.airpower.
maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/vorfal01.html.
101  Mann et. al. (2002), pp. 1-3; Mann et. al. (2001).
102  Mann et. al. (2002), pp. 4-6; Mann et. al. (2001).
103  Mann et. al. (2002), pp. 25-34.
104  Quotation in Mann et. al. (2001).
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through which actions lead to stated objectives. Effects-based operations always mean further
asking and accepting unexpected effects in which the emphasis is on the ability to deal with
complex interactions, adaptation to changing conditions, and turning initial shortcomings into an
advantage. Unfortunately, despite deep roots and the power of effects-based operations, the
military has never really attempted to institutionalize a thought process that is needed to ensure
adherence to effects-based principles.105 In terms of taxonomy, effects are inherently complex
phenomena and demand an exhaustive and comprehensive categorisation. Effects have a dual
nature and can be both causes and results. Effects refer to a full range of outcomes, events or
consequences that result from a specific action, and can be categorized either as direct or
indirect. Direct effects are those with no intervening effect or mechanism between action and
outcome. Such effects are usually immediate and easy to recognise. Indirect effects are
triggered by direct effects and have an intermediate consequence or mechanism in between, as
such effects are often the cumulative and cascading results of many direct effects. They are
generally more difficult to recognise due to the time required for maturation. Both direct and
indirect effects can be physical, functional and psychological in nature, although indirect effects
may also be systemic. A further distinction rests on the order of effects, and differentiates among
first, second and third-order effects. Whereas first order-effects are directly attributable to a
certain action both in terms of location and time, second- and third-order effects are only
indirectly attributable to their causes.106 Effects can also be cumulative or cascading. Cumulative
effects are the aggregate results of many direct and indirect effects, and refer to how effects flow
upward in the hierarchy. Cascading effects refer to how results at higher levels can flow down
and influence lower levels of employment. Thus effects have a distributive character as they
ripple through the enemy’s system. Each successive layer of effects makes any precise
prediction and measure increasingly difficult. Higher-order effects tend to be fleeting in character
and give room to subjective interpretations. Collateral effects are unintended occurrences of
actions, and can be either positive or negative to the original intent. Whereas negative
consequences are those direct and indirect effects that cause unwanted damage, injury or
casualties, certain positive aspects can generate outcomes that may support the ongoing course
of action:
· Physical effects are direct, first-order effects that rest on direct impacts aimed at achieving
physical alteration. Their primary purpose is damaging, destroying or disrupting.
· Functional effects can be direct or indirect effects that degrade the general ability of
functioning properly.
· Systemic effects are indirect effects and aim at changing certain characteristics of specific
systems or a set of systems.
· Psychological effects are those direct or indirect effects that focus on emotions, motives and
reasoning in order to influence behaviour.
· There is also a natural linkage between effects, which may vary over time or in degree
according to the situations.107
105  Mann et. al. (2002), pp. 42-55; Mann et. al. (2001).
106  Mann et. al., pp. 30-32.
107  Ibid., pp. 33-36.
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Terms such as levels of employment or spectrum of engagement refer to the traditional levels of
conflicts and can serve as a background for tactical, operational and strategic-level effects.
Every conflict is interwoven with all sorts of effects that constantly influence each other.108
108  Ibid., pp. 39-42.
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2 Mixed Reactions
Most approaches regard effects-based operations as a superior employment of force with the
potential to achieve national security-policy goals not only faster and in a more comprehensive
fashion, but also with the involvement of fewer resources. For this reason it is important to see to
what extent and at what pace the concept expanded into official milestone documents. This
chapter traces back the codification process of effects-based operations as reflected in the
Defense Reviews and the Joint Visions. The first such report was published soon after the 1991
war against Saddam Hussein’s armed forces. The chapter further spots reflections of effects-
based operations aimed at making the concept digestible. For exploring the band-with of
reactions, we first introduce a rather sceptical U.S. Army approach detailing the possible
shortcomings and weak points of effects-based operations. This will be followed by a more
enthusiastic and technology-oriented U.S. Air Force approach. Both can be seen as attempts to
check the concept’s usefulness in terms of real-world applicability.
2.1 Milestone Documents
The first such document was the Report on the Bottom-Up Review. Released in 1993, the report
was intended to help mold the strategy, size and shape of future military forces.109 It  was
announced two years after the successful air campaign in Iraq. Although it attempted to define
strategy, force structure, modernisation and other related areas, only a limited number of effects
references can be found. The report contains only general statements such as the ability to
respond effectively to crises or the need to operate more effectively with allied forces. There is
neither a reference to what desired effects are, nor how they should be achieved. The only
aspects mentioned are accurate information on enemy forces, which are the prerequisite for
effective military operations and that precision guided munitions can dramatically increase the
effectiveness of a fighting force. Airborne re-fuelling of aerial surveillance and control platforms is
seen as a contributor of maximum mission effectiveness. Other references are mainly scattered
statements, such as the enhancement of military forces increases the effectiveness of power
projection, and a certain type of fire control radar system enhances the effectiveness of attack
helicopters.110
2.1.1 Joint Vision 2010
Issued in 1996, it was meant to be a conceptual template to achieve new levels of effectiveness
in joint war-fighting.111 As General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
remarked, Joint Vision 2010 was aimed at providing a benchmark for the evolution of the Armed
Forces in order to meet the requirements of a challenging and uncertain future. According to it,
commanders are expected to create forces that can produce immediate effects leading to
desired results. The document also emphasises the importance of advances in target-effect
109  Department of Defense: Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, Internet, accessed 19. 05.
2003, available at www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html.
110  Ibid.
111  Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Vision 2010, July 1996, p. 1.
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technologies that produce a broader range of weapons effects.112 Regarding the conduct of joint
operations there is a shift from the traditional concept of massing forces towards massing
desired effects. Effects of mass equal the concentration of combat power at decisive time and
place that will be achieved with less force than in the past. As Joint Vision 2010 states, the ability
to produce desired effects rests on the correct mix of assets and capabilities, which is enhanced
by the enormous potential of advanced technology.113 For power projection, it proposes four new
operational concepts such as dominant manoeuvre, precision engagement, full-dimensional
protection and focused logistics:
· Dominant manoeuvre is defined as the application of overwhelming force to combine joint
combat power more effectively.
· Precision engagement reflects the ability to generate and deliver desired effects from an
extended range in order to lessen the risk to friendly forces and minimize collateral damage.
· Full-dimensional protection enables the effective employment of forces while denying the
same to the enemy.
· Focused logistics is aimed at directly delivering tailored packages of logistics and
sustainment at all levels of operations. These four new concepts result in full spectrum
dominance and massed effects in the full range of military operations.114
2.1.2 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review
Released in 1997, it went much further into an effects-based direction. The report
comprehended the nature of threats and devised appropriate strategies and programs to defuse
or defeat them.115 It also attempted to separate fact from fiction, and purge antiquated
assumptions from current realities in order to prepare the U.S. armed forces for an uncertain
future. It speaks about new operational concepts and organisational arrangements aimed at
enabling joint forces to achieve new levels of effectiveness in conflicts. In reference to Joint
Vision 2010, the report understands precision engagement as the ability to deliver desired
effects at the right time and place. Focused logistics is seen as the effective delivery of
sustainment packages, which result in the overall effect of reduced logistics support. As for the
Army the document mentions the effects of increased mobility, lethality and manoeuvre. In
reference to the Air Force, it highlights the ability to achieve desired effects with a minimum of
risk and collateral damage. For the Navy, it emphasises that network-centric warfare significantly
enables the services to achieve enhanced massed effects. There is further shift towards an
effects-based direction: whereas the 1993 report speaks of an effective deterrent in the form of
nuclear forces, this document uses the term deterrent effect when referring to the ability to
respond to crises as they develop.116
112  Ibid., pp. 8-12.
113  Ibid., pp. 17-19.
114  Ibid., pp. 20-25.
115  Department of Defense: Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, Internet, accessed 19.
05. 2003, available at www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/msg.html.
116  Ibid.
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2.1.3 Joint Vision 2020
Issued in 2000, it states that the most effective force must possess full jointness in intellectual,
operational, organisational, doctrinal and technical terms in order to make new technologies
work. It expands on the conceptual template established by Joint Vision 2010 to guide the force
transformation process with the overall goal to create a force that can be dominant across the
full spectrum of military operations.117 Full spectrum dominance, with the four operational
concepts as enablers are retained. Only information superiority is extended and seen as the
pivotal factor that gives competitive advantage over the enemy if effectively translated into
knowledge and decisions:118
· Dominant manoeuvre now rests on the capability to scale and mass forces or force itself and
the effects of fires as required in the operational theatre. Potential and actual effects result in
control of the battlefield at the right time and place.
· Precision engagement is further refined and understood as effects-based engagement,
which is seen as relevant to all sorts of operations. Linking sensors with kinetic and non-
kinetic delivery systems provides the commander with desired lethal or non-lethal effects
that support campaign objectives.
· Focused logistics is seen as the effective link between the operator and the logistician in all
logistics functions with the result that operational effectiveness and efficiency increases.
· Full dimensional protection is understood as an integrated architecture that effectively
manages risks to the joint force and its assets, and results in increased freedom of action
and better protection at every level.119
A further enabler of full spectrum dominance is the extended concept of information operations
in which desired effects and required actions serve as variables. The concept of joint command
and control is regarded as most effective when decision superiority exists. The increasing tempo
of operations requires quick choices among weapons and effects, in which the emphasis is on
parallel planning and execution.120
2.1.4 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
Released in 2001, the report states the possibility to identify threats and avoid surprise, but
mentions the importance to learn to expect it. Thus the aim is to establish a new strategy that
can embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise. According to the report transformation is not
seen as a goal for tomorrow, but as an endeavour that must be embraced today.121 The
introduction of the capabilities-based model as basis for defence planning aims at increasing the
war-fighting effectiveness of the forces and indicates a process that deals with uncertainty. The
new model helps provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges and circumstances
within an economic framework necessitating choices. It contrasts developing forces with specific
117  Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Vision 2020, June 2000, pp. 1-4, Internet, accessed 26. 10. 2004, available at
http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm.
118  Ibid., p. 11.
119  Ibid., pp. 26-33.
120  Ibid., pp. 34-37.
121  Department of Defense: Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001, pp. IV-VI.
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threats and scenarios with a general emphasis on flexibility, adaptiveness, and robustness.122
One stated defence policy goal in the report is to dissuade future military competition with the
dissuasive effect coming from the combination of technological, experimental and operational
activities. Another key objective in force transformation is understood as strengthening forward
deterrent postures that rests on improved capabilities of forward forces. The resultant deterrent
effect in peacetime comes from capabilities that impose strategic and operational effects on the
enemy.123 Force transformation is understood as effects-based as the document regards a small
amount of transformed forces a factor that can produce disproportionate strategic effects for
further transformation. Also the requirement of forces to be networked is mentioned that help
maximise combined effects.124
2.2 Army and Air Force
These milestones documents reflect a gradual shift from a traditional, threat-based, firepower-
centric, attrition and annihilation-oriented employment of force, to a more sophisticated
approach. As a result, members of the services wanted to fill the concept with practical
knowledge. Although Joint Vision 2010 emphasises the importance of balanced and sustainable
capabilities, and Joint Vision 2020 clearly states that wars should not be expected to be won
easily and without bloodshed, Army representatives feared that effects-based operations can
cause an imbalance in the traditional role of the services and showed clear scepticism.125
2.2.1 U.S. Army Concerns
For a prominent representative of the Army, Gen. Reimer, effects-based operations are nothing
more than a technological silver bullet with which proven and balanced battlefield capabilities
can disappear. The technological potential of precision strike weapons is a dangerous fallacy
that negates the human dimension of warfare.126 Only fully balanced capabilities can become a
solid basis for strategy and result in an overwhelming advantage on the enemy. The right
balance of dominant manoeuvre and precision engagement must be retained since the power
that smashed the Iraqi forces came from the successful combination of precision engagement
and dominant manoeuvre. Although increased lethality and mobility are impressive, only balance
provides for choices. Manoeuvre and fire are still the primary elements of combat power.
Precision engagement, although a significant contributor to shape the battle space, does not
accomplish all tasks. The synergism that comes from the simultaneous application of dominant
manoeuvre and precision engagement is still critical. Any dependence on a one-dimensional
strategy such as effects-based operations negates the possibility to achieve decisive effects that
come from positional advantage and psychological impact. Purely technical solutions cannot
122  Davis, Paul K.: Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and
Transformation, RAND MR-1513, 2002, pp. xi, 1.
123  Department of Defense, pp. 12, 20, 26.
124  Ibid., pp. 29, 34.
125  Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996), p. 27; Joint Chiefs of Staff (2000), pp. 9, 20.
126  Reimer, Dennis J.: Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement, Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter
1996-97, p. 13.
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eliminate the irrationality of war and relying on technology alone does not provide for appropriate
strategy, doctrine or operational concepts.127 Likewise, other representatives of the Army did not
support effects-based operations. According to Col. Cheek, the concept is based on precision
weapons and the long-lasting desire of the air service to become independent and commanded
by an airman.128 The information-intensive nature of effects-based operations can overload
commanders and planners, and result in an over-centralised command. The concept also
performs badly when the enemy reacts, deceives or otherwise manipulates information. The
Clausewitzian understanding of compelling the enemy to do our will can also not be realised with
effects-based operations. The term is synonymous with control, which means that the enemy
has space for making his own decisions. Thus effects-based operations are impersonal, fleeting
and persuasive from the enemy’s point of view. Consequently, effects-based operations stand
for an ill-defined concept as close combat is still the final arbiter of war.129
2.2.2 U.S. Air Force Enthusiasm
A supportive, technology driven approach to effects-based operations is given by Lt. Col.
Bingham, who sees the concept as modern version of the German Blitzkrieg. The key to joint
effects-based operations is for him, a theatre team using airborne command, control,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems that manage the decentralised executions
of air sorties against enemy land forces.130 Since the concept is basically asymmetric, military
operations will not depend primarily on physical attrition dominated by the close battle. The use
of friendly land manoeuvre only exploits the physical and psychological effects of air attacks on
the enemy. Battle management capabilities based on advanced technology make it possible to
paralyze the enemy by attacking his mechanized assets. Thus effects-based joint operations
reduce or eliminate close combat in three ways:
· First, they halt enemy army units before getting close enough to friendly land forces to
employ their weapons effectively.
· Second, they allow friendly land forces to avoid close combat in less than ideal conditions.
· Third, the applied advanced technology provides real-time information to effectively
manoeuvre friendly land forces.131
Joint effects-based operations take advantage of the central role motorisation plays in modern
land warfare. The concept exploits dependence on movement and machines by acknowledging
that all armies “depend on vehicles to move units to the battlefield as well as on the
battlefield”.132 Advanced airborne technologies are able to see moving or emitting machines in
127  Ibid., pp. 14-16.
128  Cheek, Gary H. (Col.): Effects-Based Operations: The End of Dominant Maneuver?, U.S.  Army  War
College, Carlisle Barracks, 09 April 2002, pp. 8-10.
129  Ibid., pp. 10-16.
130  Bingham uses the terms effects-based joint operations and joint effects-based operations
interchangeably. See Bingham, Price T. (Lt. Col., Ret.): Transforming Warfare with Effects-Based Joint
Operations, Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2001, pp. 58-66.
131  Ibid., pp. 58-59.
132  Quotation in Bingham, Price T.: Seeking Synergy, Joint Effects-Based Operations, Joint Forces
Quarterly, Spring 2002, p. 53.
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real time regardless of darkness or bad weather. Information on location and strength of enemy
army units become more reliable and precise. Precision engagement can paralyse the enemy’s
land forces and reduce his ability to engage friendly army units in close combat. Targeting
vehicular movement causes confusion in the form of shock and awe since surviving enemy
soldiers will regard movement and massing vehicles as visible, vulnerable and extremely
dangerous. Thus sudden and lethal air attacks together with friendly manoeuvres result in a
vicious circle with a synergetic effect. Any attempt to escape would cause visible vehicular
movement that again increases the vulnerability to air attacks. Effects-based operations can best
be described as vehicle plinking that is followed by friendly manoeuvres bypassing or defeating
paralysed enemy units.133 The dynamic integration of precision air attacks and surface
manoeuvre results in the complementary effects of an intractable dilemma. Whereas moving
units invites precision air and missile attacks, not moving means being overwhelmed by friendly
air and land forces. The rigorous exploitation of movement and human factors such as fear,
fatigue and uncertainty result in quick victory on land. The enemy is reduced to infantry that does
not enjoy the advantage of motorisation. Precision weapons not only make military operations
more effective and efficient, but increase the perception of danger that friendly actions
produce.134 Consequently, effects-based operations are aimed at achieving system-wide effects
without the destruction of significant parts of the enemy system. Advanced technologies enable
the accurate location, automatic tracking, reliable characterisation and precision-targeting of
individual enemy vehicles and make effects-based operations possible.135
133  Bingham (2001), pp. 59-62.
134  Bingham, (2002), pp. 53-56.
135  Bingham, Price T. (Lt. Col. Ret.): Air Power Targeting Theory: A Key Element in Transformation, Military
Review, Maj-June 2002, Internet, accessed 16. 09. 2003, available at www-cgsc.army.mil/
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3 Towards a General Theory
Despite the diversity of approaches the concept of effects-based operations could eventually
penetrate to the highest echelons of political and military leadership. As General Ralston,
Commander U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 2000-2003,
expressed during a conference: “we must think in terms of achieving the desired effects. We
must transition from attrition-based force on force warfare to effects-based operations”.136 The
increasing influence of effects-based operations can also be seen on the expansion of the
concept’s meaning. In this chapter we conduct a comparative analysis of the seven approaches
in order to construct a general theory of effects-based operations based on common elements
and characteristics. The chapter will also deliver definitions, and a theoretical framework that
helps us approach war in terms of causality. The seven approaches to effects-based operations
made it clear that there are various levels of interpretation, which point towards an increasing
generalisation of effects-based operations.
3.1 Increasing Generalisations
Originally, effects-based operations stood for a service-centric force employment concept and
grew out of the necessity of how to compensate for the scarcity of available resources. During
the preparation of the 1991 Gulf war the Americans possessed only a limited number of F-117s.
However, intelligence sources discovered that instead of two key command centres there were
actually four in Iraq, and potentially a fifth in Kuwait. Based on the capabilities offered by stealth
technology and precision weaponry, they redesigned the Master Attack Plan and put only one
weapon on every facility. This change resulted in higher efficiency and a greatly amplified
coverage in terms of impacts over the enemy. With the revision it became possible to attack 150
separate and discrete targets in the opening first 24 hours of the war, far more than during the
1942-43 bomber offensive over Central-Europe.137
3.1.1 Joint Employment of Force
Based on the results of the 1991 Iraq War, the idea of achieving effects on the enemy slowly
expanded, and was seen as a reason to move away from the traditional concept of massing
forces. In terms of effects, massing ground forces in the traditional manner is no longer
important, since they represent a lucrative target for attacks. Effects-based operations make it
possible to replace the deployment of force, with the projection of force. As Gen. Deptula
136  Quotation in Ralston, Joseph W.: Keeping NATO's Military Edge Intact in the 21st Century, Luncheon
Address, given at the NATO/GMFUS Conference, Brussels, 3 October 2002, Internet, accessed 15. 12.
2004, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003d.htm.
137 Air Force Operations Concept Aims at Success, Not Destruction, “Effects-based operations” a new but
ancient military concept, U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, Issues in Focus,
an interview with Maj. Gen. Deptula, 21 March 2003, Internet, accessed 06. 10. 2004, available at
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030321-usia14.htm; According to Mann the
advent of advanced technology shifted the principle of mass from the tactical to the operational level,
see Mann, Edward (Lt. Col): One Target, One Bomb, Is the Principle of Mass Dead? Airpower Journal,
Internet, accessed 10. 03. 2005, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronciles/apj.mann.html.
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emphasises, effects-based operations redefine the concept of mass, relies to a greater degree
on force projection than on force deployment, and aims to control adversary systems rather than
destroy them. All this requires changes in the current approach to force management. It is
claimed that effects-based operations deny the traditional approach of the service components
to do their own thing and demand new organisations and doctrine. Jointness stands for the use
of the most effective force in any given situation, in which effects-based operations act as a
functional vehicle that includes not only the air component, but also the entire theatre campaign.
For Gen. Deptula jointness is the right force, at the right place, at the right time. It is not using
every force, every place, all the time.138
3.1.2 Integration of All Elements of National Power
For many, effects-based operations not only provide for a perspective and framework in
planning, executing and assessing military operations, but have the power to integrate all
elements of national power. This further generalisation suggests that all services operate as part
of a bigger, joint interagency effort within a multinational ad-hoc coalition or an alliance.139 This
generalisation regards effects-based operations as a springboard for better integrating the
diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements of national and international power.
According to this level, desired effects determine engagement methods in which the military
force is only one element in the full spectrum of options. The integration of all elements of
national power means that the traditional border between military and non-military activities
evaporates and an entirely new horizon for better achieving security policy goals opens up.140
3.1.3 Systems Acquisition and Procurement
The performance of stealth technology and precision weaponry drove many to conclude that
effects-based operations are also helpful in making decisions on resource allocations. Thus we
should digress from individual platform costs, and consider other dimensions such as cost per
target engaged or cost per desired effect achieved. This reorientation means that the evaluation
of combat systems could be based on terms such as functionality of effects brought to
accomplishing national security needs.141 This broadest generalisation indicates that effects-
based operations are also suitable to define the nature and type of forces to be sustained in
order to deal with emerging challenges. It appears that the more general the concept becomes,
the more it indicates significant consequences for the composition of the armed forces.142
138  Deptula (2003b), p. 40; Lambert, Andrew (Air Com.): The Future of Air Power, RUSI Journal, 2003, pp.
46-47.
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141  Wolfe, Frank: Air Force Officials To Emphasize Effects-Based Operations in QDR, Defense Daily, 18
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3.2 Elements and Characteristics
A comparative analysis of the seven approaches helps us find those common elements and
characteristics, which are needed to construct a general theory of effects-based operations. The
attributes of the concept can be grouped around three common, but interrelated elements such
as effects focus, advanced technology, and systems thinking. Unfortunately, the comparative
analysis made it also clear that the characteristics upon which the common elements are built,
such as causality/deduction for effects focus, intangibles/control for advanced technology, and
categorisation/analysis for systems thinking, are loose ideas that bear dangerous simplifications
regarding the nature of war. The focus on direct causality emphasises almost exclusively the
strategic level, and similar to the mainstream literature dealing with the Revolution in Military
Affairs, no particular attention is devoted to the tactical level. It appears that effects-based
operations are fed by the unconditional believe that advanced technologies make it possible to
look at the whole and neglect the particular.143 Despite sporadic references to Clausewitz and
friction in war, most approaches give us the impression that both technological prowess
combined with an analytical, top-down methodology emphasising clear causality, can turn war
into a logically solvable phenomenon. Another problem concerns the term effect as the
approaches made it clear that effects-based operations centre first and foremost on achieving
effects on the enemy. Common wisdom indicates that the term can have multiple meanings,
which does not promote precision and clarity in military language.144 As one critical observer
ironically remarked, if the proponents of the concept “were aware of the many different meanings
and usages of the term effect it is doubtful that they would have made it the first choice among
the words they wanted to use.”145 Effects-based operations also serve as a vehicle to go back in
history as many approaches attempt to reinterpret wars of earlier ages through an effects-based
filter. Generalisation of this kind however can distort the meaning of effects-based operations,
which will be detailed later in a separate chapter.
3.2.1 Categorising Effects
The diversity of the effects taxonomies in terms of categorisation is bewildering. However, they
allow for a twofold ordering, which indicate general and particular attributes. Effects can be
recognised either immediately or after a certain, although finite time has elapsed. In the case of
simple physical effects, time can be instantaneous or short. Higher order effects need longer
time to mature. It follows from the categorisation that achieving physical effects is rather easy to
do and recognise. Achieving and recognising psychological effects is far more difficult. A general
subdivision can be defined by intention, order and timing. Intention means that an effect can be
intended/desired or unintended/undesired. In terms of order, effects can be direct/first order or
indirect/higher order. Timing indicates effects to be permanent or temporary. The particular
subdivision rests on level, type and flow. Level refers to tactical, operational and strategic
143  Jobbagy, Zoltan (Maj.): Effects-Based Operations and the Age of Complexity: A Critical Reflection,
Militaire Spectator, May 2006, pp. 235-242.
144  Gove, Philip B. (ed. i. ch.): Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,
Unabridged, Merriam-Webster Inc., 1981, p. 724.
145  Quotation in Van Riper, Paul K.: Precision and Clarity in Military Language, received via e-mail from
author on 05. 09. 2006; Van Riper, Paul K.: Planning for and Applying Military Force: An Examination of
Terms, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006, pp. 5-6, 13-15.
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effects. Flow reflects the distributive character of effects and describes the way they flow up or
down within the enemy system’s hierarchy. The difficulty of handling psychological effects is also
reflected in the gap between effect understood in normal English usage and effect as
conceptualised in the taxonomies. An effect normally follows an antecedent directly, which
means that any reference to indirect or higher order effects becomes questionable at best and
nonsensical at worst. The more we move towards intangibles in the form of higher order effects,
the more we leave effects-based operations behind, and arrive at something that can better be
described as consequence-based, outcome-based or event-based operations. The more we
move towards abstract psychological effects aimed at influencing the enemy’s behaviour, the
more meaningless the term effects-based operations becomes. In the same way Clausewitz also
pointed out that “consequences of some kind [would] always follow.”146 As Clausewitz indicated,
regardless what we do we achieve effects anyway. This however, can mean that not only the
term effects-based operations may be vacuous, but also the concept behind it. In the end we can
run the risk to refer to something that is scarcely more than military truism or commonplace.
3.2.2 Theoretical Framework Explained
Many ideas are often passed on down without proper consideration or reflection. Unfortunately, it
appears that the same holds true for effects-based operations.147 In order to elaborate more on
the obstacles and opportunities of the concept, we suggest a theoretical framework that helps
systematically challenge wide spread and obsolete thoughts regarding the nature of causality in
war, and the problems it creates. Clausewitz emphasised that the nature of war is complex, and
with the proposed theoretical framework of our own we try to establish a basis to analyse it in
terms of causality. Although the problem of causality lends itself to further metaphysical and
epistemological considerations, our intention is only to analyse certain properties in broad terms.
Discussing effects-based operations on the basis of cause-and-effect relationships draws us
onto a long and complex intellectual path of study and continual analysis. The framework is thus
an attempt to produce a durable explanation of war’s nature in terms of causality and the way
cause and effect relate to each other in space and time. It is generic in a true Clausewitzian
sense, namely that first and foremost “instead of a complete theory it offers only material for
one.” Probably the biggest benefit of such an approach is that it helps us understand war in
causal terms and, as Clausewitz emphasised to “investigate the essence of the phenomena of
war and to indicate the links between these phenomena and the nature of their component
parts.”148 The theoretical framework can be seen as a tool that helps develop knowledge
throughout the thesis in order to distinguish error from truth. It is also useful to analyse and
critique assumptions regarding effects-based operations. A further benefit comes from the fact
that this way we can examine the nature of causality in stages working both from narrower to
wider settings and vice versa. Thus we establish a context for examining causal relations, which
is sufficient in detail and realism to discern relationships between factors.149 Seeing causality in
146  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 212.
147  Moseley, Alexander: A Philosophy of War, Internet, accessed 25. 01. 2007, available at
www.lewrockwell.com/orig3/moseley1.html.
148  Quotations in Clausewitz, p. 69.
149  Rubel, Robert C.: The Epistemology of War Gaming, Naval War College Review, Volume 59, Number 2,
Spring 2006, pp. 108, 120-122.
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war on a continuum as offered by the framework “if nothing else, will help clarify military thinking”
in a way that false assumption regarding causal relationships can come to light.150 Based on
Clausewitz we propose a conceptual embodiment reflecting the fact that causality can be both
inherently imaginative, and formed through experience. In other words, the properties of cause-
and-effect relationships in war are the consequences of our imaginative capacities and the
experience of the physical environment in which we act. The framework also offers room for
conceptual categorisations in a way that different factors can be linked around common
properties. Consequently, it can explain how we unconsciously connect factors, which are
ostensibly different.151
3.2.3 Theoretical Framework Depicted
War consists of so many factors that most efforts fail to include all applicable forces with the
complexity of their interactions.
Figure 1: Continuum of war in terms of domains
In accordance with Clausewitz, we understand war as an activity in which both the enemy’s
physical and psychic forces have to be destroyed. Whereas the destruction of the former can be
seen as the means of war, the latter is its objective. Clausewitz advocated that efforts had to be
aimed at the enemy’s power of resistance, which was “the total means at his disposal and the
strength of his will”. This indicates that a war can end only if the enemy’s will is broken through a
“gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.”152 In a similar fashion the taxonomies
of the seven approaches refer to two different, but interrelated domains of war: the material and
the non-material in which effects can generally be achieved. According to Clausewitz the two
domains display war as an “extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina” in which
the actions of the belligerents aim at the “gradual exhaustion of the [enemy’s] physical and moral
150  Quotation in Lopez, Antonio M./Comello, Jerome J./Cleckner, William H.: Machines, the Military, and
Strategic Thought, Military Review, September-October 2004, p. 77.
151  Johnson, Eric: WAR in the Media: Metaphors, Ideology, and the Formation of Language Policy,
Bilingual Research Journal, Volume 29, Number 3, Fall 2005, pp. 625-626.
152  Clausewitz, pp. 102-106 (quotations p. 106).
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resistance.”153 The theoretical framework as depicted in Figure 1 indicates that unlike the seven
approaches to effects-based operations that put mostly an unilateral emphasis on the moral
element, Clausewitz regarded moral and physical elements as both inseparable and interacting.
The only difference he saw between the two is that the moral element is the “most fluid element
of all”.154
3.2.4 Theoretical Framework Discussed
We depicted war in a two-dimensional setting as a continuum, which is defined by ends/means
relationships. The framework indicates war as a phenomenon, which works in an everything-
affects-everything mode thus making various levels of interrelatedness possible. This allows
room for both loose and tight structures, which exist side-by-side in war. Whereas ends are
depicted on the vertical axis characterised by the combination of physical and psychological
effects, the means are located along the horizontal axis and range from destruction to influence.
The framework indicates that effects occur on a spectrum characterised both by tangible and
intangible attributes. Clausewitz also indicated the existence of a material and non-material
domain, by emphasising that war is “a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of
the latter” in which “psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved”.155
Based on the taxonomies and Clausewitz’s advice we propose the following in terms of effects:
· The material domain represents categories such as physical strengths and stamina. It
describes the space the military tries to influence through combat and manoeuvre.
Consequently, the material domain deals with tangible items the enemy usually needs to
wage war. It includes assets such as physical platforms and communications networks. This
domain is the traditional basis for measuring combat power, which has to be rendered
inoperable. The material domain can also be described as reality proper. Attempts to
achieve effects in this domain must aim at physical ability and as a consequence serve the
purpose of changing functions.
· The non-material domain on the other hand, is characterised by psychological factors such
as moral strength and stamina. It represents the mind and attributes that generally influence
the will in the form of perception, awareness, understanding, belief, and values. Effects in
this domain stand for influencing intangibles the enemy needs to wage war. Consequently,
effects in this domain serve to change behaviour.
When compared to the material domain, the non-material domain is at first appearance non-
existent. However, by holding things together it permeates all human endeavours. It appears to
be the medium in which act and will merge, and points towards the ability and movement to act.
Despite the difference regarding the two domains we assume a strong correlation between them
as physical and psychological factors form an organic whole.156 Whereas Clausewitz regarded
153  Ibid., pp. 80-86, (quotations p. 86).
154  Quotation in ibid., p. 111.
155  Quotations in ibid., p. 145.
156  Alberts, David S./Gartska, John J./Hayes, Richard E./Signori, David A.: Understanding Information Age
Warfare, CCRP Publication Series, August 2001, pp. 12-14; Huss, John (Maj.): Exploiting the
Psychological Effects of Air Power, A Guide for the Operational Commander, Aerospace Power Journal,
Winter 1999, p. 23; McNicoll, Iain: Effects-Based Operations: Air Command and Control and the Nature
of the Emerging Battlespace, RUSI Journal, June 2003, p. 39.
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the physical the “wooden hilt,” the psychological was for him “the real weapon, the finely honed
blade.”157
3.3 Delivering Definitions
According to the theoretical framework, effects can point either to the tangible aspects of war
aimed at changing function or to intangibles such as changing behaviour. Whereas the former
refers to the tactical level of war, the latter refers to the strategic level.
Figure 2: Effects as interrelated phenomena
In order to fill the continuum the term systemic effect as indicated by some approaches appears
to be appropriate. Systemic effects, similar to the operational level of war link the two end-poles
in various ways expressing the fact that effects can flow freely between the two. The taxonomies
also made it clear that effects have a distributive character as they flow from lower-order to
higher-order status and vice versa. In other words, effects are interrelated entities, which form an
organic whole. Therefore we suggest depicting the relationship of effects in the form of three
distorted rings as shown in Figure 2, each referring to one level of war. Based on the seven
approaches we also state that achieving an effect requires the involvement of a dynamic and a
static component. Whereas the dynamic component is our action, the static component is the
object upon which we act. This approach provides for a broad framework in which we see
causality as an expectation for certain events to result after the other events preceding them.
Thus we suggest understanding the problem of causality in a true Humean manner. According to
Hume causation stands for “such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or
action of one object, that [is] follow’d or preceded by any other existence or action; nor can the
other two relations be ever made us of in reasoning, except so far as they either affect or are
affected by it”.158 Approaching cause-and-effect relationships this way also helps us understand
157  Quotations in Clausewitz, p. 217.
158  Hume, David: A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 73-74.
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the mechanism of achieving an effect in which (E) can be understood as a function (ƒ) of an
action (a) on an object (o), and depicted in the form of a simple equation such as
),( oafE =
In order to explain the equation we suggest first analysing the term object in more detail since in
our understanding object appears to fit better to actions than other frequently used terms such
as target or agent:
· Target is very much destruction oriented, and has an exclusively military connotation. It is
mainly associated with the application of kinetic means and stands for destructive assets
such as platforms, weapons, and explosives.
· Agent is fleeting and too neutral in nature. It is either associated with the material dimension
of war and means an instrument to achieve a result, or with the human dimension and
stands for acting or exerting power.
· Object describes something that is materialised in its nature and can be elements of a
system or the system itself. Thus it does not make a difference, whether an object is a living
or a non-living entity. It stands for perception by the senses and indicates something we can
see, smell, hear, taste and/or touch.
Simply put, an object is nothing more than a cause for attention. It can not only refer to systems,
sub-systems and elements, but also to their relationship. Consequently, an object can also be a
process that is in the material domain, but is not materialised and possesses no physical
characteristics such as size, shape and weight. In this sense we regard a radio transmission that
can be jammed also an object.
3.3.1 Two Definitions
A thorough systematisation also requires clear definitions in order to turn the loose similarities
found in the seven approaches, and expressed in common elements, into a neat theory. Thus
we define effects-based operations as a force employment concept aimed at achieving
effects on the enemy, which is enabled by advanced technology and a systemic
approach. In a similar fashion for an effect we propose the following definition: a physical,
systemic or psychological resultant condition, aimed at inducing functional and
behavioural changes of the enemy. For a better understanding of war in terms of cause-and-
effect relationships we suggested a theoretical framework in which war is depicted as a
continuum defined by ends/means relationships. The common elements and characteristics we
discerned indicate that the main focus of effects-based operations is somewhere around the
psychological/influential end-pole as depicted in Figure 3. Consequently, effects-based
operations can be located in the upper right area in the continuum of war. The figure also allows
us for addressing the tree sorts of effects we outlined earlier in more detail as follows:
· Physical effect – it is regarded mainly as the outcome of a certain action or actions on an
object that alters the object’s physical condition through modification or destruction.
· Systemic effect – it can either be the product of some physical effects or the outcome of
certain actions on a system, which alters the system’s performance through modification or
destruction.
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· Psychological effect – it may be the outcome of the interplay of certain physical and
systemic effects, or some actions aimed at the enemy’s cognition in order to alter his
perception and induce a behavioural change.
Figure 3: Effects-based operations in the continuum of war
Although physical effects are normally associated with the tactical level of war, to a lesser
degree they may also have systemic and psychological consequences. Systemic effects are
mostly associated with the operational level of war as they have both physical and psychological
attributes. A given amount of physical destruction can cause systemic effects or such effects can
be the result of operations collapsing certain functions that help maintain the enemy’s war-
making or war-sustainment capabilities. However, psychological effects can also result in
systemic effects as it was the case with Iraqi power plant directors who feared bombardments
and shut down their facilities as soon as an F-16 took off.159
3.3.2 Multiplicity in Causality
The proposed theoretical framework suggests effects to be inherently complex and interrelated.
Although both causes and effects can be identified in advance, objects and actions can
theoretically be fully known, the mechanism needed to achieve desired effects always contains
an amount of uncertainty.160 This is also addressed in most approaches, and can be described
as the vulnerable Achilles-heel of effects-based operations. As we move towards higher order
psychological effects, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify causal linkages. Whereas
causes can be seen as limited proposition-like facts, effects refer to actual changes and
processes that can go on indefinitely. War is a phenomenon in which we can never do only one
thing: the enormous array of interactions generates endlessly complex alternatives that make it
very difficult if not impossible, to isolate individual causal relationships. The higher the complexity
of the situation encountered, the lower our ability to detect useful causal relationships, and at a
159  Denny, Anthony, D.: U.S. Air Force Uses New Tools to Minimize Civilian Casualties, Internet, accessed
20. 08. 2003, available at www.stratwise.com/countries_us_civ_casualties.htm.
160  Emmet, Dorothy: The Effectiveness of Causes, Macmillan, 1984, pp. 64-75.
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certain threshold we might find characteristics that are almost mutually exclusive.161 This sheds
light also on the problem that we often do not understand the subtle difference between
exactness for which causes stand for and correctness representing effects. Whereas causes can
mostly be verified through direct experimentation, effects can only be postulated from theories
not amenable to direct proof. In other words, desired effects are nothing more than
extrapolations of a known past onto an unknown future. Humans tend to see the relationship
between past and future in causal terms and “think that the past has ‘more reality’ than the
future.”162 Human behaviour allows both for stochastic and functional associations, which mean
that the consequences even of repeated actions are never constant, but cover a range of
possibilities. Although on occasion we might have sufficient knowledge of the possible
consequences, or even adequate knowledge for estimating certain statistical probabilities of
some possible consequences, it will never be possible to predict with certainty, the
consequences in any particular case. Hence we will never be able to define completely
homogenous categories or categories with sufficient homogeneity that allow for accurate
predictions based on causality. The problem with the mechanism further indicates that we
always have to expect a deviation between the effects desired and the effects achieved. Past
experience might allow for discerning general rules, but helps little in anticipating the direction
and extent of deviations. A mechanism that was successful under a given condition to achieve
an effect will not obviously be successful under all conditions. Regardless the information we
have at our disposal we can attend to only some aspects of a situation, but never to all aspects.
War indicates complex interactions in which even the actions of one belligerent have
ramifications. Consequences are never restricted to the area they were originally aimed at, but
might occur in areas that are interrelated, though ignored at the time the action was taken.
Predicting the consequences of complex interactions is also problematic since the prediction
itself can become an important new element that influences the initial course of actions. As soon
as desired effects become explicit and actions proceed, the assumption that other-things-being-
equal is no longer valid. The introduction of new other things in the form of desired effects, points
towards inconsistency, which often account for unforeseen, unexpected and unanticipated
consequences.163
3.3.3 Further Problems
Effects-based operations suffer from semantic problems, which in the end mystify ideas rather
than help clarify them. The concept reflects the tendency to explain a complex human
phenomenon such as war in the framework of a causal nexus, composed of a network of causal
processes and interactions. Humans tend to confuse the nature of change with the causation of
161  Storr, Jim: A Critique of Effects-Based Thinking, RUSI Journal, December 2005, pp. 34-35; Duczynski,
Guy A: To what extent can knowledge management systems build and reinforce consensus around
initiatives for change?: A self-reflective analysis of professional practice, Ph. D. thesis, Edith Cowan
University, November 2001, pp. 131-136.
162  Sakulich, Timothy J. (Lt. Col.): Precision Engagement on the Strategic Level of War: Guiding Promise of
Wishful Thinking, Occasional Paper Number 25, Air University, December 2005, pp. 15-26; Horvich,
Paul: Asymmteries of Time, Problems in the Philosophy of Science, MIT Press Classic Series, 1987, pp.
129-145 (quotation p. 143).
163  Merton, Robert K.: The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, American Sociological
Review, December 1936, pp. 898-904; Gove pp. 1729-1730.
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change. Generalisations relating causes to effects can only be true in one or at best in some, of
the underlying properties. As soon as the properties blur in spatial and temporal terms no
disposition can deliver useful generalisations, and we have to rethink in terms of co-variation or
correlations rather than imposing causality.164 Both co-variation and correlation stand for
phenomena that follow one another in a regular fashion, but do not imply causal relationships
per se. Nevertheless, people tend to interpret cases of co-variation and correlation as
manifestations of causality. We are too ready to assume causality and often confuse causation
with co-variation and correlation.165
Figure 4: Mechanism – the propagation of effects
The problem of finding useful mechanisms points towards at least four limitations we have to
consider in order to harness the power of effects-based operations: the need to understand the
enemy as fully as possible; the need to understand causal relationships between actions and
higher order effects; the ability to assess the consequences of our actions in terms of enemy will
and behaviour; and to synchronise our actions with the different requirements demanded by the
various levels of war. Regardless what mechanism we select, war’s proverbial friction works
against detecting clear causal relationships. Friction indicates variation in terms of causal
relationships. This variation is due to the fact that friction does not allow discerning something
that can be seen as absolute.166 Despite the optimism we discerned in the seven approaches
regarding the ability to link causes and effects directly and comprehensively, we must bear in
mind that “absolute objectivity, clinicalism, and precision in mapping causation are unattainable
164  Abdoullaev, Azamat Sh.: The Ultimate of Reality: Reversible Causality, Internet, accessed 16. 11. 2006
available at www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Meta/MetaAbdo.htm; McCullagh, Behan C.: Natural Necessity,
Objective Chances and Causal Powers, Internet, accessed 16. 11. 2006, available at www.bu.edu/
wcp/Papers/Meta/MetaMcCu.htm.
165  Cheng, Patricia W.: From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory, Psychological Review,
Volume 104, Number 2, 1997, pp. 367-369, 398.
166  McCrabb, Maris “Buster” Dr.: Limitations to and Effects-Based Approach to Planning, Executing or
Assessing Military Operations, received via e-mail from author on 12. 11. 2006, pp. 1-5.
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ideas” both in general as outlined by Hume, and in our particular case, which is war.167
Nevertheless, Figure 4 depicts some aspects of such a mechanism. Most mechanisms (a1oa to
a6of) are physical operations that aim at achieving effects in the physical domains (E11 to E14) by
hoping that they can indirectly induce higher order subsequent effects both in the material (E21 to
E24) and non-material domains (E31 to  E33). Some mechanisms can also achieve systemic
effects directly (a5oe to E24). A more complicated mechanism in psychological operations (a7og)
tries to initiate effects in the non-material domain directly (E34). Effects can both cascade (from
E11 to  E21 and E22) or become cumulative (E11,  E12 and E13 to  E22) as they move through the
enemy system. Effects can also jump through the various levels of war (E14 to E33 and E15 to E34)
displaying the fact that according to fortunate circumstances even simple physical effects can
have disproportionate consequences. In effects-based operations higher order effects can
influence lower order effects (E31 to E22). Effects on the same level may also be interrelated (E21
to  E22) as they can also mutually enforce each other (E31 and E32). Mapping cause-and-effect
relationships are even theoretically very complex, and can hinder most attempts to predict which
cause results in what effect. Attempts that focus on detecting causality can easily result in
paralysis by analysis, especially in terms of desired higher order effects in which causal
relationships are usually not directly identifiable. Another problem concerns the relationship
between decision-making and time. In general, we can say that the shorter the time available the
more likely it is that we think in terms of a relevant analogy rather than look for alternatives
based on sophisticated analysis.168
167  Quotation in Beaumont, Roger: War, Chaos, and History, Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 27; Hume, pp.
82-84.
168  Smith (2006), p. 129.
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4 Historical Overview
Many approaches to effects-based operations state that the concept is far from being new since
astute commanders, statesmen and the like have always practiced this sort of operations.169 In
this chapter we examine the truth of this assumption. The problem with simplified statements of
this kind is that they indicate a generalisation, which de-emphasises specific social, political,
cultural and economic factors that have always been important in the evolution of warfare. All the
phenomena that support war including organisations and conventions, depend on a combination
of certain historical circumstances. As the social wave-front analysis indicates, any manifestation
of war is the result of societal transformation and mirrors social conditions.170
4.1 Four Classics of Strategy
The danger of superficial generalisations is that they turn any given phenomenon into its own
caricature, and logically meaningless. Clausewitz warned that if an idea becomes diffuse it starts
losing proper meaning and its value declines accordingly. Certain principles of war can survive
ages or be rediscovered occasionally. However, the main reason for their endurance is often not
due to their value or utility, but their simplicity and exceptional convenience. Strategic theory is
always a framework, and as such independent from the size and scale of the conflict, the
medium that hosts it, the means by which it is fought, and likewise the amount of violence it
involves. In general it is the combination of efficiency and effectiveness with the aim of finding a
balance between these two attributes. It follows a mostly deductive logic whereby a conclusion
about particulars, flows from a course of actions rooted in a general or universal premises.171
The term effect refers to resultant conditions that follow an antecedent, which explains why
strategy can be understood as effects-based. Consequently, references to effects-based
operations as an ancient phenomenon, point towards strategy in general terms rather than the
existence of an early version of the concept. Displaying effects-based operations as an ancient
concept explains everything and nothing at the same time. Therefore it is useful to take a close
look at the vocabularies of significant past theorists of war in order to examine to what extent
their works can be regarded as sources of effects-based operations. The following comparative
analysis does not intend to deliver a broad historical, philosophical, cultural or even linguistic
overview. The intention is to allow the respective authors to speak for themselves as they
represent different periods within the first two waves. The aim is to detect reference points
towards the three common elements of effects-based operations such as effects focus,
advanced technology, and systems thinking. The following theorists of war will be subject to this
analysis: the Chinese classic Sun Tzu representing ancient China; the Italian Niccolo Machiavelli
169  Crane, Conrad: Effects-Based Operations: A Blast From the Past, Commentary, Defense Week, 14 May
2001, p. 16; McNicoll, p. 38.
170  Toffler/Toffler, pp. 1-18; Creveld (1991), pp. 112-122.
171  Clausewitz, pp. 554, 624; Brodie, Bernard: Strategy as a Science, World Politics, Volume 1, Number 4,
1949, pp. 471-475; Creveld (1991), pp. 157, 218; Robbins, Stephen P.: Organization Theory: Structure,
Design, and Applications, Prentice-Hall International Editions, 1987, pp. 25-49; Hooker, R. D. Jr.:
Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War, Parameters, Summer 2005, p. 4.
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representing the Italian city-state of the late Medieval Age; the Swiss Antoine Henri de Jomini
and the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz, both representing the emerging modern nation state.
4.1.1 Sun Tzu
The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu lived around 500 B.C. and belongs to the earliest known
military theorists. His book The Art of War became known in Europe shortly before the French
Revolution. Its summary translation was first published in Paris in 1772 and soon became widely
circulated.172 He is the first known theorist who attempted to formulate the planning and conduct
of military operations on a rational basis that enabled a successful prosecution of war. In the
chapter on strategic assessment, Sun Tzu emphasised that intelligence was required to change
plans effectively. He also wrote about effective discipline by stating that subordinates did not
dare to disobey orders which were effective. Sun Tzu also mentioned effective armament
together with carefully chosen and trained troops. As an effective method he suggested
appearing weak whilst being strong, and appearing cowardly whilst being brave in reality. In
order to confuse the enemy he mentioned the importance of giving the impression of being
incompetent and ineffective whilst the opposite was true in reality. Sun Tzu concluded that
formlessness was the most effective in military operations and unexpected movements the most
efficient.173 In the chapter on planning a siege, Sun Tzu wrote that the inability to deploy
machines effectively could cause great trouble. For him there was also a difference between
military and civilian life, especially in customs regarding military procedure and command in
effect. He found that adaptation to the situation was important as sometimes even a large group
could not effectively attack a small group. Conquest depended for him on co-ordination and not
mass.174 In the chapter on formation, Sun Tzu wrote that sometimes there was no chance to see
any effective way to attack, and defence was the better option by not letting the opponent find
our forces.175 In the chapter on force he concluded that good warriors sought effectiveness in
battle from the force of momentum and not from that of individuals.176 In the subsequent chapter
on emptiness and fullness he proposed attacking gaps and, among others, he mentioned the
inability to affect rescues. The ability to affect rescues meant for him fullness, which he regarded
as worth defending.177 In the chapter on terrain he named six factors that resulted in defeat and
one of them was the ineffectiveness of law and order.178 In the chapter on nine grounds, Sun
Tzu wrote of an effective rulership, which rests on firm knowledge regarding the enemy’s plans,
the lay of his land and the use of local guides.179 In the chapter on fire attack he suggested not to
go against the momentum of fire, because it was not effective as the enemy would surely fight to
the death.180
172  Sun Tse: L’art de la guerre, Traduit du chinois par le pére Amiot, Éditions Didot Faîné, Paris, 1772.
173  Tzu, Sun: The Art of War, Shambhala Dragon Editions, Shambhala Publications Inc., 1988, pp. 41-56.
174  Ibid., pp. 66-83.
175  Ibid., pp. 84-92.
176  Ibid., pp. 93-99.
177  Ibid., p. 103.
178  Ibid., pp. 143-147.
179  Ibid., pp. 148-163.
180  Ibid., pp. 164-167.
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4.1.2 Niccolo Machiavelli
The Italian thinker Machiavelli published his book Art of War in 1521. As a child of the
renaissance and living in the city state of Florence, he viewed military problems in relation to
politics. He devoted great attention to the procedures he regarded as important for the
acquisition, maintenance and application of a well-equipped and highly trained military force. He
suggested adapting the military practices of the ancient Romans, but also pointed out the
difficulties of its accomplishment. Machiavelli outlined fundamental questions such as creating
an army, individual armaments and organisation of military units, formations in battle and during
marches, command and control, encampments, intelligence operations, and fortifications and
sieges. In book one he suggested that the military should be made up of people who were not
fully forced or fully committed to this profession. An army composed only of committed people
would carry wicked effects as such people were for him without restraint and religion, like
gamblers or blasphemers. Machiavelli concluded the middle way to be the best when people join
the military due to their respect for the prince, which prohibits bad effects arising.181 In book
three whilst detailing the order of battle of the ancient Romans he mentioned that lightly armed
men were posted in front of the army between the cavalry and infantry. When they were
repulsed they could withdraw along flanks or through “intervals ordered to such an effect” and re-
establish themselves among the unarmed people.182 Regarding the signs on the flags of the
army Machiavelli proposed that the captain-general should bear the sign of the prince. The signs
of subordinate commanders were for him not that important as long as they had the effect of
recognising each other.183 In book five he detailed the marching order of the Roman army.
According to Machiavelli the Romans sent ahead some groups of cavalrymen followed by the
right horn, then by the wagons belonging to it, followed by one legion and its wagons, another
legion with its wagons, the left horn with the wagons behind and then the rest of the cavalry.
After this listing he concluded that this “in effect was the mode in which [the Roman army]
marched ordinarily.”184 For marching through a hostile country he suggested the army to be in a
square since this formation was good both for marching and fighting, and “to this effect” he
proposed ordering a brigade in the same way.185 In a situation when an army was between two
mountains occupied by the enemy and there were only two roads, he suggested that the
commander should make a ditch at the rear and give the impression of forcing the army through
the only road that remained open. This act could mislead the enemy who concentrates his forces
on the remaining open part prepared to fight. However, if the commander “[threw] a bridge of
timber ordered to such an effect over the ditch” and crossed that obstacle, he could escape the
enemy.186 In book six Machiavelli detailed the importance of information on enemy activities and
plans requiring spies, ambassadors and experts of war. However, he emphasised that the
enemies were also active in this field, which became manifest “when one [took] prisoners from
them to this effect.”187 In book seven Machiavelli gives 27 general rules on war, but the rules do
181  Machiavelli, Niccolo: Art of War, The University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 23.
182  Quotation in ibid., p. 64.
183  Ibid., p. 81.
184  Quotation in ibid., p. 101.
185  Quotation in ibid., p. 102.
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not contain terms such as effect, effective or efficient, or refer to the importance of achieving
effects on the enemy.188
4.1.3 Antoine Henry de Jomini
The strategist and historian Jomini was an officer in the Napoleonic wars. His book The Art of
War was first published in 1838, and can be seen as a synthesis of his practical military services
and a thorough historical study. In chapter one he illustrated the importance and effect of wars of
intervention, which were for him wars of opportunity. Regarding national wars he thought that the
efficient defence of a country should rest on organised militia to limit the barbarities of war.189 In
chapter two Jomini praised the great advantage of the lance and concluded that lancers were
inferior to hussars as skirmishers, but more effectual in charges. He also mentioned the
Congreve rockets “the effect and directions of which … the Austrians [can] now regulate”.190 He
acknowledged the contribution of councils of war, advising how the commander could contribute
to more weight and effect of military operations. Enthusiasm and military spirit were for him
factors that produced the same effects: passion that was temporary and the more permanent
great love of the country.191 In chapter three he concluded that converging routes were better for
defence since two retreating divisions “[could] effect a junction more quickly” and may defeat the
pursuers separately.192 He also wrote that prejudice towards entrenched camps as bases of
operations does not allow generals to trace the effects back to their real causes. By explaining
the term objective point he used a fictitious scenario in which the French army’s task was to
“relieve the forts … if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the river and in besieging
them”.193 He also emphasised the significance of a position in the rear within which divisions
could collect and oppose the enemy if he becomes successful in effecting a passage. Regarding
the French declaration of war in April 1792, Jomini could not understand why the French did not
conquer Belgium in which there was “no effectual resistance.”194 The behaviour of the allies in
the campaign of 1793 was for him an example of the effect that a “faulty direction of operations”
has.195 His maxim number ten concerning lines of communication stated that two such lines
must be arranged in a way that passing armies are able to effect their junction without being
separately exposed to the enemy. According to maxim number fifteen, on crossing a large river
in the presence of a numerous enemy the first consideration should be “to ascertain where the
passage can be most certainly effected”.196 By examining the advantage of the central lines in
the case of very large masses and concentric operations, he used expressions such as effecting
a junction, the effect of suffering reverses, and effecting a union of two armies.  He  also
emphasised the effects of roads on a retreat and the advancement of armies so as to effect a
188  Ibid., pp. 157-159.
189  Jomini, Baron Antoine Henri de: The Art of War, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books,
Pennsylvania, 1992, pp. 22, 34.
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junction. In his epitome of strategy he wrote that the “system of rapid and continuous marches
multiplies the effect of an army”, which can be magnified if those marches are directed “upon the
decisive strategic points of the zone of operations”.197 In chapter four on grand tactics and
battles Jomini suggested the selection of tactical position to be done in such a way that it should
give “the artillery all its effect in the defense.”198 In his analysis regarding offensive and defensive
positions in a battle, he emphasised the importance of the moral effect that comes from
movement towards enemy lines. Such an advance can only be stopped by well-placed batteries
that produce the “greatest effect” on the approaching assailant. The moral effect of the
subsequent counterattack was for him “enough to stagger the boldest troops.”199 Regarding
battles he wrote that force must be employed to “obtain the most effective action” since this
offers the biggest chance for success.200 In detailing the different orders of battle, he wrote about
effecting the decisive manoeuvre and detours around the enemy’s flank. A perfect order of battle
was for him one that “united the double advantages of the fire of the arms and of the moral effect
produced by an onset.”201 The retreat of the first line had for Jomini a moral effect on the second,
resulting in loss of command over the troops involved. Regarding the fire of musketry, he
admitted that it was much more effective in defence than in offence. In his analysis of various
campaigns he used expressions such as effecting a detour and the effect of discouraging the
enemy.202 In chapter six on logistics he again used terms such as effecting a junction and the
effective capture of enemy soldiers.203 In chapter seven on the formation of troops he wrote
about the greatest and destructive effects of the artillery and the effect that comes from shock
when attacking with pikes. Among others he mentioned moral effects in battle, which came from
being in a column and having arms at the shoulder without firing a shot. Further references
included the effect of the enemy’s fire, the effect of arms improvements, the momentary effect of
a cavalry charge, the effect of artillery and musketry fire, the moral effect of reverse fire upon
troops and the efficiency of rocket batteries in frightening horses.204
4.1.4 Carl von Clausewitz
No other theorist has shaped military thinking in the Western world more than Clausewitz.
Although his sudden death deprived him of the opportunity to finish his work properly, even in its
incomplete form, On War is one of the most influential and voluminous book ever written on the
matter. The sheer volume of the book prohibits a similar display with the other authors, but it also
differs in some respects. Clausewitz not only used words such as effect, effective and efficient
significantly more often than the previous authors, but he also delivered a detailed analysis
regarding cause-and-effect relationships and the way effects interact. In book one on the nature
of war, he used terms such as disproportionate effect, combined effect, moderating effect, effect
197  Ibid., pp. 175-177 (quotation p. 176).
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of fear, and restrictive effect. He also wrote about the effective way of using force and the
effective forms of fighting.205 In book two on the theory of war he referred to psychological
effects, particular effect, moral effects, effects of danger and the effect of the engagement.
However, what makes his work interesting is contained in chapter five, in which he delivered a
critical analysis, which he understood as an attempt to trace effects back to their causes. For him
facts and the underlying motives are seldom fully known in wars, and the deduction of effects
from their causes is difficult. Therefore causes remain mostly unknown due intentional
concealment or improper recording. Since effects do not always come from known causes, there
are always gaps in terms of causality, and ignoring this can cause serious problems. Clausewitz
was convinced that effects in war cannot be traced back to a single cause, as several concurrent
causes are normally at work. It is not sufficient to trace effects back to their causes, but the
causes themselves must be assessed correctly. He regarded investigation of the nature of
effects important, otherwise the analyst faces the danger of unending arguments that lead to no
conclusion. Regarding effects and their causes, it is impossible to establish laws and standards,
although reliance on aids in the process of judgement can be helpful. For Clausewitz,
investigating the relationship between cause and effect becomes easy only if they are closely
linked. Unfortunately, in war everything is interconnected and effects produced influence all
subsequent events, as for the final outcome every means available influence the ultimate
outcome. When tracing effects back to their causes, every step means that effects become
causes themselves. An effect that appears correct at one level can become objectionable on a
higher level and imply a new basis for judgement. This hierarchical chain indicates serious
problems since he regarded the distance between cause and effect proportionate to the number
of other causes to be considered. Consequently, the range of forces involved and circumstances
that must be taken into account grows: the higher the effect the greater the causes by which they
could be achieved. In order to comprehend the intricate and difficult nature of causal
relationships in war, Clausewitz advocated a critical analysis to illuminate the connections and
determine essential concatenations. This analysis is even more important since people are
biased and tend to blindly follow single line of thoughts. As the analysis goes towards
psychological forces and effects, reliable evaluation becomes increasingly cumbersome.
Regarding the will, which he defined as the interplay between courage and fear, even critical
analysis cannot determine probable outcomes. Although he was aware of the difference and
interrelatedness of physical and psychological effects, he emphasised that “the psychological
effect is what concerns us”.206 In book three, he insisted that a strategic theory must consider not
only material factors, but also moral qualities since physical and psychological effects form an
organic whole. Furthermore, he referred to the effect of the engagement, the effects of genius,
the ricochet effect of forces, desired effects, destructive effects, and the effect of the
advantage.207 In books four to seven his vocabulary included a wide array of effects such as the
effectiveness of additional forces, effect of surprise, effective integration of the individual parts of
the army, effective sphere of operations, effective range of weapons, strategic effectiveness,
effectiveness of resistance, effective strategic move, effectiveness of diversion and immediate
205  Clausewitz, pp. 83-142.
206  Ibid., pp. 145-204 (quotation p. 199).
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effect.208 In the last book concerning war plans he emphasised that so many factors influence
military campaigns that the “almost infinite distance … between a cause and its effect” reveals
an endless combination of the elements involved.209 The maximum that can be achieved is to
work in a comprehensive fashion to avoid “narrow formulas for solving problems”.210
Commanders should rely on the capacity of their mind with actions being “a response to the
immediate challenge rather than a product of thought.”211 He further wrote about effective blow
against the principle ally, intentional effect, maximum effect of an attack, and effective help.212
4.2 Effects-Based Vocabulary
All of the four selected theorists’ vocabulary contain terms such as effect, effective, and efficient
to various degrees. However, attempts to reinterpret their work on effects-based principles
means that their theory and methods are used to explain present day phenomena. The result is
a naive and one-dimensional misconception that disregards influential and historical
circumstances of their respective age.213 We made it clear earlier that effects-based operations
rest on three common elements such as effects-focus, advanced technology and systems
thinking. These elements served as the vehicle for our examination back in time in order to
detect the theorists’ relevance for effects-based operations in detail.
4.2.1 Effects Focus
Statements that the origins of effects-based operations lay with Sun Tzu, because he wrote that
“killing is not the important thing” appear to be far fetched and biased. His recommendations
have validity only in their own historical context. Sun Tzu intended his advice not as replacement
for, but as an adjunct to, the actual use of force. Citing him in order to validate present day
strategic theory disregards the particular reality and the particular praxis of his age.214 His
significance is due to the fact that Sun Tzu was probably the first who understood the importance
of strategy and forming strategic alliances as an alternative to bloody wars. References such as
the ability to overthrow a city without throwing a rock only highlights the existence of various
alternatives that have always existed to bloodshed.215 A vocabulary that uses the term effect and
its derivatives does not indicate a certain early conceptualisation of effects-based operations. No
theorist delivered better, fresher and more detailed analysis on the relationship between cause
and effect than Clausewitz. However, he did not do it in an attempt to formulate any early
concept of effects-based operations. As a soldier-cum-philosopher, he wanted to warn theorists
that reality is too multifaceted for single-minded causal explanations.216 Despite the diversity and
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frequency with which he used such words, On War fails to give a detailed analysis,
categorisation and definition of effects. His statement of disinterest in generals who promise to
win victories without any drop of blood may appear to be a blow for the proponents of effects-
based operations. His cynical style of writing about the higher skill of avoiding decisive battles
and reaching goals by other less violent means does not qualify him as the forerunner of the
concept either. For him, war was brutality and blunder, and as he concluded history has
scattered attempts to win bloodless wars to the winds.217 Although both Machiavelli and Jomini
can be positioned between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, Machiavelli’s vocabulary is the least
effects-based. It is the best example that using the term effect does not indicate the existence of
an effects-based vocabulary. In the original Italian, effetto the equivalent of the English effect is
mentioned only ten times, and never in an effects-based way.218 One probable explanation is
that Machiavelli was less interested in how an army fights and more how it is possible to
establish and sustain one that fight once it occurs. His argumentation relates the armed forces
as much to the political aspects of war as to operational employment. In this respect, he was
probably among the first theorists in the Western world who raised an issue roughly similar to the
concept of long-term defence planning. The absence of the term effect in his many rules of war
reflects a clear lack of thinking in this regard. Jomini’s vocabulary was much more interwoven
with references to effects, although not to the same extent as that of Clausewitz. He personally
preferred chivalrous warfare to organised assassination. Unfortunately, he cannot be seen as
one of the forefathers of effects-based operations since for him, this sort of warfare stood for a
certain epoch, but not phenomenon.219 His four maxims regarding the fundamental principles of
the art of war do not contain any reference to effects. He thought in terms of massing armies and
massing forces, which stand in sharp contrast to the rather balanced and delicate approach of
effects-based operations focusing on massing effects.220 The idea of throwing the masses upon
the decisive point forms a recurrent pattern in his work, and clearly negates the chance of an
early conceptualisation of effects-based operations. Although he knew that armies could be
destroyed without pitched battles, this option was for him, the “succession of inconsiderable
affairs.”221 He often referred to the moral effect, but did not attempt to examine the way it could
relate to actions and physical phenomena. Thus using the term effect and its derivatives and
thinking in an effects-based way do not mean the same.
4.2.2 Advanced Technology
We devote the next scrutiny to the technological aspect of effects-based operations. No theorist
put considerable emphasis on elaborating the difference that technology can make in war.
Despite the millennia that lie between Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, and the centuries between
Machiavelli and Jomini, weapons were operated mostly by muscle and being mounted on a
horse was the fastest means of advancement. It does not come as a surprise that speed in
military operations was best understood and practiced by confederated horse riding nomads
such as the Huns, Avars, Hungarians and Mongols who invaded Europe throughout the ages.
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Due to their mobility they conducted brilliantly executed campaigns and as the Mongols showed,
at a speed that could be repeated by European armies only five and a half centuries later on the
corps level. Seven full centuries had to pass before all military operations were conducted at a
speed that even Subotai Khan would have accepted.222 Another example for the missing
technological aspect can be found in Machiavelli and his relationship with artillery, the first and
foremost military technological innovation of that age. Due to their size and weight, cannons
were very hard to use in the beginning and were regarded as extremely unreliable, inaccurate
and risky. However, they heralded the end of primeval warfare and paved the way for the wars to
come. For Machiavelli artillery was useless, and could be overcome by ancient modes and
ancient virtue. Jomini himself did not regard technology as a significant aspect of war either.
According to him superiority of armament can increase the chances of success, but it does not
gain battles in itself. It is just one, albeit great element of success. Although he was aware of the
numerous technological improvements that took place during his lifetime and made war more
destructive, he saw their effects basically to force troops to prefer shallower formations. Similar
to Jomini, Clausewitz did not regard the technological aspect of war, manifested in weapons and
equipment, as important. For him, they were not essential to the very concept of fighting as he
thought that the act of fighting determines the weapons employed. The range and effectiveness
of firearms were only of tactical importance. He saw the relevance of new technologies mostly in
their psychological impact on the enemy, but not as enablers of military operations. As he
concluded, armies of his age were very similar in weapons, training, and equipment.
Consequently, he saw little difference between the best and the worst armies.223 It appears that
the military lessons of past ages were not significantly influenced by changing technological
conditions until the second half of the 19th century. Although the disparity between methods and
weapons used became clear as early as the Crimean and American Civil Wars, it was only
World War I that displayed the immense gap. Weapons of industrial mass production with an
ever-increasing destructive potential shattered the value of past military experience only in the
20th century. Regarding the technological aspect of effects-based operations, none of the four
authors can be regarded as originator of effects-based operations since they did not regard
technology as leverage.
4.2.3 Systems Thinking
Regarding systems thinking, more similarities can be detected with effects-based operations. For
Sun Tzu the way of battle was measured by five things such as the way, weather, terrain,
leadership and discipline. Way stood for inducing the same aim in order to share death and life
without the fear of danger. Weather meant the four seasons, terrain referred to distance,
difficulty, dimension and safety. Leadership was composed of intelligence, trustworthiness,
humaneness, courage and sternness. Discipline stood for organisation, chain of command and
logistics.224 Machiavelli did not provide such an explicit categorisation, but the sequence of his
books might reveal some sort of systematisation. Book one describes the qualities needed for
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war and discusses the role of fortune and virtue. Whereas book two details initial armament and
unit organization, book three addresses battles, formations and describes the value of artillery at
length. In book four he describes the role of the environment and addresses strategies of
movement together with the psychological condition of troops. Book five details marching orders,
communication, and ambushes. Book six contains encampments and intelligence, but pays
special attention also to health, medicine, and supply lines. Book seven discusses fortifications
in detail. Jomini’s categorisation of the art of war aims basically to manifest five military branches
such as strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering, tactics, and discipline, and one civilian
branch called diplomacy. Strategy equalled war made on the map, with the aim to direct masses
properly in the theatre of war. Grand tactics was the positioning of troops in order to bring them
into the action to fight. Whereas logistics was the art of moving armies comprising means and
arrangements, while engineering meant the art of attacking or defending fortifications. Tactics
mainly described the actual fighting, including actions such as charges, repulsions and
positioning troops. Diplomacy meant statesmanship and its relationship to war efforts. For
Clausewitz, a systemic approach might have been the subdivision of war into his famous
paradoxical trinity, the people with a creative spirit unleashed and free to roam, the military
standing for subordination as an instrument of policy, and the government that makes war
subject to reason alone.225 Thus concerning the aspect of systems thinking, we can say that at
least three of the authors wanted to grasp the essence of war in systemic terms. Claims that
throughout history effects-base operations have always been applied by talented commanders
are, at least, only partly true.
4.2.4 Carriages and Cars
We can state that works of the four theorists have at best an indirect relationship with effects-
based operations, but cannot serve as origins of the concept. Referring to past theories and
making forced links to support present day strategic thought is appealing. It provides useful tools
to validate one’s own arguments with reference to the classics, and offers better prospect and
stronger arguments for selling ideas in order to gain influence. However, any such reference can
jeopardise a well-founded understanding of the message and the theoretical implications of
effects-based operations. It prohibits the decoding of unique historical conditions and detaches
theory from practical relevance. Instead of seeing both the theoretical forest and the contextual
trees it offers only theoretical trees and a contextual forest, which is superficial, misleading and
extremely dangerous.226 A carriage pulled by a horse, and a car driven by a combustion engine
reveal obvious similarities, but do not indicate that those who invented the carriage also had the
car in mind. If we understand war and effects-based operations in a social context then we
assume specific factors and conditions. For Clausewitz it was clear that “every age had its own
kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period …
would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to
work things out on scientific principles. It follows that the events of every age must be judged in
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the light of its own peculiarities.”227 Following his advice we must conclude that the origins of
effects-based operations must lie much closer to our time. In reality, the reason why effects-
based operations came into being was the scarcity of available aerial resources during the 1991
war against Iraq. As Gen. Deptula stated during an interview the concept grew out of the
practical problem of how to compensate for this shortcoming. The unexpected success of the
approach and the power of advanced technology resulted that effects-based operations became
“the philosophy … we used in targeting for the rest of the war planning effort and then during the
war”.228
227  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 717.
228  Quotation in Air Force Operations Concept Aims at Success, Not Destruction, interview with Maj. Gen.
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5 Military Coercion
In this chapter we will prove that the vocabulary of most air-power theorists reveals striking
similarities with the three common elements of effects-based operations. Aimed at certain
vulnerable elements of the enemy the intention was to achieve victory less through the
application of brute force in the physical domain, but more through various coercive mechanisms
aimed at influencing the psychological domain. The focus on influence and psychological effects
came as a result of a powerful technological innovation of the early 20th century, the airplane.
We defined effects-based operations as a force employment concept aimed at achieving
effects on the enemy, which is enabled by advanced technology and a systemic
approach. Similar to the definition, air power theorists have also advocated the application of
mechanisms of military coercion to achieve various sorts of effects on the enemy. The
assumption has always been that the power of advanced technology in the form of the airplane
makes it possible to go directly to the heart of the enemy thus making war less bloody and
perhaps morally acceptable. This image of war rested on the assumption that technological
development and a systemic top-down strategic approach make possible to attack enemy
vulnerabilities directly.229
5.1 Air Power Theories
Major wars of the 20th century disproved much of such assumptions. World War II was extremely
destructive as the focus was more on the physical domain than on achieving higher order
psychological effects. Massed firepower and large-scale destruction were regarded as first and
foremost decisive factors, which reflected the “tendency among the industrialized nations to
employ force beyond reason.”230 The seven approaches to effects-based operations made it
clear that the concept focuses on control instead of destruction. The clear relationship with
military coercion theories is obvious as the aim is at the sources, and not manifestations of
power. 231 Unfortunately, in the area in which air power theories and military coercion theories
overlap, technological developments and practical considerations have often played greater
roles than ideas with real-world relevance. Another peculiarity of the overlapping is that not only
does the vocabulary used differ from one theorist to the other, but the same term can refer to
different things for the same author at different times.232 Nevertheless, a thorough examination of
air power theories advocating various coercive mechanisms to achieve victory in war can explain
the preference for control and shed light on the fundamental differences between destruction
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and influence. This is important as destruction and influence mark the two end poles on the
horizontal axis of our theoretical framework. There is a general consensus that there are four
different schools of military coercion theories. Each school stands for one mechanism and can
be described as punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial.233 It  is  impossible  to  detail  all  the
ideas that have contributed to the literature of military coercion, but the introduction of well-
known representatives from respective schools can help us understand underlying assumptions.
The following comparative analysis aims at identifying the types of effects the respective schools
stand for, the technology that made the theories possible, and the extent to which these theories
reflect a systemic approach. Throughout the chapters the four schools of thought will be
confronted with battlefield realities in order to examine to what extent they have worked in
reality.234
5.1.1 Obvious Similarities
Limitations in terms of means applied together with the focus on desired psychological effects
support the assumption to regard effects-based operations as a coercive concept. According to
Gen. Deptula, he would once like to see “a set of integrated physical and cognitive effects
models that could help … achieve … national security objectives without the adversary even
knowing that he’s been influenced.”235 Similar to effects-based operations, military coercion
theories are built on the assumption that a limited application of force can be sufficient to make
the enemy comply, thus leading to lower overall costs and less bloodshed. Military coercion
means to convince, and not to force, the enemy to concede by precluding any alternative
physically. It is a form of explicit power that does not rely on direct and exclusive application of
force, but emphasises reasoning and the persuasion of the enemy in order to change behaviour.
Due to its attractiveness, coercion is often perceived as a quick and cheap solution to complex
international problems. Coercion has also a strong economic focus as “commerce and prosperity
of civilized nations are so closely interwoven and interdependent that the destruction of the
enemy country’s economic wealth recoils on the head of the victor.”236 Technological and
political aspects of the post-modern age such as complex contingencies including small wars,
and operations other than war, and advanced military technology, make military coercion very
attractive. Whereas the technological aspects enforce the interest in it, the political aspects
enable it. Increasing globalisation and interconnectedness also mean that any attempt to “fight a
purely destructive war is neither clean nor heroic; it is just purposeless.”237 Military coercion
means influencing the enemy’s behaviour by manipulating his cost-and-benefit calculations with
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the aim to achieve the same political goals as with brute force, but with the involvement of fewer
resources. It is an attempt to achieve victory on the cheap in which the coercers often tend to
“overestimate the prospects of coercion and underestimate the costs.”238 As an alternative to
unlimited destruction, military coercion emphasises that confrontations can be better settled
through the selective application of force aimed at modifying enemy behaviour. Although the
emphasis on influence over destruction does not exclude the application of force, combined with
alternatively negotiated solutions military coercion tries to avoid the escalation of violence.
5.1.2 Carnage of the Trenches
The genesis of modern military coercion theories dates back to World War I and the carnage
encountered in the trenches. After the war many were convinced that further wars of this kind
would mean the demise of Western civilization and regarded it as a great waste of resources
that exhausts both the victor and the vanquished.239 Theorists started to search for new
approaches and questioned the need to confront large forces in a fashion that extended attrition
and annihilation. Instead of applying brute force to make the enemy comply, theorists started to
focus on quicker and cheaper mechanisms emphasising coercion rather than destruction. Their
efforts aimed at exploiting the difference between coercion and the application of brute force,
which is manifest in getting what someone can take by force or make the other to give it
voluntarily, in order to avoid risk or damage. Military coercion does not exclude the involvement
of force, but it is applied in a limited way in order to induce changes in enemy behaviour. It
requires intimidation to make the enemy realise that it is his decision to fight and eventually die,
or to surrender and live.240 The potential offered by coercion was persuasive enough to drive the
search for better and more humane applications of force. Undoubtedly, there is a striking
difference in terms of mechanism between brute force and military coercion. Whereas the former
aims at complete destruction of the enemy’s capabilities to resist, the latter seeks to persuade
the enemy prior to military defeat. Brute force rests on attrition and annihilation, which demand
killing more enemy troops than the own side loses. Brute force comes as the result of unlimited
aim and unlimited method in which the focus is on wearing down the enemy to the extent he no
longer possess an organised force. Brute force results in physical defeat that comes as a result
of direct, unconditional actions eliminating the enemy’s ability to do anything other than comply.
Military coercion accepts that the enemy might have a certain capacity to command his forces by
offering the chance of mitigation and solving security challenges short of major war.241 As Figure
5 depicts, similar to effects-based operations the primary focus on psychological effects places
military coercion in the upper right area of the continuum of war. The psychological focus
indicates the assumption that it is less expensive to convince the enemy to surrender than to
make his resistance physically impossible. Military coercion stands for a camouflaged war, which
238  Pape (1996), pp. 2, 12-15 (quotation p. 2).
239  Liddel Hart (1925), p. 4; Liddel Hart, Basil H.: Strategy, Frederick A Praeger Publishers, 1967, p. 370;
Douhet, Guilio: The Command of the Air, USAF Warrior Studies, Office of the Air Force History, 1983, p.
12.
240  Schelling, Thomas C.: The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University, 1997, p. 2; Crowder, Gary L. (Col.):
Effects Based Operations Briefing, United States Department of Defense, News Transcript, Internet,
accessed 19. 03. 2003, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03202003_t0319effects.html.
241  Liddel Hart (1925), pp. 74, 75; Liddel Hart, Basil S.: The Revolution in Warfare, Faber and Faber Ltd.,
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is based mainly on political manoeuvres in the diplomatic field that can transition into military
operations if necessary.242 We can say that whereas brute force is aimed at the enemy’s
physical capabilities, military coercion rests on the exploitation of potential violence to influence
the enemy’s behaviour. In case the enemy does not comply, force is applied only as limited
military actions to persuade him.243
Figure 5 Different focuses of brute force and coercion
Military coercion regards fighting power as a flexible tool that helps achieve psychological
effects. Brute force sees fighting power as a blunt instrument to achieve an end-state regardless
of enemy behaviour. Similar to the assumptions of effects-based operations military coercion
stands for a more gradual, adequate and sophisticated response involving a broader range of
means.244
5.2 Types of Coercion
Coercion in general can be defined as “the use of threatened force, including the limited use of
actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise
would.” 245 In normal English usage terms such as to coerce and coercion have the following
meanings:
· Coercion is synonymous with force. Whereas meaning one (a) says that it is an act, which
includes the use of both physical and moral force to compel to act or assent, (b) states that it
242  Johnson, D. E./Mueller, K. P./Taft, W. H.: Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations,
The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment, RAND MR-1494, 2002, pp. 7-
10; Liddel Hart (1946), p. 87.
243  Schelling (1976), p. 214; Cimbala, pp. 162-164.
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L./Simmons, William E. (eds.): The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Westview Press, 1994, p. 10;
Rhodes, Edward: Power and MADness, The Logic of Nuclear Deterrence, Columbia University Press,
1989, p. 82; Liddel Hart (1967), p. 364; Liddel Hart (1925), p. 44.
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is a power or force that coerces. According to meaning two, coercion is the application of
sanctions in order to compel dissenters to conform. Meaning three emphasises it as a
physical force tending to constrict or compress.
· Meaning one of to coerce indicates restraint, control or domination; meaning two defines it
as to compel an act or choice by force, threat or other pressure. Definition three is the most
general and stands for effecting, bringing about, establishing or enforcing by force, threat or
other pressure.246
Both verb and noun stand for an outside influence that includes the possible application of force
or a forceful act. Based on the definitions above, coercion can be seen both as an act and a form
of power. It is a kind of control subset to some types of exercises that reveal a power relationship
with two universally recognised and intrinsic elements, such as the players and their actions. As
an example the term coercive internationalism refers to this power relationship by taking
incompatibilities between states for granted, but aims at abstaining governments with colliding
interests from escalation and war.247
5.2.1 Threat and Choice
Coercion in its purest form must not include the actual use of physical force since the power
relationship includes all means of influencing behaviour through the threat of harm. Coercion is a
two-sided activity in which the enemy is forced to perform or is restrained from performing a
certain act. In both cases actions and their consequences are detached from his desire as he is
not able to choose freely, but only to comply or risk a penalty. Thus the enemy can choose only
from a restricted set of alternatives since his will is subjected to that of the coercer. In this sense,
coercion is a particular way of bringing the enemy to perform an action under threat.248 Threat
coerces more than the reality of actions; therefore the coercer’s capabilities might matter less
than what the enemy thinks the coercer can do with his capabilities. Coercion takes the
perception of threat for granted and requires a communication of incentives about the automatic
consequences. Threat indicates the involvement of overt actions and not intentions with the
assumption that “one asserts that he will do, in contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not
to do if the contingency occurred, the contingency being governed by the second party’s
behaviour.”249 Although threat plays an important role in coercion it is only a substantial, but not
sufficient element. Sufficient coercion depends on the nature of the act, the character of the
harm involved and the circumstances framing that threat. Threat can never occur in a vacuum
since it is not intrinsically or inevitably coercive:
246  Gove, p. 439.
247  Rosenbaum, Alan S.: Coercion and Autonomy, Philosophical Foundations, Issues, and Practices,
Greenwood Press, 1986, pp. 3-11; Goldmann, Kjell: The Logic of Internationalism, Coercion and
Accommodation, Routledge, London New York, 1994, pp. 44-45.
248  Hoekema, David A.: Rights and Wrongs: The Justification of Coercion and Punishment, Ph. D. Thesis,
Princeton University, February 1981, Authorised Facsimile by University of Microfilms International, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, USA, 1985, pp. 4-9, 10-17.
249  Mueller (1998), p. 223; Jervis, Robert: Perceiving and Coping with Threat, in: Jervis, R./Lebow, R.
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82
· It can become insufficient either because it is simply not severe enough to achieve its
purpose, or not sufficiently severe to leave the opponent with only one reasonable choice.
· Whereas the first is insufficiency in relation to the opponent and circumstance, the second is
insufficiency in relation to the act.250
Threat indicates that the enemy acts in the only reasonable, but not necessarily the only possible
way. Threat must also be sufficiently serious to compel the enemy into acquiescence. He must
be threatened with a penalty that is severe enough to justify him in submitting. Coercion is
forcing the enemy to choose one option over another by making one more attractive. It is a
message about what the enemy should do with the difference in possible consequences. Threat
alters the attractiveness of options available with the prospect of both a negative and a positive
sanction. Coercing the enemy requires coercive power in order to achieve a desired outcome by
influencing enemy behaviour. Coercive power rests on a contingent strategy, credibility and
commitment. Unfortunately, coercion cannot always be successful since the enemy is either
rational and thinks that suffering the imposed unpleasantness is still more attractive than
yielding, or he is irrational and insensitive towards the sanctions imposed. Consequently,
coercion is context-dependent and only successful if we are able to alter key components in the
enemy’s decision calculus to compel concessions.251
5.2.2 Deterrence and Compellence
Although context dependency indicates coercion to be simple in theory, but complex in practice,
a rough subdivision into two broad categories such as deterrence and compellence is helpful.252
Both categories rest on mechanisms that manipulate the enemy’s decision-making calculus
either by the threat of force or its limited application. They are intimately linked in reality since
deterrence refers to something the opponent is already doing, which includes some aspects of a
compellent threat. Whereas in compellence the enemy is promised some reward if he yields, in
deterrence he faces a certain threat of pain if he does not.253 A further differentiation can be
based on whether the enemy must merely refrain from acting, must stop doing an ongoing
activity, or start a desired one. Deterrence and compellence reflect the difference between a
threat, intended to make the enemy do something and a threat intended to keep him from
starting something. The distinction is based on timing and initiative.254 Whereas deterrence is
rather passive, compellence is more active. The former is a static action and means setting the
stage and waiting, the latter is dynamic and stands for initiating an action or gaining momentum
250  Hoekema, pp. 21-27; On threat see Nozick, Robert: Coercion, in: Morgenbesser, S./Suppes, P./White,
M.: Philosophy, Science and Method, Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, St. Martin’s Press, 1969, pp.
441-472.
251  Hoekema, pp. 30, 38; Rhodes, pp. 82, 83-84, 86; Pape (1996), p. 38.
252  Byman/Waxman/Larson, p. 9; Wijk (2005), pp. 85-121; Johnson/Mueller/Taft, p. 10;
Byman/Waxman/Larson, pp. 69-78; Schaub, Gary, JR.: Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept, in
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of Military Might, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 6-9; Pape (1996), p. 4; Schelling (1976), p. 77;
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to make the opponent act. Regarding timing, deterrence is rather indefinite, but compellence
more definite, since too little time makes it impossible and too much unnecessary. Assurances
accompanying compellent actions are also difficult to demonstrate in advance, but in deterrence
the need for assurances emerges as an integral part. Deterrence is something like a defence,
and compellence is more like an offence, but as soon as the confrontation starts the difference
may vanish as coercion includes both. Whereas in deterrence there is a connection between the
proscribed action and threatened response, in compellence the connection is less defined or
does not exist as compellent mechanisms usually depend on threat and demand. Deterrence is
more future-oriented, since a threatening act intended to dissuade the opponent from
undertaking an action is not yet initiated. Compellence seems to be more cumbersome in this
regard as it does not offer a distinction between the defensive and offensive aspects of coercive
threats. Compellence simply does not leave space for other aspects, such as rational persuasion
and accommodation.255 In terms of future aspects deterrence may include promises of rewards
for complying with the coercer’s demands. Complying with one’s demands might be more
attractive and has the same effect as making defiance less attractive. Deterrence is convincing
the enemy not to take an action by making the expected benefit appear worse than the
consequences of not acting. It involves preventing the opponent from an action that has not yet
materialised. The point is that in deterrence nothing happens until the enemy acts contrary to our
demand. Deterrence seeks to discourage the opponent by altering his behaviour and influencing
his calculus for decision-making. Deterrence is a preventive approach to avoid certain outcomes
rather than an approach aimed at bending the enemy to our will. Compellence is more active
and better recognisable under duress. The difference between the two is similar to that of
inducing inaction or making the enemy perform. Thus compellence involves attempts to reverse
an action that has already occurred in order to overturn the status quo.256 Compellence means
causing an action favourable to our demands as successful threats do not have to be carried
out, but violence may be used in order to influence the enemy’s perception. Compellence
appears to be more risky since the initiative is ceded to the opponent, who can decide upon the
duration and cost of resistance. In general we can say that compellence tends to be more
difficult than deterrence. It is harder to force the opponent to reverse an action, than to not carry
it out. Threat in compellence can take the form of administering the punishment until the enemy
acts, and not if he acts. Success in compellence depends on the connection between threat and
demand, which can range from physical to psychological.257
5.2.3 Schools and Mechanisms
Although compellence is more difficult than deterrence, many deterrence situations can turn out
to be cases of compellence. Compellence also involves persuading the enemy to stop an
ongoing action or to start a new course of action by changing his calculations regarding costs
and benefits. In terms of the threatened sanctions, compellence seems to be more complex than
deterrence, although both share the vocabulary of threat and imply punishment in some form.
255  Schelling (1976), pp. 70-76, 78-80, 86-90; George, p. 7.
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The spectrum of coercion is characterised by compellence and deterrence, which indicates a
huge bandwidth for possible coercive mechanisms. Similar to effects-based operations
successful military coercion means understanding the basic logic of actions and the sensitivities
of the enemy. It goes together with a careful selection of proper mechanisms in order to affect
those sensitivities and the way they change over time.258 Based on writings during the Cold War,
the literature of military coercion is dominated by deterrence. Although during that period
deterrence was seen as the main business and compellence the exception, such preoccupations
have distorted the concept and often do not apply to the circumstances political and military
decision-makers face today.259 Nevertheless, the two categories and the four schools of thought
each describing one mechanism, will serve as a solid background for examining the similarities
between effects-based operations and military coercion.
258  Krause, p. 121; Pape (1996), p. 12; Treverton, pp. 5-6; Pape (1992), p. 429.
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6 Menace from the Air
This chapter introduces the first two schools of military coercion, which are punishment and risk.
The first school, punishment can be seen as a reaction to the brutality of trench warfare during
World War I, which was perceived by many as a march in barbary. As a reaction, strategists
everywhere wanted to answer the question of how wars could be waged more cleanly, more
decisively, more intelligently, and as humanly and civilised as possible. These theorists believed
in technological developments and saw the airplane as a revolutionary instrument that offered
alternative means to the futility and immobility of trench warfare. Punishment means that air
power is applied against population centres in order to achieve a quick inside-out collapse of the
enemy. Punishing civilians for supporting war efforts was regarded as a better mechanism for
achieving victory than being dragged into static military engagements based on attrition and
annihilation.260 The major theorists we introduce in this chapter are Douhet, Mitchell, members of
the Army Air Corps Tactical School (AACTS), and de Seversky, all representing punishment. In
respect to risk we introduce Brodie and Schelling.
6.1 Punishment – Enthusiasm for New Technology
Strategists of the inter-war period searched for ultimate means with maximum leverage in order
to shorten time and save resources. Their efforts were based in the context of total war between
modern industrialised nation-states and focused on reducing war sustainment capabilities by
affecting enemy population. Their theories reflected a mechanical image of war in which victory
would go to the nation with the greatest industrial resource. Strategists assumed that the entire
population together with all national resources would be required to wage war successfully as
wars would be total in character and scope. They wanted to avoid excessive bloodshed on the
battlefield and instinctively sensed that the coming era stood for a new age, and saw war in
technological terms. Industrial mass production, increasing mechanisation, and the combustion
engine made them assume that future wars were bound to be a matter of material and
machinery.261 They uncritically believed in the supremacy of the recently introduced aerial
weapon and stated that applied independently, it could destroy any target on its own. Their ideas
were filled with enthusiasm for the recently introduced new service. These theorists were
confident that air power could produce the speedy moral collapse of the enemy, which comes as
a result of quick and decisive effects. The trenches demonstrated the limitations of surface
forces; therefore the airplane was seen as a sort of advanced technology and regarded as a
superior alternative. These early theorists are all punishment-oriented since they did not make a
260  Malik, J. Mohan: The Evolution of Strategic Thought, in: Snyder, Craig A. (ed.): Contemporary Security
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difference between military and non-military objectives. Consequently, governments everywhere
assumed the worst, and starting with the 1930's the heavy shadow of bombers hung over the
cities throughout Europe.262 In general, the mechanism of punishment targets the enemy
nation’s will to resist, by making life so unpleasant and difficult that people would rise up and
prefer to comply with terms of surrender, rather than endure the imposed misery. Later
punishment was not limited to hitting the population and referred to the killing of military
personnel in large numbers in order to exploit casualty sensitivity of the enemy. Either way, the
aim is to increase costs of suffering that a society has to pay should it continue with the
resistance. In military terms, punishment means relentless bombing of civilian centres or
damaging the enemy’s economy in order to cause shortages in key supplies and services.263
6.1.1 Command of the Air - Douhet
The Italian military strategist, Giulio Douhet, was the first among air-power theorists who
advocated the superior quality of the airplane. He regarded the air as a battlefield, and lobbied
for air power’s independent application since Douhet regarded any auxiliary role conceptually
illogical. Victory in war depended on the technical means applied, from which the air power and
the application of poison gases were the most significant. War was a conflict between two
opposing wills in which air power was able to fly far behind fortified lines to make its effect felt
deep in the enemy country. The application of airplanes meant that all enemy citizens could be
exposed to offensives from the air since air power does not differentiate between soldiers and
civilians. Thus there was no effective defence against determined efforts aimed at bombing
cities.264 Douhet proposed offensive actions to achieve victory, for which air power was an
excellent weapon due to its ability to magnify the advantages of the offensive, and minimize or
even nullify the advantages of the defensive.265 Consequently, he opposed Clausewitz for whom
defence was the stronger form of combat. The guiding principle for bombing was based on
complete destruction of the objective in one attack in order to achieve moral and material effects,
the repercussion of which would become tremendous. Since Douhet did not differentiate
between military and non-military objectives, he suggested targeting industrial and commercial
establishments, important private and public buildings, transportation infrastructure, and centres
of civilian population. For bombs he advocated a mix consisting of explosives, incendiaries and
poison gases that should be dropped as uniformly as possible over a given area. He also
advocated aerial offensives “not only against objectives of least physical resistance, but against
those of least moral resistance”.266 He regarded offensive aerial actions so devastating that the
enemy’s physical and moral resistance would collapse. Command of the air meant for Douhet
victory based on mathematical certainty. He proposed striking the enemy by air power in the air,
at bases of operation, and at production centres. For him excluding the army and navy meant
262  Liddel Hart (1967), p. 360; Douhet, p. 20; Overy, Richard J.: The Air War 1939-1945, Stein and Day
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265  Ibid., pp. 12-15.
266  Clausewitz, p. 585; Douhet, pp. 20-22.
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achieving swift and crushing victory on the battlefield with least casualty and a minimum of
means involved.267 Regarding an independent air force he differentiated between two functions:
· Units of bombardment had to possess sufficient striking power to achieve significant results
by destroying the target completely. For one unit of bombardment he proposed ten planes,
which made attacks more effective and painful, thus paralyzing all human activity.
· Units of combat had the task of clearing out aerial opposition that may cross the path of
bombers in a mission.268
He wanted to achieve effects on the enemy through aerial offensives, concentrated in time and
space. Douhet did not propose any rules regarding the choice of enemy targets. However, he
saw target selection as the most delicate aspect of aerial warfare, which depended upon a
number of circumstances including material, moral, psychological, and other factors the
importance of which cannot be easily estimated. His aim was to smash the material and moral
resources of the enemy until all social organizations collapsed. Despite the horror of such
warfare he assumed that it might involve less bloodshed in the long run.269 In order to attain
maximum effectiveness he regarded the thorough co-ordination of land, naval and aerial forces
as paramount. War was for him fought in masses, composed of men and machines, in which an
independent air force must attain two strategic goals namely, achieving command of the air and
crushing the moral and material resistance of the enemy. The key elements of his theory were
the destruction of the enemy air force on the ground, achieving air supremacy and taking war
directly to the heart of the enemy. Thus air power was the ultimate strategic weapon and
strategy defined by its destructive potential.270
6.1.2 Winged Defence – Mitchell
The American proponent of air warfare, William “Billy” Mitchell, saw the aeronautical era of
mankind approaching, which would subjugate the atmosphere. As he wrote, the arrival of the
aircraft “set aside all ideas of frontiers … and, in case of war, one place is just as exposed to
attack as another place.”271 He built on Douhet’s ideas and emphasised the use of explosive
bombs and poison gas in order to make the enemy evacuate his population centres and cease
industrial production. However, unlike Douhet he thought that with the rapidity of technological
advances only the threat of aerial bombing would be sufficient. He pledged the importance of
achieving air supremacy that enables airplanes to fly over the enemy’s territory at will. He also
believed that aerial bombardments could make wars not only much sharper, but also more
decisive and shorter. Mitchell did not see the people as important targets, but rather the centres
of production such as “means of transportation, agricultural areas, ports and shipping … [that]
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cannot be replaced in the usual length of a modern war.”272 Victory depended on the amount of
air power produced and applied as aerial bombardments were for him the “most accurate
method of hurling a missile”.273 Air power has a decisive impact on the enemy’s capability and
will to fight since air battles would be of so far reaching effect that the nation loosing them could
do nothing, but to capitulate without resorting to further contest. He regarded air power as a
punitive element of the first order that could fly straight to the heart of the enemy country and
destroy its capacity to make war in an incredibly short time. Air power makes it possible to attack
any human population centre ranging from large cites down to a simple hamlet, and once the
control of the air was established its effect was terrific, cumulative and constantly becoming
greater. He envisioned the air force as an independent service, established to attain victory first
in the air and then to destroy enemy establishments on the ground. He advocated a mixed air
force composed of fighter, pursuit and bomber airplanes that possessed the ability for both
offensive and defensive applications. Air power was for him a strategic weapon, but not the
ultimate one.274 Mitchell envisioned the enemy country as an integrated and mutually supporting
system, susceptible to sudden destruction and laid the foundation of the industrial web theory. In
order to exploit the air fully, he suggested employing the air force on the strategic level aimed at
achieving strategic level effects. He also proposed destroying the enemy’s war-making capability
and questioned the need to defeat his army in the field. According to Mitchell the airplane was
able to fly directly to the enemy’s heart to paralyse any form of resistance.
6.1.3 Attacking Bottlenecks – Army Air Corps Tactical School
Faculty members of the AACTS took Mitchell’s ideas further by extending his theory. They
assumed that the delicate balance of interdependent segments within national structures could
be offset by air power in order to break civilian moral. Their assumption was that through the
destruction of selected targets it would become possible to disrupt the enemy’s economy, which
both discommodes his population in its daily existence, and brakes the faith in the military
establishment. Applying pressure to certain vital links and nodes can create an imbalance that
leads to the collapse of enemy morale, and paralyses economic factors essential for waging war.
This assumption received a considerable boost with the introduction of the then-superior B-17
and the advanced Norden Mark XV bombsight equipment, despite the fact that the effect they
might produce had yet to be determined. The basic assumption was that victory in war comes as
a result of disrupting national life quickly and efficiently. The enemy nation was regarded as an
interlaced web and it was assumed that dislocations would produce disturbances since industrial
capacities are neither separated, nor disconnected.275 This systemic approach regarded nation-
states as interconnected economic systems with detectable critical points. It was thought that the
destruction of these points through high-altitude precision bombing could achieve strategic
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effects.276 Attacking those vulnerable elements, also called bottlenecks reveals the greatest
cumulative effect on the enemy’s economic structure. In order to destroy the right elements they
proposed that intelligence should not only be in the realm of sheer military activity, but must rest
on the collaboration of economists, statisticians, and other area experts. This approach was
based on indirect attacks on the enemy through his economy, with the assumption that attacking
economic facilities leads to victory through disorganisation and dislocation. Identifying and
disabling such facilities within the economy is critical in weakening the enemy’s collective will.
Although nations differ both in vulnerability and structure, it was thought that a thorough analysis
could reveal those critical elements, which support the enemy’s will to resist. For such theorists
air power could be applied as a force that can efficiently solve policy disputes on its own through
daylight offensive precision bombardments. The emphasis on daylight precision bombardments
requiring no fighter escort achieved a dogma-like status, and was not abandoned until the clear
demonstration of its failure in 1943.277 Members of the AACTS believed in the ability of air power
to break down the enemy’s will and capability to fight, either by destroying the web of organic
industrial systems in the enemy’s interior, or by paralysing organic industrial, economic and civic
activities. Whereas the first was responsible for the armed forces in the field, the second
provided for the existence of the enemy nation. Air power was seen as able to destroy those
critical systems that were crucial to other industrial branches, and the population such as
“production and distribution of electricity, fuel, food, and steel: transportation networks: and
certain specialised factories, especially those producing electrical generators, transformers and
motors”.278 A small amount of carefully concentrated destruction of critical nodes was assumed
to be enough to cause the fragile economic system of the enemy to collapse. This paralysis
could shatter the will of the people so much that they would stop fighting and force the
government to surrender.279
6.1.4 Victory through Air Power – de Seversky
For the American strategist, Alexander de Seversky, aviation was a paramount and decisive
factor in war-making. As a swift and destructive weapon it also influenced tactics and strategy.
He regarded air power a dynamic and expanding force that spoke a strategic language requiring
the capability to out-build, out-think and out-plan any potential enemy. Similar to the members of
AACTS, air power was for him a weapon that could strike at the enemy nation’s nerve centres
and jugular veins. He believed that a total war from the air was possible and that such a war did
not proceed piecemeal since the whole enemy country was regarded as a target. For him, war
was no longer seen focused on occupation, but destruction that should be systematic and
scientific. Instead of being dragged into a mutual slaughter of soldiers, genuine air power could
make the short cut that comes as a result of an all-out aerial assault on the enemy. Air power
indicated to him that mankind arrived at the age of tri-dimensional warfare in which air
276  Belote, Howard, D. (Maj.): Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School, What Goes Around Comes
Around, Airpower Journal, Fall 1999, p. 40.
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dominance provides for a solid and impregnable roof.280 Aviation as a new weapon altered the
principles of war and by opening a new and vast sphere of conquest it became the key to
modern strategy. He dismissed the idea that air power alone could not achieve definitive victory
over an enemy. He firmly believed that a nation could be forced to surrender from the air alone
for which he suggested the following prerequisites: sufficient combat power to eliminate and
neutralize enemy air power; correct and intelligent choice of vital targets against industrial
centres, especially those of the aviation industry; adequate bombing power mostly expressed in
load-carrying capacity; commitment in the form of continuity of action and endurance of effort.281
For de Seversky, the advent of aerial warfare widens the choice of method since it either
reinforces the traditional patterns of war such as invasion and occupation, or strikes at the
enemy as a totality. This way the enemy’s entire war potential could be disarmed directly and
reduced to a helpless mass without the need for an invasion and mile-by-mile conquest.
Although he differentiated between war of possession and war of elimination, air power meant
more efficiency in both. Whereas large-scale demolition carried out by army units would look like
horrifying vandalism, aerial bombing as a kind of technical preparation or softening.282
Consequently, air power brought some new principles into the science of war-making,  such as
any kind of operation requires control of the air, and an umbrella provided by air power is the
minimal condition in any surface warfare. Furthermore he claimed that only precision bombing
aimed at planned and predetermined military and public facilities can destroy enemy morale from
the air. Aerial blockades that systematically wreck the implements and channels of normal life
can brake down both the enemy’s will and ability to fight. For de Seversky aviation was, the first
and foremost firearms of the twentieth century and deserves a prime position in modern
warfare.283
6.2 Shattering Enemy Morale
Punishment rested on the assumption that by bombing the population as a homogenous,
passive mass, it would revolt against the government demanding surrender. As depicted in
Figure 6, the primary effect sought was psychological assuming that victory “w[ould] lie with
whichever side first gains the moral objective.”284 The mechanism aimed either at achieving
psychological effects directly through the use of area weapons such as incendiary bombs and
poison gases, or indirectly through shortages caused in basic public services. Air power was
regarded as a psychological tool and the idea of aerial warfare slowly became an all-
encompassing credo possessing decisive and transformative power. Loose ideas turned into
dogma as numerous publications detailed how to achieve victory through psychological effects
aimed at changing behaviour.285 The focus on destruction explains why the theorists never really
quailed at the notion of the mass killing of civilians and as a logical consequence bombings
delivered no escape from the horrors of the trenches of World War I. Not for the soldiers who
280  Seversky, Alexander P. de (Maj.): Victory Trough Air Power, Simon and Schuster, 1942, pp. 3-41.
281  Ibid., pp. 47-73.
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285  Budiansky, pp. 132-136.
91
flew the planes in the air and much less for the civilians who experienced the bombs on the
ground below.286
Figure 6 Primary effect sought in coercion by punishment
In general punishment can be considered as an attempt to make war fit a mechanism, instead of
developing a mechanism that fits the characteristics of war. A constant over-estimation of the
capability of air power contributed to didactic and rationalist strategies based on unilateral
actions with standards and methods applicable to all wars. Minimum attention was paid to the
context since the assumption that maximum force always results in maximum effects was never
questioned. One explanation for this bias is that there was simply no proven knowledge
regarding aerial warfare at that time. Plans for employing air power and assumptions regarding
their probable strategic effect had no practical experience of what the bomber really can and
cannot do, in modern wars. Achieving psychological effects was always the equivalent of hitting
morale. In the end punishment theories failed because “threats to inflict harm on civilian
populations by conventional bombing have never forced an adversary to abandon important
goals.”287
6.2.1 Reality Check
The consequence of punishment in World War II was that there was no difference between the
home front and the war front. The reality of war became a first-hand experience both for civilians
and soldiers alike. However, the large-scale bombing campaigns of the 20th century showed that
the morale of any given society can be quite resilient, even under harshest consequences. Air
raids against Germany obviously damaged the prestige of the Nazi regime, but the political
conditions were never close to the desired collapse in terms of war-willingness, sought so
286  Liddel Hart (1946), p. 15; Budiansky, p. 330; Meilinger, in: Hallion, p. 57; Luttwak, Edward A.: Strategy,
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desperately by Allied commanders. In the case of Japan where bombing lowered both the
morale of the population and the willingness to work, surrender was an open discussion, but
there was no attempt to overthrow the regime. A British study examining the effects of
bombardments in Hull and Birmingham also concluded that despite the damage, the overall
willingness of the workforce to work was not affected.288 Contrary to the assumptions of the
industrial web theory, economies were able to recover surprisingly fast. National industries were
sufficiently resilient and robust to accept strategic bombardments. Due to the German military
success in 1941 thousands of Soviet industrial facilities were destroyed or abandoned. The
overall output sank to a fraction of the level before the invasion, and the economy faced a
complete collapse. However, Soviet industrial output was able to supply nearly three-quarters of
weapons and almost all of the iron and steel in 1942. Despite the immense disaster at the
beginning of the war and the fact that the rest of the economy remained as critical as of 1941,
the output of each worker in the war industry increased up to three-times during the war.
German industrial output, despite the heavy bureaucratic structure and increasing losses due to
attrition on the fronts, and relentless Allied bombings, peaked in September 1944. In the end
even firm believers of punishment had to admit that air power might be the first decisive of
factors, but it was never decisive in itself. Thus anticipations regarding its decisive effects were
disproved by events, even when the original concept of precision bombing was abandoned and
cities saw wholesale carpet bombings.289
6.2.2 Destruction, not Decision
World War II showed that punishment as mechanism was more destructive than decisive. It
successfully contributed to the process of attrition, but did not produce the expected
psychological effect in the form of a quick collapse of enemy morale. Strategic bombing
campaigns attacked the foundations of civilized life as the bomber offensive could only be
expected to be decisive in the long term. Regarding industrial performance the bombing
campaigns certainly lowered the maximum possible output, but never reduced the overall output
until the very end of the war.290 National identity and cohesion are powerful driving forces for
accepting great sacrifice in which economic and social suffering is regarded as part of business
during wartime. Even the heaviest bombings with conventional weapons can kill only a small
percentage of the population. Evacuation, relocation and other counter-measures can further
cushion the effects of punitive action. There is also a huge difference between personal
frustration and collective rage as political alienation is often more important than economic
hardship and deprivation.291 Punishment based on aerial bombardments assuming that air power
could do it alone, proved to be a dead end. As examples showed the only way bombing could
destroy anything, was to destroy everything. In the end cities became the target and not
factories. The physical was attacked as nobody thought of the psychological. This inefficiency
288  Budiansky, pp. 284, 308; Overy (1981), pp. 122, 125.
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can be greatly explained by the fact that people can adapt and accommodate to worsening living
conditions as long as the process is gradual.292
6.3 Risk – Nuclear Weapons Theory
The second school is risk. Unlike punishment, risk as mechanism is associated with the
existence of the nuclear weapon. The period between the end of World War II and the demise of
the Soviet Union is often seen as a period of simple nuclear deterrence. The atomic bomb forced
theorists to developed new ideas in terms of mechanism. As both superpowers possessed
nuclear weapons, a total war without any regard to possible consequences was not feasible. All-
out nuclear wars based on large-scale bombardments were considered as mutually suicidal.293
The focus shifted more to issues regarding how to negotiate, and not how to act. Not the sheer
existence of the atomic bomb became important, but its effects on the traditional pattern of war
that governed the adjustments of states in terms of their relations. It was assumed that the
arrival of the atomic bomb changed the main purpose of the armed forces as from then on their
existence was aimed at avoiding, and not winning wars. The emerging school of risk focused on
achieving a right balance between clarity and ambiguity, rationality and irrationality, credibility
and capability.294 Its mechanism aimed more at affecting the enemy’s perception and not his
capabilities. The emphasis shifted towards apportionment and timing, which were seen as
crucial elements in the employment of force. Risk indicates that the civilian costs of defying are
inflicted gradually as operations escalate slowly in intensity and geographical extent, interrupted
only temporarily as a result of the enemy’s reactions.295
6.3.1 Absolute Weapon – Brodie
According to the American military strategist, Bernard Brodie, the airplane added only a new
dimension to the battle and to the traditional patterns of war. However, the atomic bomb
increased its potential enormously as even a single aircraft equipped with such weapon could
inflict an unprecedented amount of destruction on the enemy. He regarded the atomic bomb as
an epochal invention in the history of military technological developments, which introduced a
greater economy of destruction, and turned strategic bombing the dominant form of future wars.
The amount of destruction inflicted on the enemy is bound to be decisive, which renders other
kind of military operations mostly superfluous.296 The sheer destructive potential requires
politicians, who can control their emotions and keep only a moderate amount of adversity. Brodie
did not regard fighting as glamorous and emphasised negotiation over action, caution over
boldness and reflection over feeling. The presence of the atomic bomb meant that basic
decisions about wars had to be made in peacetime. In the case of war everything would be
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much too late. Approaches that rest on traditional military virtues such as seizing initiative to
carry the fight to the enemy must be replaced by other and better ideas. The strategy of
deterrence was aimed at limiting the tolerable amount of destruction. The emphasis was on
avoiding total thermonuclear war at almost any cost since such wars would not permit survival.
Deterrence stands for the status quo and the importance of becoming aware of attendant risks
and taking them into account properly. It acquires a special connotation since deterrence differs
markedly from all-out wars in several respects. It must rely on an absolutely effective threat,
which is never allowed to break down. This requires a retaliatory instrument that is never called
upon to function though its efficiency and readiness must be maintained. In other words,
deterrence rests on a system, which is always ready and permanently unused. Thus deterrence
does not depend on superiority per se.297 Deterrence is not absolute either, but only relative and
its effectiveness must be measured based on the power it holds in check and the incentives to
possible aggression. In the age of the thermonuclear bomb the deterrent value of an inferior
force is much greater than in earlier epochs of history. The increase of its effect is less than
proportional to the increase in potential destruction. Each unit of additional damage
progressively diminishes the increments of deterrence. Deterrence takes place in the
psychological domain and much depends on the other side’s actions. Deterrence deliberately
plays with the uncertainty coming from the enemy’s mind. Although gain cannot be measured in
the simple amount of damage, the degree of incentive to aggression is at the heart of
deterrence. The size and efficiency of the armed forces manifest in the physical domain do not
matter. What is important is the way those forces manifest themselves in the psychological
domain of the enemy’s thinking regarding how those forces will be used. Deterrence means that
the enemy must expect a certain amount of vindication and irrationality in case force will be
used, preferably against his major centres of population. Logically, should war erupt he
suggested developing super dirty bombs that produce the maximum amount of radioactive
fallout in order to achieve maximum effect.298
6.3.2 Exploiting Uncertainty – Schelling
The American economist and strategist, Thomas L. Schelling, saw war as a confusing and
uncertain activity in which due to the involvement of fallible human beings, the outcome is highly
unpredictable. Consequently, he understood international relations as a competition in risk-
taking, a test of nerve, a large-scale game in which victory is achieved as much by trick as by
merit. Issues in the international arena are decided not by the force that can be brought to bear,
but by the eventual willingness to bring more force to bear if need be. Manipulating the shared
risk of war means exploiting the danger that one opponent could go over the brink and drag the
other with him. He admitted that such manipulation contains the risk of escalation.299 Similar to
Brodie, Schelling emphasised the psychological dimension of the conflict in order to modify
behaviour through the employment of both threat and the actual use of force. He suggested
targeting the enemy’s government and population in a two-fold application of force, as brute
force and coercion. In order to win wars he regarded demonstrations and bargaining much more
important than target destruction based on local tactical purposes. Target selection should not
297  Ibid., pp. 264-278.
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95
be based on tactical importance, but on influencing the enemy’s perception about one’s intent
and the character of war. The difference was not in the sheer number of destroyed targets, but in
the perception of risks and intent, which all influence the conduct or termination of war. Extra
targets destroyed are just noise that distorts the message, since war never involves only
antagonism, but also co-operation.300 Thus armed forces had to be used either to hurt or destroy
value, in order to change behaviour and induce co-operation. Consequently, war meant for
Schelling both hurting and damaging the value system of the enemy on the strategic level. The
outcome is more determined by the manipulation of risk rather than by the actual use of force.
Although he emphasised deterrence, he also stressed that compellence could convince the
enemy to accommodate. Military force had to act as a source of pain in order to make threats
credible. Waging war required knowledge about the enemy’s painful areas and a force that could
inflict punishment in a gradual way. The power to hurt must induce cumulative losses, which
should be more unattractive than the war is worth, or induce the enemy into making
concessions, compromises or limited manipulations.301 Actions must aim at inflicting loss of
value by raising the costs until the enemy comes to terms. War must be conducted in measured
doses in a gradual, deliberate, and less concentrated fashion. Schelling regarded hurting as an
indirect action that depends more on threat than on damage already done. He also demanded
restraints in war because risk aims at exacting good behaviour and obliging discontinuance of
mischief, but not destroying the enemy altogether. Threat obviates the need for the actual use of
force, in which only a minimum amount of force is required in order to initiate fear of future
attacks. Schelling did not exclude that the enemy can value the armed forces rather than the
economy, but made a clear difference between coercing the enemy’s government and his
population. Coercion must be directed against things the adversary values most. Consequently,
he always emphasised the difference between civilian or non-military targets and civilians
themselves.302
6.4 Weapons Unused
Schelling was convinced that few parts of the world were worth of a serious war. However,
defending such parts or running risks in order to protect them might preserve commitment to act
elsewhere and at later times. Risk-based military coercion is also biased towards the strategic
application of air power. However, it reflects the existence of the nuclear weapon and its effect,
which is not that it will make war more violent, but it concentrates violence in terms of time. This
overwhelming power rendered the aspect of precision irrelevant and as a consequence,
targeting did not go beyond vague categories. The assumed causal relationship between aerial
attacks and political outcome rested on the overwhelming physical and psychological power of
the atomic bomb, which did not encourage the re-examination of old strategic bombing
dogmas.303 The prospect of a nuclear war was an excellent background for achieving
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psychological effects on the enemy despite the fact that risk requested a weapon that should
never be used. The real value of influencing the enemy in order to induce a behavioural change
was in the threat that such weapons embodied.304 Terms such as mutual assured destruction
reflected the idea that a full-scale atomic war or even a limited version of it would run counter to
national interest as risk focused on the same categories and assumed the same mechanism as
punishment. Massive damage simply meant reducing leverage. The real value of risk lays in its
potential to signal that future damage will come, and cease only if the enemy complies with the
demand.305
Figure 7 Primary effect sought in coercion by risk
Whereas punishment was intended to get to psychological effects in the fastest possible time
without taking care whether the hostage was alive or not, risk focused very much on keeping
targets such as the enemy’s population and economy alive as long as possible. Although risk
aims at the same targets as punishment, it slowly raises the amount of destruction. The key is to
inflict damage at a gradual rate rather than destroying the target at once. Risk acknowledges
that effects must be achieved in a nuclear age in which wars are fought to be terminated, but not
terminated definitively. Compared with punishment, risk is a rather defensive approach that
emphasises deterrence in order to make the enemy accept certain conditions. It is not re-
establishing the status quo by using military means, but preserving it and signalling the
possibility of further interventions by military means. It is punishment-by-timing since it attempts
to inflict costs at a gradual and increasing rate.306 As Figure 7 displays, similar to punishment the
primary effect sought in risk was also psychological, but due to the absolute character of the
nuclear weapon, destruction was not seen as a viable mean. The exclusive focus on influence
indicates that risk seems to be less effective than punishment. Damage in the future instead of
the present appears to be a weak coercive leverage. Wars in Vietnam and Korea showed that
actual damage can be quite high with conventional weapons, but it is physically impossible to kill
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all of the enemy’s population and industry. Apart from the time aspect and the means employed,
there is no real difference between punishment and risk. As a RAND study examining the effects
of military operations on Viet Cong behaviour summarised, enemy units could suffer
considerable losses from surprise air attacks, but “in many instances bombing was either
inaccurate or failed to inflict major casualties”.307 Threatened damage can also not exceed the
actual damage imposed by punishment and its step-wise accumulation leaves chance to adjust.
Risk simply leaves too many opportunities for the enemy to act, who can turn the situation to his
advantage. Increasing damage gradually can also suggest loss of commitment, which can
evaporate credibility. As the RAND study pointed out, bombing civilians was rarely a cause to
revolt as during interrogations captives often denied that attacks on villages were a major cause
to join the Viet Cong. Thus risk strategies can probably enhance the settlement of nuclear
disputes when political constraints prevent a thermo-nuclear punishment campaign, but barely
work in conventional crises and confrontations.308
307  Quotation in Goure, Leon: Some Impressions of the Effects of Military Operations on Viet Cong
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7 Battlefield Re-Orientation
In this chapter we introduce the last two schools of military coercion, which are decapitation and
denial. As their names imply, these two schools focus either on decapitating the enemy or
denying him the ability to use his armed forces properly. Despite their recent character, the roots
of these two schools are deep. Whereas decapitation resuscitates many elements of classical air
force theories advocating strategic bombing, the origins of denial can be found as early as in the
works of some British strategists.309 The major theorists we introduce in this chapter are Warden
associated with the decapitation school of thought, and Slessor, Liddel Hart and Pape, all
representing the denial school of thought.
7.1 Decapitation – War Based on Equation
Decapitation as a school goes back to the American Air Force officer John Warden. He can be
seen an iconoclast to critics and a visionary to admirers. Warden became famous with his
systematic approach that depicts the enemy in the form of five concentric rings.310 According to
him modern industrial societies possess resilient industrial facilities with no single key to achieve
leverage. Consequently, the commander’s most important responsibility is the correct
identification and appropriate strike of enemy centres of gravity. The latter should be done by
decisive blows that come as a result of air superiority. No state has lost a war while it was able to
maintain air superiority, which is always the prelude to military victory.311
7.1.1 Strategic Warfare – Warden
Similar to most strategic bombing theorists, also Warden advocates the importance of air
superiority. Key to it is for him materiel, personnel and position. Due to their combination any
analysis is impossible and simplification is required. Similar to Douhet also he describes
defensive operations as a negative concept since they delegate the initiative to the enemy. In
detailing offensive operations he argues that the enemy’s centre of gravity may be in equipment
such as planes and missiles; logistics such as supply support; geography such as operational
and support facilities; and personnel such as pilots and command and control facilities.312 He
regards the last to be the true centre of gravity which, if successfully destroyed or isolated,
equals decapitation with serious or even fatal consequences. Although command and control
facilities are resilient and difficult to destroy, three areas such as information, decision and
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communication appear to be vulnerable. A successful attack on one of these spheres decreases
the effectiveness of enemy operations as “even a slight disturbance … can be dangerous or …
catastrophic.”313 Although all services can attack those centres of gravity, Warden thinks that
only air power can circumvent enemy forces and attack directly.314 He also emphasises that
military operations must be conducted in a way that directly supports political objectives.
Furthermore, military objectives and plans must be tied to political objectives as seen through
the enemy’s eyes. Military objectives generally fall for him into three categories such as
destruction of enemy forces, the enemy’s economy with its war-related components, and the will
to resist. He asserts that direct attacks on the will of the population are difficult to carry out. The
population is either more resilient than expected or has no influence on the government.
However, once the objectives are identified, he suggests an in-and-out campaign, an indirect
approach that does not focus on the enemy’s armies and makes war shorter and cheaper in
terms of blood and treasure. His suggestion is to go directly to the political centre of gravity and
avoid direct encounters with enemy’s forces. He sees air power as a key force and claims that in
modern warfare orchestration and not subordination or integration of services is important.
Gaining territory should not be regarded as an objective for the military since focusing on
territory is beguiling, time deceiving, and the commander must be careful with both.315
7.1.2 Towards Hyper-War
He terms the approach to link political ends with military means strategic warfare that rests on
deductive top-down thinking and proceeds from the big picture to the small. His early ideas on
orchestrating war are further developed and summarised in a model depicting the enemy as a
system of five rings. The rings are in concentric order fielded military, population, infrastructure,
organic essentials and leadership as the bull’s eye in the middle.316 Strategic warfare focuses on
the totality of the enemy in order to produce desired effects in which the clash of forces is only a
means to an end, but not the end in itself. His approach rests on the assumption that the enemy
is composed of numerous subsystems that can be affected to combine minimum effort with
maximum effect. As Warden argues, clashes of fielded forces are the most costly and least
productive in the majority of cases.317 According to him, war can be depicted in the form of a
simple equation in which the physical and moral components define the outcome.
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Whereas the physical is theoretically knowable, the moral is beyond the predictable.
Consequently, efforts must focus on the physical domain. Military objectives at the strategic level
must have a political value that imposes paralysis upon the enemy on the highest level. He
understands paralysis as changes to one or some parts of the enemy's physical systems in a
way that he decides to adopt our objectives, because physical opposition is impossible for him. If
any part of the system stops working properly it also affects all other parts. However, he also
admits that there might be a delay between strategic events and subsequent tactical effects. In
strategic warfare the entire enemy system is targeted, which starts with large entities and works
downwards to small details as required.318 Decapitation aims at enemy command and control by
threatening it directly or through indirect pressures on the outer rings. Warden regards control of
the enemy’s command structure as the ultimate goal of military operations. By moving outward
the redundancy of the enemy system grows and the chance of being dragged into a classical
war of attrition and annihilation increases. He sees the purpose of war in doing something to the
enemy’s centre or to prevent him from doing something to ours.319 Affecting the bull’s eye either
forces the enemy to make concessions, or he is no longer able to pursue actions. Unfortunately,
he asserts that threatening the command element directly is not always possible and indirect
pressure must be applied to make the enemy realise that further actions are impossible and he
is unable to continue with combat activities. He terms this sort of war the hyper-war that
capitalizes on advanced technology, precision in hitting the target, and surprise at the
operational and strategic levels. Hyper-war expresses the ability to attack all of the enemy’s key
operational and strategic nodes near-simultaneously. In this sort of war we achieve strategic
paralysis through parallel attacks by hitting targets in a single blow, which makes an effective
response impossible. It is just the opposite of the traditional serial warfare, which makes him
conclude that the history of warfare has eventually arrived at the age of the airplane.320
7.1.3 Axiological Targeting
Warden’s systemic approach soon became popular in the air force community and resulted in an
abundance of clones and modifications.321 Among others it was refined and made more focused
also by Wijninga and Szafranski. They assume that unlike during the Second Wave when
dominant mechanisms and measurements for air targeting were based only on utility, in the
Third Wave the focus will move beyond utility targeting aimed at things that enemy leaders
value. The enemy is also for them reducible to targeting templates, but they emphasise that it is
equally important to realise that the enemy is a complex human organisation. Their composite
model combines Warden’s five rings with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs in order to show that
value targeting of leadership at every level of war and utility targeting of military assets is the
right combination. This way the enemy is equally affected in the material and non-material
318  Warden (1995); Warden’s equation is Clausewitzian who regarded war as a destructive test expressing
“physical and moral strength. Whoever has the greater sum of both left at the end is the victor”.
Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 274.
319  Warden (1992), p. 63; Warden (1995).
320  Warden (1992), pp. 64-65, 78-84.
321  See Felker, Edward J. (Lt. Col.): Airpower, Chaos and Infrastructure, Lords of the Rings, Air War
College, Air University, Maxwell Paper No. 14, Maxwell AFB, July 1998.
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domains. Axiological targeting capitalises on attributes of the Third Wave with its global
connectivity. Whereas utility targeting engages objects which are of value in the physical
domain, value targeting is aimed at the minds and needs of leaders. Utility targeting denies
functions, value targeting deprives needs and due to their combination the enemy declares
cessation of fighting as a desired effect. In sum, axiological targeting regards non-military
centres of gravity as more important and counter-value targets as more strategic than counter-
force targets.322
7.2 Strategic Bombing Revitalised
Decapitation is the culmination of earlier strategic bombing ideas wrapped in a different and
more sophisticated vocabulary. It is a theory that resuscitates old ideas of strategic bombing by
injecting new technology and terminology into it. The enemy is not one mass with only two vague
strategic vulnerabilities such as population and economy, but a system depicted as interlinked
concentric rings. This approach also regards the enemy mechanistically as a passive collection
of targets that can be reduced to simple templates.323
Figure 8 Primary effect sought in coercion by decapitation
Similar to strategic bombing theories decapitation offers only insufficient tools to grasp the
enemy’s true nature with his social contours and the way he organises for war. It is a schematic
representation, a disembodiment that rests on five tangible and discrete categories assumed to
be constant during war.324 In general Warden’s ideas reflect both the political changes that
322  Wijninga, Peter W. W. (Col.)/Szafranski, Richard: Beyond Utility Targeting, Toward Axiological Air
Operations, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000, pp. 47-56; Kan, Paul R. Dr.: What Should We
Bomb? Axiological Targeting and the Abiding Limits of Airpower Theory, Air Power Review, Volume 7,
Number 3, 2004, p. 33.
323  Budiansky, p. 413; Ware, Lewis Dr.: Ware on Warden: Some Observations of the Enemy as a System,
Airpower Journal, Winter 1995, Internet, accessed 07. 06. 2004, available at www.airpower.
maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ware.html.
324  Soonthornkit, Saridporn (Wing. Com.): Sun Tzu, Strategic Paralysis and Small Nations, Air Power
Review, Volume 4, Number 4, 2001, pp. 40-46.
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resulted in fundamental reorganisation of the world, and the advent of a new military-
technological revolution. Precision and stealth are the two main enablers of decapitation, which
made Warden to assume that fighting is neither the essence of war nor a desirable part of it. For
him the real essence of it is taking necessary actions to make the enemy accept our objectives
as his objectives. As depicted in Figure 8, decapitation stands for a conceptual shift in military
coercion theories as the focus moved from achieving psychological effects towards systemic
effects in the physical domain. The aim is to paralyse the enemy on a strategic scale by inducing
system-wide havoc and disturbance. According to decapitation destruction of the enemy’s armed
forces is desirable only if it leads directly to political objectives. The underlying assumption is that
leadership acts like a body’s brain. If it is destroyed the body dies, if it is isolated the body is
paralysed, and if it is confused the body becomes uncontrollable.325 In decapitation air force is
regarded as a central service, a strategic instrument capable of organising its own military
operations at all levels of war. Decapitation is based on the assumption that air power can create
systemic effects beyond the scope of the geographically oriented surface battle. It does not need
to proceed through the tactical-operational-strategic levels of war to fight a “prolonged duel of
powerful weapons against even more powerful defense fortresses”.326 Decapitation means that
air power can achieve systemic effects with theatre-wide significance just bypassing surface
forces. Unfortunately, similar to the theories of the inter-war period also the mechanism upon
which decapitation rests is more a “principled belief rather than … reason, and principled belief –
however powerful or well intended – is by definition not susceptible to rational explanation.”327
7.3 Denial – Achieving Imbalance of Forces
The last school of thought we introduce is denial, which indicates that inflicting sufficient pain on
the enemy’s society or decapitating the political and military leadership is simple beyond the
capacity of conventional armed forces. In contrast to the previous three schools it is again
surface-focused as the underlying mechanism seeks to ruin the feasibility of the enemy’s
strategy in terms of achieving his territorial objectives. Denial stands for compelling concessions
to avoid futile expenditure of resources. It does not attempt to cause suffering to the population,
but focuses on prohibiting the enemy from achieving his territorial objectives.328 Although denial
is not as consistent as the previous schools of thought, the approaches we introduce make it
possible to discern a clear relationship with the three common elements of effects-based
operations.
7.3.1 Air Power and Armies – Slessor
The Britain John C. Slessor, Marshall of the Royal Air Force, differentiated three types of war
that had appeared since the eighteenth century. Whereas the first type was the classical war of
battlefields and sieges, the second was the war of lines such as World War I. The third type was
325  Warden (1995); Pape (1996), p. 80; For decapitation effects see Gordon/Trainor, pp. 312-321.
326  Noedskov, K. (Maj.): Systematizing Effect Based Air Operations, Air & Space Power Chronicles,
Internet, accessed 27. 09. 2002, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/
noedskov.html; Quotation in Douhet, pp. 12-13.
327  Quotation in Ware.
328  Pape (1996), p. 20; Pape (1992), p. 441.
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the war of vast areas as waged in World War II. This type of war he also described as the first air
war in which the enemy country itself and the population became the primary objectives of
attacks. Although he believed that modern air power made the traditional meaning of the
battlefield irrelevant, he thoroughly examined the relationship between air power and armies.329
He saw the object of an air force in a land campaign in assisting and co-operating with the army
in the field. Its aim is to defeat the enemy’s army and air forces through destruction of his land
forces, communications and system of supply. Slessor also paid attention to another aspect,
which he regarded as the positive influence of direct air strikes on objectives on the ground.
Once the enemy army was defeated he suggested the ultimate reduction of the enemy nation by
air measures that could be directed against vital centres to put the population under unrestricted
air actions. He regarded air superiority as the control of air communications with the aim to break
down the resistance of the enemy’s army. Otherwise, the air situation had for him no importance
in any form of war, except of its effect on the situation on the ground. Successful air operations
required a dynamic enemy since “air action against the communications and back areas of an
enemy army cannot have a decisive effect unless that army is being forced to fight”.330 In order
to achieve air superiority he suggested two principles:
· The resolute bombing of the enemy’s vital centres, which destruction or even interruption
can result in fatal effects in terms of continued vitality.
· Since he did not regard vital centres strictly as military assets he further proposed direct
actions against the enemy’s air forces to a varying degree.331
He assumed that the importance of vital centres might vary from time to time according to the
strategic situation and claimed that the selection of appropriate objectives must rest on the most
exhaustive use of resources and information. As he argued such a meticulous system of
intelligence should involve all available political and industrial sources.332 Air superiority could
only be secured by offense with objectives falling into two main classes with distinctions
becoming nebulous as soon as war starts. The first objective was fighting troops and meant
killing in order to prevent the enemy to be in the right place at the right time or reducing his
fighting efficiency by denying access to food supplies and various sorts of war material. Fighting
troops could also be conceptualized broadly as lines of communication and headquarters. The
second objective was supply, which he subdivided into rough headings such as production,
which meant the movement of goods of every kind from source up to the area of operations,
reserves of such material, and distribution throughout the lines of communications.333 His
concept of strategic air concentration was due to the fact that he underrated the effects of
bombing on the morale of the civilian population. In a Clausewitzian fashion Slessor admitted
that the moral effect is first and foremost dependent on the material effects. Thus air power
should be used in a concentrated way to achieve a decisive effect for which he suggested
fighting troops to be the primary objective and supply only in the case of relative military
inactivity. Although he knew that material and machinery would play a great part in future wars,
329  Slessor, John C.: Strategy for the West, Cassell and Company Ltd., 1954, pp. 10-13.
330  Slessor (1936), pp. 1-10; Slessor (1954), pp. 113-114 (quotation p. 114).
331  Ibid., pp. 12-17.
332  Ibid., pp. 22-30.
333  Ibid., pp. 61-64.
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he regarded their production facilities as less vulnerable to strategic bombing since aerial
offensives could only limit and reduce them.334 He saw the role of air power mainly as creating
difficulties where they do not exist, and to intensify them when they exist already. Thus air power
had the capacity to limit the margin of safety on the line of communications of an enemy army.335
7.3.2 Indirect Approach – Liddel Hart
Another Britain, the military historian and strategist B. H. Liddel Hart, regarded the idea of a
nation at arms a mere worship that stressed quantity over quality with national objectives
achieved only by mass destruction. According to him victory is not an end in itself. It is useless if
the end of the war finds the victor so exhausted that he is defeated in the peace. The true aim of
war is to subdue the enemy’s will to resist with the least amount of human and economic losses.
The destruction of the enemy’s armed forces is just a means, which questions the usefulness of
a decisive victory in battle if the victor bleeds to death as a result of it.336 Liddel Hart understood
strategy as more than the sheer movement of forces. It meant for him simply achieving an effect.
His idea concerning grand strategy was to direct and regulate all resources of a nation, all
available instruments in a way that a better state of peace can result. Thus effects could only be
achieved by sound calculation and co-ordination in terms of ends and means, which lead to a
perfect economy of force.337 He advocated the exploitation of movement and surprise
representing the physical and psychological spheres. Only surprise can lead to advantageous
circumstances in which serious fighting does not take place. In the physical sphere he named
four effects that resulted through movement such as upsetting the enemy’s disposition,
separation of his forces, endangering his supplies and menacing his route of retreat. Liddel Hart
thought that effects in the physical sphere would penetrate into the psychological sphere and
cause the impression of being trapped. However, this can only be achieved through the line of
least resistance in the physical sphere, which is equivalent with the line of least expectation in
the psychological sphere. He suggested a preceding distraction that deprives the enemy of his
freedom of action in both spheres. His famous indirect approach meant maximum possible
concentration with minimum necessary force. He stressed that in order to hit with effect,
adaptability is needed to operate along lines offering alternative objectives. He regarded cutting
communications as extraordinarily important and presented the deduction that “the nearer to the
force that the cut is made, the more immediate the effect; the nearer to the base, the greater the
effect. In either case, the effect becomes much greater and more quickly felt if made against a
force that is in motion, and in course of carrying out an operation, than against a force that is
stationary.”338 He expected more success and more effects when cutting communications as far
back as possible. Whereas the minds of enemy troops could be influenced by a stroke close in
the rear, a stroke farther back would rather influence the commanders’ mind. He praised the
advent of new technologies from which he valued the air force as a contributing factor to
dispersed strategic advance. Thus advancing forces should not be distributed as widely as
334  Ibid., pp. 65-85.
335  Ibid., pp. 90, 200-215.
336  Liddel Hart (1925), pp. 9-10; Liddel Hart, Basil S.: Thoughts on War, Spellmount Staplehurst, 1999, pp.
19-20, 47.
337  Liddel Hart (1967), pp. 335-336.
338  Ibid., pp. 338-344 (quotation p. 344).
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compatible with combined actions, but dispersed as much as compatible with cohesion. The
effectiveness of armies meant paralysing the enemy’s actions and not crushing his forces.
Concentration meant for him waging one’s own strength against enemy weakness as a fruit of
calculated dispersion.339 In connection with the arrival of tanks on the battlefield, he named their
moral effect on enemy infantry that induced both mental and physical paralysis of the enemy’s
command.340 In the airplane he saw the possibility of striking at the enemy’s economic and moral
centres to attain a direct end by the indirect application of means. He fully appreciated the
mobility of the airplane and called it the knight-move into warfare:
· The combination of air power and increased ground mobility resulted in more effective
achievement of economic and moral objectives. He believed that mechanisation both on the
ground and in the air made an easier paralysis of the enemy’s vital organs possible without
the need to destroy him through hard fighting.
· He pledged for paralysis and striking civilian objectives deep in enemy territory. As he
emphasised disorganisation and demoralisation both having paralysing effect on the enemy
have always been well-understood by the masters of the art of war.341
His indirect approach anchored in the assumption that attacking the military’s command, control
and communications facilities paralyses the armed forces as a whole, which can overlap and
disintegrate the nation behind. Contrary to the theorists of strategic bombing he assessed
industrial bombing as less decisive than actions against military strategic objectives. Instead of
striking the capital and other vital centres, Liddel Hart suggested disposing the enemy’s main
forces first. The enemy’s air force must be defeated first face-to-face in order to realise any
benefit. Later in the nuclear age he opted for indirect, strategic actions against military objectives
and not industrial attrition. He always stressed the superiority of strategic operation over battle
by stating that the true aim of war is not so much to seek battle as to seek an advantageous
strategic situation, which does not in itself lead to victory, its continuation by battle can surely
achieve this.342
7.3.3 Bombing to Win – Pape
According to the American political scientist, Robert A. Pape, the essence of denial is to cause
an imbalance of enemy forces by hitting military targets in the enemy’s homeland until he
compels and modifies behaviour. Denial as a mechanism threatens to defeat the enemy’s
military adventure by reducing his military capacity to control areas. It suggests nothing, but
suffering the costs of the conflict. The enemy cannot gain or hold the disputed territory since his
strategy is targeted in order to undermine his confidence.343 Denial stands for the application of
military means in order to prevent the enemy from achieving his political goals. However,
successful denial also requires the possession of superior military capabilities for achieving a
decisive victory on the battlefield. Denial might not always work and there is no other option than
339  Ibid., pp. 346-347.
340  Liddel Hart (1999), p. 263.
341  Liddel Hart (1967), pp. 358-359; Liddel Hart (1999), p. 233.
342  Ibid., pp. 361-365.
343  Pape (1996), pp. 5-10.
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to inflict a decisive military defeat on the enemy.344 Although denial reduces the probability that
resistance will yield benefits and signals that not yielding involves the futile expenditure of more
resources, no special efforts are made to cause suffering to the population.345 Thus if the coercer
wants to obtain more than he can compel, failure is inevitable even when denial is partly
successful. The enemy is always flexible and ready to change his strategy in order to minimise
or negate the coercer’s actions. Consequently, denial focuses on particular vulnerabilities within
the enemy’s strategy for success as simply destroying targets has limited coercive value. Denial
attempts to exploit the enemy’s military strategy, which can be described either as
conventional/mechanised or unconventional/guerrilla warfare.346 The term mechanised refers to
traditional attrition and annihilation warfare. The objective of such warfare is to destroy enemy
forces through intense and extended battles along the frontlines. The focus is on inflicting losses
and destroying cohesion among units and certain combat functions that are highly dependent on
networked logistics and communications. The term guerrilla indicates units that are dispersed
over a wide area and avoid decisive battles. In terms of denial, guerrillas pose a problem since
coercers can obtain concessions only over a specific territory that has been denied to the
enemy. Losing one territory does not mean losing another and demanding more than one can
persuade the enemy means that coercion can eventually fail.347 Regardless of the enemy’s
military strategy pressures must be constant over a considerable period of time. Giving the
enemy breathing space means that he can improve his chances by regaining military capabilities
or attracting new allies. Demonstrating capacity by force over the disputed territory also requires
strong financial commitment.348 In denial the enemy forces are attacked to the extent they
become too weak to oppose friendly ground forces in seizing the disputed territory or to inflict
high casualties. Thus campaigns can include attrition by destroying arms-manufacturing
facilities, interrupting supplies and disrupting lines of communication.349 Pape differentiates three
kinds of denial.
· The first is support of ground units, in which the air force is applied as flying artillery. This
strategy was employed during World War I, when the newly established air units tried to
support the army in the field by dropping bombs from the air. The German Luftwaffe also
pursued such a strategy later successfully in order to support combined arms assault to
break through enemy lines.
· The second is strategic interdiction, which involves large-scale operations focusing either on
destruction or isolation of enemy military production facilities. The aim of such operations is
to reduce the quantities of enemy war materiel.
344  Pape, Robert A.: The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden, Security
Studies 7, Number 2, Winter 1997/98, pp. 192-194; Pape (1996), pp. 12-15.
345  Pape (1996), p. 19.
346  Pape (1992), pp. 441-442; Pape (1996), pp. 30-31.
347  Corum, James S./Johnson, Wray R.: Air Power in Small Wars, Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists,
University Press of Kansas, 2003, pp. 423-439.
348  Pape (1996), pp. 31-32.
349  Ibid., p. 69.
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· The third is operational interdiction aimed at inducing operational paralysis and includes
actions such as attacking certain theatre-level combat support functions to reduce the
enemy’s ability to co-ordinate forces in the field.350
Altogether his conclusion is that denial strategies work much better against conventional
mechanised forces than against guerrillas who are mostly immune to coercion. Coercers should
often expect to pay the full costs of military success if they want to extract political concessions.
In this case, he suggests attacking military targets instead of politically sensitive civilian centres
to force the enemy to change behaviour. Denying the enemy his fielded forces at the earliest
possible time means degrading his capacity to wage war. Denial stands for avoiding
unnecessary destruction of the enemy’s social and economic infrastructure, but in the case it
fails denial can also bring the coercer closer to victory through the application of brute force.351
7.4 Smashing Enemy Forces
Denial-based coercion can be seen as the antithesis of punishment, risk and decapitation. It
neither focuses on the enemy’s population and economy, nor on his leadership. In its purest
form denial is smashing enemy military forces and weakening them to the point where friendly
ground forces can seize disputed territories without the danger of suffering unacceptably high
losses. Denial campaigns focus on arms-manufacturing facilities, interdiction of supplies to the
front, disrupting enemy movements and communication, and the attrition of enemy armed forces
in the field. It accords with Clausewitz, who also assumed that the real key to the enemy country
is his army. As he emphasised the annihilation of the enemy’s military aimed at a considerable
weakening can lead to the loss of a particular territory. The enemy must either be made literally
defenceless or put in a position that increases this probability.352 Denial is an approach that,
similar to decapitation, rests on extensive application of precision weaponry, but focuses on a
much wider set of targets. Instead of achieving full paralysis of the enemy, denial focuses on his
armed forces through a combined application of ground and air power. As depicted in Figure 9,
denial indicates a low level of ambition in terms of the mechanism selected and means applied
to achieve physical effects through destruction. It stands for a careful attrition and annihilation in
which air power is an effective and lethal complement to ground units to efficiently crush enemy
armed forces. Attacks coming simultaneously from air and ground put the enemy in a quandary,
and defeat him relatively rapidly and with few casualties.353 Denial appears to offset the most
important drawback of the air force. Although tactically air power is most rapid in operation and
sudden in causing shocks, strategically it is less fitted to produce desired decisive effects.
Consequently, aerial warfare always bears the chance to lead to attrition warfare on the strategic
level. Denial means defeating the enemy’s capacity to organize its resistance, which comes as a
result of being concentrated around large ground forces.354 It is based on significant ground
forces even if they can occasionally be put into an air-support role. Thus ground forces do not
350  Ibid., pp. 70-73.
351  Ibid., pp. 74-80.
352  Ibid., p. 69; Clausewitz, pp. 85, 554, 586.
353  Pape (2004), pp. 117-120.
354  Liddel Hart (1946), p. 25; Pape (2004), p. 127.
109
swarm around the enemy, but confront his units head-on in a Clausewitzian fashion. Whereas
decapitation calls for transformation of the armed forces to make strategic bombing more
efficient, denial emphasises better integration of the services in order to achieve more effective
destruction from greater range and at higher speed. Simply put, denial stands for exploiting fire-
power and movement.355
Figure 9 Primary effect sought in coercion by denial
In denial campaigns air operations are an integral part of the entire manoeuvre plan, and make
the battlefield the focus of the coercer’s efforts. Denial confirms the RAND study mentioned in
relation with risk that “in the end only the ground forces [could] transform the Viet Cong from
hunters to hunted, defeat them decisively, and establish complete control and security over the
population. It follows that the main purpose of air harassment [was] to create favourable
conditions for more effective ground offensive operations.”356
7.5 Air Power and Effects
As the four schools of thought in military coercion have shown, the origins of effects-based
operations are rooted in the advent of powered flight. The concept can be traced back to air-
power enthusiasts such as Douhet, Mitchell, members of the AACTS and Warden, and to
strategic thinkers of a more general kind including Slessor, Liddel Hart, Brodie, Schelling and
Pape. It became also clear that many theorists were passionate rather than analytical, and most
mechanisms of coercion rested on assumptions advocating quick, clean, mechanical,
impersonal and linear solutions. From the earliest days of powered flight theorists have struggled
355  Pape (2004), p. 129; For this image of war Pape earned much criticism see McPeak, Merrill A.: A
Neater Way to Winn, Response, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004, pp. 160-162 and Warden
(1997/98), pp. 186-190.
356  Budiansky, pp. 434-439; Quotation in Goure, p. 20.
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“to define and measure the success of operations … in terms of the effect achieved on the
enemy”.357
7.5.1 Similar Mechanism
These strategists embraced the airplane as a formidable and flexible weapon that most cogently
reveals the relative effectiveness of various coercive mechanisms. Although in its infancy, the
airplane had momentous effects during World War I, its flexibility and versatility impressed many.
This significant technological innovation of the early 20th century and its possible application for
military purposes resulted in challenging theoretical and doctrinal concepts. Most theorists
assumed that precise intelligence is always available; limiting or disturbing factors can always be
minimised; concentrating on ends rather than means is a superior alternative to the traditional
mechanisms of war; control can substitute for destruction, and strategy can be reduced to
targeting issues.358 Thus we can say that all four schools of military coercion aim at harnessing
cause-and-effect relationships in order to achieve desired effects on the enemy. We made it
clear that the mechanism for achieving an effect (E) can be understood as a function (ƒ) of an
action (a) on an object (o). In a similar fashion Mueller argued that in terms of military coercion
the desired change (C) of the enemy can be understood as a function (ƒ) of a given amount of
force (f) applied on a certain target (t).359 This can also be depicted in the form of an equation as
follows
),( tffC =
Most theorists regarded the airplane the ultimate weapon, as it was not committed to any one
course of action and could switch from one objective to another on short notice. Apart from
denial, the basic assumption was that a comprehensive and mostly analytical study can reveal
the proper targets, which combined with a well apportioned amount of decisive force, triggers a
mechanism that reveals the preferred effect. Due to its inherent mobility and flexibility, the
airplane was regarded as a winning factor of the first order possessing the ability to deliver
decisive blows. The conviction that this new weapon is superior to the traditional surface-bound
services has led many to believe that the airplane is an effective coercive instrument and
represents a superior alternative to protracted ground wars. Consequently, most theorists had a
firm belief that similar to the British inter-war experience in Mesopotamia, technological
advances had reduced war basically to an act of “dealing out punishment in doses precision-
calculated to send political signals or keep the [enemy] under control”360 Hence, technology
turned war into an activity that can be controlled in a top-down fashion.
357  MacIsaac, in Paret (ed.), p, 626; Quotation in Peach, Stuart (Air Com.): Effects-Based Operations: The
Contemporary Air Perspective, Air Power Review, Autumn 2003, p. 27.
358  Slessor (1954), p. 11; Pape (1996), p. 39; Moran, Daniel: Strategic Theory and the History of War, in:
Baylis, John/Wirtz, James/Cohen, Eliot/Gray, Colin S. (eds.): Strategy in the Contemporary World, An
Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 37.
359  Mueller (1998), p. 186.
360  Slessor (1936), pp. 8-9, 70; Quotation in FM 100-20, p. 2; Liddel Hart (1925), p. 54; Douhet, p. 9;
Garden, Timothy: Air Power: Theory and Practice, in: Baylis, et. al., pp. 138-141; Gilbert, pp. 230-231;
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7.5.2 Similar Elements
Similar to the characteristics of effects-based operations, military coercion theories are based on
three common elements. The first element, effects-focus is manifest in the idea of achieving
effects on the enemy, although depending on the respective schools of thought the effects
sought altered from time to time. An examination of the four schools of military coercion made it
clear that punishment and risk stood for achieving psychological effects. Whereas decapitation
stands for achieving systemic effects on the enemy, denial emphasises the importance of
achieving physical effects. The second element, advanced technology is defined by the state of
available military technology embodied in the airplane and various sorts of bombs that were
regarded as significant innovations in any given period. The technology that drove punishment
was the airplane carrying various sorts of aerial bombs. Risk was driven by the airplane carrying
nuclear bombs. Decapitation is enabled by stealthy airplanes and precision bombs. Denial
comes as the result of stealthy and non-stealthy airplanes, dropping mostly precision bombs.
The third element, systems thinking displayed the biggest diversity of ideas as it largely
depended on the individual mind of the respective theorist. In terms of punishment, selected
targets such as population and industry indicated a focus away from the battlefield. In a similar
fashion, risk focused mostly on targets outside the battlefield such as leadership, and population.
However, unlike the exclusive focus of punishment, attacks on the enemy’s military were seen
as an option. Decapitation rested on systems thinking as targets are grouped around five
categories in the form of concentric circles such as the fielded military, population, infrastructure,
organic essentials and leadership. Denial has a strong military focus since it stands for targeting
military related assets mostly on the battlefield. The basic assumptions of all theories mirror the
remarkable trinity of Clausewitz, albeit the emphasis shifted from time to time. The theories
reflected the existence of primordial violence, the play of chance and probability, and
subordination, which stand for the people, the military and the government. Although it was at
the core, military coercion theories rid themselves of the bloody Clausewitzian heritage, no-one
could surpass the boundaries he set.361 Aerial attacks or bombings are the common
denominator in all theories. Punishment theorists left the battlefield intentionally in order to find a
mechanism that allowed achieving psychological effects directly or indirectly on enemy
population. They advocated that through strategic bombing it becomes possible to achieve a
popular revolt and coerce the enemy leadership to comply. Risk-oriented coercion was based on
the basic tenets of punishment, but as a broader and slower approach it aimed at influencing
both population and leadership. Theorists of this school hoped to achieve psychological effects
through manipulation of the fear of nuclear escalation. Thus risk also sought to achieve
psychological effects mostly outside the battlefield. Decapitation refocused from the
psychological domain and emphasised the enemy’s physical side. It claimed that a given amount
of systemic effects achieved on command and control facilities can result in strategic paralysis
that leaves no other option than to comply. It appears that denial closes the gap that began to
emerge when early theorists wanted to escape the brutality of the battlefield and the carnage of
the trenches. Denial again focuses on the enemy’s military capabilities through achieving
physical effects mostly against military and military-related targets. Unlike the other theories, the
emphasis is again on battlefield attrition and annihilation resulting in physical effects.362
361  Clausewitz, p. 101.
362  Hallman, Wesley P.: Airpower and Psychological Denial, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 37, pp. 33-39.
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7.6 Conclusion Part I
The three common elements of effects-based operations indicate that war is seen as a
management activity with a clear cut beginning and a definite end. Waging war is understood as
the exploitation of technological advantage and the efficient use of scarce resources. Effects-
based operations indicate that in the end capital can mostly substitute for personnel.
Unfortunately, the Third Wave stands for asymmetric wars in which the enemy has no traditional
centres of gravity or resources that can be destroyed by state-of-the-art weaponry. Although in
wars the relationship between ends and means might be clear at the strategic level, it may
become considerably less clear as specificities emerge and more ambiguous as the full range of
military options expands. Wars demand full-time commitment, but offer only prospects for a
provisional, modest and always fragile form of control.363 Thus as long as there is no peer
competitor for the West on a global or regional scale, with traditional attributes, it appears that
most assumptions of effects-based operations have limited applicability:
· It will be increasingly difficult to link military means with political ends, tactical actions with
strategic objectives directly in order to identify, penetrate to and destroy the very centres of
gravity within the enemy organisation.
· It will also be inherently difficult to circumvent the slow and painful processes of attrition and
annihilation with the aim to achieve quick and decisive victory in the psychological domain
aimed at influencing enemy thinking and behaviour.
· It will be increasingly difficult, to save precious resources in terms of time, money and
manpower by collapsing enemy’s system from the inside-out that exists outside the
traditional boundaries of a nation-state.
· In asymmetric wars information superiority and technological sophistication can best be
seen as enablers, but not as ultimate leverage. Thus the assumed advantages of effects-
based operations can mean no advantage at all.
Apart from the objections that come from the attributes of the Third Wave and the challenges
posed by asymmetric warfare, any sober theory of war must take into account that waging war
has always been more than linking ends with means in a simple deductive fashion, and in
detecting obvious causality on the strategic level in the form of desired or decisive effects. War is
fought on a spatial and temporal continuum involving both the material and non-material
domains. It is as much a physical as a psychological phenomenon, which spans over many
layers. As the limitations of military coercion theories indicate, waging war involves an
abundance of physical, systemic and psychological effects. Both punishment and risk put
unilateral emphasis on psychological effects. In contrast, decapitation addresses only certain
areas of population centres, which harbour leadership facilities. Its basic assumption is that
upgraded strategic bombing campaigns based on the application of advanced technologies can
crush the enemy’s resistance. Strategic paralysis means that the will to resist is not broken, but
the systemic effects achieved simply do not allow the enemy to command and control his
363  Dorff, p. 17; Murphy, Timothy G. (Lt. Col.): A Critique of the Air Campaign, Aerospace Power Journal,
Spring 1994, Internet, accessed 14. 04. 2003, available at www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/
apj/apj94/murphy.html; Hardt/Negri, pp. 37-54; A Defining Moment in Marine Corps History, Interview
with Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Internet, accessed 15. 08. 2005, available at www.navyleague.org/
seapower/ krulak_interview.htm.
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functions properly. Decapitation advocates that many systemic effects are sufficiently strong to
make the enemy’s resistance futile. Parallel attacks assume that the greater the percentage of
targets hit in a single blow, the more impossible it becomes for the enemy to respond. Regarding
the philosophical foundations there is barely any difference between decapitation, punishment
and risk. Denial on the other hand, takes war back to the battlefield. It suggests that careful
attrition and annihilation, focusing on physical effects can subsequently generate systemic and
psychological consequences sufficient to achieve victory. As one observer pointed out, within the
framework of denial the effects that interrupted road and rail traffic in 1991 in Iraq were neither
psychological nor temporary, but physical and cumulative in nature.364 In denial the traditional
mechanism of war aimed at attrition and annihilation of the enemy’s armed forces is again writ
large. The assumed ability of air power to achieve strategic effects motivated military thinkers to
search for mechanisms that allow victory without the involvement of irrational costs and losses.
In the end, and at least in theory, air power offered a promising solution to protracted surface-
oriented attrition and annihilation warfare.365 Unfortunately, these basic assumptions have never
been really validated. Most theorists have felt, rather than known, what air power can and cannot
achieve. Regarding the psychological effects of air operations against strategic targets, we can
conclude that bombing alone cannot secure war aims, and limitations should be expected
regarding its coercive leverage. Victory in war requires multiple pressures such as attacks on
deployed enemy forces, destruction of various high-value targets, better co-operation with
ground units and better integration of psychological operations with strategic air attacks.
Examples from the 20th century showed that enemies capitulated or came to terms only after
serious battlefield defeats of their deployed forces. It appears that after a century of the air
force’s struggle for independence, and claiming the ability to achieve strategic-level effects on its
own, only through denial has it become possible that “the balance of forces on the battlefield will
progressively shift to the enemy disadvantage as long as the fighting continues.”366 Air-force
theories were originally fed by the idea that war can be taken away from the battlefield. However,
the airplane only established a new dimension, and fought in it with equal ferocity. Although air
power’s maturity and independence was regarded for many years as the driving force in military
coercion, in the end it was on the battlefield where air power ascended to equality with the other
services.367 Regardless of the age in which mankind lives and the technology it uses, military
operations are dirty, up-close and personal experiences that often defy ideas elaborated on the
strategic level. Air enthusiasts saw in the air force the service that could control the enemy from
the air. Effects achieved by air power have been helpful contributions to success in war, but
indicate the impossibility to “control a country from the air, any more than from the business end
of a gun.”368 Focusing on enemy psychology was already seen after World War I as a dead end.
364  Warden (1995); Luttwak, p. 196.
365  Meilinger, Philip S. (Col.): Air Targeting Strategies: An Overview, in: Hallion, pp. 51-54.
366  MacIsaac, in Paret (ed.), 636; Hosmer, Stephen T.: Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four
Wars 1941-1991, Lessons for U.S. Commanders, RAND MR-576-AE, 1996, p. 70-77 (quotation p. 75);
Hinen, Anthony L. (Col.): Kosovo: “The limits of Air Power II”, Air and Space Power Chronicles, Internet,
accessed 09. 03. 2005, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/hinen.html.
367  Brodie (1955), pp. 4-5; Budiansky, p. 441; Clausewitz, p. 689.
368  Gordon/Trainor, pp. 473-474; Quotation in Slessor (1956), p. 56.
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As the French Marshall Foch bluntly confessed “at the beginning of the war we believed that
morale alone counted, which [was] an infantile notion.”369
369  Quotation in Possony, Stefan T./Mantoux, Etienne: Du Picq and Foch: The French School, in: Earle,
Edward M.: Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton University Press, 1943, p 228.
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Part Two – Reflecting the Theory
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8 Frictional Mechanism of War
“… to discover the situation, such as it is, in spite of its being
surrounded by the fog of unknown; then to appreciate soundly what is
seen, to guess what is not seen, to take a decision quickly, finally to act
with vigour, without hesitation.”
von Moltke
8.1 Assumptions and Dynamics
The comparison of the four schools of military coercion made it clear that denial combines
traditional mechanisms such as attrition and annihilation with mechanisms aimed at influencing
enemy behaviour. It contains elements of both brute force and military coercion. Denial does not
suggest that there are quick and cheap solutions in which we can harness causality and focus
exclusively on the psychological domain. The application of brute force aimed at unconditional
military defeat can never be excluded when waging war. Denial stands for thwarting the enemy’s
military strategy or undermining his confidence in it.370 Denial also suggests that the boundary
separating brute force and military coercion is more porous than normally expected. In this
chapter we expand on denial in order to better understand friction and devote more attention to
the mechanism of war in terms of causality.
8.1.1 Towards Battlefield Effects
In general we can say that psychological effects refer mostly to the strategic level, systemic
effects address the operational level, and physical effects point towards the tactical level of war.
Battlefield reorientation in denial means that we must focus as much on lower-level effects as on
higher ones. Victory in denial comes as the result of clashing forces, which indicates that denial
and brute force seem to have similar mechanisms. Whereas denial stands for the possibility of
achieving a given end-state, brute force stands for the necessity of achieving an end-state
should denial fail. Decisive military victory does not rule out the utility of military coercion. The
difference between the two comes from the enemy’s particular military strategy. Whereas brute
force means large-scale battlefield attrition in order to make the enemy basically defenceless,
denial leaves him a certain capacity of military resistance. Although both demand that
considerable forces are brought to bear, denial does not aim at fighting to finish. It emphasises a
given amount of enemy attrition without attempting to pay the full cost of a military victory. This
indicates that military coercion might not always work and there is often no choice, but to defeat
the enemy decisively. In fact, successful denial comes as a result of the political ambitions of the
belligerents, their chosen military strategy and the domestic politics. An effective denial strategy
depends on the strategy of the enemy and requires military pressure to be maintained
continuously. Denial can be very expensive and demand more than small fractions of the
370  Pape (1996), pp. 1, 10-11.
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battlefield cost.371 Achieving various sorts of effects plays a large role in denial since the focus is
on military or military-related targets like arms manufacturing facilities, interdiction of supplies to
the battlefield, disruption of movement and communication on the battlefield, and attrition of
fielded forces. The aim is to weaken battlefield capabilities either directly or indirectly in order to
prevent the enemy from achieving his goals on the battlefield. As denial indicates, successful
military coercion is hard to achieve and can be attained only if we are prepared to impose
demands by force. In other words, military coercion and effects-based operations are not much
easier or significantly cheaper than traditional war-fighting aimed at imposing a full military defeat
on the enemy.372 Thus even with a declared cause-and-effect focus we must be prepared for
things to go badly and there is always a chance for escalation. Denial indicates that in military
coercion the attrition and annihilating enemy military forces must be of first consideration.
8.1.2 Filling the Continuum of War
The introduction of the four schools also made it clear that the more a given school focused on
higher order effects, the harder its evaluation becomes:
· Risk, which is the most psychologically oriented and the least focused on compliance by
force, appears to be a specific case. The theory was constructed in an age of global
confrontation. It worked on a global scale because no nuclear war erupted. However,
nuclear weapons could not prevent the eruption of regional wars fought by conventional
weapons aimed at attrition and annihilation.
· The most controversial of all schools is punishment aimed at achieving psychological effects
directly through conventional weapons. Since the end of World War II military historians
have been arguing as to what extent the bombing of Germany and Japan influenced the
enemy population’s morale and contributed to the victory of 1945.
· Decapitation can be described as an upgraded strategic bombing approach aimed at
paralysing enemy systems in the physical domain. Although the enabling technologies are
powerful tools, it is still debated to what extent this mechanism works. Bombing critical
nodes might have a strong coercive power, but as the 78-day bombing of Serbia in 1999
showed it is not yet clear how bombing alone contributes to stated political goals.
Victory in war is a product of many contributing factors, some of which can be replicated, and
some not. Thus the theoretical foundations of risk, punishment and decapitation, together with
their suitability to real world challenges deserve close scrutiny.373 As  denial  indicates,  it  is
important to address the full continuum of war, and not promoting only one mechanism to the
expense of the other. Denial stands for military operations in which the contest is decided by fire
support, and the close interaction of fire and manoeuvre in all dimensions. Even if we
acknowledge that possessing the technological edge in the form of precision weaponry and
stealth are great contributors to success, air power or ground forces alone do not have the
371  Ibid., pp. 12-36; Clausewitz, p. 101.
372  Pape (1996), pp. 69-79, 314-331.
373  It is sufficient to think of the great air-power debate that took place in the American defence community
and various educational establishments during the 1990s. The debate was initiated by Pape who openly
questioned the utility and relevance of strategic bombing.
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potential to suffice in the total conflict.374 Achieving desired effects mostly in the psychological
domain and linking political objectives with military actions directly, reflect a vocabulary that has
an inherently elegant flair. The tendency of referring to effects especially to psychological ones,
is a sort of modern political-military courtship. It is wrapped in a euphemistic vocabulary that
might reflect high-level commitment, but often lacks real-world substance. As wars of the 20th
century showed, ill-founded, misleading and fallacious assumptions always bore the risk of
volatility that resulted in disastrous failures. Attempts to oversimplify military effectiveness, the
unrestricted belief in panaceas, an unsophisticated view of war can blur the lines between fact
and fiction, and substitute one with the other.375 We made it clear earlier that in theory, desired
effects can be identified and although both objects and actions can be fully known, the
mechanism linking causes to effects will always contain a given amount of uncertainty. Effects
are complex phenomena that do not allow for decoding all aspects in detail. This problem points
towards two different, but interrelated levels:
· The first level refers to the difficulty of identifying a mechanism that explains the interplay of
certain actions and objects on the one hand, and the desired effect on the other. None of
the mechanisms could deliver a reliable and satisfactory solution to that problem. The closer
we move towards physical effects, the easier it becomes to detect causality. However, in
terms of psychological effects, it becomes very difficult if not impossible to discern clear
causal relationships and we might end up in speculations.376
· The second level refers to the problem of identifying a mechanism that translates military
effects into political effectiveness. The examples in Vietnam and Afghanistan showed that
military victory has often no relevance to the political settlement. Although the West
perceives war as an instrument fought for political purposes, current enemies are often
driven by motives that regard war an existential phenomenon. Therefore no common basis
exists according to which a settlement can be reached, or a better state of peace achieved.
8.2 Exploring the Mechanism of War
In order to better understand the problem of mechanism in terms of causality, we suggest
exploring the works of earlier theorists of war. According to the social wave-front analysis, war is
an expression of a given society and its conceptualisation always reflects the peculiarities and
characteristics of that society.377 However, contemporary Western military thinking is heavily
shaped by two influential classics such as Jomini and Clausewitz. Any thorough examination of
war requires that we return to them, as both attempted to examine war’s mechanism in detail.
374  Biddle, Stephen: Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy,
Strategies Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002, pp. 3-8.
375  Hammond, Grant T. Dr.: Myths of the Air War over Serbia, Some “Lessons” Not to Learn, Aerospace
Power Journal, Winter 2000, p. 85; Hammond, Grant T. Dr.: Myths of the Gulf War, Some “Lessons” Not
to Learn, Airpower Journal, Fall 1998, pp. 16-17; Shy, in Paret, p. 160; Wojtysiak, Martin (Lt. Col.):
Another View of the Myths of the Gulf War, Aerospace Power Journal, Internet, accessed 17. 09. 2004,
available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/wojtysiak.htm.
376  This explains also the difficulty of evaluating success and failure in psychological operations. See
Collins, Steven: Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints, Parameters, Summer 1999, pp.
57-73.
377  Toffler/Toffler, pp. 25-42; Jobbagy (November 2005), pp. 13-24.
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They applied different methodologies and as a consequence proposed different
conceptualisations, which can be seen as the two end-poles of Western military thinking.
8.2.1 Jomini and Clausewitz Revisited
Jomini is often referred to as a narrow and linear theorist of war, who claimed that waging war
was science in itself, and advocated that battles can be fought in a scientific manner. However,
even he had to acknowledge that many of war’s aspects can never be estimated on paper. Thus
he felt the necessity to emphasise that an accurate execution of any carefully designed plan was
rarely possible and embarrassments had to be expected even in the case of simple questions.
The cause for this problem was human nature, as even generals are men who have faults.
Conflicting interests, pretensions and rivalries could become important hindering factors in the
conduct of operations. As a consequence he spoke of the real secret of the military genius and
highlighted that in war everything is possible.378 Like Jomini, Clausewitz also found it difficult to
construct a scientific theory of war since it dealt with matters that do not allow for permanent
laws. He did not believe in any particular scientific way that helps disarm and defeat the enemy
without bloodshed, which he did not regard as a true goal in waging war either. War had its own
law and due to the continuous interaction of the forces involved, any attempt to deduce absolute
terms would reflect individual imagination and fantasy. The interplay of possibilities and chance
made him conclude that guesswork and luck play a great role in war. He also emphasised that
absolute mathematical factors can never guide military calculations. War was a human activity
that has similarities with a game of cards. Dealing with living creatures never allows for absolute
clarity and there is always a margin of uncertainty. For him, war was a complex and changeable
phenomenon.379 Clausewitz emphasised that the enemy’s will must be broken as a prerequisite
for ending war, but equally advocated the importance of destroying the enemy’s fighting forces
and the occupation of his country. He also knew that not every war leads to a final settlement
and the disarmament of enemy forces is not always needed to achieve peace. He claimed that
victory in war does not come from the enemy’s outright defeat since destruction can never be an
end in itself: it is only a means to an end – a matter of secondary importance. In the case of
imparity between the opposing forces he assumed that the weaker side would yield.
Nevertheless he regarded war as the realm of uncertainty in which three-quarters of the factors
are hidden to various degrees. Chance playes a great role in war since it interferes with the
course of events. In order to handle uncertainty he also referred to the military genius and called
it the coup d’oeil, which was manifested in quick recognition that the mind would normally miss
or perceive only after a long delay. No science or analysis, but coup d’oeil makes it possible to
overcome fundamental elements of war such as danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance.
According to him the single concept of a general friction best expressed the restrictive effects of
war, which can turn apparently easy phenomena, difficult. He argued that friction could not be
reduced to comprehensible elements and as a consequence it could not be measured.380
378  Jomini, pp. 56, 122, 197, 200, 252-257, 274, 300.
379  Clausewitz, pp. 78-101.
380  Ibid., pp. 101, 102-114, 115, 138-142.
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8.2.2 Human Character and Causality
Clausewitz was aware that the human mind always strives for principles and causal rules in
order to settle controversies. However, he also argued that the endless complexities of war allow
for considering various principles and systems only in terms of physical phenomena. Attempts to
reduce war to a formula containing numbers and functions, was an oversimplification that could
not stand up against the realities of war. Even broad arbitrary assumptions often do not
correspond with practical experience. Due to war’s inherent uncertainty every calculation has to
be done with variable quantities. An inquiry aimed solely at physical quantities is absolutely
useless since war is always intertwined with psychological forces. Human psyche does not obey
rules and can only be described in vague terms. He suggested that for lack of objective
knowledge soldiers should trust to their talent or luck. As he emphasised causality describes the
relationship between causes and their effects, and allows for discernible laws. Unfortunately, war
as constantly changing and diverse phenomenon does not allow for such laws, since it is
composed of actions that have to be handled individually.381 He warned that things do not turn
out in war according to causal expectations as friction always overwhelms the participants with
various disturbing and encouraging effects. Friction is such a powerful constituent of war that
even surprise, which he thought as the key element of victory, could be held up by its force. He
argued that war displays both human strength and weakness and due to the multitude of factors
involved no causal concept can be defined with accuracy.382 A further problem in war is that the
limitation of human insight and the occurrence of unforeseeable accidents do not allow for the
elaboration and selection of causal options even under favourable circumstances. War displays
catastrophes, accidents and missed opportunities, which all indicate that war is more than an act
of reason, and reasoning is not war’s foremost activity. The means applied are not absolutely
necessary or the only ones possible. War is to a great extent, guesswork with numerous
possibilities and wrong turns in which great results are often produced by the application of
limited means. War has its natural inertia and friction goes together with various human failures
such as inconsistency, imprecision and timidity. Friction is an inherent constituent of war and
reflects possibilities, probabilities, and luck: all indicate conditions without logical reasoning. Due
to the multitude of such factors it is difficult to gauge the resistance we face, and there will
always be impossible to pair the objectives and the means. Causality, exact sciences and
mathematical logic are of little help since waging war is basically an art in the fullest meaning of
the term. Due to this vast variety of factors, methodological examinations are rarely possible and
the conclusions reached reflect more the intuitive comparison and the qualities of the individual
mind. War is shaped by the character of men who take and execute decisions rather than by
general and universally applicable causal rules.383 Both Jomini and Clausewitz can be seen as
two end-poles in conceptualising war, but unlike the Swiss theorist, Clausewitz did not attempt to
provide the reader with principles and methods. However, he was able to develop enduring
ideas and a powerful conceptualisation of war. Although On War can be characterised by
intellectual flexibility and lack of dogmatism, there is a good reason to believe that most of its
content has become obsolete over the years. Clausewitz is a representative of the early 19th
century and even if the mechanism of war might remain constant we cannot deny that change is
381  Ibid., pp. 153-171, 175-180.
382  Ibid., pp. 227, 233, 304.
383  Ibid., pp. 607-617, 623-626, 692-693, 702-708.
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also an important part of it.384 Thus we propose to focus on war’s mechanism manifest in the
very concept of friction. Effects-based operations rest on the assumption that it is possible to
take advantage of direct causality, which makes possible to link the strategic and tactical levels
of war directly. Clausewitz warned that friction denies the presence of traceable cause-and-effect
relationships in war and in the case we prove that friction is an enduring phenomenon we can
claim that effects-based operations stand for a narrow conceptualisation and have limited
practical utility.
8.3 Examining Friction in War
Attempts to question Clausewitz’s relevance either partly or entirely are not new as there were
such attempts by Jomini. Later on many have also demanded that Clausewitz’s image of war
should be thrown overboard. Liddel Hart, who was otherwise considered by his admirers as the
Clausewitz of the 20th century, was likewise not short of critiques.385
8.3.1 Challenging Friction
The way wars are waged changes throughout the ages. War is a social phenomenon and as
such, influenced by the peculiar characteristics of the respective wave. The demise of the bipolar
world-order made many question the relevance and utility of Clausewitz. There are claims that a
different culture of war is emerging and spreading far and wide. The meaning of war changes,
and Clausewitz’s teachings do not fit present domestic and international circumstances, as
manifested in the contradictions between the prevailing military mentality and the occurring
exigencies. Thus we should free our mind from the Clausewitzian approach and try to
understand this new culture. Undoubtedly, On War stretches over 800 pages and it is so broad
in scope and so inclusive in methodology, that it can be regarded as a patchwork of loose ideas
rather than a well designed and thought-through book. Even Clausewitz himself warned the
reader that in the case of an early death, his work would be nothing more than shapeless mass
of various ideas and subject to endless misinterpretations. This explains why referring to him is
for many both so satisfying and pointless. In fact, five out of his eight books describe the
technicalities of wars of his age and reflect the pragmatic observation of a practical military
mind.386 Three books however, contain enduring principles regarding the nature of war in which
friction plays a central role. For Clausewitz friction expressed best the true nature of war. It is
manifest in inexplicable or random events that jeopardise the relationship between causes and
their effects. It is a double-edged sword that both fuels the human desire for causality, and
makes its meaning for war irrelevant.387 The causal focus of effects-based operations indicates a
384  Handel, Michael I.: Clausewitz and the Age of Technology, in: Handel, Michael I. (ed.): Clausewitz and
Modern Strategy, Frank Cass, 1986, pp. 52, 57, 60-61.
385  Ludendorff, Erich von: The Nation at War, Hutchinson, 1938, p. 24; Jomini, pp. 166, 178-179, Liddel
Hart (1967), pp. 352-353, 356-357; Alterman, Eric: The Uses and Abuses of Clausewitz, Parameters,
Summer 1987, pp. 18-32.
386  Keegan, John: A History of Warfare, Pimlico, The Random House Group Limited, 1994 pp. 12-22;
Luttwak, Edward N.: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare, Foreign Affairs, May, June 1995, pp. 109-122;
Clausewitz, p. 78; Fleming, Bruce: Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?
Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 62-68.
387  Clausewitz, p. 406.
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direct link between tactical actions and strategic effects. In order to identify controllable actions
and the relationship between desired effects the concept focuses more on the outcome of
operations than on the way they are conducted. This unilateral emphasis of the ends and neglect
of the means explains why Gen. Deptula hopes to subdue the enemy without fighting and
destruction. A further reason why friction should deserve close scrutiny is based on the fact that
it is the difference between war on paper and real war. The imbalance of ends and means in
effects-based operations and the deliberate subordination of the tactical to the strategic level in
the form of direct causality, can give the impression that the concept makes it possible if not to
eliminate, than at least to reduce friction in war.388
8.3.2 Revolution in Frictional Affairs
The claim to be able to look through is also supported by the prevailing idea of the Revolution in
Military Affairs, which has promised for a long time that advanced technologies can digitalise and
make the battlefield transparent. It is not surprising that effects-based operations are often seen
as a true revolution of warfare. One important element of effects-based operations is the
utilisation of advanced technology, which backs the belief that friction in war can be eliminated
by technological means. War is seen as a phenomenon that can be understood and controlled in
an analytical top-down fashion. It is perceived as a quick and cheap undertaking, something that
can be done efficiently as it is fought for a positive good. Ends/means rationality in war can also
result in a direct relationship between military achievements and political goals.389 In his attempt
to examine the relationship between friction and war, Watts re-examined Clausewitz’s original
concept. He identified a detailed taxonomy composed of seven elements, such as danger,
physical exertion, imperfect information, structural resistance, chance events, physical and
political limits, unpredictability of interactions, and disconnects between ends and means.390
Watts concluded that differences in weapons systems similar to that in training and operational
concepts can shift the relative balance in terms of friction to one’s favour and often in a decisive
fashion. However, he equally stated that friction in itself is not a technical problem that can be
eliminated. Although technology can contribute to an information-rich environment, man has
limitations in absorbing and digesting the information provided. These limitations can be further
exacerbated by stress, fatigue and other disturbing factors usually accompanying war. Other
limitations in terms of space and time also mean that regardless of technological prowess key
pieces of information will always be missed at any given time, in any given place, and by any
given person. This mismatch between reality and perception fundamentally limits attempts to
predict what cause will result in what effect. We must always expect friction and novelty in war,
which indicates that indirect effects in the form of higher order consequences are never
388  Herbig, Katherine L.: Chance and Uncertainty in On War, in: Handel (ed.), pp. 104-107; Cimbala,
Stephen J.: Clausewitz and Chaos, Friction and Military Policy, Praeger Publishers, 2001, pp. 4-13;
Handel, in Handel (ed.), p. 82.
389  Owens, William A.: Lifting the Fog of War, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000, pp. 117-149; Knox,
MacGregor/Murray, Williamson: The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 5: Lazarus, David B.: Effects-Based Operations and Counterterrorism, Air & Space
Power Journal, Fall 2005, Internet, accessed 14. 10. 2005, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/lazarus.html.
390  Watts, Barry D.: Clausewitzian Friction and the Future War, McNair Paper 68, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 2004, pp. 17, 20-21, 79-86.
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predictable with a high degree of certainty. Friction will always dim expectations in terms of
detecting causality and achieving higher order effects mostly in the psychological domain.391
Consequently, friction calls for a more modest way of theorising war. Due to its waxing and
waning nature attempts to find a good fit between means and ends, causes and effects mostly
fall outside analytic metrics. The frictional nature of mechanisms also indicates that the outcome
does not depend on the absolute level of friction experienced, but on a relative frictional
advantage. Therefore assumptions that with effects-based operations it becomes possible to
reduce or even eliminate friction appear to be mostly baseless and unjustified.392
8.3.3 Eternal Phenomenon
The difference we can detect regarding friction of the past and friction today, is that for
Clausewitz it was basically created by external causes coming mostly from the enemy’s
unexpected actions. The growing specialisation and compartmentalisation of Western armed
forces, together with self-imposed constraints such as casualty sensitivity and destruction
awareness, have resulted that friction today is equally due to internal causes. For Clausewitz
friction occurred within war itself, the Third Wave increasingly reveals friction between war and
politics. The nature of asymmetric conflicts, the multitude of players and motives involved make
extremely difficult to formulate clear and concise ends/means relationships, even at the highest
political and military levels. Clausewitz regarded friction as the outcome of different interests
within the same culture. However, ad-hoc and multinational coalition operations introduce a
heavy load of additional friction. It appears that friction in war had an important past and has a
significant role to play in future. The difficult-to-comprehend nature of complex challenges and
the ever-increasing dependence on technology indicate that we should expect not less, but more
friction to come. Friction is the difference between fiction and reality, expectations and
achievements. It indicates that confusion and frustration are inherent elements of war, which will
always hinder both the formulation and achievement of desired effects. Friction as an eternal
phenomenon will always influence both the means and methods employed and betray
expectations and perceptions regarding causes and their likely effects.393 The taxonomy and the
propositions introduced by Watts make us conclude that due to the frictional mechanism of war
the outcome is highly contingent, which means that there is only a very low practical ceiling for
effects-based operations. We have always to expect indirect effects and other consequences
that defy most attempts to develop useful analytical models in order to detect causality:
· Friction indicates that various higher order consequences can arise and stay hidden far after
the war ended or remain in the dark forever. War is a social phenomenon dominated by
people who have motives, purposes, frailties, and limitations.
391  Watts, pp. 79-84.
392  Handel, in Handel (ed.), p. 68.
393  Handel, in: Handel (ed.), pp. 77, 78, 81; Pick, Daniel: War Machine, The Slaughter in the Modern Age,
Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 32-37; , Pearce, LeRoy J. Dr.: Coalition Operations in the Global
Village, Internet, accessed 27. 10. 2005, available at www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/coalition/ksco/ksco-
1999/DOC/pearce-c-ops-global-village.doc; Cimbala pp. 198-209.
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· Friction remains a significant part of war and waging it has similarities with gambling in
which uncertainty and confusion are not annoyances that can be eliminated gradually, but
integral and dominant parts.394
· Friction means that waging war is to a great extent based on guesswork and intuition
however sophisticated the analytical support might become. Much of Clausewitz and On
War might go with the wind, but the very concept of friction indicates that there is hardly any
difference in terms of mechanism between wars of the past and wars yet to come.
394  Watts, p. 53; Knox/Murray, pp. 176-179.
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9 Scientific Principles, Chaotic Reality
9.1 Science, Causality and War
The very essence of causality can best be described by a series of deductive if/then statements
that assume mostly linear connections in which a particular effect results from a particular cause.
Clausewitz warned that in war “there is a gap between principles and actual events that cannot
always be bridged by a succession of logical deductions.”395 War is composed of a complex web
of interconnected constituents in which friction poses a serious challenge. Due to friction, we
face circular causation in which causes and effects are connected via feedback loops. There is
always a chance of escalation and we have to take into account that tiny differences between
causes can lead to completely different effects. This however, indicates the impossibility to
predict future time paths in the form of desired effects.396 In this chapter we examine the problem
of unpredictability, incompleteness and instability in war together with the consequences that
follow.
9.1.1 War, Science, and the Classics Again
Approaching war in terms of desired effects indicates war to be an analytically solvable
phenomenon, which allows for prediction in the form of causal statements. War’s frictional
mechanism stands for disguised correlations rather than detectable causal chains.
Consequently, there is always the risk to disregard the difference that lies between correlation of
attributes and causal mechanisms.397 Addressing the continuum of war in an exclusive way
inadequately captures its dynamic nature. Friction explains why it was so difficult for Jomini to
establish a scientific theory of war good one and a half centuries ago. Jomini desperately tried to
provide his readers with a meaningful set of standardised scientific methods or phenomena. He
developed four maxims for the fundamental principle of war, but failed to make that very principle
explicit. He provided the reader with eight rules for selecting tactical positions, twelve orders of
battle, thirteen points for fighting battles, five directions for an attack by main force, three rules
for pursuit, eighteen points for the movements of armies, and nineteen rules for the use of the
artillery.398 However, time has mostly parodied and ridiculed his attempt to provide a scientific
categorisation of war. Unlike the appreciation and influence he possessed before World War I,
contemporary readers often find his work to be narrow, simplistic, occasionally boring and overtly
superficial. His example is a warning that any approach attempting to simplify, reduce and
prescribe actions in war is barely more than a dead-end. The analys of only a small number of
selected variables has a limited potential that yields a restricted set of options. Putting those
395  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 125.
396  Stacey, Ralph D.: Strategic Management & Organisational Dynamics, Pitman Publishing, 1996, pp. 177-
179; Salmon, Wesley C.: Causation, in: Gale, Richard: Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, Blackwell,
2002, pp. 35-42.
397  Christensen, Clayton M./Raynor, Michael E.: Why Hard-Nosed Executives Should Care About
Management Theory, Harvard Business Review, September 2003, pp. 67-71.
398  Kuhn, Thomas S.: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, International Encyclopedia of Unified
Science, Foundations of the Unity of Science, Volume 2, Number 2, 1962, pp. 10-13; Jomini, pp. 70-71,
181-184, 188-195, 200-203, 211-213, 242, 254-257, 289-290, 316-319.
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options through the filter of various cost/benefit analyses and other probability evaluations further
narrows those blinders and does not address important issues such as clarity, rigour and utility
for a real-world application. Thus by looking both at Jomini and the common elements of effects-
based operations we have the impression that employing analytic principles of natural scientific
inquiry can address war fought on paper rather than real war fought with blood and guts.
Jomini’s rigid, dogmatic and prescriptive thinking has relevance only for the former, and even
then with a very strong limitation.399 Jomini’s approach is the best example that forced natural
scientific principles based on direct causality and deduction, analytical rationality and
categorisation fail to address much of war’s frictional mechanism. Although scientific principles
might be helpful in describing war, it cannot be analysed on strict scientific principles only. The
common elements and characteristics classify effects-based operations as an approach that
addresses war mostly in scientific terms. It uses the vocabulary of natural science, which
resembles similarities with the failed geometrical and mathematical schools of European military
thinking of the outgoing 18th century. The concept’s hierarchy-oriented architectural design bears
the danger of taking the art out of warfare by inserting more science at the same time.400
9.1.2 Paradigms and Causality
In order to explain the recurring popularity of applying scientific principles to war we suggest to
take a close look at natural science and the way it develops. According to Kuhn, the early stages
of any natural science for which he used the term normal science, display a vast array of
descriptions and interpretations that largely disappear when one of the competing schools
triumphs. Natural scientific inquiry is a causal process that works towards homogenisation and
ends with the acceptance of a certain paradigm. It proceeds by improving paradigms in the form
of an infinite and spiralling determining-matching-articulating cycle. In the first stage it
determines significant facts of reality at hand, then it matches significant facts with theory, and in
the last stage it articulates the theory based on significant facts. This process implies that
paradigms are objects for further articulation and specifications should new conditions arise.
They are built on a few problems at hand to be solved and their success depends largely on the
ability to force those problems into a preformed and inflexible box. Paradigms do not call for new
sorts of phenomena since those that do not fit into them are often ignored and normally left
aside. The result of this causal approach is a drastically restricted and narrow focus, which is
both the driving force behind any natural scientific inquiry and the enabler to predict factual
information of intrinsic and substantial value.401 Paradigms indicate that natural scientific
endeavour is highly cumulative in its results. The steady extension of its scope and the ever-
increasing precision of the knowledge gained result that natural science does not aim at factual
or theoretical novelties, and in the case of success it finds none. As time passes not all existing
theories of a natural scientific field support a given paradigm. Paradigms do change and those
changes are normally accompanied by many speculative, roughly articulated and ad-hoc
modifications. Although paradigms can tolerate crises and accommodate tensions to a certain
degree, due to their causal focus scientists normally try to avoid anomalies and conflicts with
399  Shy, John: Jomini, in Handel, pp. 164-184.
400  Vego, Milan N.: Effects-Based Operations: A Critique, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd Quarter 2006,
pp. 51, 54.
401  Kuhn, pp. 17-34.
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existing paradigms. Consequently, natural science proceeds through the change of paradigms,
which explains why a scientist does not see something as something else: he or she just simply
sees it. As a result of the causal focus of paradigms natural science proceeds towards a
narrowing and ever increasing subdivision of its field of inquiry. It is this causal focus, which
separates natural scientific from artistic activities. Clausewitz indicated that natural scientific
endeavour with all its paradigms, methods and standards seeking causality, does not have much
relevance for war. In other words, friction does not allow for a narrow focus aimed at exploiting
cause-and-effect relationships.402 However, even the causal focus of natural science does not
indicate that paradigms can stay unchanged. They do change from time to time, which induces
re-examination and re-education of the existing world view. This painful and controversial
process is normally accompanied by the emergence of a novel gestalt. A gestalt refers to
functional units, which have properties that cannot be derived from the parts as a result of simple
summation. In other words, gestalts indicate that causal constructs are always imperfect.403
9.1.3 Science as Convenient Language
The most striking character of natural science is its ever-increasing specialisation, which evolves
through the prolonged utilization of the scientific method of inquiry. In terms of scope and
concern, the successive stages point towards an increase in detail and refinement proving that
while natural science can grow in depth, it may not grow equally in breadth. Although facts of
natural scientific inquiry reflect the crude facts of nature, they translate these facts into another
and more convenient language. Thus the properties of the raw material on which the inquiry
focuses always limit scientific freedom. This limitation in terms of causality indicates that the
border between rough and scientific facts can never be precisely drawn.404 Due to such
imprecise borders, any given law of natural science is always approximate, probable, and
incomplete. Although it can be replaced by other, closer and more probable laws ad infinitum, it
will always be an approximation, differing as little as chosen “from exactitude and the probability
from certitude.”405 Laws and paradigms are useful tools for natural scientific inquiry, but they are
by definition imperfect and provisional. The often praised objectivity of natural science is nothing
more than a provisional, crumbling and crude image, which indicates that even natural science
can never be true, only convenient.406 Approaches based on causality have limited practical
utility and indicate analytical convenience rather than real-world relevance.
9.1.4 Gestalt and Causality
We made it clear that Clausewitz did not attempt to provide a scientific image of war. He did not
come up with any paradigm for a phenomenon that “appear[s] to defy a “scientific” approach.”407
Clausewitz regarded war an integrated and holistic activity in which nothing could constitute a
functional unit. His metaphysical mode, reflecting methodology and scientific vocabulary further
402  Ibid., pp. 35, 43-46, 52-61, 78-79, 85, 92-109; Clausewitz, pp. 155-162
403  Kuhn, pp. 111-115, 139, 146-161; Gove, p. 952.
404  Ibid., pp. 170-174; Poincaré, Henry: The Foundations of Science, Science and Hypothesis, The Value of
Science, Science and Method, University Press of America, 1982, pp. 330-333.
405  Quotation in Poincaré, p 341.
406  Ibid., pp. 340-355.
407  Klinger, Janeen: The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz, Parameters, Spring 2006, pp. 79, 88.
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indicate that he did not search for causal explanations. However, there is one common
denominator that forms a recurrent pattern in his work. Unpredictability as gestalt manifested in
friction, best expresses his most important message: war is an extended event that cannot be
properly described as the exact sum of smaller and independent events. Unpredictability revels
war as a human phenomenon, which poses problems that often fall outside the reach of natural
scientific inquiry based on paradigms and causal explanations. Unpredictability helps us see war
as a functional whole that cannot be compounded from the action of its constituent parts.
Unpredictability can be described with a certain precision, but this precision is not necessarily
relevant to the parts. War does not allow for logical, direct and traceable connections between
causes and effects. Unpredictability comes as a result of mutually determined parts, which
indicate an interactive process that cannot be adequately described by the sum of causal
relationships. War’s frictional mechanism indicates that causes and effects are often the result of
intrinsic interactions.408 In war unpredictability comes as a result of terror, disequilibrium, and
non-linearity created by two opposing groups of intelligent human beings. We learned that
paradigms stand for firm and reliable information regarding some basic assumptions in terms of
causality. Unpredictability in contrast, acknowledges that war always depends on a wide variety
of factors that can either be known, or unknown, but can become knowable, or factors that are
unknown and remain potentially unknowable. In sum, unpredictability is responsible for the gap
between information known and information desired to be known, which can allegedly be
eliminated if we adopt effects-based operations.409
9.2 Unpredictability and Consequences
Natural science and its supporting paradigms always assume that there are clear and definite
answers to clear and definite questions. The driving force is a causal assumption that
information known and information desired can eventually overlap. However, in the case of war
we must assume that there is no such overlap. The only certainty regarding wars is that the war
actually fought differs from the war one expected to fight. As Clausewitz pointed out, war often
seems to be the difference between plans and events, fiction and reality. The most striking
difference between war and natural science is that the research of the former can mostly be
defined by a lack of any significant progress. This also explains why it is still possible to refer to a
theorist who lived nearly two centuries ago. The many theories of war display various mutually
inconsistent propositions and findings, which exist side-by-side and do not allow for the
emergence of any paradigm. This anomaly is mostly of a systemic nature, and due to the
impossibility of applying the methods of natural scientific inquiry. War is a context-dependent
408  Asch, Solomon E.: Gestalt Theory, in Sills, David l. (ed.): International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Volume 16, New York Macmillan & The Free Press, 1972, pp. 158-174.
409  Gove, pp. 952, 1421; Mansfield, Sue: The Gestalts of War, An Inquiry into Its Origins and Meanings as
a Social Institution, The Dial Press, 1982, pp. 232-240; McCrabb, Maris Dr.: Uncertainty, Expeditionary
Air Force and Effects-Based Operations, Air Force Research Laboratory, 2002b, pp. 7-8, Internet,
accessed 23. 04. 2003, available at www.eps.gov/EPSdata/USAF/Synopses/1142/Reference-Number-
PRDA-00-06-IKFPA/ uncertaintyandoperationalart.doc.
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cultural and social system, which consists of a network of components often acting in parallel.
The result is that everything moves, as nothing in war is stationary.410
9.2.1 Unpredictability and Non-linearity
Unpredictability as proposed gestalt might be bewildering at first. During our life we are
socialised for seeing the known, and are rarely prepared to learn about the unknown.
Consequently, the known is pressed on our mind from the outset and the unknown is regarded
mostly as irrelevant. We conveniently move along a narrow path of knowledge and think that
more is known than actually is. As time passes we are confident that many unknown things
usually become known. However, in the case of war as friction indicates, beyond the contours of
the unknown there is a vast array of inherently unknowable phenomena. Natural science reflects
the natural world by focusing on the known and the unknown, but mostly leaves the unknowable
out of its scope. It is a correct, but artificial reflection of the natural world in which paradigms
provide convenient tools that are always simpler and more controllable than the natural and
original. As various natural and man-made industrial disasters have shown, even the simple and
the artificial can slide out of hand. Given that war is waged by complex and idiosyncratic
humans, any attempt to separate the known, the unknown and the unknowable become
impossible.411 Consequently, if we had a better understanding of the known, the unknown, and
the unknowable, we could gain a broader perspective for dealing with a complex human
phenomenon such as war. This however, requires that similar to friction, we must thoroughly
elaborate on the attributes of unpredictability.
9.2.2 Sources of Unpredictability in War
Earlier we explained that identifying a useful mechanism for achieving an effect is the Achilles
heel of effects-based operations. In terms of causality we face various possibilities in war, which
we can identify as known and obvious, unknown, but knowable, and inherently unknowable.
Thus the real significance of unpredictability lies exactly in the area in which the known,
unknown and unknowable meet. Clausewitz himself emphasised the impossibility of making
predictions regarding the outcome in terms of causal statements. It is not surprising that for
critiques On War is a theoretical mess, since it offers many and often contradicting views
regarding the mechanism of war. Although Clausewitz’s reasoning was limited by the respective
state of science and its vocabulary, as a compelling classic of Western military thinking, he was
among the first who explicitly addressed war’s complex and non-linear character. He
emphasised that the conduct of war is not an analytical process, but one that always changes in
an unpredictable way. Confronted with the unknowable and having no better toolset than the
scientific vocabulary of the early 19th century, explains why he introduced the idea of friction,
410  Friedman, George: The Unpredictability of War and Force Structure, The  STRATFOR  Weekly,  29
September 2003, Internet, accessed 12. 08. 2005, available at www.vialardi.org/IRAQ/unpredictability
_of_war.html; Geeraerts, Gustaaf: Non-Linearity, Chaos and the Predictability of War, Pole Paper,
Volume 4, Number 1, January 1998, Internet, accessed 02. 08. 2005, available at www.poli.vub.ac.be/
publi/pole-papers/pole0401.htm.
411  Gomory, Ralph E.: The Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable, Essay, Scientific American, June
1995, p. 88.
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which is an essentially mechanical, hence a natural scientific term.412 Clausewitz perceived war
as a phenomenon involving a large band-with of interactive and competing factors that display a
messy interplay between order and disorder, predictability and unpredictability. For him, waging
war was a non-linear and dynamic process in which the inherent complexities and probabilities
could not be seen as isolated phenomena. Although the unpredictability of war is manifest in
nearly every book of On War, Beyerchen identified three sources as follows:
· Interaction – unpredictability of interaction emphasises war as an interactive process
between intelligent and adaptable human beings. Actions in war do not produce simple
reactions, but dynamic interactions, and any attempt to anticipate the enemy’s move runs
into considerable difficulty. Interactions allow only for vague assumptions in the form of
generalisations based on qualitative theorising. War is a structurally unstable phenomenon,
which means that participants must always expect disproportional effects and unpredictable
situations.
· Friction – this source of unpredictability has already been detailed. It is the sort of resistance
that stands for the feedback effects responsible for constant novelty, and the fact that things
in war never go as planned. Friction is the noise in the system of war and expresses how
information distortion and overload can produce uncertainty regarding the actual state of
affairs. Both resistance and noise emphasise that it is not possible to calculate in advance
what cause results in what effect. It is equally impossible to predict which effect will turn out
to be critical and decisive.
· Chance – unpredictability from chance means that most of the factors on which actions are
based are obscured and distorted in war. Chance has three sources from which it stems,
such as statistically random phenomena, amplification of micro-causes, and the result of
analytical blinders. All refer to the role of probability in calculations due to the enormous
amount of variables. The result is that small causes can generate disproportionate effects,
which indicates that there will always be the possibility that the result of any given action can
defy the odds. Chance mirrors the idea that the precision of available information regarding
causes and their effects is always limited and “attempts to reconstruct cause and effect [will]
always face the lack of precise information.” 413
Clausewitz emphasised that human intuition is guided by linear conceptions, which are of
analytical convenience rather than real-world relevance. Unfortunately, as unpredictability
indicates, attempts to generate principles for the conduct of war and discern clear causality is a
desirable, but an unattainable goal.414
9.2.3 Chaos and Determinism
War is a phenomenon composed of a multitude of connected parts. According to Clausewitz
every act in war has consequences, which could be either intended and immediately obvious, or
unintended and delayed. Although he knew that war displays cause-and-effect relationships, he
412  Beyerchen, Alan D.: Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, Internet, accessed 02. 08.
2005, available at www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm; Fleming, p.
69.
413  Beyerchen (quotation ibid.).
414  In ibid.
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equally argued that war’s frictional mechanism renders it largely impossible for most attempts to
take full advantage of direct causality.415 Whereas he invented friction to describe war’s
unpredictability, we can refer to the recent concept of chaos, which offers a more detailed insight
into the mechanism of war. Strictly speaking chaos is a mathematical concept that does not
mean anarchy or confusion. It simply describes the disorder that arises from non-random
causes. Chaos is used to describe a range of irregular behaviours in which seemingly random
occurrences can be depicted by entirely deterministic and often very simple equations. Chaos
occurs in nearly all aspects of military affairs and stems from the presence of feedback. In
general we can say that the behaviour of a chaotic system is non-periodic and apparently
random, which means that the system’s response is recurrent, but no longer predictable. Thus
the inability to make long-term predictions in chaotic systems is not due to the lack of data, but
an immediate consequence of the non-linear rules that govern its behaviour. Deterministic chaos
can best be described as irregular or random appearances of nonlinear dynamic systems, in
which dynamical laws determine the time evolution of the system based on its history. The
necessary ingredients for a system to be labelled as chaotic, are, among others, boundedness,
non-linearity, non-periodicity, sensitivity to initial conditions, and mixing. Chaos’ biggest
implication for war is that in non-linear systems we must always expect instability in the form of
novelty.416 Clausewitz suggested war is chaotic, which breaks down predictability. The result
being that there is no way to predict the effect of the actions of the participants with any great
certainty. Historical evidence indicates that predictability and control are already lost at the
threshold separating war and peace. Chaos indicates that small perturbations of initial conditions
can lead to unforeseen changes, since war’s unpredictability is as much manifest in creating
structures, as it is in tearing them apart. In war the creation and dissolution of order go hand in
hand and defy most explanations based on deductive causal models, which were identified as
an important characteristic of effects-based operations.417
9.2.4 War and Determinism
Although chaos is a deterministic mathematical concept that does not mean randomness, in
English parlance it is understood heuristically, and synonymous with chasm, gulf or abyss. Thus
chaos refers to chance, which is subject to no law and displays no signs of uniformity. It is not a
distinct or an orderly form, but precedes the creation of order. In war military operations often
display a state of confusion including complete disorder, lack of sequence, organization, and any
sign of predictability. Chaos in war seems to be for many “a confused mass or agglomerate of
matters or heterogeneous items that are hard to distinguish, isolate or interpret.”418 The question
415  In ibid., pp. 145-152.
416  James, Glenn E.: Chaos Theory, The Essentials for Military Applications, The Newport Papers, Naval
War College, October 1996, pp. 2-6, 14, 27-28, 38, 46, 53; Durham, Susan E. (Maj.): Chaos Theory for
the Practical Military Mind, Air Command and Staff College, March 1997, pp. 1-2, 6-15; Ilachinski,
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Center for Naval Analyses, CIM 461, July 1996a, p. 27.
417  Beyerchen; Saperstein, Alvin M.: Chaos – a model for the outbreak of war, Nature, 24 May 1984, pp.
303-304; Saperstein, Alvin M.: War and Chaos, American Scientist, November-December 1995, p. 548;
Kuruc, Anton: The Relevance of Chaos Theory to Operations, Australian Defence Force Journal,
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regarding war, chaos and determinism arises naturally: is the chaos found in war deterministic or
heuristic? We made it clear that natural scientific inquiry can best be characterised by attributes
such as covering laws, known initial conditions, deduction, prediction and explanations. The
results are deductive-nomological models capable of connecting causes and their effects, each
occurring as contiguous instants at their own place and time. Mathematically chaotic systems
are deterministic and governed by laws that indicate intimacy between causes and their effects,
since only their sensitivity to initial conditions qualifies them as chaotic. In war however, attempts
to connect causes and effects run against war’s frictional mechanism lacking such intimacy. The
multitude of factors, motives and players involved distorts any accurate statement regarding
initial conditions. Despite similarities in terms of chaos, war probably cannot be regarded as a
chaotic system in strictly mathematical terms. Although it displays particular factors and events
coalescing in various proportions to realise their end, war is far more complex than any
sophisticated mathematical model. The scope and complexity of the factors involved, together
with the human tendency to gauge decisions by relatively external events indicate the
impossibility of comprehending all variables. The result is that war cannot be regarded as a
closed and isolated phenomenon. The greater the temporal and spatial difference between initial
conditions, the bigger the inaccuracy with which those conditions can become known. Temporal
and spatial factors always diminish the accuracy of any deductive and nomological explanation,
which in terms of war can only cover events and their immediate consequences. This is the very
reason for why it is relatively simple to discern causality in the case of physical effects, and
nearly impossible in the case of psychological effects. War displays tangled and intricate
relationships in terms of causality. As various temporal and spatial limitations indicate, in war
causal relationships are never fully contiguous or fully point-like.419 Consequently, any attempt to
detect causality must contend with an emergent novelty. Earlier we made it clear that war does
not allow for any separation into parts to be studied individually. It is composed of so many
components and elements that identifying causal subordinations to newly emerging processes
can be very difficult, if not impossible. Although certain aspects of emergent properties might
allow for detecting causal relationships, other aspects possess characteristics of their own that
cannot be determined in terms of causality. Thus even in the case of a systemic approach based
on analytical rationality and categorisation, we face a general methodological problem. Any
attempt to identify the components of a given system and the dimensions according to which
they are arranged can only be done incompletely. Open and dynamic systems such as war
evolve over time, and any identification process can be considered adequate only, if we are able
to enumerate all the unfilled positions and the strains they create. This however, is again
supplicated to a novelty we cannot anticipate as such systems do not exhibit mathematically
representable temporal series of behaviour. Consequently, the system is unquantifiable in terms
of causal relationships and does not permit accurate prediction regarding its future states.420
419  Reisch, George A.: Chaos, History and Narrative, History and Theory, Winter 1991, pp. 1-20; Pool,
Robert: Chaos Theory: How Big an Advance? Science, 7 July 1989, pp. 26-27.
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9.2.5 War as Natural Form
The issue of determinism/indeterminism is closely related to human free will and means that an
irregularity as understood heuristically, is not generally incompatible with determinism, except
when it has no determining conditions for its occurrence.421 We often might not precisely know
the conditions for the occurrence of many chaotic events, but are basically confident regarding
those conditions. This confidence explains why it is possible to establish relationships between
statistical properties of events, and why we are less successful in doing the same for individual
events and their properties. Applying various statistical variables expresses our ability to
consider the statistical properties of the elements accompanying the events. Therefore, the
question of whether events occur in an absolutely heuristic or deterministic fashion is not an
issue that has significant importance, since real life is compatible with both alternatives. Thus the
question of whether structures are heuristic or deterministic in war is basically nothing more than
a subject of inconclusive controversy, since both indicate unpredictability. Heuristic and
deterministic structures refer to natural forms, which stand for occurrences and phenomena we
can perceive. They are isomorphic structures across the fields of human inquiry such as
biological cells, economic societies, the population of organisms, and in our case – war. Natural
forms can be understood either as a natural complex or a natural system. Although both refer to
the same, they possess different attributes. Whereas a natural complex displays purposeful
forms and organic interactions among the constituents, a natural system displays chaotic forms
and topographic interactions among the components.422 Thus any given natural form can be
examined either as a natural complex or as a natural system. Although both constructs stand for
unpredictability, the difference comes from subjective interest:
· Natural complex – is a form composed of constituents, which are non-separable from each
other. Every attempt to divide or dissect a natural complex obviously changes its identity.
Due to the organised division of labour within such a complex, one constituent’s particular
function complements the function of the other constituents organically. The unpredictability
of a natural complex arises from non-determinism, as it reacts differently to the same
stimulus.
· Natural system – is composed of constituents that are separate, but not independent from
each other, which indicates that the components act as external and arbitrary impetuses.
They are separate, but have a chain-like integrity that cannot be divided. Consequently,
unpredictability of a natural system is the result of human ignorance regarding all the factors
at play and we face determinism in which topographic interactions involve efficient
causation.423
War as a natural form can be regarded both as a heuristic and deterministic phenomenon in
which the difference does not come as a result of the underlying attributes, but as the respective
inquiry. War as a natural form indicates similarities with systems, such as the weather or rain
421  Lorenz, Edward N.: The Essence of Chaos, UCL Press, 1993, pp. 157-160.
422  Nagel, Ernest: The Structure of Science, Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, Hackett
Publishing Company, 1979, pp. 317-335; Khalil, Elias L.: Natural Complex vs. Natural System, Journal
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forest, which might be heuristic real-world phenomena, but can nevertheless be modelled and
explained to a given degree by deterministically chaotic mathematical models.
9.3 Incompleteness and Instability in War
Due to the presence of chaos in war the history of warfare is replete with examples in which
dramatic consequences resulted from minor actions, or that identical actions, depending on the
context, have resulted in different outcomes. War as a distinct and specific form of social
interaction does not always display a direct relationship between causes and effects. Human
interactions are context dependent in which similar causes can lead to very dissimilar effects.
Nevertheless, the obvious similarity between chaotic abstract mathematical models and chaotic
social and cultural phenomena such as war, allow for an extended examination of friction and
unpredictability. Both depend on factors that can drive the system from stability to turbulence
and back again. Prediction becomes impossible since chaotic structures are vulnerable to
dissolution, and the higher the number of actors and longer the time-scale of prediction, the
greater the problem of accuracy. Regardless of whether chaos is seen as a deterministic or
heuristic phenomenon, it indicates that in war the general push for stability is nothing more than
illusion.424
9.3.1 War and Incompleteness
War is full of dispersed, diffuse, intermittent and irregular processes, which stand for fluid and
dysphasic movements that constantly erode attempts to achieve symmetry and order.
Consequently, war stands for a constant interplay between fractalisation and the drive for
homogeneity.425 War as a natural form also reminds us that any outcome reflects the complex
interactions of the constituents in which unpredictability best catches the “combined effect of
friction, disruption, and lethality of unit behavior”.426 Regardless of how we name the aggregate
results, war does not provide for consistency and completeness. Whereas consistency refers to
the lack of contradictions, completeness expresses the ability to provide for proofs of all true
statements. Even if war provided for such attributes and could be described entirely in
mathematical formulas, Gödel proved that it is not possible to reach consistency and
completeness. According to him all formal mathematical systems, despite the fact that they
display completeness and consistency, are inherently incomplete. They might be true, but
cannot be proved despite the abundance of existing axioms and rules of inference. Gödel
424  Mann, Steven R.: Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought, Parameters, Autumn 1992, pp. 54-68;
Peatland, Pat A. (Lt. Col.): Center of Gravity Analysis and Chaos Theory, Air War College, Air
University, April 1993, pp. 10-11.
425  Saperstein (1995), pp. 548-557; Beaumont, pp. 3-12; Nicholls, David (Maj.)/Tagarev, Todor (Maj.): What
Does Chaos Theory Mean for Warfare?, Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 1994, Internet, accessed 10.
12. 2003, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/nichols.html; Weeks, Michael
R. (Maj.): Chaos, Complexity and Conflict, Air & Space Power Chronicles, Internet, accessed 22. 05.
2003, available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Weeks.html.
426  Cramer, Friedrich: Chaos and Order, The Complex Structure of Living Systems, VCH
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 115-117; Pfaff, Charles A. (Maj.): Chaos, Complexity and the Battlefield,
Military Review, July August 2000, pp. 83-86; Herman, Mark: Entropy-Based Warfare: Modeling the
Revolution in Military Affairs, Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, pp. 85-90 (quotation p.
87).
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understood formalisation as consistency and completeness, in which axioms and rules are tools
applicable to all mathematical questions in expressible formulas. Consistency and completeness
can never be reached even in formal mathematical systems, as there would always be simple
problems that cannot be decided from axioms. Since problems of this kind appear in a very
extensive class of formally expressible systems, he concluded that every formal system must
contain propositions that cannot be decided. In other words, there would always be propositions
that cannot be proved or disproved. Thus Gödel’s theorem indicates that there are always
propositions that assert their own improvability. Consequently, even formal systems in which the
class of axioms and rules of inference can be recursively defined display undecidable
propositions. Similar to a complex social phenomenon such as war formal mathematical systems
are incomplete and display logical inconsistency.427 Although his theorem refers to formal
statements of mathematical truth, it also sheds light indirectly on problems found in the cause-
and-effect relationships during war. Among others, his incompleteness theorem explains why
computer-based simulations of war are essentially unstable and display inconsistency between
input and output. Computer simulations are excellent examples that even if there are definable
deterministic relationships within a given system that can be formalised mathematically, we must
always expect occurrences that cannot be proved or disproved in terms of causality.428
9.3.2 Structural Variance and Non-Monotonicity
Despite attempts to comprehend war in terms of causality we always face inconsistency and
incompleteness as even simpler settings that attempt to model it, show non-linear attributes and
signs of instability. The Lanchester equations were the first combat model that attempted to
estimate war mathematically in terms of casualty rates. Lanchester wanted to catch the essence
of loss ratios in combat based on a pair of coupled differentials. From a contemporary point of
view the equations seem to be very crude and clumsy tools. Growing computing power in the
second half of the 20th century has enabled analysts to model increasingly more aspects of war’s
complex features. However, this development has shown that the relatively simple model
instability of the Lanchester equation has been replaced by others, yielding more divergent and
unexpected results.429 The term structural variance was  the  first  attempt  to  express  the
occasional and seemingly erratic behaviour that came from a strictly deterministic mechanism of
the models employed. Another attempt to describe model outputs, which were seen as irregular
functions of some input parameters, resulted in the term non-monotonicity. Both terms describe
erratic outputs that were regarded mostly as the analysts’ faults. Although first efforts were
aimed at finding reduction techniques for these anomalies, later it was found that in the case of
complex simulations, even infinitely small factors such as computer rounding errors can become
the source of instability. It was concluded that dynamic instability appears to be an inherent
427  Gödel, Kurt: On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems,
Basic Books, 1962, pp. 37-41, 62, 69-72; Coveney, Peter/Highfield, Roger: Frontiers of Complexity, The
Search for Order in a Chaotic World, faber and faber, 1995, pp. 25-28.
428  Gove, pp. 153, 1635, 1819.
429  Sidran, Ezra D.: A Calculated Strategy: Readings directed towards the creation of a strategic artificial
intelligence, Readings for Research, Spring 2004, pp. 11-13, Internet, accessed 10. 11. 2005, available
at www.cs.uiowa.edu/~dsidran/ReadingsForResearch2.pdf; Speight L. R.: Lanchester’s Equation And
The Structure of the Operational Campaign: Between-Campaign Effects, Military Operations Research,
Volume 7, Number 2, 2002, pp. 16-21; Glenn, p. 75.
138
feature of complex simulations. This conclusion however, allows for a much broader
generalisation. If deterministic combat models based on highly controlled conditions can display
irregular outputs, than real wars in which the signs of determinism are less clear may be
destined to do so. Real war is always more complex than any model can ever become; therefore
if relatively simple computer models can show signs of instability then “the instability of the
corresponding reality is certainly implied.”430 This, however, indicates that similar to the concept
of friction, chaos allows only for a rather low practical ceiling for effects-based operations.
430  Speight, L. R.: ‘Structural Variance’ or ‘Non-Monotonicity’ Effects in Combat Models: A Review, Military
Operations Research, Volume 8, Number 1, 2003, pp. 18-19; Saperstein, Alvin M.: The “Long Peace” –
Result of a Bipolar Competitive World, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 35, Number 1, March
1991, pp. 70-72; Ilachinski (July 1996a), pp. 125-127; Ilachinski, Andrew: Land Warfare and Complexity,
Part II: An Assessment of the Applicability of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complex Systems Theory to the
Study of Land Warfare (U ), Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 96-68, July 1996b, pp. 62-64.
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10 Attributes of Causality
10.1 Dissecting the Continuum of War
In order to better understand the mechanism of war, in this chapter we suggest examining it
along two properties such as couplings and interactions. Although the properties we use are of a
qualitative nature and were originally introduced to understand and study the way accidents
happen, in a slightly modified form they equally explain the way unpredictability develops. The
proposed structural analysis displays unpredictability as a phenomenon that comes mostly in the
form of unintended and unexpected effects. 431
10.1.1 Combination of Properties
Although war happens on a continuum, the proposed properties allow for dissecting it into four
rough areas representing different sorts of relationships. This way we can address the so-called
intricate relationship between causes and effects. As depicted in Figure 10 whereas interaction
can either be linear or complex, coupling may be tight or loose.
Figure 10: Perrow’s quadrant
Interactions will be the first property explored. Due to their simplicity and comprehensibility,
linear interactions allow for visible and simple relationships between causes and effects.
Linearity can be anticipated since the underlying sequence of causality is directly
comprehensible. Complex interactions indicate branching paths, feedback loops and jumps from
one sequence to another. Here connections multiply in unexpected ways often revealing
unintended and unfamiliar effects. Causal relationships are outside the normal and assumed
sequence of events and are either invisible or not immediately comprehensible.432 Linear
interactions can also display invisible cause-and-effect strains, but they occur mostly in a well-
defined segment and sequence. Complex interactions do not stand for a well-defined segment or
431  Perrow, Charles: Normal Accidents, Living with High-Risk Technologies, Basic Books, 1984, p. 63.
432  Ibid., pp. 75-78.
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sequence, as causes and effects are linked differently and may interact in unexpected ways.
Causal processes are more indirect and inferential so that not even the tip of an iceberg is
visible. Complex interactions are full of misunderstood or missed signals and faulty information
regarding causes and their likely effects. Whereas linear interactions have minimal feedback-
loops and are generally clear and concise, complex interactions are more likely to display
unanticipated or unintended relationships. The second property is coupling, which refers to slack
or buffer in cause-and-effect relationships. Tight couplings do not contain slack or buffer, but
refer to direct causality since what happens in one directly affects what happens in the other.
Loose couplings can best be characterised by ambiguity and flexibility in which the absence of
intended connections can remain unobserved. Whereas loose couplings make it possible to
display our own logic and interest in terms of causality, tight coupling restricts such attitudes.
Unlike loose couplings that are more stable as they can accommodate shocks without
destabilisation, tight couplings generally respond to a quicker and more disastrous fashion to
perturbations.433 Consequently, in terms of the properties we can state the following:
· Linear interactions – indicate spatial segregation and dedicated connections. They refer to
attributes such as easy substitution, with only a few feedback loops. They also allow for
single purposed and segregated control, since they rest on direct information that makes an
extensive understanding possible.
· Complex interactions – are based on proximity and common mode connections. They
display interconnectedness, which means limited substitution and many feedback loops.
They require multiple and interacting controls that stand for indirect information and limited
understanding.
· Tight couplings – do not make delays possible. Due to the underlying invariance of
sequences there is only a small amount of slack. Should buffers and redundancies exist,
they are mostly built-in features that allow only for limited substitution. Tight couplings mean
that there is hardly any spatial and temporal separation between a cause and an effect.
· Loose couplings – allow for delays as the order of sequences is changeable. This results in
extended and often unanticipated sets of alternative methods, slack and buffers in which
substitutions are fortuitously available. In the case of loose couplings, causes and effects
are separated both in time and space.434
10.1.2 Flattening and Projecting the Quadrant
It became clear that linear interactions refer to highly structured, logical, sequential, and
predictable cause-and-effect relationships. In contrast, complex interactions offer less
predictability due to the presence of unplanned and unforeseen relationships in terms of
causality. Tight couplings can be described by high centralisation and rigidity, which allow for a
close monitoring and a certain tolerance. Loose couplings mean decentralised operations and
allow for a wide variety of outcomes in terms of effects.435 Although the generic relationship
between couplings and interactions allow for four possibilities, we suggest a different
visualisation than in the form of a quadrant. Thus a flattened design is best suited to be projected
433  Ibid., pp. 79-85.
434  Ibid., pp. 86-92.
435  Czerwinski, Tom: Coping with the Bounds, Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs, CCRP
Publication Series, January 1998, pp. 89-92, 96-98; Perrow, p. 332.
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on the continuum of war as depicted in Figure 11. War can roughly be subdivided into four
vague, but interrelated areas such as simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic.436 In general
the more we move from the first area to the last, from tightly linear to tightly complex, the more
the level of predictability based on causal relationships decreases and in the case of the latter, it
can disappear entirely. The figure also shows that even if it is possible to discern causality in
terms of physical effects such as one bomb/one kill, it is mostly impossible to see which way this
particular effect relates to subsequent and desired psychological consequences.
Figure 11: Czerwinski’s flattened quadrant projected on the continuum of war
The increase in non-linearity and the growing instability of combinations result in difficult-to-
decode causal relationships. Nevertheless the following explains some characteristics of the
combinations:
· Simple – area I can be described as tightly linear and stands for linear causality indicating
known causes and effects. We can discern clear and visible cause-and-effect relationships
that allow for predictions. Due to their empirical nature, causal relationships are not open to
dispute and planning for effects makes sense. Consequently, this area can be characterised
by the predominance of centralised causes and centralised effects.
· Complicated – area II can be described as loosely linear and refers to knowable causes and
effects. Although causal relationships exist, due to spatial and temporal separations they
might not become fully known. The relationship between causes and effects are generally
difficult to comprehend, which indicates limitations in terms of prediction. Planning for effects
still makes sense, but we must take into account that centralised causes increasingly yield
decentralised and unexpected effects.
· Complex – area III can be described as loosely complex. Cause-and-effect relationships
might still exist, but they defy most attempts at categorisation or other analytical techniques.
Effects can be perceived, but not predicted since their relationship is not open to any
inspection. Both interactions and couplings indicate that causes and effects are mostly
decentralised and appear coherent only retrospectively, but even then subject to debate.
436  See Jobbagy (May 2005), pp. 47-57.
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· Chaotic – area IV can be described as tightly complex. Here there are no visible cause-and-
effect relationships, which indicate that causality is basically not perceivable. The amount of
factors together with spatial and temporal separations makes prediction impossible, or
allows only for very general terms. In this area it is not possible to plan for effects or discern
causal relationships in a meaningful way.437
10.1.3 Friction and Chaos Depicted
The flattened quadrant made it possible to dissect war into four interrelated areas with different
characteristics. Whereas in tightly linear systems everyone can detect causality, in loosely linear
systems experts might detect causality. In loosely complex systems causality often becomes
clear only retrospectively. Unfortunately, in tightly complex systems there is no discernible
causality that can guide our actions.438
Figure 12: Effects-based operations and unpredictability
As depicted in Figure 12 the more we move towards tightly complex attributes the more
unpredictability takes hold. Earlier we located effects-based operations in the upper right area of
the continuum of war. Unfortunately, this is the very area in which it is very difficult or impossible
to detect and exploit causality. Another problem with the concept comes from the fact that even
the area in which we can discern causality, it interacts with areas that are inherently
unpredictable. Consequently, as indicated earlier by friction and chaos, we must expect novelty
everywhere and every time in war. This also means that the Clausewitzian assumption that in
war everything is simple, but even the simplest thing can become difficult, takes hold.
Unpredictability reminds us that if we have no firm basis for comprehending the initial state with
all the factors that must be considered, we will equally have no basis to judge which of the
possibilities should be regarded as desired effects:
437  Kurtz, Cynthia F./Snowden, David J.: The new dynamics of strategy: Sense–making in a complex and
complicated world, IBM Systems Journal, Volume 42, Number 3, 2003, pp. 468-469; Snowden,
David/Stanbridge, Peter: The Landscape of Management: Creating the context for understanding social
complexity, ECO Special Double Issue, Volume 6, Number 1-2, Fall 2004, pp. 144-145.
438  Kurtz/Snowden, p. 472.
IV. Chaotic
(Tightly complex)
III. Complex
(Loosely complex)
II. Complicated
(Loosely linear)
Psychological
Physical
Destruction Influence
I. Simple
(Tightly linear) Identified focus of effects-
based operations
(Systemic)
143
· In general we can say that even if effects-based operations worked, it would offer
considerable promise only for physical effects, but in the case of psychological effects the
concept is rather hopeless. Unfortunately, this is the area in which effects-based operations
are claimed to offer the most benefits. It appears that in the case of systemic effects the
concept touches the borderline that separates prediction from pure guesswork.
· Thus we can say that effects-based operations are generally good for creating desired
physical effects, and might occasionally be good for generating desired systemic effects.
However, in the case of psychological effects the best we can say is that the concept does
not work well, but on occasion we might get useful information.439
The consequences of such a visualisation are serious since the figure indicates that the concept
aims at exploiting causal relationships in an area in which it is either very difficult or even
impossible to detect any sort of causality. Thus the figure also explains why it was so difficult to
find a useful coercive mechanism that aims at influencing behaviour rather than destroying
physical capability.
10.2 General Properties of Complexity
Dissecting the continuum of war based on interactions and couplings enables us to see the way
structures are produced and dissolved in terms of causality. The four areas made it clear that the
mechanism of war stands for a general unpredictability that can be described as follows:
· Moving towards the physical/destruction end-pole indicates direct causality and prediction,
but the value of the effects achieved is normally seen as low.
· Although effects achieved around the psychological/influence end-pole have high values,
they do not allow for predictions based on direct causality.
The properties indicate that in war all activities take place in an environment in which chaos
constantly meets order in a disorderly way. Thus, the four areas display war as a phenomenon in
which pre-order meets order in disorder, and occurrences move continuously back and forth in
the continuum. Due to such attributes war can best be described by the term complexity. Similar
to friction and chaos, complexity also denies the primacy of order and causality and the drive for
efficiency and constant affirmation. In terms of unpredictability, complexity stands for freedom
and openness that puts an emphasis on action and possibility. It is a whole in its own right in
which actions complement each other when seen from the totality of the system.440
10.2.1 Describing Complexity
The structural analysis made it clear that war displays complex forms of causality in which we
must take the various interdependences better into account. Links between causes and effects
often become distant in time and space or can even disappear. Consequently, in the case we
439  Lorenz, pp. 102-110.
440  Lefebvre, Eric/Letiche, Hugo: Managing Complexity from Chaos: Uncertainty, Knowledge and Skills,
Emergence, Volume 1, Number 3, 1999, pp. 7-15; Axelrod, Robert/Cohen, Michael D.: Harnessing
Complexity, Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier, The Free Press, 1999, pp. 28-31;
Lissack, Michael R.: Complexity: the Science, its Vocabulary, and its Relation to Organizations,
Emergence, Volume 1, Issue 1, 1999, pp. 110-125.
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proceed as “if simple linear links exist even if we do not know what they are, then we are likely to
undertake actions that yield unintended and surprising results.”441 As indicated by friction about
one and a half centuries ago and by the recent concept of chaos, complexity can also best be
described as the result of many constituents that are interdependent in a non-linear way. They
display a bewildering array of effects that possess a hierarchical structure spanning over several
scales:
· Complexity appears as an emergent property in the continuum of war and comes from the
constant interplay of chaotic and non-chaotic forces. Simply put, complexity arises from the
sheer number of the constituents and their interdependencies.
· Complexity stands for a continuous evolution and adaptation containing a network of various
alternatives. It cannot be represented based on reasoning and causality since the
interactions and couplings of the constituents often produce unforeseeable results.442
In order to explore complexity properly, we must acquire a pluralistic world view that
accommodates all the different kinds of phenomena co-existing side-by-side. Although the
simplest way to think in terms of complexity is to assume a system that involves a huge number
of interacting elements, the introduced structural analysis made it clear that complex systems
cannot be defined only by the quantity of the interacting components. Complexity stands for a
multitude of hierarchical layers in which any exclusive focus on individual agents means that
important properties can easily be lost. Nevertheless, the four areas make it possible to deliver
an explanatory framework that helps us better understand the consequences of our actions, and
the spatial and temporal effects they generate.443 A very important attribute of complexity can be
defined as structural stability/instability. Whereas structural stability allows for analytical
examination, structural instability can only be explained in a non-analytical way.444 The laminar
flow of events ceases to be stable and spontaneously turns into a turbulent flow. Structural
instability stands for bifurcation in which new solutions emerge. Every such point contains an
element of randomness or chance that makes impossible to predict which path the system will
take. Consequently, at bifurcation points the system is beyond the threshold of stability and is
under the rule of a chaotic mechanism that expresses an extraordinary sensitivity to initial
441  Stacey, pp. 273-276 (quotation p. 275); More on the consequences see Tasaka, Hiroshi Dr.: Twenty-
first-century Management and the Complexity Paradigm, Emergence, Volume 1, Issue 4, 1999, pp. 115-
123.
442  Levin, pp. 163-168; Baranger, Michel: Chaos, Complexity, and Entropy, A physics talk for non-
physicists, pp. 9-11, Internet, accessed 24. 11. 2005, available at http://necsi.org/projects/baranger/
cce.pdf; Cilliers, Paul: Complexity and postmodernism, Understanding complex systems, Routledge,
1998, pp. 2-5; Swenson, David X./Rigoni, David: Ethical Problem Solving and Systems Theory: The
Complexity Connection, Systemic Practice and Action Research, Volume 12, Number 6, 1999, pp. 576-
577.
443  Nicolis, Grégoire/Prigogine, Iliya: Exploring Complexity, An Introduction, W. H. Freeman and Company
New York, 1989, pp. 5-8, 31-32; Moffat, James: Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare,
Information Age Transformation Series, CCRP Publication Series, September 2003, pp. xi-xiv, 1-10;
Prigogine, Ilya/Stengers, Isabella: Order out of Chaos, Man’s New Dialogue with Nature, Heinemann,
1984, pp. 131-137.
444  Nicolis/Prigogine, pp. 93-98; Gove, p. 213; Moffat, p. 15. For a similar purpose another option would
have been to display the so-called Lorenz equation. See Briggs, John/Peat, David F.: Turbulent Mirror,
An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the Science of Wholeness, Harper & Row, 1989, pp. 53-65,
102; Lorenz, p. 147.
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conditions. In terms of causality, links between causes and effects can be lost and it is not
possible to identify “the specific consequences of a specific action, nor will we be able to identify
the specific cause of a specific event.”445 As indicated by the four areas, any complex system
can display both deterministic outcomes and random fluctuations. Around bifurcation points
deterministic descriptions break down and explanations based on causal relationships do not
make sense. Fluctuations completely upset the equilibrium of a system and as a result the
number of possible effects can become very high. This constant shuffling between stability and
instability explains why war can display “growth and decay, capture and domination, periods of
opportunity for alternative developments followed by solidification of the existing domination
structures.”446
10.2.2 Depicting Complexity
In war areas with different characteristics overlap and constantly influence each other, which
makes attempts to identify direct causality very difficult. Linearity goes together with non-linearity
and stability always co-exists with complexity and chaos.
Figure 13 Overlapping characteristics of war
Whereas stability stands for simplicity and linearity reflecting a tight and linear relationship
between causes and effects, non-linearity points towards chaos that can be described by
extreme sensitivity to initial conditions indicating a tight, but complex relationship between
causes and effects. The biggest area within the continuum of war can best be described as
complexity proper, which stands for non-linearity, far-from-equilibrium conditions and
emergence. Although war displays linear properties, its mechanism is mostly defined by non-
linear attributes. Consequently, we must rethink regarding the basic mechanism that drives
effects-based operations, and shift our reasoning away from prediction in terms of causality
aimed at identifying desired effects.447 War shows emergent and interactive attributes that come
445  Prigogine/Sengers, pp. 140-141, 160-170, 177-179, 196-203 (quotation p. 203).
446  Stacey, pp. 324-329 (quotation p. 324).
447  Czerwinski, pp. 39-60; Briggs/Peat, pp. 174-180.
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as a result of structured, but non-additive interactions. Figure 13 indicates war to be more than
the sum of its constituents in which we always face a general unpredictability in relation to the
input. The various combinations in terms of the constituents’ interactions and couplings also
mean that complex systems can be surprisingly stable and resilient. They can continuously
adjust and adapt, which ability provides them with multiple and often unexpected paths that
make causal explanations very difficult.448 Instead of attempting to create idealised sets of
problems that can be solved, war requires an everything-affects-everything-else mode to grasp
the entire web of various connections. It is a phenomenon that cannot be examined through
conceptual elegance reflecting rational thinking, deductive logic and analytical categorisation.
Novelty can often come from simple properties producing emergent and unpredictable effects.
Depending on the level chosen for examining war, we always confront with structures for which
different laws, concepts, and generalisations apply. In contrast to the three common elements of
effects-based operations, war stands for an infinite variety of possibilities and a general
unpredictability regarding causes and their likely effects.449
10.3 Emergence and War
It became clear that emergence is the most important attribute of complexity. It works against
causality since it refers to the way novel and coherent structures arise. Emergence cannot be
predicted or anticipated in its fullness beforehand since it displays features not previously
observed. Emergence is a holistic configuration that offers explanation into the dynamics of the
system rather than explanation based on the system’s parts alone. It does not allow for
predictions based on deduction and causality. Emergence does not make it possible to explain
the full richness of interactions and couplings, and the resulting multitude of possibilities. It is not
a provisional construct, since the temporal and spatial dimensions of war point towards greater
and greater unpredictability. Thus emergence does not allow exact prediction of future states
and cannot be handled by analytical rationality. It produces unexpected or counter-intuitive
results, which indicates that causes and effects are not only separate, but often disconnected in
space and time. Consequently, we can say that under emergent conditions it becomes very
difficult if not impossible, to say what causes what effect or to say what will happen in a specific
place at a specific time. Emergence reflects attributes such as compensation and counter-action,
which make most attempts to predict and plan for desired effects impossible, as such properties
cannot be added together in a simple and system-wide way.450
10.3.1 Emergence and Environment
Unpredictability is further exacerbated by the fact that in an open and dissipative system such as
war displaying emergent attributes, the environment must also be taken into account. The social
448  Russ, Marion/Bacon, Josh: Organizational Extinction and Complex Systems, Emergence, Volume 1,
Issue 4, 1999, pp. 75-79; Griffin, Douglas/Shaw, Patricia/Stacey, Ralph: Knowing and Acting in
Conditions of Uncertainty: A Complexity Perspective, Systemic Practice and Action Research, Volume
16, Number 2, April 2003, pp. 302-304.
449  Waldrop, Mitchell M.: Complexity, The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, Viking 1992,
pp. 38-39, 60-63, 81-83.
450  Goldstein, Jeffrey: Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues, Emergence, Volume 1, Issue 1,
1999, pp. 49, 57-62; Stacey, pp. 296-297; Axelrod/Cohen, pp. 11-15.
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wave-front analysis made it clear that war is a social phenomenon that is linked to and interacts
with, the surrounding social, cultural and political context. The environment is never static, but
changes over time, which indicates that interactions stand more for what we do not know, and
less so for the possibility to make accurate predictions in terms of causality. In order to get a
better insight into the causal texture of the environment a simple matrix as below might be
useful.
L11, L12
L21, L22
According to the matrix emergence arises as the interplay of L11 that refers to the processes
found within the system, L12 and L21 both referring to interactions between the system and the
environment, and L22 referring to processes and interaction within the environment itself. The
matrix indicates that environmental interdependences of social phenomena such as war are
often incommensurate with those connecting parts of the system. In other words, the
environment is not just out there, but constantly changes in ways no one can anticipate.451
Environmental factors also indicate that emergence stands for two sorts of unpredictability.
Whereas in spatial terms it stands for the fact that properties at a certain level cannot be
predicted from other level properties, in temporal terms it means unpredictability from the
properties that constitute the preceding condition. Consequently, we can state that emergence:
· Creates new properties regardless of the substance involved since it relates levels to each
other by denoting the very passage connecting them.
· Reminds us that in a complex phenomenon such as war several levels co-exist
simultaneously and interpretations based on causality can lead to mistakes.
· Poses a challenge to the notion of causality since it refers to something that disrupts the
notion of causality and cracks the power of causal explanations.
· Stands for a qualitative change suggesting that causality and randomness are always
interwoven in an intriguing way.
· Indicates novelty in the form of new and random solution paths open to chance occurrences
that do not allow for mechanical explanations.
· Although it might allow for the prediction of certain structural features in general terms, it
does not help predict details of the future in terms of desired effects.452
451  Jobbagy (May 2005), pp. 11-23; Moffat, p. xiii; Emery, F. E./Trist, E. L.: The Causal Texture of
Organizational Environments, Human Relations, Number 18, 1965, pp. 22; Green, David G./Newth,
David: Towards a theory of everything? – Grand challenges in complexity and informatics, Complexity
International, Volume 8, 2001, p. 1, Internet, accessed 25. 10. 2005, available at http://journal-
ci.csse.monash.edu.au/ci/vol08/green05/; Jervis, Robert: Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,
in: Alberts, David S./Czerwinski Thomas J.: Complexity, Global Politics and National Security, National
Defence University, Internet, accessed 25. 11. 2003, available at www.dodccrp.org/comch03.html.
452  Emmechie, Claus/Køppe, Simo/Stjernfelt, Frederik: Explaining Emergence: Towards an Ontology of
Levels, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Volume 28, 1998, pp. 83-100; Goldstein, Jeffrey:
Causality and Emergence in Chaos and Complexity Theories, in: Sulis, W./Combs, A. (eds.): Nonlinear
Dynamics in Human Behaviour, World Scientific, 1996, pp. 163-182.
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10.3.2 On Complex Adaptive System
Emergence opens both the door for a better understanding of unpredictability and a
conceptualisation of war as a complex adaptive system, which can also be found in four of the
introduced approaches to effects-based operations. Although the notion of a complex adaptive
system generally applies to war since it refers to entities that show emergent properties across
time and space, we must also acknowledge that not all emergent systems are adaptive.
Complex adaptive systems display multiple interacting scales that mostly defy the utility of
deductive and analytic categorisations. Consequently, thinking in terms of a complex adaptive
system defies most assumptions regarding direct causality, identifying desired effects, and
linking various levels in a direct and comprehensive manner. Retrospective analysis is feasible in
a complex adaptive system, but prediction is only possible in the most general terms, which
makes it very hard to see the consequences of our actions. The term adaptation indicates  a
process that constantly changes, as the system never settles down. Although a complex
adaptive system might be surprisingly stable, it is never in equilibrium.453 War perceived as a
complex adaptive system implies that the belligerents do not simply follow certain rules, but by
changing those rules they create emergent futures. They are capable of learning from non-linear
feedback and produce unpredictable actions. A complex adaptive system thrives best at the
edge of stability and instability, which promotes creativity. A complex adaptive system stands for
ambiguity, paradox and the anxiety it generates. Seeing war this way is uncomfortable since a
complex adaptive system cannot be planned or intended:
· The most important consequence of a conceptualisation based on a complex adaptive
system is that long-term outcomes are unknowable since the ability to self-organise
spontaneously can result in disappearing causal relationships.
· Emergence and adaptation explain why the general unpredictability of war takes hold if we
want to get a grip on the future pattern it might display, or to reduce that pattern to its
constituents.454
10.3.3 Self-Organisation Everywhere
War conceptualised as a complex adaptive system means that its structures come from a
process in which the constituents interact in an inherently complex way. Structures come as a
result of self-organisation; therefore predictions based on direct causality can only be possible in
the short term. The spontaneous adjustment of a complex adaptive system involves complex
interactions with so many factors that control becomes impossible. Self-organisation means that
a complex adaptive system is able to dynamically adapt to changes even if those changes
appear in an irregular fashion. Although self-organisation happens at all levels of the system, the
components operate on local information and general principles that have only limited content for
the system as a whole. Self-organisation runs against most assumptions of direct causality and
reminds us that war is a phenomenon in which the operational conditions make it mostly
impossible to see the output without considering the mechanism by which it is produced.
Unfortunately, as previously stated, war’s development might be determined by its mechanisms,
but cannot be predicted as the output does not make it possible to find reliable rules.
453  Levin, pp. 3-4, 11; Axelrod/Cohen, pp. 7-9; Gell-Mann, pp. 16-21, 54-56, 69-70, 72-74.
454  Stacey, pp. 334-345; Coveney, Peter/Highfield, Roger: The Arrow of Time, The Quest to Solve
Science’s Greatest Mistery, Flamingo, 1991, pp. 182-190.
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Consequently, in terms of causal relationships we can say that a complex adaptive system
displaying self-organising behaviour stands for complex and circular causality in which “causes
and effects cannot be mapped linearly; similar causes can have different effects and different
causes similar effects; small changes of causes can have large effects, whereas large changes
can also result in only small effects (but, nonetheless, it can also be the case that small causes
have small effects and large causes large effects).”455 Self-organisation indicates that
unpredictability of war generally takes hold. It also gives us a feel as to why the bulk of military
coercion theories failed, and why some of the proponents of effects-based operations call for an
essentially vacuous process they describe as hard thinking. Consequently, similar to friction and
chaos, we can say that complexity in general, and the complex adaptive system and self-
organisation in particular, indicate a rather low practical ceiling for effects-based operations.
10.3.4 Increasing Structural Instability
The concept of effects-based operations emphasises deductive reductionism and causal laws
attempting to predict certain desired effects. The supporting assumption is that war displays
order and equilibrium, the possibility for rational choice, and the ability to steer and control
events. In contrast war as understood by Clausewitz, stands for variety and novelty in which
certain properties remain inherently unknowable to the human mind. Although war can be
described in general terms using causal relationships, effects that go beyond the immediate
spatial and temporal levels cannot be predicted with any accuracy. Understanding war as a
complex adaptive system indicates something very different than the fundamental assumptions
of effects-based operations, namely that it is only possible to come to grips with some things –
especially those things which are local to us both in space and time. Friction, chaos and
complexity suggest that everything in war is interrelated and all we can attain is a temporary and
partial interpretation. They also remind us that we often confuse causation with correlation, and
simulation with prediction. Whereas the former refers to our preference for creating retrospective
validation to identify best practices, the latter points to the fact that even if we can simulate
something it does not obviously mean that we can equally predict its future.456 War  is  a
phenomenon full of discontinuities and uncertainty, which indicate a general unpredictability that
can make both individuals and organisations disoriented. This uncomfortable feeling explains
why a concept such as effects-based operations appears attractive for so many. The
international arena has been a messy place since the demise of the bipolar world-order and it
should not come as a surprise that effects-based operations have gained an astonishing
attention in the political-military community. During turbulent times in which orientation becomes
difficult, humans increasingly turn to panaceas for advice. In cases we do not understand or can
455  Cilliers, pp. 89-95; Krohn, W./Küppers, G.: Self-organization: A new approach to evolutionary
epistemology, in: Hahlweg, K./Hooker, C. A. (eds.): Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology, State
University of New York Press, 1989, pp. 155-156; Quotation in Fuchs, Christian: Structuration Theory
and Self-Organization, Systemic Practice and Action Research, Volume 16, Number 2, April 2003, p.
135.
456  Flood, Robert L.: Knowing the Unknowable, Systemic Practice and Action Research, Volume 12,
Number 3, 1999, p. 247-252; Kurtz/Snowden, pp. 462-463; Snowden/Stanbridge, p. 146; Stacey, pp.
346-347.
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cope with, we often look for simple or simplistic solutions that promise quick help.457 As depicted
in Figure 14, even in the framework of the proposed and extended conceptualisation of effects-
based operations covering the full continuum of war, we must constantly balance in terms of
ends/means relationship. Friction, chaos and complexity indicate that we face unpredictability
both in terms of what we are trying to achieve (effect), and in terms of how it becomes possible
to achieve what we want to (cause).
Figure 14: Predictability and causality in war
War stands for a general unpredictability in terms of ends and means. Several different futures
are possible and there is not always time for mechanical, deductive systemic analyses aimed at
detecting direct causality. The most important message of unpredictability is that instead of
focusing on certain desired effects, we should rely on the ability to respond consistently to the
unpredictable nature of war. War cannot be waged based on single and prescriptive models. It
requires that we evolve rapidly in order to handle dynamic and changing situations similar to the
biological evolution of species.458 The serious contradiction between the basic assumptions of
effects-based operations and the unpredictable nature of war naturally raises the demand for an
enhanced conceptualisation. Friction, chaos and complexity indicate that we must be satisfied
with understanding certain general features in terms of correlation, rather than attempting to
discover a mechanism that links causes with effects directly. Thus friction, chaos and complexity
should be regarded as opportunities that can explain qualitative behaviour instead of
inaccurately predicting futures in terms of desired effects.459
457  Ackoff, Russel T.: Fundamentalism and Panaceas, Systemic Practice and Action Research, Volume 14,
Number 1, 2001, pp. 3-10; Christensen, Clayton M./Raynor, Michael E.: Why Hard-Nosed Executives
Should Care about Management Theory, Harvard Business Review, September 2003, pp. 67-74;
Rosenau, James N.: Many Damn Thing Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs, and
Mann, Steven R.: The Reaction to Chaos, both in: Alberts/Czerwinski.
458  Snowden, David: The Paradox of Story, Scenario and Strategy Planning, Volume 1, Issue 5, November
1999, pp. 16-20.
459  Emmeche C./Køppe S./Stjernfelt F. (1997): Explaining emergence: Towards an ontology of levels,
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Volume 28, 1997, p. 116.
Psychological
Destruction Influence
As we move towards the area of effects-based
operations the combinations of couplings and
interactions indicate increasing structural instability with
serious consequences for assumptions regarding causal
relationships
Physical
(Systemic)
151
11 Towards an Organic Model
11.1 Consequences of Complexity Theory
This chapter will show that similar to the biological evolution of species also war can be seen as
a co-evolutionary process. Friction, chaos and complexity stand for a lack of accurate prediction,
which indicates that war requires constant adaptation. They impose adjustment on the
belligerents, which does not make it possible to know all values for all relevant variables
beforehand. Thus similar to biological evolution, perpetual novelty is a typical feature of war.
Prediction is generally difficult and when the enemy learns or adapts the difficulty increases
enormously. Seeing war this way means that even if we were able to discern all the individual
constituents, direct links in the form of causal relationships would not provide for convincing
information regarding the underlying properties. Consequently, the mechanism of war cannot be
explained as the sum of these properties. Comprehending all relationships between causes and
effects exceeds anything predictable. War is context-dependent and non-linear in which the
whole is always more than the sum of the parts. The same phenomenon understood in a given
context can often become obscure in another. Even if we detected laws applicable for one level,
they might become entirely upset at another. Consequently, if we want to stick to the term
effects-based operations our focus must shift from end-effects towards transitional effects and
we must regard the means applied equally important as the ends sought. In other words, we
have to acknowledge that whatever the effects achieved in war they reflect combinations that
come from a trial-and-error mechanism rather than a careful process of optimising.460
11.1.1 War as Complex Human Phenomenon
The earlier chapters detected a dangerous gap between the promises of effects-based
operations and the assumptions upon which the concept is based. The current understanding
and supporting argumentation display major conceptual and methodological weaknesses that
are dangerously disconnected from the characteristics of war. This inconsistency indicates that
effects-based operations stand for a concept that, in its current conceptualisation, lacks both
substance and meaningful content. In an age of a desperate search for finding useful concepts
for developing war-fighting capabilities the idea of referring to effects, especially to higher order
ones in the psychological domain is nothing more than a fashionable mantra. It is empty, harmful
and does not take war’s frictional, chaotic and complex reality into account.461 Much of the
continuum of war displays non-linearity that stands either for a dynamic equilibrium or far from
equilibrium conditions. In contrast we identified effects-based operations as a conceptualisation
of war that reflects an equilibrium-oriented thinking. War is addressed in natural scientific terms
based on the principle of causality, which assumes that it is possible to predict end-states based
on analytical rationality. Unfortunately, in the case of a complex human phenomenon such as
war analytical skills based on direct causality are valid only within a limited range. Beyond that,
460  Holland, John H.: Emergence, From Chaos To Order, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 42-45, 121-
123, 185-187, 238-246.
461  Jobbagy, Zoltan (Maj.): Effects-Based Operations and the Problem of Thinking Beyond: A Critical
Reflection, TNO Report, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, CCSS-2006-001, March 2006.
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they are not able to deliver satisfactory descriptions as we increasingly deal with emergent and
self-organising properties.462
11.1.2 Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Western military thinkers prefer to address war mostly in a way that is closely related to the
methodology found in various natural scientific fields. Even Clausewitz used the vocabulary of
natural science. In order to understand this preference we must go back to the 17th century.
Normal scientific thinking as an originally Western phenomenon is based on the Newtonian
world view of synthesis and emphasises actions on the environment by promising better ways to
organise and exploit the world. Its biggest payoff is to arrange human natural and social life,
which enabled and drove the force of industrial revolution. However, despite all the contributions
to human social and economic developments scientific homogeneity emphasising criticality and
verification has never been able to get entirely rid of instability. As we made it clear even
abstract mathematical precision and rigour are approximate descriptions of imprecise natural
processes. In a complex world and especially in the case of a complex human phenomenon
such as war displaying multi-layered problems, an approach is needed that is less rigid and
more flexible, less artificial and more natural, less mechanistic and more organic; one that
emphasises actions in the environment.463 Natural science and its supporting paradigms also
ignore most human attributes that constitute a very important part of life. Clausewitz was not
short in emphasising that apprehensions, sensations, perceptions, impulses, and emotions are
essential ingredients of war. Unpredictability of war also forces us to think holistically and in
terms of opposites, in which one side cannot be right at the expense of the other. Thus the
interplay of opposite forces such as stability and chaos must be taken better into account in
order to help redirect our intuition. As the continuum of war indicates, a complex adaptive system
allows for polarities to manage rather than problems to solve. Thus a more sober look at the real
world can reveal some new insights regarding the nature of most human activities including that
of war.464 However, such an approach means less certainty and challenges our inherent
preference for clear boundaries representing distinct and potentially solvable problems.
11.1.3 Thinking Outside the Box
Any analysis regarding the relationship between certainty and uncertainty, stability and chaos
can easily end with the conclusion that the emphasis on the former has always been dominant in
modern Western thinking. However, focusing on certainty only is analogous with a life spent in
the box. It excludes the different and includes the similar without questioning the latter. An
exclusive focus on certainty means that nothing is tolerated beyond its contours. In contrast, war
is full of evidence that certainty and uncertainty always mix and are separated only by
boundaries in our thinking.465 As displayed in Figure 15 much of war is non-linear and composed
of waxing and waning structures that constantly emerge and change. Consequently, it always
displays qualitatively different behaviours. War shows emergent and self-organising attributes
462  Beinhocker, Eric D.: Strategy at the Edge of Chaos, The McKinsey Quarterly, Number 1, 1997, p. 25.
463  Prigogine, Ilya/Stengers, Isabelle: Order Out of Chaos, Man’s New Dialogue with Nature, Heinemann,
1984, pp. 37-40.
464  Dent, Eric B.: Complexity Science: a Worldview Shift, Emergence, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 1999, pp. 10-13.
465  Molderez, Ingrid: Freedom and Uncertainty, Emergence, Volume 1, Issue 3, 1999, pp. 84-91.
153
with changing and evolving boundaries; therefore our knowledge gained is always limited and
provisional. Boundaries depend on the level of aggregation chosen, reflect the limitations of
human cognitive resources, and agree with our inherent need to reduce complexity.
Unfortunately, since a holistic description of the world is impossible all descriptions must be
essentially metaphoric in order to comprehend the complex relationship between various natural
and social boundaries.466
Figure 15: Boundaries and the continuum of war
Boundaries also remind us that coping is often possible, but control is not. Issues such as global
warming together with various environmental disasters painfully display that boundaries are not
there to separate. Boundaries connect, and most of our actions only disturb complex adaptive
systems on various scales. Solving problems in a given area can cause new and unexpected
problems in others, often in fields that are not directly related. Due to the intricate relationship of
interactions and couplings, desired effects always induce unexpected, unwanted and
uncontrollable consequences. Thus modelling the world and a complex human phenomenon
such as war, based on a logical framework focusing on direct causality is inappropriate. As
modern science evolved it produced ever-increasing specialisations. The disciplines moved
deeper and deeper into their respective fields resulting in high and impenetrable walls that
divided up sources and targets of their efforts. In contrast conceptualising war as a complex
adaptive system means that we appreciate it as an organic whole and not as dissected entities.
This approach shows similarities with the idea of a war-fighting ecosystem as coined in some
recent military publications.467
466  Richardson, Kurt, A./Lissack, Michael R.: On the Status of Boundaries, both Natural and Organisational:
A Complex Systems Perspective, Emergence, Volume 3, Issue 4, 2001, pp. 40-49.
467  Levin, Simon A.: Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable,
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Volume 40, Number 1, 2003, p. 4; Alberts, David
S./Gartska, John J./Stein, Frederick P.: Network Centric Warfare, Developing and Leveraging
Information Superiority, 2nd Revised Edition, CCRP Publication Series, July 2002, p. 83.
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11.2 Metaphors and the Military
Taking full advantage of metaphors requires that we first clarify the term. Thus a metaphor is an
implied comparison or a figure of speech in which a word denoting a certain object or action is
used for another in order to suggest an analogy. The very strength of metaphors is that they
involve both sources and targets surrounded by an aura of meanings and associations.
Metaphors enlarge our perception by producing insightful connections and interpretations. They
offer a conjunction by activating a train of associations. Metaphors place the target in a new light,
which might lead to a profound re-conception. Powerful metaphors offer more than a list of
associations by emphasising some aspects whilst diminishing others. They enable the individual
to see and experience new connections. In sum, metaphors are “comparisons that help give
shape and form to abstractions through images that are not dependent on the weaker “like” or
“as” foundations of the simile.”468 Metaphors are figurative expressions in which a word or
phrase designating one thing is used to designate another in the form of an implicit comparison.
Metaphors make a qualitative leap from reasonable, prosaic comparison to identification or
fusion of two objects as the resulting new entity possesses the characteristics of both.
Traditionally, the military has loved metaphors and military writings are full of them acting as
frames of reference for facilitating discussion and developing ideas.469 Thus metaphors can be
extremely powerful and much more significant than normally considered. Although metaphors
are usually paradoxical statements, they can be very robust. They are literally false according to
abstract rationality, but true according to imaginative rationality. Metaphors form essential as-
gates in the human cognitive process since they enable the understanding of one thing in terms
of another. Metaphors are indicators of a network of meanings that all affect the processes of
perception and conception. As evolving things, they are open to novelty even mutation. They are
able to capture the underlying processes of other evolving entities surprisingly well. Metaphors
can help us explore an interesting possibility space characterised by contingency and feedback.
Metaphors can also be superior to analytical models when the phenomena of interest are
impossible to control or the necessary assumptions unsure.470 Thus metaphors appear to be
helpful aids when dealing with a complex adaptive system such as war. Four general levels of
metaphors can be differentiated:
· Transfer – level one means the transfer of a single term into another context in order to
create new meaning.
· Construction – level two is the construction of analogies as part of a specific theory or a
general and systematic inquiry to elucidate phenomena.
· Unification – level three stands for a unifying view of an entire paradigm, often symbolised
by a specific term that refers to the whole frame of understanding under a given paradigm.
468  Gove, p. 1420; Holland (1998), pp. 202-210; Saperstein, Alvin M.: Complexity, Chaos, and National
Security Policy: Metaphors or Tools?, in: Alberts, David S./Czerwinski, Thomas J. (ed.): Complexity,
Global Politics, and National Security, National Defence University, June 1997, Internet, accessed 25.
11. 2003, available at www.dodccrp.org/comindex.html; Quotation in Jablonsky, David: Time’s Arrow,
Time’s Cycle: Metaphors for a Period of Transition, Parameters, Winter 1997-98, p. 4.
469  Ilachinski (1996a), pp. 44-45; Durham, pp. 38-40.
470  Beyerchen, Alan D.: Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery, in: Alberts/Czerwinski;
Czerwinski, Thomas J.: Coping with the Bounds, Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs, CCRP
Publication Series, May 1998, pp. 63-70.
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· Merger – level four can be seen as the most comprehensive in which science itself is
understood as an irreducible metaphor.471
Based on the idea of the evolving biosphere we propose the Organic Strategic Ecosystem
metaphor. Organic since it is born out of complex adaptive systems theory that emphasises war
as a conflict between two self-organising, living and fluid-like entities. Strategic since the many
mutually interacting and co-evolving parts form emergent possibilities that have relevance on the
strategic level in the form of victory and defeat. Ecosystem since biological evolution serves as
the basis for conceptualising war as an open ended and dynamic system.
11.2.1 Biological Evolution as a Complex Adaptive System
Conceptualising war in the framework of an Organic Strategic Ecosystem resembles similarities
with processes found in biological evolution. Both emergence and self-organisation represent
non-linear attributes pointing towards spontaneous order rather than a gradual process. We
made it clear earlier that the continuum of war refers to an area that can be characterised by two
end-poles such as stability and chaos. Whereas chaos is a randomising force that points
towards a disordered state, stability stands for equilibrium and represents spontaneous
crystallisation and a high degree of order.472 Minor changes can sometimes cause catastrophic
outcomes in such a system’s behaviour; therefore it appears naturally that selection as a steady
optimising force alone cannot drive evolution. Selection is powerful, but not too powerful, which
indicates evolution to be an unpredictable process consisting of detailed bits of selection and
improbable ad-hoc events. As a consequence, biological evolution exhibits spontaneous order
even in the absence of any selective force. Understanding this mechanism requires the
introduction of two interrelated attributes such as fitness and co-evolution, both indicating
simultaneous adaptation and change.473 They allow biological evolution to be depicted in the
form of a landscape, also called the fitness landscape. Its surface is continually evolving and
changing due to the action/reaction cycles of the species inhabiting them. Similar to the
unpredictability of war dynamic and deforming fitness landscapes also defy clear causality by
implying the impossibility of continuing and exploiting current capabilities through constant
refinements. There is no guarantee that current locations of high fitness symbolised by high
peaks remain unchanged over time since their values can alter significantly. Thus the challenge
is to strike an appropriate balance between exploiting locations of high fitness and constantly
exploring new locations that might have an even higher value. Conceptualising war this way
means that similar to biological species we move along an evolutionary path or trajectory
representing effects-based operations.474
471  Ilachinski (1996a), pp. 45-49.
472  Kauffman, Stuart A.: Antichaos and Adaptation, Scientific American, August 1991, p. 64.
473  Kaufmann, Stuart A.: At Home in the Universe, The Search for Laws of Self-Organisation and
Complexity, Oxford University Press, 1995a, pp. 151-152; Waldrop, Mitchell M.: Complexity, The
Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, Viking 1992, pp. 102-110; Kaufmann, Stuart A.:
Adaptation on Rugged Fitness Landscapes, in: Stein, Daniel L. (ed.): Lectures in the Sciences of
Complexity, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1989a, p. 527.
474  Brabazon, Tony/Matthews, Robin: Organisational Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes, pp. 3-5, Internet,
accessed 15. 02. 2004, available at http://business.kingston.ac.uk/research/intbus/paper2.pdf.
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11.2.2 Landscapes, Fitness, and Effects
The proposed metaphor makes it possible to take the frictional, chaotic and complex reality of
war better into account. The inherent and age-old relationship between the military and
landscapes supports such an approach in many respects:
· The literal interpretation understands landscape as terrain with its geographical features that
have always been influential for the conduct of war and warfare.
· The first level of abstraction is embodied by the topographical map that directly refers to
geography since it depicts the physical landscape in standard symbols.
· The second level of abstraction is representation by metaphor and indicates political,
economic, and cultural landscapes that have no physical basis.
· The third level of abstraction allows us to understand landscapes as tools for analysing and
modelling complex problems.475
The proposed conceptualisation relies on the second level. Fitness originally described the
relative success of a species in relation to others in its environment. No fitness landscape is
fixed, but changes in response to the actions of other species with which it co-evolves. A species
tries to optimise its fitness by getting onto a peak that symbolises a relative competitive
advantage. Similar to the unpredictable mechanism of war, fitness emphasises a constantly
changing environment in which a species’ suitability to the circumstances often alters in a subtle
and dramatic way.476 Since such attributes resemble situations found in war, the notion of an
effects landscape in which peaks stand for effects, is extremely suited for a conceptualisation.
Although effects landscapes differ from each other, they show a number of regular properties
and structures. In most cases heights of different peaks are correlated in such a way that peaks
differing slightly are near each other. As the environment and the enemy change, the value
attributable to any given effect will also change. Consequently, the heights of the peaks in the
landscape move constantly up and down over time indicating that one effect regarded as
valuable today might probably be of little help tomorrow.477 If we can better understand the
underlying properties of such an imaginary landscape it becomes possible to think of effects-
based operations as a search process to find high peaks. This powerful metaphor helps us
conceptualise effects-based operations in a way that not only acknowledges the frictional,
chaotic and complex reality of war, but also takes full advantage of it.
475  Dockery, John T./Woodcock, A. E. R.: The Military Landscape, Mathematical Models of Combat,
Woodhead Publishing Limited, 1993, pp. xiv-xv.
476  Glenn, Kevin B. (Maj.): “Complex” Targeting: A Complexity-Based Theory of Targeting and its
Application to Radical Islamic Terrorism, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University Maxwell
AFB, June 2002, pp. 40-41; Osinga, pp. 140-142.
477  Jobbagy, Zoltan (Maj.): Literature Survey on Uncertainty, Non-linearity, Complexity and Chaos. A Ph. D.
study on measuring military effects and effectiveness, TNO Report, FEL-04-B061, June 2004, pp. 183-
184.
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12 Properties of Fitness Landscapes
12.1 Dynamic Law in War
In the framework of the Organic Strategic Ecosystem we conceptualise war as a complex
adaptive system in which effects-based operations represent an approach that aims at finding an
appropriate combination of effects. Thus we approach effects-based operations as a complex
optimisation process. Effects form a large pool of possibilities in which the combination of effects
achieved decides over victory and defeat. As the actions of the belligerents develop, high value
effects can become obsolete and effects with originally low significance can turn increasingly
powerful. In this dynamic give-and-take process, similar to biological evolution the belligerents
continuously adapt by means of compensation and substitution. As indicated by the continuum
of war and depicted in Figure 16, the conflict shuffles back and forth between orderly and chaotic
regions reflecting the Clausewitzian observation that every “action in war is not continuous, but
spasmodic. Violent clashes are interrupted by periods of observation, during which both sides
are on the defensive.”478
Figure 16: Continuum of war perceived as complex adaptive system
He defined this attribute the Dynamic Law in War. Thus in campaigns, periods of inaction and
response change with periods of action as “periods of active warfare [would] always be
interspersed with greater or smaller periods of rest”.479 The period of rest meant for him stability
and equilibrium including phenomena such as physical and psychological forces, circumstances
and motives. Although this continuous cycle defined war fully, Clausewitz emphasised that the
“state of crisis is the real war; the equilibrium is nothing, but its reflex.”480
478  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 257.
479  Quotation in ibid., p. 260.
480  Quotation in ibid., p. 262.
War as complex adaptive system (CAS)
indicates a non-linear dynamical system
composed of interacting, semi-
autonomous, and hierarchically
organised parts that continuously self-
organise as a result of changing
environmental conditions
Physical
Psychological
Destruction Influence
(Systemic)
158
12.1.1 Towards the Biology of War
Due to war’s frictional, chaotic and complex reality prediction is generally limited. There are so
many variables that must be taken into account that the combination of effects reflects a
distribution of potential outcomes rather than a unique outcome. Moreover, distributions overlap
so that approaches attempting to optimise make more sense than those attempting to maximise.
Consequently, success and victory in war can be seen as a realised positive outcome rather
than a maximum one. The greater the uncertainty the greater the possibility, that victory is a
combination of relative superiority and fortuitous circumstances. Chance in the form of trial-and-
error also limits the selection of any meaningful criteria for achieving maximum effects. In war
there is no guarantee that a particular outcome in the form of desired effects is really the best
one. Once chance forces select a particular path it often locks in regardless the quality of other
possibilities. Consequently, there are many possible solutions to the same problem and
sometimes small, fortuitous, and trivial events determine the one event that becomes
dominant.481 Darwin recognised in his book On the Origins of Species that genetic usurpation
and endemic warfare share similarities as both are important forces in evolution and human
history. In chapter three he drew an analogy between war, battle and natural selection and saw
evolution as a “[b]attle within battle [that] must ever be recurring with varying success.” This
analogy made him conclude that “from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most
exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals,
directly follows.” Thus evolution was for him a “great and complex battle of life”, which together
with the Law of Battle for survival formed a recurrent pattern also in his second epic work The
Decent of Man.482 The seven approaches described effects as interrelated phenomena, which
also mean that in biological terms they interact. Like living species effects may gain strength or
lose momentum thus resembling attributes of the organic world. Consequently, effects-based
operations can be interpreted as a process of filling niches with a combination of effects that are
fitter than those of the enemy.483 Thus soldiers might share similar problems with ecologists as
both try to find a function that matches the crude reality of life. The American military thinker
John Boyd also advocated that evolution by natural selection and the conduct of war are
intimately related. Both reflect conflict, survival, and conquest in a very similar and fundamental
way. Stability and chaos mark the two end-poles of war in which the degree of non-linearity
defines both the quantity and quality of the outcome. By finding small areas of order sometimes
it is possible to achieve equilibrium, but occasionally no equilibrium can be reached at all. When
we understand effects-based operations as a process that includes a trial-and-error mechanism,
481  Alchian, Armen A.: Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, The Journal of Political Economy,
Volume 58, Number 3, June 1950, pp. 211-214; Arthur, Brian W.: Positive Feedbacks in the Economy,
Scientific American, February 1990, pp. 92-94.
482  Crook, Paul: Darwinism, war and history, The debate over the biology of war from the ‘Origin of Species’
to the First World War, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 20; Darwin, Charles R: On the Origin of
Species, By Means of Natural Selection, Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life,
John Murray, 1859, pp. 73-88, 490 (quotations pp. 73, 80, 490); Darwin, Charles R.: The Descent of
Man, And Selection in Relation to Sex, John Murray, 1871, Volume 2, pp. 40-51, 98, 102, 123, 238,
239-315, 323-326, 403.
483  De Greene, Kenyon: Field-Theoretic Framework for the Interpretation of the Evolution, Instability,
Structural Change, and Management of Complex Systems, in: Kiel, Douglas L./Elliott, Euel: Chaos
Theory in Social Sciences, Foundations and Applications, The University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp.
275-277, 288.
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insights coming from evolutionary biology are very helpful as even a modest pool of effects can
show an enormous amount of possible combinations. Clausewitz also pointed out that “the vast,
the almost infinite distance … between cause and its effect, and the countless ways in which
these elements can be combined” demand things to be seen in a comprehensive fashion.484
12.2 Shifting Balance of Evolution
When biologist Sewell Wright wanted to understand the properties of gene mutation he
concluded that under bi-parental reproduction even a limited number of mutations can result in
an almost infinite field of variants. In order to handle this problem he introduced the idea of
shifting balance, which is a less rigorous and strict theory, but a more picturesque metaphor.485
Wright constructed a graphic representation, which he understood as a short and non-
mathematical approach to biological evolution resembling a certain similarity with a
topographical map. Although he emphasised that references to geography are of secondary
importance, the result was a map containing multiple peaks surrounded by circular contours. The
map was defined by two axes representing the dimensions along which possible combinations
can be arranged. Every combination had a certain value and by connecting the points of equal
value contours of peaks and valleys arose.486 Wright assumed that evolutionary selection could
carry the species to the top of the nearest peak, but could not cross valleys that separate the
current peak from other, probably higher ones. However, should the species be able to cross
valleys then it is not under the exclusive control of natural selection, but of a certain trial-and-
error mechanism. An indefinitely large species that lives under constant environmental
conditions and is exposed only to natural selection can reach equilibrium by occupying a certain
peak. The population either grows through an increase in mutation rate or a decrease in mass
selection, or it decreases through the opposite process as depicted in Figures 17/A, and 17/B. In
both cases evolutionary selection alone does not seem to be sufficiently strong to push the
species towards another and possibly higher peak (from peak D to peak E).487 Wright assumed
that the environment is never static, but changes continuously. The landscape constantly
deforms by depressing high places and elevating low ones. According to him, if a species is not
extremely specialised and occupies a wide field on the landscape, by moving constantly it could
find higher general regions. Such a trial-and-error mechanism can shuffle the species about by
means of change without advance in adaptation. As a solution he proposed a large species to be
subdivided into many local races that shift continually in a non-adaptive fashion on the
landscape as depicted in Figure 17/C. Although this exploratory process could result in a
484  Gleick, James: Chaos, Making a New Science, Viking Penguin Inc., 1987, pp. 59-80; Williams, Garnett
P.: Chaos Theory Tamed, Taylor & Francis, 1997, pp. 229-235; Byrne, David S.: Complexity Theory and
the Social Sciences, An Introduction, Routledge 1998, pp. 32-33; Alchian p. 217; Boyd (1986), p. 11;
Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 698.
485  Wright, Sewall: The Roles of Mutation, Inbreeding, Crossbreeding and Selection in Evolution,
Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Genetics, 1932, p. 356; Joshi, Amitabh: The Shifting
Balance Theory of Evolution, Resonance, December 1999, p. 66.
486  Wright, Sewall: Surfaces of Selective Value Revisited, Notes and Comments, The American Naturalist,
Volume 131, Number 1, January 1988, pp. 115-116; Later he delivered a mathematical model. See
Wright, Sewell: “Surfaces” of Selective Value, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA,
1967, pp. 165-172; Amitabh pp. 67-68.
487  Wright (1932), pp. 360-362; Wright (1988), p. 117.
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decrease of fitness as an immediate effect, this way it would become possible that at least one
local race finds a higher peak and pulls the entire species towards this better position. Wright
emphasised that a “subdivision of a species into local races provides the most effective
mechanism for trial and error in the field of gene combinations.”488
Figure 17: Trial-and-error mechanism by Wright
Thus evolutionary adaptation involves differentiation in which the principal mechanism is
essentially non-adaptive. Although he was not explicit, Wright regarded the species themselves
as a complex adaptive system that depend on the balance of certain factors controlled by a trial-
and-error mechanism. In his attempt to see evolution as a dynamic process he regarded
adaptation as a balance between natural selection and random genetic drift with each having a
varying contribution to the survival and extinction of species over time and space. He proved that
adaptation and chance events play an important role in biological evolution.489 From  a
contemporary military point of view, Wright’s idea resembles clear similarities with the network-
centric genre of military writings that are characterised by the following factors:
· The re-focus from the sum of individual platforms to the network of possibilities they provide
for, and the gains that can be exploited.
· The re-focus from mostly isolated and homogenous actors to the various interdependencies
smaller and more specified players stand for.
488  Quotation in Wright (1932), p. 363.
489  Ibid., pp. 362-366; Amitabh, pp. 68-72; Wright (1988), p. 118.
CBA
Selection > Mutation Selection < Mutation Species in local
Peak E Peak E Peak E
Peak D Peak D Peak D
161
· The re-focus from strategy development in traditional terms to issues such as adaptation,
learning and coping under continuously changing conditions.490
12.2.1 Applicability Issues
Wright’s idea applies to many phenomena in which outputs depend on several inputs. Although
he referred to the space of possible genotypes, the concept can be extended to model various
complex problems ranging from combinatorial chemistry, physics, computer sciences and
various social disciplines. It is also very valuable for effects-based operations since no
comprehensive list of desired effects can reveal the countless possibilities in which individual
effects interact or provide useful information regarding the underlying mechanism.491 Some
critics question the meaningfulness of fitness as a unit of measure and regard the theory a crude
metaphor that has heuristic, rather than analytical values. However, they cannot deny that
Wright’s idea is a fascinating approach towards visualising real-world problems by means of
statistical features. In fact, critics acknowledge that despite objections, problems and limitations,
a discussion of biological evolution based on the idea of fitness can be helpful. Fitness can
reveal insightful guidelines that may be generalisable to more intricate relations of evolutionary
mechanisms.492 In sum, the fitness landscape is a beautiful idea that helps us think about
effects-based operations differently by offering the following advantages:
· It helps conceptualise effects-based operations as an emergent and self-organising process.
· It forces us to differentiate better between two basic aspects of adaptation such as efficiency
and effectiveness.
· It can give impetus for a different and more sophisticated understanding of strategy
development especially in a constantly changing and dynamic environment.
· It can contribute to a meaningful discussion regarding issues such as command and control,
and military effectiveness.
Earlier we detailed the way causal relationships develop in war. The suggested biological
analogy and the idea of fitness make it possible to see war as a process, which is not always
causally connected. They help us see war as a temporal sequence of aggregates rather than a
linear process in which earlier events simply cause later ones.493 Within this framework effects-
based operations are conceptualised as a migratory process on an imaginary landscape that
490  Cebrowski, Arthur K. (Vice Adm.)/Garstka, John J.: Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future,
Proceedings, January 1998, Internet, accessed 14. 06. 2006, available at www.usni.org/Proceedings/
Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm.
491  Brabazon/Matthews, p. 2; Merry, Uri: Organizational Strategy on Different Landscapes: A New Science
Approach, Systemic Practice and Action Search, Volume 12, Number 3, 1999, pp. 257-258; Kaufmann
(1989a), p. 529; McKelvey, Bill: Avoiding Complexity Catastrophe in Coevolutionary Pockets: Strategies
for Rugged Landscapes, Organization Science, Volume 10, Number 3, May-June 1999, p. 298.
492  Gell-Mann, Murray: The Quark and the Jaguar, Adventures in the Simple and the Complex, Little Brown
and Company, New York, 1994, pp. 247-255; Cruzan, M. B.: Adaptive Landscapes, in: Brenner,
Sydney/Miller, Jeffrey H: Encyclopedia of Genetics, Volume 1, Academic Press, 2001, p. 5; Holland,
John H.: Hidden Order, How Adaptation Builds Complexity, Helix Books, 1995, pp. 65-80; Mitchell,
Sandra D.: Function, Fitness and Disposition, Biology and Philosophy, Volume 10, 1995, pp. 47-50.
493  Matthen, Mohan/Ariew, Andre: Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection, The Journal
of Philosophy, February 2002, pp. 79-83.
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resembles topographical features. Consequently, the goal is to find and occupy regions that
contain high peaks representing high value effects and deny the enemy doing the same.
12.3 General Landscape Features
Backed by computer power Kaufmann and Levin picked-up Wright’s idea and stated that
evolutionary adaptation is composed of small changes. Its mechanism resembles similarities
with a local search process in the form of an adaptive walk, which is always constrained.
Evolutionary adaptation deals with conflicting requirements that limit the end result. Adaptive
walks proceed along a path characterised by fitter variants leading to attainable local or global
optima. In other words, both adaptation and fitness come from the environmental context. Real
life displays an extended web of relationships and conflicting constraints; therefore they
assumed a landscape featuring many peaks and valleys. Kaufmann and Levin regarded
adaptation the simplest form of optimisation and also the simplest form of the trial-and-error
mechanism. Similar to Wright they saw evolutionary change as a novel and creative process that
may or may not be accompanied by adaptation to the constantly changing conditions of the
environment.494
12.3.1 Uncorrelated Landscapes
As a baseline case they first examined adaptation on uncorrelated fitness landscapes. In such
landscapes they suggested to draw the fitness value of each entity randomly from a given, but
fixed underlying distribution. Kaufmann and Levin used N genes where each gene could have
only two values, 1 standing for gene activated and 0 for not activated. The number of possible
combinations is 2N with 1 being the lowest value and 2N the highest. Connecting the 2N points
with lines results a landscape-like surface, which is very rich in peaks or local optima. According
to them the number of such local optima increases almost exponentially to N resulting that on an
uncorrelated landscape the expected lengths of adaptive walks are generally very short. Each
successive step on average moves halfway from the current point, towards the point with the
maximum value. After each step the expected number of fitter points is halved on average. The
result being that the stopping times are distributed very tightly. In such a setting the great
majority of adaptive walks stop within one or two steps. The number of alternative pathways
leading to optima with higher fitness values decreases linearly with the rank order of the points.
Consequently, with an adaptive walk from any single starting point via a 1-mutant fitter variant
only a small fraction of the true local optima is accessible.495 Kaufmann and Levin argued that
the success of an adaptive walk depends on the correlation structure of the landscape. A point
with an initially low fitness has many fitter neighbours, a point with high fitness has just few and a
point that is a local optimum has none. In such a landscape an adaptive walk can branch into
many alternatives early in the process, but the number of alternatives slows down as fitness
494  Kaufmann, S. A./Levin, S.: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Walks on Rugged Landscapes,
Journal of Theoretical Biology, Issue 128, 1987, pp. 12-15; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 163-166; Capra,
Fritjof: The Web of Life, A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems, Anchor Books Doubleday,
1997, pp. 222-230, 245-254.
495  Kaufmann (1987), pp. 19-24; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 167-169.
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becomes higher. Their conclusion was that adaptation on an uncorrelated fitness landscape
favours branching radiation that slows ultimately to stasis.496
12.3.2 Correlated Landscapes
According to Kaufmann and Levin most fitness landscapes are correlated in which points with
similar values are closer to each other. The result is that neighbouring points or 1-mutant fitter
variants show similar properties. Correlated fitness landscapes can also be rugged and make for
long-jump adaptation via J-mutant fitter variants. In this case the importance of a local optimum
disappears since all points become accessible. As a result the correlation structure becomes
weaker and weaker, and the number of local optima diminishes. On such landscapes the
importance of the expected waiting time increases as jumps sufficiently far represent adaptation
that experiences an uncorrelated landscape. Similar to an adaptive walk they assumed that if
more than one J-mutant fitter variant is found the fittest is chosen. Thus on average, a single J-
mutant fitter variant lies halfway between the least fit and the fittest; therefore the waiting time to
find the next fitter variant doubles with each successive step almost independently of the
population’s size. Adaptation via J-mutant fitter variants is rapid at the beginning, then slows
down and after a modest number of steps stasis sets in. Similarly to adaptation via 1-mutant
fitter variants branching into alternatives is more common initially, but progressively harder later.
Adaptation via J-mutant fitter variants also tends to prefer branching radiation that eventually
quiets to stasis.497 Later Kaufmann assumed that correlated landscapes might exhibit self-
similar, fractal-like characteristics resulting that small hills nestle into the sides of larger hills
which again nestle into the sides of much larger hills. Consequently, landscapes can be
correlated, but rugged. After a jump with a distance shorter than the maximum the species may
land on an uncorrelated landscape when measured on a shorter length scale, but on a
correlated landscape when measured on a longer length scale.498
12.3.3 Evolutionary Landscapes
Using the insights coming from the two baseline landscapes and the two sorts of adaptation, it
became possible to derive some generalisations for adaptation on correlated landscapes. They
argued that it makes sense to marry the local and global search in adaptation depending on the
time scale of the process. Most statistically rugged landscapes are correlated, and adaptation via
J-mutant fitter variants may possibly escape the correlation structure, which is not possible with
adaptation via 1-mutant fitter variants. Given a randomly chosen point on the landscape with an
average fitness, early in the process the population would sample both in the vicinity via 1-
mutant fitter variants and further away via J-mutant fitter variants. Since the fitness is average,
half of the points sampled will be fitter and half less so. Due to the correlation structure, points
sampled nearby will be only slightly fitter, whereas points further away and not constrained by
the power of correlation could reveal much higher fitness levels. Early in the process long jumps
trying to find J-mutant fitter variants would become dominant and result in a branching radiation.
However, as more J-mutant fitter variants are encountered, the chance of finding J-mutant fitter
496  Kaufmann, Stuart A.: Principles of Adaptation in Complex Systems, in: Stein, Daniel L. (ed.), 1989b, pp.
619-622; Kaufmann (1987), p. 26.
497  Kaufmann (1987), pp. 27-29.
498  Kaufmann (1989a), pp. 572-577; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 171-175.
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variants will be less than finding nearby and only slightly fitter 1-mutant variants. Consequently,
in the mid-term adaptation via 1-mutant fitter variants in the form of an adaptive walk or local hill
climbing will dominate the process. However, as the process goes towards the peak, the rate of
finding 1-mutant fitter variants decreases and the danger of ending up in stasis grows. Therefore
in the long term, adaptation via J-mutant fitter variants will again make sense, since only with
long jumps is it possible to land in the vicinity of a fitter point that can again be climbed.499
Although evolution can be understood as a process composed of long jumps and walks uphill,
after each long jump and hill climbing the time requirement for finding the J-mutant fitter variant
is typically more than double. Consequently, radiation and stasis are inherent features of the
evolutionary process. Early in the process many different pathways branch upward. As time
passes fewer alternatives can emerge until single lineages get trapped on local optima. As local
optima are approached the number of ways leading uphill decreases. On rugged landscapes
radiation and stasis are utterly generic. In other words, adaptation stands for branching lineages
that surf on a turbulent fitness sea with both divergence and convergence occurring at wave-
tops.500
12.3.4 NK(C) Landscapes
Although in reality the contours of fitness landscapes remain unknown, they can be
reconstructed in order to make them knowable. Based on the general insights gained above,
Kaufmann developed a model, which is defined both by the variable N and another variable K.
Thus the two main parameters are the number of genes N, and the average number of epistatic
interactions K standing for conflicting constraints within N that profoundly influence the fitness of
any combination. Since K can be tuned from zero to a maximum value, it basically defines the
ruggedness of the landscape. As K increases, the landscape changes from smooth to very
rugged, or from statistically correlated to statistically uncorrelated:501
· K=0 means that there are no epistatic interactions, no conflicting constraints and no cross-
connections. The structure of the landscape contains only one global optimum, which makes
an adaptive walk via 1-mutant fitter variants possible. This landscape is the simplest
possible in which all points are on a connected pathway leading to the top. The surface is
smooth with neighbouring points having nearly the same fitness value. Thus knowing the
fitness value of one point provides significant information about the fitness value of
neighbouring points. On such landscapes for very large N the fitness values of 1-mutant
fitter variants are very similar. In that case, walk lengths to the global optimum increase
linearly with N resulting that the pace of such a walk is very slow. This smooth landscape
perfectly reflects the ideal gradualism of evolution as outlined by Darwin.
· K=N-1 means that the amount of conflicting constraints is maximum and each point is
affected by all other points. The result is an entirely uncorrelated and extremely rugged
fitness landscape. The fitness value of any given point does not give information about the
fitness value of neighbouring points. On such landscapes, the number of local optima is very
large and the rate of finding better optima via 1-mutant fitter variants decreases at every
step. Thus the lengths of adaptive walks to local optima are generally very short and the
499  Kaufmann (1987), pp. 33-35.
500  Kaufmann (1989a), pp. 577-580.
501  Kaufmann (1989a), pp. 540-543; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 169-171; McKelvey, pp. 301-302.
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expected time to find a local optimum is proportional to N. Only a small fraction of the local
optima is accessible from any given point. As the number of points increases the fitness
value of local optima falls towards the average fitness of the space, which limits the force of
selection and the success of an adaptive walk. The fitness values of accessible optima
become poorer as the peaks themselves decrease.502
12.3.5 Landscapes and Recombination
As Kaufmann argued, between the two end-poles there is an infinite variety of potential surfaces.
Should K and N increase proportionately, the fitness of accessible optima becomes an ever
poorer compromise and hardly better than mere chance. Such landscapes resemble isotropic
features as high peaks move apart from each other in the landscape. Consequently, any one
area looks roughly as any other area. Good peaks do not exist since it is not possible to climb
higher peaks than afforded by the landscape itself. However, if K is small and fixed whilst N
increases the landscapes display non-isotropic features and contain special regions in which
high peaks cluster. The location of one high optimum gives information about the location of
other good local optima. In this case it is reasonable to search for peaks that lie between two
higher peaks that contain mutual information about possible good regions of the landscape.
Originally the concept of NK landscapes was developed to understand evolutionary migration of
haploid gene combinations that do not involve sexual recombination, but happen if
advantageous point mutations accumulate. However, sexual recombination of diploid gene
combinations helps improve the mostly myopic search process of an adaptive walk guided only
by the local features of the terrain. Although through sexual recombination it becomes possible
for a species to get a bird’s-eye view on the landscape, in this case success depends on the
correlation structure. Consequently, on random landscapes recombination is useless and does
not make any sense since it suffers the problems of long-jump adaptation. However, on
correlated landscapes in which the highest optima are close to each other and peaks are largest,
the location of any given high optimum carries information about other optima. Peaks contain
mutual information about the good regions in which recombination can be compared with the
effect of repeated long jumps. Thus recombination is a very powerful form of adaptation on very
rugged, but correlated fitness landscapes. The only critical requirement is that local optima must
carry mutual information about the location of other good or better optima.503
12.3.6 Two Sorts of Catastrophes
NK landscapes can have two baseline cases. Whereas the first equals K=0 and indicates an
entirely smooth surface, the other equals K=N-1 and stands for an entirely rugged surface.504 By
approaching one of these two end-poles, evolution suffers from two limits of complexity in the
form of catastrophes:
· The first extreme refers to K=0 in which the gradient leading to the single optimum is
shallow. In this case selection is not always able to hold the population at the peak and can
502  Kaufmann (1989a), pp. 544-547; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 173-175.
503  Kaufmann, Stuart: The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution, Oxford University
Press, 1992, pp. 112-120; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 180-183; Kaufmann (1989a), pp. 583-592;
Coveney/Highfield (1995), pp. 227-228.
504  Kaufmann (1989a), pp. 569, 611.
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become too weak compared with mutation. The adapting population cannot stay at the top
of the peak, but flows down mostly in the form of quasi-species into the lower regions of the
landscape. This phenomenon stands for large mutation rates that lead to a sudden
breakdown of stability. Such a case is called the error catastrophe.
· The other extreme refers to K=N-1, which indicates a very rugged landscape containing a
huge number of peaks. Here, local optima fall towards the mean of the space.
Consequently, walks are locked into typical local regions that have an average fitness value.
In this case selection affords only poor peaks to be climbed. A shift towards this extreme
results in a complexity catastrophe.505
Given these two limitations, Kaufmann assumed that early in the evolutionary process
adaptation occurs on a highly uncorrelated fitness landscape with a subsequent adaptation
happening on a rather well-correlated landscape. Adaptation on a correlated landscape means
that the rate of finding fitter variants can either stay constant as the fitness increases or
decreases slower than on uncorrelated landscapes. In other words, history does matter since
“early development locks in.”506
12.3.7 Coupled Landscapes
In real life species live in niches afforded by other species, with the result that fitness landscapes
are not fixed, but evolve due to interactions with other species. As Kaufmann argued, real
evolution is a co-evolutionary process that happens on coupled landscapes in which adaptive
moves deform the landscapes of respective partners. This implies epistatic interactions between
the landscapes themselves, since in reality the fitness of each species depends both on the
environment and other species. Consequently, landscapes of co-evolving species show a very
dynamic surface that trembles, waves and heaves. In such a situation all bets are off since
attempts of one species to improve its own fitness may deform the landscape of the other
species to which it is coupled. Although the fitness landscape of any given species is a function
of the adaptive moves of other species since they correspond to the changes, it cannot be
excluded that certain aspects of fitness might be independent from interactions. In order to catch
the essence of co-evolution he introduced two new variables, C and S. Variable C describes the
epistatic interactions between the landscapes and represents those external constraints that
influence a species’ fitness. Increased C shows how the adaptive moves of species deform the
landscapes of their partners. Variable S stands for the number of interacting species, hence the
number of different fitness landscapes. Thus the variables tune the landscape’s ruggedness and
also model the richness of external conflicting constraints.507 Similar to fixed NK landscapes, on
co-evolutionary landscapes there are also two end-poles. Whereas the one end-pole is called
505  Kamp, Christen/Bornholdt, Stefan: Coevolution of Quasispecies: B-Cell Mutation Rates Maximize Viral
Error Catastrophes, Physical Review Letters, Volume 88, Number 6, pp. 068104-1-4; Franz, Silvio/Peliti,
Luca: Error threshold in simple landscapes, Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General, Volume
30, Number 13, pp. 4481-4487; Kaufmann (1989a), pp. 552-558, 580-583, 587-592.
506  Quotation in Kaufmann (1995a), p. 177.
507  Kaufmann, (1989b), pp. 675-688; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 215-222; Kaufmann, Stuart A./Johnsen,
Sonke: Co-Evolution to the Edge of Chaos: Coupled Fitness Landscapes, Poised States, and Co-
Evolutionary Avalanches, in: Langton, C. G./Taylor, C./Farmer, J. D./Rasmussen, S.: Artificial Life II, SFI
Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Volume X, Addison-Wesley, 1991, pp. 325-369.
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evolutionary stable strategy, the other is called evolutionary unstable strategy or the Red Queen.
In an evolutionary stable strategy each species climbs to a peak that is consistent with the peaks
on the other species’ fitness landscape. Under this condition the species stop co-evolving
because each is better off not changing as long as the others do not change.508 At the other
extreme the species never settle down, but keep chasing peaks forever. Their effort to deform
and lower the peaks on the other species’ landscape also alters indirectly their own.
Consequently, the behaviour lies in the chaotic domain in which the species run ever faster in
order to stay in the same place. For cases in between Kaufmann found that species can co-
evolve well. The speed at which species move depends on their current fitness and the
ruggedness of the respective landscapes. If species are on landscapes of different ruggedness
the rate at which they move uphill depends on their joint fitness and landscape ruggedness.
When the amount of coupling between the landscapes is high, by increasing the number of
conflicting constraints internally, a species can reach equilibrium faster and gain higher
fitness.509 In general Kaufmann concluded that for K>C equilibrium is encountered more rapidly
than for K<C where the waiting time can become very long. For co-evolving species K=C is a
crude dividing line for the time requirement to encounter equilibrium. In the case K>CxS the co-
evolving partners all get to equilibrium rapidly; in the case K<CxS equilibrium can only set in
after a long period of time. Thus the fitness in co-evolving systems increases when a species
can adjust its K to C with K=CxS being a rough guide.510
508  Beckerman, Linda P. Dr.: The Non-Linear Dynamics of War, Science and Application Corporation,
1999, Internet, accessed 04. 07. 2003, available at www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/
beckerman/non_linear.htm.
509  Kaufmann (1989b), pp. 689-702; Kaufmann (1995a), pp. 223-225.
510  Kaufmann/Johnsen (1991), pp. 334-343; Hordijk, Wim/Kauffman, Stuart A.: Correlation Analysis of
Coupled Fitness Landscapes, Internet, accessed 12. 12. 2006, available at www.lirmm.fr/mab/IMG/
pdf/HK-COMPLEX-05.pdf.
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13 Introducing the Effects Landscape
13.1 Construction and Considerations
The evolution of species is manifest in their migratory process chasing high peaks and comes as
the result of various genetic combinations. An effect (E) can be seen as the function (ƒ) of an
action (a) on an object (o) and be depicted in the form of an equation
),( oafE =
In this chapter we show that the equation also makes it possible to conceptualise effects in terms
of genotypes, similar to living species. For this reason, first we clarify what the term genotype
stands for. The genotype of an organism can be defined as “the class to which that organism
belongs as determined by the description of the actual physical material made up of DNA that
was passed to the organism by its parents at the organism's conception.”511 In a similar fashion
we understand genotype as the specific makeup of an effect that refers to certain composition of
objects as outlined in the equation above. However, before we go further it is important to make
a distinction between an object and an objective. Whereas in terms of effects an object forms the
focus of an action as it sets the boundaries between phenomena, an objective exists only as a
specific state regardless of whether an action was taken or not.512
13.1.1 The Effect-Genotype
The first part of the equation refers to actions and can be grouped in many ways. Well-known
terms such as divert, delay, disrupt, destroy, and demoralise can describe actions needed to
achieve effects as well. Another more comprehensive and extended listing can include deter,
destroy, disrupt, degrade, decapitate, divert, dislocate, delay, deny, deceive and defend.513 The
listings provide us with a vast array of options. However, we suggest a simplification in which an
action is limited to two alternative states such as action taken standing for 1 or action not taken
standing for 0. The second part of the equation refers to the object and is equivalent to the
number of genes N. In a military conflict, similar to living organisms the number of objects that
511  Quotation in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: The Genotype/Phenotype Distinction, Internet,
accesed 21. 09. 2006, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/genotype-phenotype.
512  McCrabb, Maris “Buster” Dr.: Explaining “Effects”: A Theory for an Effects-Based Approach To
Planning, Executing and Assessing Operations, Version 2.0, as of 07. 08. 2001, pp. 7-12, Internet,
accessed 08. 03. 2005, available at www.dtic.mil/jointvision/ideas_concepts/ebo.doc; Jobbagy, Zoltan
(Maj.): Wars, Waves and the West. Putting Effects-Based Operations into Context, TNO FEL-04-B-077,
May 2005, p. 54; Vego, Milan N.: The Problem of Common Terminology, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue
43, 4th Quarter 2006, p. 45.
513  Walker, Scott G. (Maj.): Targeting for Effect, Analytical Framework for Counterland Operations, School
of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, May 1998, pp. 28, 73; McCrabb,
Maris “Buster” Dr.: Concept of Operations For Effects-based Operations, Draft, Version 2.0, Air Force
Research Laboratory, 2002a, p. 11, Internet, accessed 03. 03. 2003, available at
www.eps.gov/EPSdata/USAF/Synopses/1142/Reference-Number-PRDA-00-06-IKFPA/Latest EBOCON
OPS.doc; Wagenhals, Lee W./Levis, Alexander H.: Effects based course of action analysis in support of
war games, Internet, accessed 18. 03. 2003, available at www.mors.org/meetings/ebo/ebo-reads/
Wagenhals_Lewis.pdf.
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must be considered is normally very large.514 Thus each effect has genes represented by bits
composed of binary numbers. Pairing objects with actions means that an object can either be
targeted in the form of action taken or not targeted in the form of action not taken. Consequently,
the effect-genotype represents a given combination of effects and takes the simple form of a
binary string with 2N possibilities.515 For example in the case of ten objects (N=10) and the two
sorts of actions the effect-genotypes can have 210 or 1024 various possible states ranging from
0000000000 to 1111111111. These possibilities can be depicted in the form of a landscape that
contains various peaks representing the different values of the effect-genotypes. Similar to
Kaufmann’s NK model we define the value of any combination as the average of the contribution
of the individual objects, each in its own context and the K other objects in the form of functional
couplings or epistatic interactions. The effects landscape is defined by effect-genotypes
consisting of a given number (N) of objects (o) with two possible states at each object (oi) and
can be expressed as follows
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Whereas for K=0 each object is independent of all other objects, for K=N-1 each object depends
upon itself and all other objects. Thus each object’s fitness contribution depends on the choice
between the two different binary states at each of the K other objects that impinge upon it.516 The
effects landscape reminds us that effects are highly complex phenomena. There is no single
dimension along which it becomes possible to search and find combinations that possess good
or high value. Hence predefining desired effects often do not make sense. Effects-based
operations represent a high-dimensional search process that aims at finding an optimum
combination of effects with the goal to occupy high spots on the landscape in which a given
combination of effects influences battlefield performance and as a consequence the outcome of
war.517
514  According to Kaufmann an organism such as the eukaryote has 20,000-100,000 structural genes and a
variety of other control points. See Kaufmann (1992), p. 427; In order to interdict enemy ground units
the Air Campaign during Operation Iraqi Freedom identified and struck approximately 19,900 aim points
or objects. See Conetta, Carl: Catastrophic Interdiction: Air Power and the Collapse of the Iraqi Field
Army in the 2003 War, p. 2, Internet, accessed 07. 03. 2005, available at www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/
0309bm30.pdf.
515  Rinaldi, Steven M. (Maj.): Beyond the Industrial Web, Economic Synergies and Targeting
Methodologies, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, April 1995, p.
53; Kaufmann (1989a), p. 540; Levinthal, Daniel A.: Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes, Management
Science, Volume 43, Number 7, July 1997, pp. 936-937; Ramsey, Marshall: GA Optimizer, Artificial
Intelligence Lab, The University of Arizona, Internet, accessed 21. 11. 2006, available at
http://ai.bpa.arizona.edu/~mramsey/ga.html.
516  Kaufmann, Stuart A./Macready, William G.: Technological Evolution and Adaptive Organisations, Ideas
from biology may find applications in economics, Complexity, 1995b, p. 28; Levinthal, pp. 936-937;
Hordijk, Wim: Population Flow on Fitness Landscapes, Erasmus University Rotterdam, August 1994,
pp. 10-11; Altenberg, Lee: NK Fitness Landscapes, in: Back T./Fogel D./Michalewicz Z.: The Handbook
of Evolutionary Computation, Oxford University Press, 1997, section B2.7.2, p. 2; Goertzel, Ben: From
Complexity to Creativity Computational Models of Evolutionary, Autopoietic and Cognitive Dynamics,
Internet, accessed 11. 12. 2006, available at http://goertzel.org/books/complex/contents.html.
517  Rivkin, Jan W.: Imitation of Complex Strategies, Management Science, Volume 46, Number 6, June
2000, p. 827; Ilachinski (1996b), pp. 136-137.
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13.1.2 Context Dependency and Limitations
Before we go on detailing the implications of such a conceptualisation of war some limitations
must be acknowledged. Despite similarities with Kaufmann’s model we understand the effects
landscape in heuristic terms and do not attempt to quantify the search process more precisely.
Consequently, we acknowledge that it might not always be possible to find a search process that
guarantees a good optimum, and similar to biological evolution in war we have to accept mostly
sub-optimal solutions. Whereas in the NK model the search process is driven by an algorithm
that always chooses the fittest option, it is not always possible to do that in reality. Much of real-
life problems are NP complete and intractable to analytical solutions in the form of algorithms.518
A further limitation is due to the fact that cultural imprints and past experience always distort
perception. For example the same phenomenon or even a simple symbol can have a different
meaning for a Christian and a Muslim. Reality is not directly comprehensible and the effects
landscape represents a specific mapping of reality. Identity can limit the search process by
excluding certain areas that may contain good peaks, but cannot be explored or climbed. Due to
these blinders, the effects landscape is always a compressed and distorted form of reality that
puts limitation on the search potential. A further reason why the search process is suboptimal
comes from the fact that it is not the peaks sought, but the landscape’s ruggedness that
determines the success of any given search. The effects landscape exists only in our
representation, which means that the search process is typically constrained and appears mostly
in the form of a biased walk. In other words, the effects landscape has no objective reality
separable from the autonomous agents inhibiting it. Although this sort of bias sometimes eases
the search process, it always limits the search potential. Thus any problem decomposition in the
form of an effects landscape only coincides with the reality as it “may or may not correspond to
the ‘true’ decomposition structure”.519 An utterly false representation can induce additional and
lasting interactions, which influence the way alternatives are generated and evaluated.
Consequently, effects landscapes refer to unique and private mappings of the actors involved.520
This however, indicates that there will never be perfect battle-space knowledge or transparent
battlefield available, only approximations with a certain error value. Due to such less-than-perfect
descriptions generating wrong predictions, as time passes the desired peaks on the landscape
might differ from the expected peaks, which again might differ from the actual peaks found. We
must always assume that very good strategies might often become hidden for long periods of
time, but can also emerge occasionally.521
518  Weinberger, Ed: Correlated and Uncorrelated Fitness Landscapes and How to Tell the Difference,
Biological Cybernetics, Volume 63, 1990, p. 326; More on NP-completeness see Rivkin, pp. 826, 831-
832.
519  Brabazon/Matthews, pp. 6-18; Beckerman; Smith (2006), pp. 142-148; Dosi, Giovanni/Levinthal, Daniel
A./Marengo, Luigi: Bridging contested terrain: linking incentive-based and learning perspectives on
organisational evolution, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 12, Number 2, 2003, pp. 418-422
(quotation p. 418).
520  Roos, Johan/Oliver, David: From Fitness Landscapes to Knowledge Landscapes, Systemic Practice
and Action Research, June 1999, p. 284.
521  Sakulich, Timothy J. (Lt. Col.): Precision Engagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding Promise or
Wishful Thinking, Occasional Paper No. 25, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College
Maxwell AFB, December 2001, pp. 15-18; Daven, Choy (Capt.): Effects-Based Operations: Obstacles
and Opportunities, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Volume 30, Number 2, 2004, Internet,
accessed 31. 08. 2004, available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2004/
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13.1.3 Further Considerations
Whereas war exists in a high-dimensional space, the effects landscape can only provide us with
certain statistical characterizations of the space of possibilities. Thus the search space is
explored in one particular direction, which always implies biased characterisation of the
landscape. The way effects are constructed also does not provide clear and attainable
information on the genotype/phenotype mapping. The way effects are generated and perceived
can differ significantly. Despite its power to deliver helpful and valid statistical insights regarding
the possibility space, the predictive power of the effects landscape is limited. The effect-
genotype has more to do with landscape statistics than landscape reality. It allows for analysing
the search space only along a single fitness function and if the problem is multi-objective it
cannot provide for further and broader generalisations. Despite all its utility, even the effects
landscape is unable to capture the true nature of emergence with all its self-organising
attributes.522 Nevertheless, the effects landscape is a powerful aid in conceptualising war in a
novel way. Effects-based operations are seen as a process that rests on adaptation and
mutation in which we attempt to offset changing conditions coming both from the environment
and interaction with the enemy. Conceptualising effects-based operations this way also has the
advantage that the emerging search process can be defined by the network of effects and not
exclusively by desired effects. Regardless of the approach and methodology chosen it will never
be possible to explore the vast space of possibilities. However, the effects landscape can give us
a chance of understanding the complexity of war and framing it as a complex optimisation
problem that includes approximations and estimations regarding optimal values. The effects
landscape can also give us a chance to assess the benefits of further optimisation or to define
termination criteria.523 The effects landscape reminds us that it is often more important to gain
insight into the mechanism of how effects interrelate rather than to define desired effects. The
frictional, chaotic and complex reality of war indicates that the combination of effects often
counts more than desired individual effects.
13.2 Dissecting Adaptation
Conceptualising war and effects-based operations in the framework of a complex adaptive
system requires the ability to manage polarities rather than solving problems. Evolution comes
as the result of two search mechanisms such as adaptation via 1-mutant fitter variant and J-
mutant fitter variant. In a similar fashion in the framework of the effects landscape, effects-based
operations can be seen as a combination of two different, but interrelated processes such as
being effective and efficient. We made it clear earlier that although in normal English usage both
refer to effects, there is a significant difference between them:
· Effectiveness – stands for the quality of being able to achieve an effect or the ability of
becoming effective. It has a general meaning since it describes only the power to carry out
Vol30_2/3.htm;  Beinhocker,  Eric  D.: Robust Adaptive Strategies, MIT Sloan Management Review,
Spring 1999a, pp. 98-99; Rivkin, p. 833.
522  Teo, Jason T. W.: Pareto Multi-objective Evolution of Legged Embodied Organisms, University of New
South Wales – Australian Defence Force Academy, Ph. D. Thesis, 2003, pp. 84-85.
523  Rosé, Helge: Complexity of Fitness Landscapes, Proceeding, International Conference on Complex
Systems, Noshua, USA, 21-26. 09. 1997, Internet, accessed 11. 08. 2005, available at
www.first.fraunhofer.de/publikationen?prID=1167&von=mitarbeiter.
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an act that has a certain result. Effectiveness suggests the accomplishment of a desired
result especially as viewed after the fact.
· Efficiency – stands for the capacity to produce a certain desired result with a minimum
expenditure of resources. It has a more specific meaning and describes the suitability of a
given procedure. Thus efficiency stands for being the immediate agent in producing an
effect. It suggests an action or a potential for an action in such a way as to avoid loss or
waste of energy in producing a result.524
The biggest difference between the two is that whereas effective stands for the power to produce
an effect, efficient describes the process of producing an effect. The following simple comparison
may explain the fundamental difference between the two:525
Effectiveness                         =               Realised Output
              Desired Output
Efficiency                               =               Realised Output
              (Desired) Input
In the framework of the equations above, effectiveness gives information about what kind of end-
state is achieved and forces us to think more precisely about what we want to achieve. Efficiency
can be regarded as the relation between input and output, representing how the end-state is
achieved.
13.2.1 Effectiveness and Efficiency
The difference between effectiveness and efficiency can be conceptualised in the framework of
the proposed imaginary landscape. Whereas efficiency means climbing discovered peaks and is
analogous with adaptation via 1-mutant fitter variants, effectiveness stands for searching for
good peaks and is analogous with adaptation via J-mutant fitter variants. Consequently,
efficiency stands for exploiting or making incremental improvements in the form of adaptive
walks. Effectiveness stands for exploring new areas in order to detect opportunities as a result of
long jumps that can be exploited. Climbing peaks in the effects landscape can be understood as
increasing efficiency, exploring new and potentially high peaks as an attempt to increase
effectiveness. Searching for efficiency means a process of climbing higher on a discovered hill
until the peak representing maximum effect is reached. Being on the top indicates that we have
achieved an effect with the minimum use of resources. Efficiency presupposes that the hill has a
clearly defined and hardly changing shape, which makes both path and peak visible. Efficiency
contains a high degree of certainty and predictability with the chance to define desired effects
and develop plans to realise them. Efficiency allows for a classical problem solving approach in
which we know both where we are relative to the peak, and know how to get to it. Exploiting a
peak means doing things the right way or doing things better. Once a peak is climbed it makes
524  Gove, p. 725.
525  Snowden D.: Being efficient does not always mean being effective, a new perspective on cultural issues
in organisations, Internet, accessed 21. 11. 2006, available at www.cognitive-edge.com/ceresources/
articles/42_new_perspective_on_culture_final.pdf, p. 3.
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sense to stay there since it represents a potential function that can be exploited.526 However, the
surface of the effects landscape always changes, which demands a constant discovery of new
and higher peaks. Due to the inherent dynamics there is always chance that a peak can become
a valley and a valley a peak. Although there might be some correlation between nearby peaks, it
is often very difficult to see the contours of the landscape. Uncertainty and unpredictability
dominate as the landscape turns increasingly complex. These features require a reorientation
based on effectiveness and flexibility, which shift the premium towards searching and
discovering new peaks. Being effective means doing better things, which often includes being
efficient since the effects landscape contains many different peaks that may offer the potential
for climbing uphill. Whereas efficiency means climbing, improving and doing things better,
effectiveness stands for searching, exploring and being innovative. In a rough and constantly
changing effects landscape one specific approach can become disadvantageous regardless of
how excellent the planning and execution. Flexibility and adaptive ability offer more potential
since they indicate the importance of learning and innovative skills. Effectiveness emphasises
possibilities rather than prediction and point towards compromise solutions that make it possible
to address the conflicting constraints of various sub-problems since rugged landscapes contain
many more low than high peaks.527
13.2.2 Parallel Processes
As the imaginary landscape indicates we should become able to find a balance between
exploration and exploitation. Exploration to the exclusion of exploitation represents
experimentation with alternatives that involve uncertainty and distance, but no potential for
gaining benefits. Exploitation to the exclusion of exploration represents refinement and is mostly
associated with being proximate and predictable. However, the peaks we try to climb might
easily be poor local optima. Whereas efficiency in the form of exploitation represents an
internally focused approach, effectiveness stands for an external focus and new connections that
allow for a “jump clear across the landscape to a new distant hill.”528 In general, efficiency and
effectiveness are interconnected phenomena and mean that the emphasis should rely less on
reducing environmental uncertainty or simply waiting for structural inertia and more on
appreciating the power of simultaneous selection and adaptation. Thus efficiency and
effectiveness are not mutually exclusive alternatives that can be treated only within their own
domain of applicability, but fundamentally interdependent. Consequently, they are not conflicting
perspectives or complementary views, but two interrelated processes of change.529
526  Merry, Uri: Organizational Strategy on Different Landscapes: A New Science Approach, Systemic
Practice and Action Search, Volume 12, Number 3, 1999, pp. 257-259; Kaufmann (1995b), p. 222;
Kaufmann (1989b), p. 625.
527  Merry, pp. 260-262.
528  March, James G.: Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning, Organization Science,
Volume 2, Number 1, February 1991, pp. 71-73, 85; Quotation in Beckerman; Meyer, Christopher:
Survival Under Stress, MIT Sloan Management Review, Fall 2002, p. 96.
529  Roos/Oliver, p. 289; Levinthal, Daniel A.: Organizational Adaptation and Environmental Selection –
Interrelated Processes of Change, Organization Science, Volume 2, Number 1, February 1991, pp. 140-
145; Courtney, Hugh: Making the Most of Uncertainty, The McKinsley Quarterly, Internet, accessed 22.
03. 2005, available at http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_abstract.aspx?ar=1128&L2=21&L3
=37&srid=10&gp=1.
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13.3 General Topography
The central element in our metaphor is fitness, which describes the relative value of a certain
effect-genotype. Before we detail the consequences of the effects landscape it is important to
compare Wright’s original shifting balance theory with Kaufmann’s NK model. The original theory
is rather static as it emphasises the importance of height difference between peaks, assumes
subdivision of a species into local races that move around in a non-adaptive fashion either to find
higher peaks or just to be in the right place by chance in case the environment changes.
Climbing is the only form of moving uphill and attention is paid exclusively to environmental
changes as the major reason for topographical consequences. In other words, the importance of
time is not of first consideration. For Kaufmann both the height differences between peaks are
important, and the way those peaks are located in the landscape is a result of various internal
and external conflicting constraints. His model also allows for the possibility of jumping long
distances in the landscape in order to escape the correlation strength. Furthermore, he assumes
that given an average fitness both the number of steps and the time requirement needed to find
a higher position increase after each subsequent step. Thus time plays an important role since
the process of evolution is examined in more detail. It is faster in the beginning, but eventually
slows down. In general Kaufmann regards fitness as a function of various more or less
favourable environmental changes and a dynamic co-evolutionary process.
13.3.1 Different Regions
The space of possibilities in the effects landscape is N-dimensional. For a better understanding
we suggest to imagine a large two-dimensional grid in which N defines the size. Each grid
represents a certain effect-genotype with a given value. The topographical features of a
landscape arise when heights of nearby grids are connected that turn the two-dimensional sheet
into a mountainous three-dimensional landscape.530 Due to differences in their respective
values, the effect-genotypes emerge in the form of hills and valleys of various sizes and shapes.
The surface of an effects landscape can range from entirely correlated to entirely uncorrelated
resulting in a smooth or rugged surface. Between these two extremes there are landscapes that
are correlated, but rugged. The way topographical features are located is influenced by the
interactions and coupling of the constituents that refer to epistasis or conflicting constraints as
outlined by Kaufmann. Thus equilibrium expressed in K=0 and chaos in K=N-1 form the two end-
poles within which effects landscapes exist. Consequently, most effects landscapes are rugged,
but correlated. They display many peaks of various heights even in the form of peaks within
peaks indicating that effects landscapes contain many more low peaks than higher ones.531
Similar to biological evolution, in the framework of the effects landscape it is impossible to
predict when transitions will occur or what the resulting pattern in terms of peaks will be.
However, effect-genotypes with similar values might often be close to each other and as a
simple analogy we suggest a subdivision into three different regions:
530  Beinhocker (1999a), p. 98; Beinhocker, Eric D.: On the Origins of Strategies, The McKinsey Quarterly,
Number 4, 1999b, p. 50; Rivkin, p. 827.
531  Waldrop, pp. 102-105; Kauffman (1991), pp. 64-67; Merry (1999), p. 265.
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· Low – the first region is equivalent to physical effects. This region contains only peaks of low
heights in the form of hills that can easily be climbed. It indicates a simple foresight horizon
that comes as a result of tightly linear attributes.
· Medium – the second region is more mountainous and refers to systemic effects. This
region stands for a complicated/complex foresight horizon that comes as a result of loosely
linear and loosely complex attributes.
· High – the third region is equivalent to psychological effects. It is the most multi-peaked
region indicating a chaotic foresight horizon that comes as a result of tightly complex
attributes.532
A further important aspect of the effects landscape is the frequency with which the surface
changes. In general we can say that the surface of lower regions change more often and
dynamically than that of higher regions, as it is relatively easy both to achieve and compensate
for physical effects. The higher the region, the more static is the surface. Although low peaks can
be discovered with relative ease, the peaks themselves have a low value. Unfortunately, higher
peaks are not only more difficult to find as they are scattered over the landscape in relatively
small regions, but also most paths leading to the top remain hidden. This characteristic explains
why it is more difficult to achieve psychological than physical effects and why psychological
effects have a longer temporal horizon indicating strategic value. Even successful exploration of
a given region does not yield information regarding where to search further. Thus the exploration
of one region does not always give sufficient knowledge on other and preferably higher regions.
The only certainty is that moving from the lower regions of the landscape to higher ones has the
consequence that the higher the peaks the higher the possibility that they offer only potential
value.533
13.3.2 Effects as Peaks
The effect-genotypes indicate effects-based operations as a search process on an imaginary
landscape. The number of objects N can be very large, the result being that the length of an
effect-genotype can be enormous with values ranging from 1 to 2N. Earlier we made it clear that
effects are located on a continuum characterised by physical and psychological effects as end-
poles.534 Thus as we move from physical towards psychological effects their value increases,
which explains effects-based operations as a process that chases high peaks on the effects
landscape. However, we must take equally into account that the more we move towards
psychological effects, the more complex they become as both the amount of objects involved
and the number of conflicting constraints increase. In other words, the average height of the
peaks we encounter might be lower than expected:
· A simple physical effect such as destroying a tank, an airplane or a bunker does not include
many conflicting constraints that must be taken into account.
· A systemic effect such as shutting down a power plant in a given area can have the
consequence that the enemy cannot operate his military arsenal properly. However,
532  Maxfield, Robert R.: Complexity and Organization Management, in: Alberts/Czerwinski.
533  Roos/Oliver, p. 284.
534  Jobbagy (May 2005), pp. 55-57.
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hospitals or critical water supply facilities may also suffer a shortage in energy thus causing
innocent civilians to starve and die.
· A psychological effect can suffer from even more conflicting constraints that may run
through various ethnic, religious, social and political dividing lines in any given society. As
the example in Iraq shows the population is mostly Muslim, but the non-Arabic Kurdish
minority makes up a large part of its territory and lives in a separated region in the North.
Political and religious differences between the two ethnically Arab groups of Shi'as and
Sunnis are also large.535
As we move from physical towards psychological effects the landscape turns increasingly
rugged containing many uncorrelated peaks that often jeopardise a successful search process
and decrease the prospect of finding good peaks. Thus there are certain common sense
elements that must always be taken into account when conceptualising effects-based
operations.536 Instead of focusing exclusively on the upper right area of the continuum of war we
propose reconsideration in terms of the probable. This can help us find the ideal mixture of
available means and achievable ends. The more we adhere to what is probable the better we
can combine effectiveness and efficiency. Although this means that we lower our ambition in
terms of desired effects, we can take better advantage of available means and address the often
proposed coherency of effects. Thus we sacrifice focus in order to gain flexibility. However, then
the question arises naturally: why is achieving psychological effects in effects-based operations
understood as something more desirable than achieving physical or systemic effects? Even
John Warden, one of the founding fathers of the concept, suggested the opposite by arguing that
we should focus more on the physical side of the enemy.537 In terms of the effects landscape two
processes explain this phenomenon. Although on average the value of local peaks declines
slightly with K, the number of such peaks increases. Thus moving into the more rugged regions
of the landscape has the consequence that the number of true local optima decreases, but their
value increases with the result that “the expected value of the maximum fitness level
increases”.538 In such a landscape it is very difficult to find high value effects since the area from
which to start is essentially smaller. Approaching effects-based operations from the
psychological end-pole has the consequence that the effects landscape becomes very rugged in
which high peaks spread apart, and even if one is detected its location carries only a very limited
amount of information regarding the location of other high peaks. Due to their distance peaks
often represent different and unrelated psychological effects rather than variations.539 Effects-
based operations are mainly associated with psychological effects aimed at creating a
behavioural change in the enemy despite the fact that such effects are generally very difficult to
535  Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book 2004, Internet, accessed 08. 03. 2004, available at
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html#People.
536  Davis, p. 21.
537  Jobbagy, Zoltan (Maj.): Powered Flight, Strategic Bombing, and Military Coercion: Study on the Origins
of Effects-Based Operations, TNO Report, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, CCSS-05-006,
November 2005, pp. 46-48.
538  Levinthal, pp. 942-943 (quotation p. 943); Kaufmann (1989b), p. 546.
539  USJFCOM JED: The Multinational Effects-Based Operations Process (CONOPS), Version 0.65, 7
January 2005, pp. 3-4, Internet, accessed 04. 03. 2005, available at www.act.nato.int/events/
seminars/05mne4etodevloews1.htm; Rivkin (2000), pp. 834, 838.
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achieve. It appears that we intentionally focus on the assumed height of the maximum peak
rather than on the landscape’s ruggedness, which profoundly influences the topographical
features. Obviously waging war and mountaineering practices share at least one common
element. Both soldiers and alpinists are equally enthusiastic about finding and climbing the
highest possible peak. In their effort to reach new heights they often disregard reality in terms of
what can and cannot be achieved.
13.4 Other Features
The surface of the effects landscape is not fixed, but coupled to the effects landscape of the
enemy. The way effects landscapes are coupled bears consequences for possible catastrophes
mostly in the form of long, protracted and indecisive campaigns based on attrition and
annihilation. The only thing possible in such cases is to decouple the landscapes as shown by
the American example in Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.
13.4.1 Coupling and Catastrophes
According to Kaufmann in the case of coupled landscapes the fitness of co-evolving species
becomes higher when they are able to adjust their conflicting constraints to the level of their
external couplings. Thus K=C was regarded as a rough dividing line for the time needed to
achieve mutual equilibrium. In a similar fashion war can be understood as a contest between two
belligerents in which each wants to maximise survival chances by forcing the other into regions
of lower fitness. The course of war proceeds from an evolutionary stable situation towards an
evolutionary unstable state as the belligerents act, react, and interact. Based on Hobbes
discussion of war, the temporal aspect can be seen as the very enabler of other advantages
such as limited casualty, destruction and low cost. Consequently, it suggests that we should go
back as fast as possible to another and more preferable stable situation. Only this way is it
possible to achieve a better state of peace in the form of a new equilibrium since as war unfolds
the chance to be dragged into a Red Queen race grows. However, if we can control our internal
couplings and achieve a rough K=C situation faster, our chance of victory grows. Raising K
above C temporarily means gaining flexibility. Although this goes together with an increase of
conflicting constraints, only this way becomes possible to induce a multitude of options that can
be exploited. We must take into account that it is not possible to entirely harmonise internal and
external couplings, but this sort of parallelism enables us to become as rugged as the
environment. The overall result is that the complexity profile internally mirrors the external
complexity, which resembles similarity with Ashby’s law of requisite variety. In other words, we
become able to track and climb those peaks that offer the best effects and come as a result of
dynamic and constantly changing interactions with the enemy. The frictional, chaotic and
complex reality of war demands that we maximise our internal diversity so as to be optimally
prepared for any foreseeable or unforeseeable contingency, which comes from the interplay with
an intelligent enemy.540 Ashby’s law indicates that if we can find the narrow edge of chaos, it
becomes possible to push the enemy towards one of the two end-poles. Should not we find this
540  Beinhocker (1999a), p. 100; Ashby, Ross W.: An Introduction to Cybernetics, Chapman & Hall Ltd.,
1957, pp. 202-218; Beinhocker (1999a), p. 105; Pascale, Richard T.: Surfing the Edge of Chaos, MIT
Sloan Management Review, Spring 2003, p. 86; Markides, Constantinos C.: A Dynamic View of
Strategy, MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring 1999, p. 62.
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area, there is a chance that we drift either towards panaceas believing that through simple
destruction we can generate desired psychological effects, or towards attrition and annihilation in
which regardless of the means applied we achieve mostly scattered physical effects. In semantic
terms both options are effects-based, but the effects achieved are less than optimal. The recent
history of warfare is rich in examples of this kind. Most strategic bombing campaigns of World
War II point towards the former, the trenches of World War I represent the latter. However, we
should not forget that even if we can act within the area of the possible no-one can ever “reach
maximal fitness, only relative fitness, taking into account the other”.541 Co-evolution tells us that
as time passes competitive advantages always tend to diminish. If the opponent is pushed
towards K=0 he becomes paralysed and cannot adapt to changing circumstances. He is unable
to react properly since the pace of change is quicker than his ability to adapt successfully. In his
effort to offset the growing disadvantage, he constantly mutates and can probably achieve lower
level physical effects, but does not possess the ability to capitalise on any sort of synergy among
them. Thus he achieves some sort of pseudo-effects as a result of destruction. His actions can
inflict damage by sporadically killing friendly forces personnel or destroying friendly assets, but
these activities cannot spill over into coherent operations. Although such effects can be
distributed uniformly over the space, his situation represents the error catastrophe. The enemy
climbs desperately uphill without realising that the peak he occupies has already started to
shrink. Instead of exploring new alternatives he clings either to a particular region or a hill thus
getting the false impression of potential success.542 The  other  extreme  is  when  the  enemy  is
driven towards a chaotic situation K=N-1 and gets dragged so deep into the conflict that the
effects he achieves suffer from an increasing amount of conflicting constraints. In this case
complexity catastrophe sets in. He is not able to take hold of the peaks explored, but wanders
around the landscape desperately chasing high peaks. Due to the amount of conflicting
constraints the effects he achieves instantly reduce the potential and value of other effects. Thus
he constantly explores the landscape without finding exploitable peaks. Consequently, he suffers
only a loss and not a gain in fitness.
13.4.2 Recombination and Occupation
A further interesting feature of the effects landscape is the issue of recombination as it became
clear that in evolutionary terms diploid organisms offer more potential for finding new peaks on
correlated landscapes. Sexual recombination is equivalent to many long jumps and provides an
aerial view of the landscape. Thus the question regarding recombination in effects-based
operations arises naturally. In biological organisms the issue of sex is an implicit part of the
fitness function, whereas in effects-based operations it is explicit.543 As outlined earlier, one
assumed advantage of effects-based operations is that the concept relies on the parallel
application of all elements of national power including diplomatic, informational, military and
economic efforts.544 By capitalising on the power of these four elements we can lift our position
541  Quotation in Merry, p. 272; Beinhocker, Eric D.: Strategy at the Edge of Chaos, The McKinsey
Quarterly, Number 1, 1997, p. 35, Arthur, Brian W.: Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and
Lock-in by Historical Events, The Economic Journal, March 1989, p. 116.
542  Franz/Peliti, p. 4481; Merry, p. 261.
543  Hordijk, p. 7.
544  Jobbagy (May 2005), p. 51.
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from which the effects landscape can be observed, and find better regions which offset the
typical shortcomings of long jumps. Recombination as manifest in a comprehensive approach
makes it possible to jump farther away and reduces the time requirement of finding high value
effects. Unfortunately, similar to biological evolution, if the effects landscape is very rugged also
recombination in the form of integrating all elements of national power suffers from serious
limitations. Another no less important issue concerns whether we should stay or move once a
peak is occupied. In Wright’s original landscape the species moved in a non-adaptive fashion
subdivided into many local races that nested around a given peak. They detected new peaks
either by chance or just happened to be at the right spot when the environment changed. In
either case, through cross-breeding the lucky genotype pulled the entire species uphill.
Kaufmann’s model allows for a much more dynamic process that rests both on adaptation via 1-
mutant fitter variants or adaptation proper in a Darwinian sense, and on adaptation via J-mutant
fitter variants. The question of moving or staying on a peak in the effects landscape depends on
the fitness difference between the potential of the effect that can be exploited and the dynamics
that can suppress or elevate the peak already explored. Due to the unpredictability of war it
makes sense to stick to, and exploit peaks already found, which seems to be a good hedge
against possible unsuccessful jumps. Such a pre-cautionary measure is even more important, as
a long-jump adaptation means that only one peak is examined out of a large pool of possibilities.
Since the evaluation of distant peaks is always difficult and equals a real value plus an error
term, sticking to peaks already achieved can be a good measure if the landscape changes.545
13.5 Conclusion Part II
This part of the thesis proved the assumption that “biological perspectives on human behaviour
have much to offer in the search for a better understanding of conflict and war.”546 Regardless
whether we see war through the eyes of Clausewitz, approach it as a complex adaptive system,
or examine it along attributes that display similarities with biological evolution, we find timeless
and innate characteristics. War stands for primordial violence: it is intrinsically complex, which
comes as the clash of physical and psychological forces.547 In the framework of biological
evolution we treated war as complex adaptive system in which its system properties emerge
from the interactions of the many components on lower levels. War contains an abundance of
dispersed interactions. Its mechanism lacks global controller, but feeds from cross-cutting
hierarchical interactions. It features perpetual novelty and far from equilibrium dynamics that
demand continual adaptation. Thus similar to biological evolution, war’s composition changes
constantly. The co-evolution of the belligerents means that the components feed back and
“affect their further dynamics by changing the attributes of the players.” 548 War and biological
evolution are as much about selection as about transformation; therefore adaptation appears to
545  Levinthal, p. 947.
546  Quotation in Goldstein, Joshua A.: The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War, International
Studies Quarterly, Issue 31, 1987, p. 33.
547  Speech by Chief of the Army Lt. General P. F. Leahy at Conference held at the National Convention
Centre in Canberra on 22 September 2005, Internet, accessed on 29. 04. 2008, available at
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/pubs/CAspeeches/20050922_1.pdf.
548  Levin, Simon A.: Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems, Ecosystems, Number
1, 1998, pp. 431-434 (quotation p. 434).
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be at the heart of both. Transformation emphasises the process character of war. It stands for
the importance of not only how to respond to perturbations properly, but also how to maintain the
capacity to respond adaptively.549 The complexity inherent in war and biological evolution can be
modelled in similar ways. Although the attributes of the underlying mechanisms of the similarity
is obvious, we should bear in mind that the approach we took can only give insights, but never
definite answers. Despite the underlying mathematics, the effects landscape is rather qualitative
and descriptive in nature as it guides our thinking increasingly towards “adaptation, evolution,
behaviour, metaphors, and models”.550 Certainly, from a biological point of view war can be seen
as a struggle for existence in which victory stands for survival of the fittest. However, unlike in
the case of the exact natural sciences there is no biological law of nature and war cannot be
expressed as a mathematical function of its variables. This was the very reason for introducing
the Organic Strategic Ecosystem metaphor in order to discuss the mechanism of war and its
restricting influence on causal assumptions. This way it became possible for us both to grasp the
complex web of relations inherent in war and see it as an interdependent whole.551 Darwin
himself emphasised that he used the expression struggle for existence “in a large and
metaphorical sense including dependence of one being on another”.552 An evolutionary
approach to war emphasises variations and diversity in order to comprehend its rapidly and
dynamically changing character. Both biological evolution and war display selection pressures
and features that point as much towards co-operation as competition. The resulting synergy
employs information and displays innovation. The obvious similarities do not mean that we can
equate war and biological evolution in a direct fashion. They do share certain general properties,
which allow for a careful application of the same scientific language. Consequently, we applied
evolutionary biology to war as a “specific scientific method but without its specific meanings.”
The metaphor is well suited to approach war both at macro and micro levels, especially in tracing
and explaining change. It helps us assume that evolution equals war, mutation stands for
achieving an effect, species for armed forces, and genes for soldiers.553 Thus war is a struggle in
which on occasion the correct route is discovered, but often it is not, and more often only
partially. Friction of war as outlined by Clausewitz emphasises a constant trial and error process,
which plays an important role in the final outcome. There is no straight genetic line in evolution,
and also war is full with ramifications and divergences. It requires continuous adaptation, which
549  Ovington, C. O.: War and Evolution, The Westminster Review, April 1900, p. 414; Vayda, Andrew P.:
Warfare in Ecological Perspective, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Volume 5, 1974, pp.
183-193.
550  Drapeau, Mark D./Hurley, Peyton C./Armstrong Robert E.: So Many Zebras, So Little Time: Ecological
Models and Counterinsurgency Operations, Defense Horizons, Number 62, February 2008, pp. 1-8
(quotation. p. 7).
551  Loeb, J.: Biology and War, Science, Volume 45, Issue 1152, 1917, pp. 73-76; Mitman, Gregg: The
Biology of Peace, Biology and Philosophy, Number 12, 1997, p. 260; Vergata, Antonello la: Evolution
and War, 1871-1918, Nuncius, Volume 9, Number 1, 1994, p. 145.
552  Quoted in Bailey, L. H.: War and Biology, The Journal of Heredity, Volume 6, Number 2, 1915, p. 54.
553  Modelski, George/Poznanski, Kazimierz: Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences, International
Studies Quarterly, Issue 40, 1996, pp. 315-319 (quotation p. 316).
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comes as a result of changing environmental conditions and the unexpected moves of the
enemy.554
554  Cole, Leon J.: Biological Philosophy and the War, The Scientific Monthly, Volume 8, Issue 3, 1919, pp.
247-253.
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Part Three – Applying the Theory
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14 Strategy Development
“Don’t establish the boundaries first the squares, triangles, boxes of
preconceived possibility, and then pour life into them, trimming off left-
over edges, ending potential: let centers proliferate from self-justifying
motions!"
A. R. Ammons
14.1 Evolution and War
The preceding chapters helped us comprehend war as complex optimisation problem in an
evolutionary framework. This however, requires a shift from mechanics to biology. An
evolutionary framework emphasises dynamics over statics, time-prone over time-free reality,
probabilities and chance over determinism, and variation and diversity over uniformity. The
effect-genotype is the foundation for this analogy as biological evolution and war share
similarities. Although they cannot be equated with each other, in an evolutionary framework, war
can be seen as a transforming large-scale system for which biology is uniquely appropriate to
trace and explain its bewildering attributes. In other words, “men and animals successful in the
struggle succeed because they happen to be best suited to their surrounding conditions, whether
those conditions are simple or complex, high or low.”555 In this chapter we explore the
consequences of this organic approach in terms of strategy development.
14.1.1 Strategic Mix of Evolution
The effects landscape has far reaching consequences on strategy development. Earlier we
demonstrated that in order to improve fitness there are two generic mechanisms such as
adaptive walk representing efficiency and random jumps representing effectiveness. Both refer
to effects and indicate that effects can basically be achieved through two different, but
interrelated ways. Due to dynamically changing circumstances war demands the application of
both processes in parallel. Consequently, we have to mix them not only to gain, but also to
maintain high fitness. Whereas efficiency means climbing and proceeds through adjacent
neighbourhoods, effectiveness stands for exploring neighbourhoods sampled far away. Due to
the dynamic surface of the effects landscape the exclusion of one process at the expense of the
other can easily result in disadvantages negating the prospect for victory. The mechanism
applied must always correlate with the characteristics of the surface. We detailed that early in
the process the landscape appears to be uncorrelated and displays a surface that mostly denies
the advantages of climbing. In order to escape the correlation structure and avoid being trapped
on poor local optima, we must jump until a good peak is found and the process of climbing can
555  Modelski/Poznanski, pp. 315-319; Andreski, Evolution and War, Science Journal, January 1971, pp. 89-
92; Quotation in Ovington, C. O.: War and Evolution, The Westminster Review, April 1900, p. 414; For
technology-based approach see Armstrong, Robert E./Warner, Jerry B.: Biology and the Battlefield,
Defense Horizons, Number 25, March 2005.
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start. In other words, we must generate feedback that can be harvested. Thus first we must act
or do something then we should identify and select what works, and finally retain only those
actions that appear desirable.556 Only then does an optimisation conducted along some selected
dimensions aimed at improving efficiency make sense. However, as we approach the peak
further climbing becomes increasingly unattractive since the potential benefit we can gain yields
less and less in terms of fitness. Sooner or later we are forced to jump again until another
suitable and exploitable peak is discovered.
14.1.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness
We demonstrated earlier that much of war is non-linear and as depicted in Figure 18 achieving
effects always comes as a combination of effectiveness and efficiency. In terms of war efficiency
means an emphasis on comprehensiveness and not dynamism. Here every move can be
planned in advance and in detail.
Figure 18: Adaptation in terms of efficiency and effectiveness
Flexibility is sacrificed in order to achieve certain predefined objectives or desired effects that
make our actions focused, streamlined and unified. This is the domain that makes an exclusive
top-down deductive approach attempting to link the strategic and tactical levels of war by means
of direct causality possible. Unfortunately, in a constantly changing environment optimisation
focusing on narrowing options often does not make sense. In this case we are better off if we
seek exploitable opportunities and are always ready to change and adjust. Instead of relying
exclusively on adaptive walks we must also have the courage to jump right across the landscape
to find good peaks. This way we do not attempt to impose order, but take disorder as inevitable
in war and assume that it also affects the enemy. Consequently, there is a great reliance on
bottom-up initiatives based on local information, which is in sharp contrast to the traditional
mechanical and deductive approach to strategy development. The two processes can be
described by two principles as follows:
556  Mintzberg, H./Ahlstrand, B./Lampel, J.: Strategy Safari, A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic
Management, The Free Press, 1998, p. 198.
Physical
Psychological
Destruction Influence
EFFECTIVENESS (jumps)
Exploring peaks; peak as becoming effective; doing right
things; environment changes dynamically; high degree of
uncertainty
EFFICIENCY (walks)
Climbing peaks; peak as
maximum efficiency;
doing things right;
environment changes
slowly; high degree of
certainty
(Systemic)
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· Maximum principle – is an approach that allows for reductionism and stands for efficiency. It
assumes that peaks can be defined and solutions come as a result of engineering activities.
Optimisation and the drive for perfection make sense since it is possible to focus on single
dimensions in order to make things better. Planning and execution are the best means to
achieve desired effects.
· Minimum principle – is an approach that attempts to exploit the power of metaphors and
stands for effectiveness. It indicates that peaks have to be found first in order to achieve
useful or good enough effects. Solutions mostly come as a result of a messy trial-and-error
mechanism. Not control, but coping is possible, which emphasise satisfying and acceptance.
Here the focus is on relationships and the way they develop over time and space as a result
of adaptation and learning.
14.1.3 Clausewitz and Strategic Thinking
Armed forces put unilateral emphasis on the maximum principle as they mostly employ a one-
dimensional strategy. They see strategy in terms of an adaptive walk despite the fact that this
process only reveals narrowing options. Armed forces traditionally attempt to realise predefined
objectives at every stage and at every level of war. In order to understand this preference we
must first look at the meaning of the term strategy that is defined in normal English as follows:
· The rather general version describes it as the science and art of employing political,
economic, psychological, and military resources in order to achieve maximum support to
adopted policies.
· The more particular and military oriented version describes strategy as the science and art
of military command in order to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous
circumstances.557
For Clausewitz strategy meant nothing more than “the use of an engagement for the purpose of
the war”.558 He lived in an age in which the aim of war equalled with a clearly expressed political
purpose. However, this rational causal construct with a clear and concise subdivision of military
means to political ends did not hinder Clausewitz to emphasise that in strategy “everything [had]
to be guessed at and presumed”.559 For him, strategy meant a unifying structure to the entire
military activity that decided on the time, place and forces of the enemy with which the battle had
to be fought. Consequently, its importance came as a result of “numerous possibilities, each of
which [would] have a different effect on the outcome of the engagement.”560 The sheer number
of possibilities explains why he equated strategy with surprise and argued that “no human
characteristic appears so suited to the task of directing and inspiring strategy as the gift of
cunning.”561 Although Clausewitz regarded the political aim the ultimate goal of war, he equally
argued that the multitude of conditions and considerations prohibits its realisation through a
single act. As a result, the political end must be decomposed into military means of different
557  Gove, p. 2256; Brodie, Bernard: Strategy As Science, World Politics, Volume 1, Number 4, 1949, pp.
475-478.
558  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 207.
559  Quotation in ibid., p. 211.
560  Quotation in ibid., p. 228.
561  Ibid., pp. 238-239 (quotation p. 238).
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importance and purpose. This instrumental focus explains his conviction that “only great tactical
successes [could] lead to great strategic ones” and his claim that in strategy “there [was] no such
thing as victory”.562 Political results on the strategic level could only come from victories fought
on the military tactical level. The more the politics on the strategic level is able to exploit military
victories gained on the tactical level, the greater the success. This was the very reason for him to
claim that in strategy “the significance of an engagement is what really matters”.563
14.1.4 Modern Attributes, Post-Modern Challenges
Despite all the merits and contribution of Clausewitz to the theory of war, in terms of the effects
landscape his efficiency-oriented approach to strategy development appears to be too narrow.
Being a theorist of the Second Wave he regarded politics as the supreme reason which tamed
and canalised the conduct of war. However, his strong influence on Western military thinking
resulted that the common understanding of strategy locked in as a link between military means
and political ends, or in a more generalised version between cause and its effect. Thus strategy
stands for a scheme for making one to produce the other. Consequently, strategy is understood
as a plan that expresses clear cause-and-effect relationships for using available military means
in order to achieve certain political ends. It provides a rationale for those actions that help realise
political goals. Strategy is seen as a rational or planning activity relating means to ends in a
focused and rigid manner despite the fact that in most cases strategy might change in case new
means become available or different ends appear to be preferable.564 We demonstrated that
non-linearity stands for the brake-down of ends/means rationality. As an example, in asymmetric
warfare and complex contingencies, which are inherently non-linear phenomena, both the
formulation of political goals and the application of military means are influenced by the interplay
of so many factors that an approach based on rational planning has limited utility. In these cases
strategy does not resemble similarity with an elegant forced march, but appears as a messy and
painful trial-and-error process in the form of muddling through. The effects landscape also
indicates a dynamic process in which military means and political ends of the participants
become confused. The result is that the means employed and the ends achieved cannot always
be delineated sufficiently. The constantly changing surface of the effects landscape best
addresses the increasing complexity of the Third Wave and the challenges posed by various
irregular forces such as globally networked terrorist organisations not possessing traditional
boundaries. In an attempt to address the consequences of the effects landscape in terms of
strategy development, the following chapters first detail the current military understanding of
strategy and then introduce a more organic approach that takes emergent and self-organising
attributes better into account.565
562  Ibid., pp. 242, 247, 268-271, 434-462 (quotations pp. 270, 434).
563  Ibid., pp 617-638 (quotation p. 617).
564  Betts, Richard K.: Is Strategy an Illusion?, International Security, Fall 2000, pp. 5-6; Builder, Carl H.:
The Masks of War, American Military Styles and Strategy and Analysis, Rand Corporation Research
Study, The John Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 47-52.
565  Mintzberg, Henry/McHugh, Alexandra: Strategy Formation in an Adhocracy, Administrative Science
Quarterly, 30, 1985, pp. 160-162.
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14.2 Strategy as Planned Phenomenon
Despite the non-linear character of war the traditional military approach to strategy development
can best be described as an engineering phenomenon. It is seen as rigid model that rests on
ends-means calculation in which we attempt to synchronise between ends sought and means
applied. A clear definition of ends is followed by a proper organisation of available means for
which objectives are set, options narrowed and choices made. Thus strategy is appraised in
terms of ends rather than means and assumes deliberate, rational and goal-attaining entities.
Goals are articulated as objectives and come as a result of a general consensus. They are
assumed to be ultimate, identified, well-defined and sufficiently few to make them both
manageable and measurable. The focus is on how well those specific and established objectives
are achieved at every level of military operations.566 Objectives-based planning emphasises a
calculated relationship between ends, ways, and means in which ends represent the objectives
sought, means the available resources and ways the concepts that attempt to organise and apply
resources in a skilful way. As Clausewitz stated “the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and the
destruction of his fighting forces the means.”567
MeansWaysEndsStrategy ++=
Ends are equivalent to military objectives, ways to military strategic concepts and means to
military resources. Strategy focuses on ways in order to employ means to achieve ends. It is a
plan of actions in a synchronized and integrated framework that helps achieve various objectives
on theatre, national, and/or multinational levels.568 This framework indicates the military as a self-
sufficient system that contains the necessary means both to determine and attain objectives.
Planning is seen as a balancing act between the two and supported by the following
assumptions:
· The enemy opposition is often regarded as something that falls outside the system. It is
seen as an environmental peculiarity that can be overcome. The enemy is simply not
allowed to affect clear reasoning, drawing up and pursuit of objectives. War is often
subdivided into various headings such as strategy, operations and tactics, and often
competence in one area does not mean competence in the other. The military is seen as a
rational machine in which decisions are governed by prediction and control.
· High degree of stability and calm is required in order to provide a basis for the rational
patterns of orders as the total body of available information is analysed and reduced. War is
566  Feld, M. D.: Information and Authority: The Structure of Military Organization, American Sociological
Review, Volume XXIV, 1959, p. 15; Beinhocker (1999b), p. 53; Robbins, Stephen P.: Organisation
Theory: Structure, Design, And Application, Prentice-Hall International Editions, 1987, pp. 31-32; Pirnie,
Bruce/Gardiner, Sam B.: An Objectives-Based Approach to Military Campaign Analysis, RAND MR656-
JS, 1996, p. 3.
567  Clausewitz, pp. 637, 697 (quotation p. 637).
568  Dorff, Robert H.: A Primer in Strategy Development, p. 11, and Lykke, Arthur F.: Toward an
Understanding of Military Strategy, pp. 179-180, both in: Cerami, Joseph R./Holcomb, James F. (eds.):
U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, U.S. Army War College, 2001, Internet, accessed 08. 03.
2005, available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps11754/00354.pdf; Department of Defense: Joint
Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 30
November 2004), p. 509, Internet, accessed 16. 03. 2005, available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
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a series of discrete actions in which events come in a visible and serial sequence. Strict
military discipline makes it possible that “nothing occurring in the course of its execution
should in any way affect the determination to carry it out.”569
14.2.1 Promoting Inflexibility
The fundamental design of this approach contains neatly delineated steps with objectives placed
at the front end and operational plans at the rear. The process of planning starts normally with
setting objectives as quantified goals, followed by the audit stage in which a set of predictions
about the future is made. Predictions delineate alternative states for upcoming situations, which
are also extended by various checklists. In the subsequent evaluation stage the underlying
assumption is that similar to firms that make money by managing money, armed forces can
make war by managing war. Several possible strategies are outlined and evaluated in order to
select one. The following operationalisation stage gives rise to a whole set of different
hierarchies, levels and time perspectives. The overall result is a vertical set of plans containing
objectives, allocation of resources, diverse sub-strategies and various action programs. The last
stage of scheduling is equivalent to the establishment of a programmed timetable in which
objectives drive evaluation in a highly formal way as everything is decomposed into distinct and
specified elements. The basic assumption is that once the objectives are assembled strategy as
an end-product will result. This approach rests on decomposition and formalisation in which
strategy development often resembles similarity with mechanical programming.570 However, due
to its linear design this approach can also promote inflexibility through clear directions since it
attempts to impose stability. Although everything is built around existing categories emphasising
a planned, structured and formalised process, it contains two possible pitfalls:
· Predictability – the first is that it presupposes a predictable course of events and an
environment that can be stabilised and controlled. Although even in war it becomes possible
to predict certain repetitive patterns, forecasting any sort of discontinuity is practically
impossible. Thus a quick reaction outside the formalised design is often better than the
extrapolation of current trends and hoping for the best.
· Formalisation – the second concerns the formalised process that often detaches thinking
from action, strategy from tactics, and formulation from implementation. Formalisation
requires hard data in the form of quantifiable measures that are often late, thin, and
aggregated. Strategy development is seen as a semi-exact science in which courses of
actions are put into dry numbers. Although such an approach might once have had an
advantage when conducting large-scale military operations, it equally can give room for
“strategising and artistic expressions by talented generals.”571
569  Warden, John A. (Col.): The Air Campaign, Planning for Combat, Pergamon-Brassey’s International
Defense Publishers, 1989, pp. 1-6; Wylie, Joseph C.: Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power
Control, Naval Institute Press, 1967, pp. 24, 84; Feld, pp. 16-21 (quotation p. 21).
570  Mintzberg et. al. (1998), pp. 48-63; Mintzberg, Henry: The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Prentice
Hall, 1994, pp. 49-67; Mintzberg, Henry: The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic Premises of
Strategic Management, Strategic Management Journal, Volume 11, 1990, pp. 175-180; Cleland, David
I.: Project Management, Strategic Design and Implementation, TAB Professional and Reference Books,
1990, pp. 21-36.
571  Mintzberg et. al. (1998), pp. 64-77; Mintzberg, 1994, pp. 257-267; Robbins (1987), pp. 32-33;
Beinhocker (1999a), p. 96; Smalter, Donald J./Ruggles, Rudy L.: Six Business Lessons from The
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In traditional terms strategy is defined by attributes such as “clarity of objective, explicitness of
evaluation, a high degree of comprehensiveness of overview, and […] quantification of values for
mathematical analysis.”572 These characteristics have been further reinforced by the influx of
various scientific tools in the form of operations research techniques that attempt to blend the
relative predictability of advanced military technology, modern mathematics and rapid data
processing tools. Although such techniques make it possible to estimate the probability of hitting
a target with a certain confidence, their power soon erodes when facing problems that cannot be
easily translated into quantifiable formulas. Undoubtedly, aggregating military activities into
measurable data is technically possible, but the subsequent re-aggregation of analytic results is
often unsatisfactory even for the analysts themselves. Consequently, it is at odds with the more
complex and constantly changing attributes of the effects landscape.573
14.2.2 Objectives-Based Planning
Objectives can best be described as “clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards
which every military operation should be directed.”574 The essence of objectives-based planning
is that higher-level objectives are decomposed into specific tasks and activities down to the
lowest possible level. Thus objectives, tasks and actions are linked hierarchically from top to
bottom and across the width and breadth of operations. Clausewitz emphasised that “[n]o one
starts a war … without being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve … and how he intends
to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.”575 Objectives-
based planning relies on the process of identifying objectives, analysing various courses of
actions, and ends with a plan. Activities become linked around common elements, and
theoretically everybody can see his or her contribution to the overall effort. Obsolete activities
can be filtered out and eliminated, activities and resources elaborated based on substitution and
scarcity.576 Forces are tasked to achieve objectives, which constitute the backbone against
which campaigns are planned, executed and assessed. It is a Clausewitzian construct in which
“series of secondary objectives … serve as means to the attainment of the ultimate goal”.577
Objectives flow from top to down as follows:
· National security objectives form the basis for applying national power in order to secure
national goals and interest.
· National military objectives guide the application of military power in various regions of the
world.
Pentagon, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1966, pp. 69-74; Mintzberg (1990), pp. 191-193;
Quotation in Daven (2004).
572  Quotation in Lindblom, Charles E.: The Science of “Muddling Through”, Public Administration Review,
Spring 1959, p. 80.
573  Millett, Allan R./Murray, Williamson: Lessons of War, The National Institute, Winter 1988/89, p. 84;
Farjoun, pp. 562-563; Mankins, Michael C./Steele, Richard: Stop Making Plans; Start Making Decisions,
Harvard Business Review, January 2006, pp. 76-80.
574  Quotation in Joint Publication 1-02, p. 308.
575  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 700.
576  Kent, Glenn A.: Concepts of Operations: A More Coherent Framework for Defense Planning, RAND N-
2026-AF, 1983; Smalter/Ruggles, p. 64; McCrabb (2003), pp. 30-34; McCrabb (2002a), pp. 6-7;
Department of Defense (2001), p. 381
577  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 228.
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· Campaign objectives on a regional operational level guide the successful prosecution of
military campaigns.
· Military campaigns are again decomposed into operational objectives in order to position
and deploy forces.
· Operational tasks and functions serve to achieve operational objectives.578
Strategy has the basic purpose of linking these levels in a coherent and clear framework since
achieving a supported objective is partly a statement of supporting objectives. The result is that
objectives cascade downwards as strategy at one level becomes objective at a level below. This
hierarchy defines the weight of effort among objectives over time at one level needed to attain a
higher level objective in any given situation. Strategy links the hierarchy of objectives and
provides the framework for achieving them. At each level objectives and strategies are
accompanied by a set of processes and actions defined by various criteria and constraints. This
sort of strategy development places a premium on mass information since the execution requires
that those involved have access to all relevant aspects. Unfortunately, we demonstrated earlier
that due to the frictional, chaotic and complex reality of war information is mostly inaccurate,
untimely and incomplete with key pieces missing or hard facts lacking.579 Objectives were well
suited to the traditional levels of modern wars fought during the Second Wave. National security
objectives and national military objectives are on the strategic level, expressed in political-
military terms and serve as a framework for the conduct of campaigns and major operations on
the operational level. Tactical level battles and engagements are fought in order to achieve
higher level objectives. Thus objectives at each level are linked to a source or actor within the
hierarchy. They proceed from the general towards the particular in a deductive fashion until
those actions that help attain higher level objectives are identified. This hierarchical design puts
emphasis on vertical relationships despite the fact that some aspects may be well understood
and quantifiable, but some more remain uncertain. The broad assumption is that lower-level
objectives help attain objectives on a higher level as the output from one objective serves as
input for others.580
14.2.3 Objectives-Based Confusion
Although objectives-based planning presupposes that objectives are defined in a clean and
coherent way, there is always a risk that the hierarchical order breaks down. The complexity of
the challenges in the Third Wave can also result that we might increasingly witness situations in
which national military objectives are not articulated in a sufficiently clear and concise way. This
hinders the proper articulation of campaign objectives, which again cannot contribute to coherent
operational objectives. The result is that the entire process shifts towards hedging against the
worst case, and ends up with completely inappropriate options. A good example for confusion of
this kind was the bombing campaign during Operation Allied Force in which the final campaign
plan, with its phased and incremental nature, left the planners mostly confused regarding the
578  Thaler, David E./Shlapak, David A.: Perspectives on Theater Air Campaign Planning, RAND MR-515-
AF, 1995, pp. 5-7; Kent, Glenn A./Simons, William E.: A Framework for Enhancing Operational
Capabilities, RAND R-4043-AF, 1991, pp. 10-15.
579  Thaler/Shlapak, pp. 8-12.
580  Pirnie/Gardiner, pp. 3-20.
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effect their actions should have on the enemy. Joint Publications 1-02 defines strategy as the
“art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized
and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives”.581
Unfortunately, fighting irregular forces such as terrorist organisations means the involvement into
asymmetric conflicts. It will be increasingly difficult to identify useful and coherent objectives that
can guide military actions as often what appears to be desired might change under
reconsideration. Although an adequate intelligence support infrastructure is a prerequisite for
selecting an appropriate strategy, the feedback loop required for planning, execution and
assessment can easily break down. The result is that accurate information does not flow rapidly
with consequences ranging from superfluous repetition of actions to dangerous negligence.582
Despite the supposed neat and streamlined design of objectives it is most likely that in the Third
Wave the absence of clear guidance from higher echelons in the form of objectives will
increasingly become the rule not the exception. More often, those who should define objectives
will be in great need and may demand to get objectives suggested from below. This may pose a
crucial challenge in cases in which national- and theatre-level objectives are not well defined or
there is no clear causal relationship between military options and desired political results. Due to
the complexity involved, the relationship between military means and political ends can either be
subject to uncertainties or poorly understood.583 The situation decision-makers might face can
become so highly variable and change so rapidly that the entire hierarchical design gets out of
balance, and we should never expect definite and well-understood inputs to objectives. The
assumed clear policy guidance in the form of objectives can often be ambiguous as various
fields may overlap or become contradictory. Furthermore, policy makers often will have to juggle
numerous values simultaneously without always making their rank order clear. Consequently,
even with this well structured, engineering-oriented, semi-scientific approach, it becomes
impossible to express and describe objectives with the required detail. Another problem is that
objectives expressed on the highest level tend to be increasingly abstract. Although they often
rely on direct and clear causality, their relevance soon erodes as we move down the
hierarchy.584 As a precaution often menus of objectives are suggested to provide a certain
baseline for times when the expected guidance from above is either insufficient or unclear.
Instead of thinking in a single and rigid plan it is believed that a spectrum of plans forming a pool
of various strategic concepts can provide for useful strategies in the case the situation changes,
or fails to proceed as assumed originally. However, in terms of the effects landscape that
displays war as a complex optimisation problem it is very questionable whether it becomes ever
possible to establish a sufficient pool of flexible and non-committal objectives that can cover the
vast array of emerging possibilities.585
581  Polumbo, Harry D. (Col.): Effects-based Air Campaign Planning: The Diplomatic Way to solve Air
Power’s Role in the 21st Century, Air War College, Air University, Air Force Academy, April 2000, pp. 6-
24; Quotation in Joint Publication 1-02, p. 383.
582  Thaler/Shaplak, pp. 15-22; Lindblom, p. 86.
583  Pascale, p. 88; Lindblom, pp. 82-83.
584  Thaler/Shaplak, pp. 37-41; Pirnie/Gardiner, pp. 21, 79-83; Pascale (1999), p. 91, Betts, p. 13; Richards,
Diana: Is Strategic Decision Making Chaotic?, Behavioral Science, Volume 35, 1990, pp. 222-224, 232.
585  Wylie, p. 84-85.
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14.2.4 Empirical Testing – Objectives and Kosovo
A good example for practical problems coming from unforeseeable events and confusion can be
found in the way NATO’s Kosovo Force was deployed in 1999. Despite heavy bombings and the
assumption that advancing troops would find demoralised Yugoslav troops, the reality turned out
to be different. Yugoslav troops withdrew from the province in a disciplined manner verifying the
fact that even if n possible scenarios can be identified, the actual would always be an n+1 that
could not be forseen. Although the original mission was to enforce peace and deter the renewal
of hostilities, as time passed the mandate emerged more into the civilian sphere and became
essentially vague. Despite all efforts prior to the deployment intelligence gathering was poor and
soldiers entering Kosovo faced a largely unknown situation. As General Sir Mike Jackson, then
commander of Allied Rapid Reaction Corps concluded, in the end the campaign in Kosovo was
lucky to be a success as potential enemies largely complied and took no particular actions to
upset the plans. Thus he did not feel the need to refer to any sort of excellence in terms of
planning and execution. Clear and concise instructions regarding the UÇK were mostly lacking,
oral instructions were unclear and not confirmed in writing. Especially in the beginning, local
commanders were forced to defuse the situation on a learning-by-doing basis in ad hoc
arrangements in the field. Regarding other aspects of the mission KFOR soldiers were also left
mostly in the dark as to how law enforcement had to be addressed. Thus they had to fill a
vacuum and often had no idea of how to do it. Only five weeks after the first troops entered
Kosovo, was General Jackson able to formulate at least his intent in broad terms to guide
commanders down to company level and to achieve some sort of unity in KFOR’s effort. Unlike
the certainties of the Second Wave in general, and the Cold War in particular, it appears that in
the Third Wave we will have to learn to embrace rather than eliminate uncertainty.586 In other
words, first we have to jump quite a few times until a suitable peak can be identified. This
however, means also that assumptions regarding Boyd’s famous observe-orient-decide-act loop
are at least partly flawed. An act-observe-orient-decide loop, which first generates options in the
form of feedback, might be much closer to reality.
14.2.5 Objectives and the Effects Landscape
As detailed earlier, strategy development based on objectives can best be described as a
maximising approach since it attempts to control everything that may happen on the effects
landscape. Despite the discrepancy between the relative rigidity and linear character, and the
increasing complexity of situations found in operations world-wide, the temptation to stick to this
approach is as strong as ever. This fact also explains why the concept of effects-based
operations is often understood as a planning methodology that emphasises the explicit linking of
strategic-level objectives with strategic-level effects in order to achieve objectives in a more
coherent and streamlined fashion. Thus effects-based operations are understood more as an aid
that adds to the power of the objectives-based approach instead of seeing the concept as an
opportunity to find new approaches to strategy development.587 The biggest shortcoming of the
586  Brocades Zaalberg, Thijs W.: Soldiers and Civil Power, Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in
Modern Peace Operations, Amsterdam University Press, 2006, pp. 289-340.
587  Ho How Hoang, Joshua (Lt. Col.): Effects-Based Operations Equals to “Shock And Awe”?, Journal of
the Singapore Armed Forces, Volume 30, Number 2, 2004, Internet, accessed 30. 08. 2004, available at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2004/Vol30_2/7.htm; McCrabb (2001), p. 35; NATO
Strategic Commanders: Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge, MC 324/1, as of 12. 01. 2003, p. 15,
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objectives-based approach is its limited ability to adapt, which is discouraged as much by the
articulation of objectives as by the separation between formulation and implementation. Despite
the claim of being flexible, its very essence is to realise specific objectives as the focus is on
realizing rather than adapting them. Focusing on objectives is quantitative since it mostly deals
with static states and not the transitions between possible states. It is a step-wise and
incremental approach that proceeds hierarchically through the various levels of war, despite the
fact that such links can become weak or even disappear as events unfold. The effects landscape
indicates a dynamic and constantly changing co-evolutionary process, in which events are also
influenced by what common wisdom would term external circumstances or luck. It is often
mentioned that a comprehensive understanding of objectives is needed, which requires that
commanders must look at both above and below their respective levels.588 However, such
demand can easily put commanders under increased pressure and lower overall performance.
Objectives-based planning attempts to see the end from the beginning and by going into ever
finer detail it reflects linear causality. Unfortunately, war seen as a complex adaptive system
indicates that much of the continuum is non-linear and messy. Thus the effects landscape has
serious consequences for such an approach:
· Objectives-based planning claims to identify single peaks and the path leading to those
peaks despite the fact that the surface changes dynamically and in an unpredictable way.
· By going step-wise through the tactical, operational and strategic levels, objectives-based
planning suggests that objectives simply add together and war can be seen as a sum, and
not the product of many factors.
· Instead of creating options and opening up new possibilities by discovering niches,
objectives-based planning shuts down or at least limits the chance of exploiting emergent
opportunities.
· In sum, objectives-based planning means that we “pursue relatively singular strategies and
thus occupy only one spot on the landscape”, but do not employ any mechanism that
provides for protection “when the landscape unexpectedly changes”.589
14.2.6 Further Considerations
Clausewitz’s contribution to strategic thinking is unquestionable. However, his goal-seeking
approach excludes a whole range of other aspects such as logistic, social and technological
issues, which must be considered as equally important in military operations. This focus should
not come as a surprise since he believed that every human activity is a rational undertaking and
governed by reason. This also explains why he understood strategy as an objective-oriented,
goal-seeking phenomenon.590 This sort of strategy dominated most of the 20th century and is still
Internet, accessed 17. 01. 2005, available at http://www.dmkn.de/1779/ruestung.nsf/cc/WORR-
66SFNQ.
588  Mintzberg/Waters J. A.: Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent, Strategic Management Journal,
Volume 6, 1985, pp. 261, 270; Pirnie/Gardiner, pp. 79-83; Senglaub, Michael: Course of Action Analysis
within an Effects-Based Operational Context, Sandia Report, Sand2001-3497, November 2001, pp. 7-8,
Internet, accessed 23. 09. 2004, available at www.infoserve.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access.control.pl/
2001/013497.pdf; Chakravarthy, Bala: A New Strategy Framework for Coping with Turbulence, MIT
Sloan Management Review, Winter 1997, p. 77; Lykke (2001), p. 184.
589  Quotations in Beinhocker (1999a), pp. 100, 102.
590  Howard, Michael: The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1979, p. 975;
Millett/Murray, p. 84; Ehrenreich, p. 7.
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dominant today. However, the unpredictability of war indicates clear problems with this sort of
strategy image as follows:
· Gambling – despite the neat and clean logic behind, planned strategies often resemble
gambling. Although they rely on planning and careful evaluation of numerous factors, it is
impossible to predict in advance which risk is more reasonable in selecting a particular
course of action. Thus there will always be a certain error in the estimation regarding what
we know and what we expect.
· Contingency – the inherent contingency of war limits the ability to control causes sufficiently
well in order to produce desired effects. Friction, chaos and complexity always include the
probability of failure since they provide only for an insufficient basis for any estimates
regarding odds. Strategic calculation is by definition vague, which also limits the possibility
of causing intended effects.
· Personality – the personal character of decision-makers often distorts strategy. Thus power
is as much applied for manifest political purposes as for subliminal personal ones, which can
heavily influence the link between military means and political ends.
· Cognition – strategic decisions always go through non-logical filters such as bias and
prejudice. Thought processes are influenced by cognitive constraints, which limit the
decision-maker’s ability to see or calculate linkages between causes and effects in a
comprehensive way. Conscious calculations can often be non-rational as we tend to see
what we expect to see.
· Communication – strategies, especially coercive ones aimed at influencing will depend
mainly on communication. However, due to cultural blinders the receiver often cannot hear
the message sent by the signaller. Logical strategic calculations only have reference within
their own cultural context.
· Friction – as detailed earlier normal operational friction can significantly influence the way
plans are executed and decouple assumed causes from expected effects as coercive
signals that depend on coupling often collapse.
· Deflection – through deflection the process of implementing stated political goals can often
be influenced, even resisted, by established organisational routines. Habits and interests
can distort the way means are applied with the result that stated goals and objectives
become closer to parochial priorities that reflect organisational stability rather than larger
political aims.
· Sequence – strategy has the purpose of shaping the courses of action that suit policy.
Unfortunately, the enemy does not co-operate, but opposes any neat and clean execution of
plans. Thus the proper sequence of causes and effects is usually disturbed or reversed and
does not unfold according to expectations.
· Constraints – opposing preferences also constrain options since they require compromise,
which is useful politically, but can be harmful militarily. Political compromises can result in
military half-measures that serve no strategic objectives. Such options can be acceptable to
all, but ideal for none since not doing or over-doing is often better than doing something in-
between.591
591  Betts, pp. 8-40, 43-44.
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14.2.7 Continuum of War Revisited
It became clear above that in most cases attempts to realise objectives can become an illusion,
although sometimes they might work and under fortuitous circumstances they might even work
quite well. As depicted in Figure 19, despite all efforts to plan and conduct carefully designed
operations focusing on influence and control, the continuum of war does not exclude blunt one-
sided conventional attrition campaigns. In other words, brute-force campaigns involving impunity
of the stronger can often be equally effective.
Figure 19: Elements of unpredictability in war
Asymmetric warfare, complex contingencies, irregular combat fought in urban areas or on
difficult terrain always constrain the ability to find and target the enemy and can turn war into a
very hard and frustrating process. In such warfare the enemy raids, evades, subverts,
submerges and withdraws which both confuses carefully selected objectives and desired effects
thus negating planned strategies. In a complex environment involving a multitude of players and
motives strategic wisdom can be more important than any formalisation, which makes strategic
success very costly and in some cases impossible. The most difficult and painful aspect of
confronting an enemy has traditionally been learning, adapting and embedding the lessons
learned into the collective memory of the armed forces. Learning on the battlefield is a nasty
business that does not provide for a clear and distinct picture. In the case we stick to the fact that
a complex adaptive system stands for polarities to manage rather than problems to solve we
must revise the meaning of strategy. Thus strategy development must rest not only on traditional
constructs such as plan, implement, and pursue, but also on constructs that emphasise the
impact of changing battlefield conditions. Unpredictability of war indicates that the character of
the enemy, the threat and the environment constantly change in a difficult-to-comprehend and
complex way as the continuum of war displays both linear and non-linear attributes.592
Consequently, we do not claim that there is no need for deliberate planning in strategy anymore,
but emphasise that it is equally important to take emergence and self-organisation much more
into account as even the most sophisticated models cannot predict the reality with all its
592  Millett/Murray, pp. 85-93; Grant, Robert M.: Strategic Planning in a Turbulent Environment: Evidence
from the Oil Majors, Strategic Management Journal, Volume 24, 2003, p. 506.
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variables. In other words, an approach that emphasises exclusively the realisation of clear goals
stated in the form of desired effects and demands to “assess … strengths and weaknesses, plan
systematically on schedule, and make the resulting strategies explicit are at best overly general
guide-lines, at worst demonstrably misleading precepts to organizations that face a confusing
reality.”593
14.3 Strategy as Emergent Phenomenon
In planned top-down strategies objectives have the function to avoid confusion by reducing
possible internal tensions as they make things focused, streamlined and quantifiable. However,
one important consequence of the effects landscape is that due to the constantly changing
surface it is difficulty to see the end from the beginning. The result is the “unpalatable fact that no
one can predict the long-term … environment with any accuracy.”594 The effects landscape
indicates that it is impossible to see the shape the future will take as there is not one
predetermined future, but many possible. Although in traditional terms strategy relies mostly on
linear cause-and-effect relationships, if the dynamics of the effects landscape blur temporal and
spatial dimensions, such an approach is simply inappropriate. An evolutionary approach to
strategy development stands for creativity, constant change, evolving situations and limitations
regarding comprehension, prediction and control. Conditions found in the effects landscape do
not provide for safe havens or free lunch and any strategy that rests on prediction and planning
is marginally helpful at best and downright dangerous at worst. Dynamic interactions cannot be
engineered and controlled in a mechanistic way. Much depends on chance as possibilities
always emerge and form a broad spectrum, with the result that narrow predictions indicate an
entirely wrong mind-set for a phenomenon that is inherently unpredictable.595 The effects
landscape does not stand for certainties, but reminds us that there are only possibilities in the
form of options. Consequently, any strategy aimed at harnessing emergence and self-
organisation must refocus from prediction and rationality. The various events and activities that
influence and determine the course of actions require a different approach.596 We are forced to
create or track emerging opportunities that can be exploited rather than attempting to realise
objectives of a predefined and analytically elaborated plan. An evolutionary approach to strategy
development demands qualities such as flexibility, robustness, learning, and adaptation.
Although they do not help reducing uncertainty, but help exploit the constantly shifting
opportunities it contains.
593  Quotation in Mintzberg, Henry: Patterns in Strategy Formation, Management Science, Volume 24,
Number 9, May 1978, p. 948.
594  Quotation in Williamson, Peter J.: Strategy as Options on the Future, MIT Sloan Management Review,
Spring 1999, p. 118.
595  Pascale, pp. 84-90; Courtney, Hugh/Kirkland Jane/Vigueri, Patrick: Strategy Under Uncertainty, Harvard
Business Review, November-December 1997, pp. 66-69; Beinhocker (1999a), p. 96.
596  Macintosh, Robert/Maclean Donald: Conditioned Emergence: A Dissipative Structures Approach to
Transformation, Strategic Management Journal, pp. 298-290; Moncrieff, J.: Is Strategy Making a
Difference?, Long Range Planning, Volume 32, Number 2, 1999, pp. 273-276.
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14.3.1 Flexibility and Robustness in Evolution
With the effects landscape we can also address the various revolutions that have taken place in
the field of military affairs, technological developments and information processing capabilities all
blurring traditional strategic boundaries.597 In the case of asymmetric and complex challenges
the three traditional levels of war can often merge into a single integrated universe in which
actions at the lowest level cause dramatic changes that ripple upward simultaneously. Although
the effects landscape denies prediction, it appreciates the power of evolution that calls for
strategies, which are more robust and adaptive than a traditional strategy with a narrow focus.
From a traditional point of view these strategies may not be optimal in every scenario, but they
can survive under a wide array of changing circumstances and always keep options open over
time. In order to minimise irreversible commitments they refocus from certainty, efficiency and
co-ordination, but offer flexibility and a higher probability of overall success. Bottom-up emergent
strategies are powerful enough to account for the uncertainty of the effects landscape and the
probability of different potential outcomes. Emergent strategies indicate that selection pressures
internally can better address external selection pressures that come from an ever-changing
environment. Robust emergent strategies acknowledge that nothing is just out there as  a
separate entity, but is created through a constant co-evolution. Emergence indicates open
strategic options and the possibility of various paths that can better contribute to a rapid change
of directions as events unfold.598 We detailed earlier that in a complex adaptive system causes
and effects are separated in time and space. Focusing on objectives and desired effects means
putting on blinders as we normally look either for the most immediate or the most obvious cause.
We have to expect many hidden trigger points that are responsible for the extremely fluid and
haphazard conditions, which so often turn confusion into the very essence of war.599 Robust and
emergent strategies can better address problems in which threats are diffuse, uncertain and
unpredictable, and make it increasingly impossible to “skilfully formulate, coordinate, and apply
ends, ways, and means”.600 The effects landscape indicates a profound difficulty in foreseeing
the course of events since in dynamic and non-linear settings effects do not always directly
follow causes. A creative and evolving enemy capable of initiating conditions that are far from
equilibrium also defies assumptions regarding clear causality. Dealing with emergent strategies
can cause internal tensions that seem to be inefficient as the simultaneous pursuit of
contradictory paths runs counter to a traditional understanding. However, they can leverage core
skills and assets by creating various options, possibilities and choices. The effects landscape
reminds us that it is better to accept conditions of unpredictability and constant change in which
strategy is not an exclusive mechanical downstream business, but something that can also
emerge. Emergent strategies never assume that a particular input produces a particular output,
but indicate probabilistic occurrences within the domain of focus.601 Strategy in traditional terms
597  Chakravarthy, p. 69; Quinn, James Brian: Strategy, Science and Management, MIT Sloan Management
Review, Summer 2002, p. 96.
598  Quinn, pp. 96-105; Dent, p. 13; Williamson, p. 118; Luehrman, Timothy A.: Strategy as Portfolio of Real
Options, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1998, pp. 90-91, 95-96.
599  Geus, Arie P. de: Planning and Learning, At Shell planning means changing minds, not making plans,
Harvard Business Review, March-April 1988, p. 74; Warden (1989), pp. 1-6; Feld, pp. 16-18.
600  Beinhocker (1999b), pp. 49-55; Chilcoat, Richard A.: Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century
Leader, in Cerami/Holcomb (2001), p. 203-208 (quotation p. 207).
601  Pascale (1999), pp. 84-88, 90, 94.
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relies on the assumption that the enemy is known and rational. However, the continuum of war is
full of corrections where the pursuit of objectives on a once-and-for-all basis is mostly impossible
and success often comes as a result of actions that respond to changing circumstances.
Emergence requires constant adjustments especially in the case of incomplete and changing
information. It also indicates that in a dynamic and ever-changing environment such as war a
bottom-up inductive approach can often be more helpful than the pursuit of a top-down master
plan.602 The structural analysis earlier demonstrated that effects always interact in a dynamic
web of relationships and show all sorts of different and intricate behaviour. Their interactions and
couplings often result in conflicting constraints that defy the logical rigor behind assumed cause-
and-effect relationships. Although emergent strategies are of little help in predicting the future,
they can be a valuable aid in promoting insights into how to become a good evolver. Traditional
strategies require clear statements in the form of objectives. The frictional, chaotic and complex
reality of war stands for a variety of possible futures in which objectives and desired effects,
however clearly and concisely stated, can perform badly. Emergent strategies often conflict and
are intrinsically difficult to manage, but the greater the uncertainty, the greater their potential and
real value. They do not presuppose the identification of the most or least likely outcome, but
cover a broad array of possibilities as they evolve over time with some succeeding and some
failing. Thinking about war in terms of a complex adaptive system indicates that victory is less
the result of a sustained competitive advantage, but more of a continuous development of
learning and adaptation aimed at exploiting temporary advantages. The emphasis is on keeping
things that work in order to maintain sufficient variation based on innovation and novelty.603
14.3.2 Evolution as Learning and Adaptation
Evolution is full of adjustments that come as a result of learning and adaptation. Both the
interactions with the enemy and environmental changes influence strategic options by forcing a
certain pattern onto the stream of actions. In other words, the frictional, complex and chaotic
nature of war brings any strategy closer to a compromise position. Environmental factors neither
pre-empt all choice nor offer unlimited choice. They just limit what the belligerents can do, and
with learning and adaptation we acknowledge that messages from the environment cannot be
blocked out. Evolution means searching for viable patterns or consistency in order to increase
flexibility and responsiveness. Learning and adaptation are especially important if the
environment is either too unstable or complex to fully comprehend, or too imposing to buck
against. They enable us to respond to an evolving reality properly without focusing on a stable
and planned fiction. The various combinations of couplings and interactions demonstrated that
effects cannot always be assessed a priori. Consequently, they must be discovered empirically
through actions that test where the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses are. Emergence and
self-organisation surrender control to those who have actual and detailed information to shape
realistic strategies. As learning and adaptation indicate, it is often more important to respond to
an unfolding and ever-changing environment than realise detailed, but inappropriate plans.604 In
602  Wildavsky, Aaron: If Planning is Everything, Maybe it’s Nothing, Policy Science, Volume 4, 1973, p. 134;
Wall, Stephen J./Wall, Shannon R.: The New Strategists, Creating Leaders at All Levels, The  Free
Press, 1995, pp. 4-19.
603  Beinhocker (1997), pp. 27-36.
604  Mintzberg/Waters (1985), pp. 268-272; Luehrman, p. 89.
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a complex adaptive system such as war, significant strategic redirections can often originate in
little actions and decisions often initiated by “the foot soldier on the firing line, closest to the
action.”605 Learning and adaptation mean that various levels interact and mutually adjust in order
to reach consensus. Emergent strategies can arise everywhere. As time passes and interactions
with the enemy evolve, some strategies may proliferate often without being recognized or
consciously managed as such. Learning and adaptation indicate that strategy development is
driven more by external forces and internal needs, than the conscious thoughts of the actors.
Emergent strategies break with the traditional understanding of strategy that often relies on the
separation of planners and executants.606 Learning and adaptation stand for the fact that it is
sometimes better to let patterns emerge than impose an artificial consistency prematurely by
stating highest level objectives and desired effects, and decomposing them into lower level
actions and tasks. Those who are in constant touch with the enemy develop their own patterns
that can lead to strategy either spontaneously or gradually over time. In a dynamic and changing
environment it is not always possible to predict where strategies emerge or plan for them. They
often just pop out as the various patterns proliferate and influence the behaviour at large. Thus
strategy is often less the result of a conscious and formal process, but more of collective actions
that simply spread through. As they evolve through experiments new directions can be
established and exploited, which indicate that it is important to have a climate within which a
wide variety of strategies can grow and contribute to a good balance between internal variation
and external demand.607
14.3.3 Learning from Passchendaele
The effects landscape requires responsibility for engendering change and opening up new
possibilities. Rapid and continuous responsiveness coupled to a minimum of organizational
momentum emphasises a myopic and disorderly process. Similar to the frictional, chaotic and
complex reality of war, learning and adaptation indicate that brilliance often does not come from
foresight expressed in a carefully designed plan. War as a complex adaptive system requires the
capacity and willingness to learn and adapt, which mostly come from qualities such as tolerance
and commitment.608 Learning and adaptation stand for trial-and-error and indicate that it is often
more important to learn from failures than from success. Although failures are often costly and
the temptation to bury and forget is traditionally large, some of the costs can be recouped and a
thorough reflection can help hidden shortcomings to surface. Thus it is often better to make a
sufficiently good decision in time than to make an excellent decision later, as it is often better to
fire more shots than to start improving one’s aim.609 Murky battlefield lessons must be put into
accurate and perceptive after-action reports in which reporting is consistently honest and the
bearer of bad news is not punished. Individuals should be afforded the freedom to fail as only
605  Quotation in Mintzberg, Henry: Crafting Strategy, Harvard Business Review, July-August 1987, pp. 70-
71.
606  Mintzberg et al. (1998), pp. 177-198; Feld, p. 20.
607  Mintzberg, H.: Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organisations, The Free Press,
1989, pp. 213-216; Mintzberg et al. (1998), pp. 196-197.
608  Mintzberg/McHugh, pp. 191-196.
609  McGill, Michael E./Slocum, John W.: The Smarter Organisation, How to Build a Business that Learns
and Adapts to Marketplace Needs, John Wiley & Sons, 1994, pp. 74, 79-81; Kanter, p. 81.
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through failure is it possible to experience success. We have to strive for a constant
improvement even if everything appears to be well at first sight. As an example Passchendaele
was a disaster in World War I because of the “combined effect of the [commander’s] tendency to
deceive himself; his tendency, therefore, to encourage his subordinates to deceive him; and their
loyal’ tendency to tell a superior what was likely to coincide with his desires.”610 Structural inertia
often prohibits detecting novel ways that might have the power to replace existing routines,
systems and procedures. Emergent strategies assume that those closest to the frontlines know
more than the remotely located headquarters, since traditionally “staff information eludes
comprehension because it is esoteric; line information because it is trivial.”611 Learning and
adaptation mean looking outside our own boundaries of knowledge. Mobilising this knowledge
through various forms of interaction is important since it must be ensured that relevant
knowledge finds its way to the unit that needs it most.612 Emergent strategy development might
on occasion equal with the conduct of random experiments. However, it always requires the
readiness to be exposed to the evolving interactions with the enemy and the willingness to learn
from him. An evolutionary approach to strategy development emphasises less rationality and
more common sense. It indicates strategic wisdom, which comes less as a result of a formalised
intellectual knowledge backed by analytically written reports full with abstracted facts and
figures, but stands for personal knowledge that comes from an intimate sensing of the situation.
Emergent strategies reflect that the frictional, chaotic and complex reality of war forces us to
accept surprise and situations of no choice. Thus learning and adaptation mean linking the
present with the future through experience, rather than linking the past with the future through
analysis.613
14.4 War as Organic Strategic Ecosystem
According to traditional understanding strategy is regarded as cerebral and formal: therefore
decomposable into distinct steps and checklists. Objectives emphasise a focused vision, which
is mostly elitist and harnesses only a small proportion of the organization’s creative potential.
Evolutionary strategies emphasise emergence in the form of learning and adaptation, which
require peripheral vision in order to detect and take advantage of unfolding opportunities. They
indicate that it is insufficient to “preconceive specific strategies, but also to recognize their
emergence elsewhere … and intervene when appropriate.”614 Conceptualising war in the
framework of the proposed Organic Strategic Ecosystem requires that we take both options
equally into account. By applying the two sorts of strategy development in parallel, we can best
exploit war’s unpredictable mechanism. Harmonising internal diversity and external demand
610  Quotation in Liddel Hart, Basil H.: Through the Fog of War, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1938, p. 346;
Mankins/Steele call this the business-unit effect, see p. 78.
611  Quotation in Feld, p. 18.
612  Hamel, Gary: Strategy as Revolution, Harvard Business Review, July-August 1996, p. 75; Lampel,
Joseph: Towards the Learning Organization, in: Mintzberg et al. (1998), pp. 214-215; Millett/Murray p.
89.
613  Mintzberg, H.: Reply to Michael Goold, California Management Review, Volume 38, Number 4, Summer
1996, pp. 96-97; Mintzberg (1987), p. 74.
614  Mintzberg, Henry/Lampel, Joseph: Reflecting on the Strategy Process, MIT Sloan Management Review,
Spring 1999, p. 22; Mintzberg (1987), pp. 74-75 (quotation p. 75); Hamel, p. 70.
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means that we can both strive towards perfection as indicated by efficiency, and find attractive
opportunities for which effectiveness stands for. Whereas the former presupposes unity of
perspective and diversity of purpose, as the planners are assumed to be at the top of the
organisation and the executants down below, the latter emphasises diversity of perspective and
unity of purpose by acknowledging that strategists can also be found deep in the organisation.
Organic Strategic Ecosystem indicates that influential and important ideas useful for strategy
development are distributed widely, reaching even to the peripheries where soldiers are forced
to tackle with fewer resources and information, and exposed to factors that often defy ideas
coming from the top. In a dynamic and constantly changing environment it is impossible to
predict the very places in which useful ideas form; therefore the net must be cast as wide as
possible. From a bottom-up perspective the organisation also tends to appear in the form of core
competencies rather than a collection of various units and other elements. Integrating both top-
down and bottom-up characteristics into strategy development means establishing something
like planned emergence or emergent planning. These contradictory terms emphasise strategy
development both as a bottom-up and as a top-down process. Whereas the former enables
subordinates to exhibit autonomy and flexibility, the latter secures a certain degree of
compliance throughout the organisation in order to avoid fragmentation of resources. In contrast
to the traditional exclusive focus, this way it becomes possible that voices are heard and options
explored since lack of diversity can lead to dogmas requiring little more than compliance.615 This
synthesis broadens both our understanding and provides information regarding constraints in
terms of causality. Seeing strategy development as a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up
process can help rule out unnecessary factors and define how they complement or constrain one
another in space and time. It does not mean that we exclude the possibility to achieve
psychological effects. It rather indicates that waging war always requires that based on the
context, we focus as much on destroying the enemy as influencing him. Although this
conceptualisation of effects-based operations is less ambitious, it better takes the frictional,
chaotic, and complex reality of war into account.616 In order to detail the consequences of the
Organic Strategic Ecosystem in terms of strategy development and to be in accordance with the
structural analysis detailed earlier, we introduce three new approaches such as strategy as
mission, strategy as rules and strategy as patches. They move away from focusing on
predefined and static end-states aimed at synchronizing all activities of military forces towards
ideas in which diverse elements of an endeavour collaborate simultaneously. The three
approaches help us cope with dynamic, uncertain, and high-risk environments in which neither
prediction nor planning is fully possible. Thus they are best suited to situations in which
traditional approaches cannot cover all cases as we face situations that are complex and not
controllable. As depicted in Figure 20, the more we venture into non-linearity the more we have
to expect emergence and self-organisation. Consequently, the more flexibility is required.
Whereas the first of the three approaches can be seen as the most known and is familiar for
615  Hamel, pp. 76-80; Goold, Michael: Research Notes and Communications Design, Learning and
Planning: A Further Observation on the Design School Debate, Strategic Management Journal, p. 170;
Chakravarthy, p. 80; Grant (2003), pp. 512-515; Wildavsky, pp. 143-144; Wall/Wall, pp. 63-80; Kanter,
Rosabeth Moss: Strategy as Improvisional Theater, MIT Sloan Management Review, Winter 2002, pp.
76-81.
616  Plutynski, Anya: Explanatory Unification and the Early Synthesis, British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, Volume 56, 2005, pp. 605-607.
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many, the two others can be described as rather novel and thought-provoking. In fashionable
terms the first stands for an attempt to self-synchronise, the second for an attempt to de-
synchronise, and the last for an attempt to a-synchronise. All three approaches suggest that in
case we face uncertainty we should not pull the reins to take more control.
Figure 20: The four various approaches to strategy development
Increased complexity means fragmented information and often the best thing we can do is to let
things develop. Thus self-synchronisation, de-synchronisation and a-synchronisation stand for
fragmented directions, relinquished control and a multitude of possible options. Only this way is it
possible to access information and build up a foundation from which we can exploit emergence.
Although the approaches rely on different mechanisms, all emphasise the need to make choices
based on always limited information, to stop analysing and start acting even in the case of
uncertainty, and to learn and adapt that comes from a constant trial and error process. Strategy
understood this way makes it possible to become flexible and fluid “able to move one way while
responding to local stimuli and changing direction in response to new information from the
environment.”617 In other words, Organic Strategic Ecosystem puts emphasis on people who are
able to think as much in terms of how as in terms of what.
14.4.1 Strategy as Mission
The simplest way of finding the winning edge means that our strategy combines the higher
rhythm generally found at lower levels, with the lower rhythm generally found at higher level
resulting in a vertical and horizontal harmony within the organisation. This self-organisation
indicates that general or larger efforts on the highest level become synchronised with particular
activities conducted at lower levels. Empowerment in the form of responsibility and commitment
throughout the organisation makes it possible to achieve a rhythm that does not pull the
organisation apart, resulting in chaos or turns it into a rigid monolith. Freedom of action and
617  Grove, A. S.: Navigating Strategic Inflection Points, Business Strategic Review, Volume 8, Number 3,
1997, p. 11-14; Markides (1999), p. 61, Markides, Costas: Best Practice, Strategy in Turbulent Times,
Internet, accessed 16. 11. 2006, available at www.tiberius.ro/enter/BestPractice/4BestPractice.pdf
(quotation ibid.).
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freedom of execution successfully combine subordinate initiative with superior intent. Whereas
the superior’s intent guides as it describes broadly the what, the subordinates’ actions realise the
intent as best as possible since they stand for the how. Consequently, effectiveness expressed
by what and efficiency expressed by how overlap and result in synergy. The process is similar to
the notion of evolution since it uses the mechanisms of long jumps and adaptive walks in
parallel. Whereas the superior’s intent describes the region in broad terms, the subordinates’
actions aim at finding both path and peak within the region. In case the subordinates discover
high peaks within the region, the inherently flexible relationship throughout all levels allows for a
quick readjustment. Self-synchronisation also means that orders are not orders in a linear,
classical and rigid way. The subordinates have the right to question the feasibility of the mission
if they feel that the superior’s ideas are not in accordance with the existing situation or no
adequate resources are available. However, after an agreement is reached on what should be
achieved the superior has every right to expect the mission to be carried out. This way it
becomes possible to minimise a loss of cohesion in the overall effort. Coupling bottom-up
initiative with top-down intent enables military organisations to adapt to changing
circumstances.618 Strategy as mission reminds us that strategy development must capitalise
both on elements of deliberate planning, and learning and adaptation. Strategy development
comes as the result of a dialectic process “generating both disorder and order that emerges as a
changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a changing and expanding
universe of observed reality.”619 This dialectic process enables the organisation to dwell
successfully at the edge of chaos facing no clear boundaries, a predictable opponent or a future
for which it can plan.
14.4.2 Strategy as Rules
As the situation becomes increasingly non-linear we must further lessen our approach to
strategy development in terms of ends/means rationality. Only this way will it become possible to
gain an even higher level of flexibility. Earlier we mentioned that the Third Wave stands for
complex challenges and asymmetric warfare. In such warfare the emphasis is on simplicity,
organisation and proper timing. In other words, nothing is more important than moving quickly,
taking advantage of emerging opportunities and rapidly cutting losses.620 Asymmetric warfare is
extremely fluid in which a simple focus aimed at increasing flexibility is more useful than any
overly detailed and difficult-to-revise plan. Although uncertainty is associated with lack of
prediction, it also means abundance of opportunities that can be captured, exploited, or dropped
should they fail to develop accordingly. Increased flexibility comes from a few critical strategic
processes guided by a handful of rules that can define directions without confining them. They
delineate only a few parameters within which we try to keep pace with the flow of opportunities.
Simple rules enable us to screen and exploit opportunities and allocate resources to areas in
618  Boyd (1986), pp. 66-79.
619  Mintzberg (1987), pp. 69-70; Mintzberg/Waters, pp. 271-272; Quotation in Boyd, John: Destruction and
Creation, September 3, 1976, Internet, accessed 22. 03. 2005, available at www.belisarius.com/
modern_business_strategy/boyd/destruction/destruction_and_creation.htm.
620  Wylie, pp. 57-64.
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which they are the richest.621 Strategy as rules indicates that similar to guerrillas the organisation
itself is the strategy as it follows the velocity of emerging, colliding, splitting and declining
opportunities. The emphasis points towards mobility, modularity and scale as displayed for
example by a Chinese folk rhyme drawn up by Mao and Zhu: “[When the] enemy advances, we
withdraw, [When the] enemy rests, we harass, [When the] enemy tires, we attack, [When the]
enemy withdraws, we pursue”.622 A strategy based on simple rules addresses best the nature of
asymmetric warfare, which cannot easily be explained by traditional notions since “any form of
unstructured raiding qualifies”.623 Simple rules stand for constantly evolving strategies that are
normally considered unattractive in traditional terms. However, in a dynamic and continuously
changing environment a strategy based on simple rules can better seize unanticipated and
fleeting opportunities should circumstances change. They not only provide for a just sufficient
structure, but can also better capture and exploit the best regions in the space of possibilities.
Simple rules help us define processes, boundaries, priorities, timing and exit should efforts fail to
succeed:
· Process-rules – describe the way key features are executed in order to keep everything
sufficiently organised to seize emerging of opportunities.
· Boundary-rules – help define which opportunities are within or outside our focus. A quick
check of such rules helps sort through emerging opportunities as within the boundaries
everything that looks promising can be pursued.
· Priority-rules – help rank the opportunities accepted in order to allocate precious resources.
They help us profit from nascent and highly attractive niches.
· Timing-rules – set the rhythm of key processes and help become synchronised with the best
opportunities in order to move quickly towards new ones should they emerge.
· Exit-rules – make possible to scan emerging, converging or more promising niches and help
us pull out from opportunities should they fade.624
Strategy as simple rules does not indicate that objectives are useless, but in a constantly
changing environment learning from experience often makes more sense than pursuing
predefined objectives that are either inappropriate or cannot be met. Simple rules often grow out
of experience and mistakes. They might often exist already in some implicit form until they
become explicit, and extend into stated objectives and desired effects. Although simple rules can
provide for flexibility, we should never forget that in a dynamic and constantly changing
environment such as war, it is impossible to predict how long an advantage lasts.625 Due to the
frictional, chaotic and complex reality of war it is very difficult to deliver timely, concise and
appropriate objectives that can address the continuum of events. Unlike objectives, rules do not
focus on static states, but by going better with the flow of events they can help find opportunities
621  Brown/Eisenhardt, pp. 32-33; Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.: Has Strategy Changed? MIT Sloan
Management Review, Winter 2002, pp. 89-91; Grant, Robert M.: Contemporary Strategy Analysis,
Concepts, Techniques, Applications, Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 516-518.
622  Quotation in Hammes, p. 46.
623  Luttwak, pp. 152-157 (quotation p. 152).
624  Eisenhardt, Kathleen M./Sull, Donald N.: Strategy as Simple Rules, Harvard Business Review, January
2001, pp.107-112.
625  Katheleen/Sull, pp. 112-115; Mintzberg, 1989, pp. 25-42.
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more effectively. It is commonplace to state that military operations are often conducted under
circumstances in which the amount of available information can become zero. However, even in
such cases commanders must provide guidance to subordinates. For this reason three simple
rules are often proposed such as “capture the high ground, stay in touch and keep moving”.626
14.4.3 Strategy as Patches
Organic Strategic Ecosystem depicts war as a hard, conflict-laden task in which many factors
interact as the result of internal and external constraints. In the case the amount of constraints is
extremely high we face a very rugged landscape that does not allow for finding good peaks. In
such landscapes new opportunities can always open up, sometimes converge, occasionally
explode or just fade away. Consequently, the match between strategic directions and emerging
opportunities constantly falls out of alignment. Finding the optimal solution in the form of desired
effects is very difficult as there are many possible optima in the space of possibilities. However,
we learned that conflicting evolutionary strategies are both distinct and modular since they can
stand either alone or constantly re-map onto evolving opportunities.627 Under such
circumstances strategy development resembles similarities with patches in a quilt in which the
quilt equates with the effects landscape as a whole, and the patches represent various regions.
Whereas in the traditional top-down approach strategy is defined by the entire quilt, emergence
indicates optimisation first within the patches themselves. Although patches do not overlap,
across their boundaries there are couplings in the form of epistatic interactions. Due to the
underlying dynamism any selfish optimisation deforms the surface of other regions. A good
solution in one patch might help solve problems in some of the adjacent patches. By means of
constant learning and adjustments the patches can eventually gain the right size and settle down
exactly on the winning edge poised in the transition between the two extremes, order and chaos.
Thinking in terms of patches reminds us that whereas a single focused and carefully planned
top-down strategy freezes into rigid and poor compromise solutions, an exclusively bottom-up
emergent strategy churns chaotically.628 Despite the errors made during the process of selfish
optimisation, finding the optimum patch size equals finding the right strategic direction. Finding
the right effects and exploiting them comes as a result of mutual and constant adjustments.
Aggregate patchwork strategies seem to be valuable for two reasons. They make it possible to
achieve good compromise solutions under conflicting constraints, and also help track moving
peaks very well should the environment change quickly.629
14.4.4 Importance of Means
Organic Strategic Ecosystem indicates that success in war comes as a result of a phase
transition in which we do not settle into a stable equilibrium or fall entirely apart. Victory in war
requires a mix of strategies that are rigid enough to organise change, but not too rigid to prevent
626  Quotation in Snowden, p. 19.
627  Brown, Shona L./Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.: Competing on the Edge, Strategy as Structured Chaos,
Harvard Business School Press, 1998, pp. 226-231.
628  Kaufmann/Macready, pp. 26, 36-41.
629  Kaufmann, Stuart A.: Technology and Evolution, Escaping the Red Queen Effect, The McKinsey
Quarterly, Number 1, 1995b, pp. 127-129; Kaufmann, Stuart A./Lobo, José/Macready, William G.:
Optimal Search on a technology landscape, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, Volume 43,
2000, pp. 141-143, 162-164.
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change. War as a complex adaptive system indicates that often the central challenge in strategy
development is to manage change. Thus we must always be prepared to accept rapid and
unpredictable changes that require the emergence of various semi-coherent strategic directions.
Friction, chaos and complexity indicate that accepting surprise, making moves, observing the
results and continuing with the ones that seem to work are inherent features of war. There is
simply too much going on, which does not allow every move to be orchestrated from the top, but
often require uncontrolled and parallel actions. Strategy development must happen both at the
top at headquarters and below at the front lines. According to traditional measures such an
approach means short-term inefficiency based on duplication and misfit. However, addressing
the challenges posed by a complex adaptive system requires strategies that are not based
exclusively on causal assumptions. They must be built as much by top-level competence as by
empowered individuals on lower levels who rely on expanded access to local information. The
dynamic interaction with the enemy requires that we eliminate unnecessary constraints. This
way we are able to exploit to our advantage the increased uncertainty and complexity that are
normally associated with military operations.630 Success and failure often rest on the shoulders
of junior personnel down to the lowest level. By being closest to the events they have to make
the right decision at the right time without any direct supervision. This however, requires an
atmosphere that promotes agility, information sharing and peer-to-peer relationship in which
everyone is empowered to do what makes sense. Thus we need to redefine the individual, the
relationship between the individual and others, and between the individual and the organisation.
This way it becomes possible to successfully allocate responsibilities and resources. The
particularity of time, place and the task, defines who takes charge since empowerment means
greater bandwidth of actions including even multi-tasking. Organisations can best take
advantage of fleeting opportunities by making the most of available resources. Although such
strategies are not optimal for accomplishing pre-defined objectives and desired effects all of the
time, they can deliver more innovative solutions to problems at hand at any given time.631
However, seeing war as an Organic Strategic Ecosystem does not mean that there is no longer
a distinction between those who lead and those who are led. Leadership will still play an
essential role, but “instead of fusing individual into a mass through the suppression of their
individuality and the contraction of their thought, the lead … only has effect, lightning effect, in
proportion to the elevation of individuality and the expansion of thought. For collective action it
suffices if the mass can be managed; collective growth is only possible through the freedom and
enlargement of individual minds. It is not the man, still less the mass, that count; but the
many.”632 Regarding cause-and-effect relationships in war “bad means deform the end, or
deflect the course thither”; therefore the only thing left possible is to acknowledge that in
630  Brown/Eisenhardt, pp. 7-15; McGill/Slocum, pp. 85-86.
631  Alberts, David S/Hayes Richard E.: Power to the Edge, Command and Control in the information Age,
CCRP Publication Series, June 2003, pp. 5-6, 175-177, 179-200, 213-222, 223-231; Krulak, Charles G.
(Gen.): The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, Marines Corps Gazette, Volume 83,
Number 1, January 1999, Internet, accessed 16. 08. 2005, available at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm; Fast, William R.: Knowledge Strategies: Balancing Ends, Ways,
and Means in the information Age, in: Neilson, Robert E. (ed.): Sun Tzu and Information Warfare, A
collection of winning papers from the Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare Competition, National
Defense University Press, 1997.
632  Quotation in Liddel Hart (1938), p. 356.
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complex situations “if we take care of the means the end will take care of itself.”633 In a similar
fashion also Helmuth von Moltke emphasised that “[i]n war it is often less important what one
does than how one does it.”634
633  Quotation in Liddel Hart (1938), p. 357.
634  Quotation in Howard, Michael: The Influence of Clausewitz, in: Clausewitz, p. 33.
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15 Command and Control Alternatives
15.1 Consequences of Evolutionary Biology
The previous chapters can be seen as a technical argument in which we used certain properties
of biological evolution to understand the internal working of a complex adaptive system. Our
conclusion was that effects-based operations conceptualised in the framework of the Organic
Strategic Ecosystem require a fundamental shift in the way we think about strategy development
and take strategic actions. This conceptualisation forces us to acknowledge that despite our best
intentions, the achieved effects do not always represent a global optimum. Problems of unclear
causality and lack of prediction cannot be solved by an allegedly better or more superior way.
Thus unpredictability together with the frictional, chaotic and complex reality of war will remain
valid factors in any kind of future military operations. Variability of performance is not a sign of
failure that can be eliminated. It is an inherent feature of co-evolution and also that of war.635
Consequently in this chapter we expand further on the biological analogy and attempt to make
certain generalisations in terms of command and control based on organic arguments.
15.1.1 Circular Causality and Cybernetics
Organic Strategic Ecosystem helps us conceptualise war as a conflict laden task in which we
always have to deal with conflicting constraints. This approach however, makes it very difficult to
strive towards predefined objectives and desired effects. War perceived as a complex adaptive
system indicates that deductive thinking aimed at detecting clear causality only narrows options
and does not address attributes such as emergence and self-organisation. Consequently, we
extended the traditional top-down approach to strategy development in order to address those
bottom-up possibilities that come as the result of a continuous co-evolution with the enemy. For
this reason we proposed three additional approaches to strategy development. Strategy as
mission, strategy as rules, and strategy as patches indicate a self-organising and emergent
process that requires constant top-down and bottom-up adjustments. Thus Organic Strategic
Ecosystem as framework for conceptualising war not only profoundly influences the way strategy
should be approached, but implies further consequences in terms of command and control, and
regarding the meaning of military effectiveness. The principle of control has a strong mechanical
connotation and assumes tight coupling among the constituents. Control means that the
manipulation of one of the constituents in all its freedoms makes it possible to influence all other
constituents indirectly. Unfortunately, the structural analysis showed that in a complex adaptive
system there are both tight and loose couplings. Attempts to find out precisely the way feedback
routes are often difficult if not impossible, since any feedback loop can result in endless
combinations. Effects have a dual nature and can act as causes to further effects, which indicate
that the information contained can occasionally cross its own path. However, if something can be
seen both as a cause and an effect, rationality is up for grabs and we face a paradox. This is the
very reason why complex adaptive systems can produce occasionally counterintuitive behaviour.
635  Macready, WilliamG./Meyer, Christopher: Adaptive Operations, Creating Business Processes That
Evolve, in.: Clippinger III., John H.: The Biology of Business, Decoding the Natural Laws of Enterprise,
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999, pp. 186-187.
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Although such systems behave over a long period of time dependably and reasonably, in a
sudden they can equally show all sorts of surprising and unexpected effects. Very simple causes
on the bottom can produce extremely complex effects at the top. We detailed earlier that the
traditional military approach equates waging war with managing war despite the fact that we
have little to say on most relationships in terms of causality. The frictional, chaotic and complex
reality of war points towards emergence and indicates that war has its own dynamic, and often
does what it wants. In other words, when facing complex adaptive systems we often assume
more oversight than we really have and more than we ever will have, regardless the
technological achievements.636 In war we have to expect non-intuitive traits in which effects can
become disproportional to causes since a small variation in inputs can produce a huge variation
in outputs. Unfortunately, as soon as we have to deal with feedback little can be deduced about
its character merely by studying it. The effects landscape can be seen as a generic model of war
that attempts to visualise massive and simultaneous interactions of various constituents. The
model also addresses the intricacy of causal relationships since anything that registers input and
generates output is interpreted as input by a neighbour. Evolution seen through the processes of
effectiveness and efficiency indicates that we need to develop the ability to adjust internal links
so that they fit external demands over time. Thus biological evolution and war are nothing more
than a set of complex and dynamic interactions. The analogy between them makes it also
possible to identify the hierarchy of codes most complex adaptive systems possess. The first is
the general drive for survival, the second is to achieve maximal flexibility, and the third is to
identify useful strategies.637 However, in the case of war we suggest a fourth code, which is
finding useful command and control practices to make strategies work.
15.1.2 Command as Force Multiplier
It is undeniable that superior command, which properly takes the frictional, chaotic and complex
reality of war into account, serves as force multiplier. It is equally true that technology can
enhance command performance, but successful command does not come as a direct result of
advanced technology.638 Commanders through all waves have exercised various sorts of
command practices in an attempt to address the difficulty posed by spatial and temporal
limitations. In a simple version such limitations allow for two possibilities: commanding all of the
troops part of the time, or commanding part of the troops all oft the time. Another difficulty of
commanding comes from the problem of information dissemination. As the chain of command
grows longer, its value suffers both from the number of stages and from standardisation
attempts. The result is that information can often be so profiled that it borders on
meaninglessness. Heaving these two extremes and the problem of information, successful
commanders have realised that it is always possible to defeat the enemy, but never uncertainty.
They knew that the greater the uncertainty the better it is to avoid tight control over subordinates.
Instead of trying to control war’s frictional, chaotic and complex reality they accepted
unpredictability as inevitable and tried to make the best out of the situation. For this reason the
636  Kelly, Kevin: Out of Control, The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilisation, Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1994, pp. 121-127, 324-330.
637  Ibid., pp. 389-403.
638  Wallace, William S. (Lt. Gen.): Network Enabled Battle-Command, Military Review, May-June 2005, pp.
2-5; Whitehead, Stuart A. (Col.): Battle Command, Toppling the Tower of Babel, Military Review,
September-October 2005, pp. 22-25.
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battle of Jena fought in 1806 can serve as a good example. Although Napoleon achieved one of
his biggest victories he “had known nothing about the main action that took place on that day;
had forgotten all about two of his corps; did not issue orders to a third, and possibly to a fourth;
was taken by surprise by the action of a fifth; and, to cap it all, had one of his principal
subordinates display the kind of disobedience that would have brought a lesser mortal before a
firing squad.”639 It appears that Napoleon, one of the biggest commanders of all time was not
only able to tolerate a high degree of uncertainty and still exploit the situation, but also his
subordinates were willing to accept responsibility and self-initiative. A complex adaptive system
such as war requires a large safety margin in order to ensure that mistakes do not accumulate
and develop into disasters. Similar to the trial-and-error mechanism of biological evolution,
waging war equals making blunders and learning from them as best as possible. Emergence
and self-organisation not only mean that planning should often not go further than the first
encounter with the enemy, but indicate that the amount of information needed to act at any given
level be reduced to a minimum.640
15.1.3 Handling Uncertainty
Whatever the command practices employed humans have always attempted to address the
pervasive temporal and spatial uncertainty of war and the problem of insufficient information.
Thus we propose to distinguish between four possibilities that come as a result of the
combination of spatial and temporal factors and indicate the possibilities of commanding all of
the forces all of the time, all of the forces some of the time, some of the forces all of the time,
and some of the forces some of the time. The four possibilities are command-by-direction,
command-by-plan, command-by-influence and command-by-evolution. The first three
possibilities can be described as follows:
· Command-by-direction – most commanders found that despite being positioned on a
vantage point from where they directed the battle, spatial limitations often rendered them to
observers rather than commanders. In order to offset this limitation they occasionally
attached themselves to that particular element of their forces, which they assumed to be
decisive. In the case the situation was favourable they also moved from one unit to the
other. Although they prioritised uncertainty depending on the unfolding dynamics of war,
they commanded only some of their forces some of the time.
· Command-by-plan – stands for comprehensiveness and an attempt to plan everything in
advance and as detailed as possible. It is a highly centralised approach that emphasises
rules and procedures. Predefined plans guide actions that both promote inflexibility and
address only the strategic/operational levels of war. Commanders focus on certain enemy
centres of gravity in order to achieve victory. This approach attempts to centralise and
structure uncertainty in a top-down deductive hierarchy aimed at exploiting causality.
However, this approach has also limitations since it makes it possible to command all of the
forces only some of the time, mostly before the engagement with the enemy.
· Command-by-influence – means that only the outline and the minimum goals are stated in
advance. This approach distributes uncertainty in order to influence subordinates behaviour,
but not control events. Instead of a detailed and difficult to revise plan the commander’s
639  Creveld, Martin van: Command in War, Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 4, 56, 75, (quotation p. 96)
640  Ibid., pp. 121, 145-146.
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intent serves as a general guidance and assumes lower-level initiative exploiting local
knowledge. The approach relaxes decision thresholds and promotes semi-autonomous
actions down to the lowest level. However, despite its flexibility this sort of command tackles
uncertainty only at the tactical level. It allows for adjustments downwards to changing
battlefield conditions, but does not promote change upwards, which is so essential in a
continuous co-evolutionary process. Consequently, this approach has also limitations since
it allows only to command some of the forces all of the time.641
We can see that the three approaches do not cover the full spectrum of command possibilities
and can be regarded as variants of a top-down, one-way methodology. The biggest difference
among them lies in the way higher-level interference is relaxed in terms of lower-level actions.
Although we can see a gradual change towards flexibility both regarding the superior’s
requirements and the subordinates’ actions, none of them promotes mutual learning and
constant adaptation. Oddly, even command-by-influence, which can be seen as the most flexible
among them allows learning from the enemy rather than from the subordinate. Based on insights
coming from the Organic Strategic Ecosystem we suggest a fourth approach. This most organic
approach makes it possible not only to live with, but also exploit uncertainty. Evolution requires
constant learning and adaptation since in a dynamically changing environment bottom-up
information can often be more useful then top-down intent. However, before detailing the fourth
option, which is command-by-evolution it is of utmost importance to analyse evolution in terms of
command and control.
15.2 Organic Command and Control
In order to conceptualise war as a complex adaptive system we draw on an analogy found in
evolutionary biology. Any conduct of military operations that takes the frictional, chaotic and
complex reality of war into account requires that we understand the mechanism of biological
evolution. Similar to the evolution of biological species, the effects landscape indicates effects-
based operations to be a phenomenon that seethes and bubbles as a result of constantly
changing disorderly processes. In biological terms war is an open system that continuously
evolves. Assumptions regarding direct causality, linear deduction, and analytical categorisation
do not address the full band-with of possible perturbations. Consequently, we can say that “in
war … even the mediocre is quite an achievement.”642 To paraphrase Clausewitz war is
evolution by other means as it deals with living and animate human beings. He also pointed out
that we must “always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as in the
smallest.”643
15.2.1 Phrase vs. Compound Word
In the case we want to trace back the origins of the term command and control also known as
C2, we should go back as early as World War II. Although there is no clear evidence that the
641  Czervinski, Thomas J.: Command and Control at the Crossroads, in Czerwinski, pp. 213-220.
642  Schmitt, John F.: Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory in:
Alberts/Czerwinski; Quotation in Creveld (1985), p. 13.
643  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 97.
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term was already used, we can find an increased number of various expressions closely
resembling the current meaning. Over the years the term evolved in a way that now it can be
treated both as a phrase and a compound word.644 Nowadays there is an abundance of
definitions indicating that command and control is well-entrenched both in military doctrine and
vocabulary. We demonstrated earlier that despite references to complexity theory and complex
adaptive systems the way Western armed forces understand strategy development is still very
much top down, deductive, analytic and linear. This however, does not take war’s emergent and
self organising attributes into account. Unfortunately, the same is true for command and control.
As an example Joint Publications 1-02 defines C2 as “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by
a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of
the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of
the mission.”645
Figure 21: Command and control as “monologue”
According to the definition and as depicted in Figure 21, command and control is understood as
a one way process flowing exclusively from top to down. War as a complex adaptive system
stands for polarities to manage, rather than problems to solve. Thus similar to strategy
development polarity must also be included in the way we understand command and control.
Although the current unidirectional understanding can best be described as a monologue, a
close and separate examination of the two constituent words makes it possible to discern
polarity in the form of a dialogue. Approaching command and control this way enables us to
marry command-by-evolution with the proposed Organic Strategic Ecosystem.
15.2.2 From Monologue to Dialogue
The inappropriateness of a top-down understanding of command and control becomes clear if
we look at the meaning of these two terms. Although command and control can both be seen as
a phrase and a compound word, for a better analysis we suggest treating it as the latter.
644  Sproles, Noel, Dr.: Dissecting Command and Control with Occam’s Razor or Ask not what “Command”
and “Control” means to you but what you mean by “Command and Control”, Australian Defence Force
Journal, No. 155, July-August 2002, pp. 19-26.
645  Quotation in Joint Publication 1-02, p. 101, For figure see Schmitt.
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Whereas command refers to the full range of human innovation and flexibility needed to solve
unexpected and complex problems, control stands for a set of regulated procedures, which
restricts flexibility and excludes alternatives. In normal English usage command can also be
understood as the ability to readily call forth or evoke. Thus command also refers to creativity,
which is probably the most important requirement both in terms of evolution and war. Creativity
emphasises the importance of learning and adaptation that points towards emergence and self-
organisation, which we identified as the most important attributes of complex adaptive systems.
Although creativity is necessary for command, it is not sufficient in itself. It requires another
characteristic such as will, which stands for motivation and opportunity. Control indicates either
direction or restraints that emphasise proportion and appropriateness in terms of procedures,
policies and guidelines aimed at certain end-states. 646
Figure 22: Command and control as “dialogue”
Thus the two end-poles within which command and control activities take place can be defined
by the creative expression of human free will on the one hand, and various structures and
processes on the other. Having these two end-poles the main functions we can discern are as
follows:
· Command – means novel solutions to emerging problems since it provides for starting
conditions that indicate a diligent purposefulness. It is the act of expressing will creatively in
order to accomplish a mission. Command stands for creating new structures and processes
that allow for unanticipated changes to plans.
· Control – makes it possible to express human will creatively in order to manage emerging
problems and maximise the chance for a good-enough solution. It provides for the
framework in the form of structures and processes. In sum, control stands for monitoring and
in the case it is needed, adjusting existing structures and processes.647
The two end-poles suggest that similar to the three approaches to strategy development,
command and control can also be perceived as a mutually adjusting top-down and bottom-up
process. As depicted in Figure 22, command and control are not exclusive alternatives, but
fundamentally interdependent and interrelated perspectives. They stand for the fact that
646  Pigeau, Ross, Dr./McCann, Carol: Re-Conceptualising Command and Control, Canadian Military
Journal, Spring 2002, pp. 53-56.
647  Gove, pp. 455-456, 496-497.
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traditional military hierarchy emphasising a formal differentiation between superior and
subordinate can often brake down as a result of unfolding situations and changing
circumstances. We do not indicate that there is no reason to differentiate between those who
lead and those who are lead. However, successful command and control requires a mutual
adjustment in order to find the narrow edge of chaos and dwell there successfully.
15.2.3 Organic Approach Documented
It appears that MCDP 1 Warfighting catches best the essence of command-by-evolution. It
recommends an organic, evolutionary approach by emphasising the importance of implicit
communication. Mutual understanding, coupled with a minimum of key phrases, the courage to
anticipate each other’s thoughts is the most efficient way to successfully address the co-
evolutionary character of war. A constant dialogue between superior and subordinates creates
an atmosphere that enables constant learning and adaptation, and promotes the readiness and
willingness to learn throughout the ranks. Command-by-evolution means that bottom-up variety
and rapidity leads normally to confusion and disorder if it does not accord with top-down
harmony and initiative. However, it also indicates that top-down harmony and initiative without
bottom-up variety and rapidity, can often lead to rigidity and non-adaptability. Whereas unbridled
creativity can often lead to chaos, over-control can result in individual de-motivation. Simply put,
command-by-evolution means that we become able to gain quickness and security. It does not
stipulate that only commanders on the top exercise command and control functions. As
emergence and self-organisation indicate, command and control is as much a top-down as a
bottom-up process.648 In other words, every human is inherently able to express will and
capability in the service of the operation. We also have to take into account that finding the right
balance does not always mean finding the golden middle way. Dealing with a complex adaptive
system such as war indicates that the situation itself defines which side of the polarity must be
emphasised in order to address successfully the challenges that come as a result of a
continuous co-evolution with the enemy. Command-by-evolution means that we are able to find
a “correct balance between encouraging creative command and controlling command
creativity.”649 Consequently, we are able to merge structure and process with creativity and will.
Only this way becomes possible to address the roiling complexity of war and adjust successfully.
15.3 Command-by-Evolution
Any approach that emphasises centralisation on all levels can de-motivate subordinates to
exercise initiative based on changing circumstances and superiors to listen to subordinates
carefully. Another danger comes from the reliance on advanced technology that easily allows
superiors to bypass subordinates and relegate them to information administrators. Centralised
uncertainty means that independence, trust, rapidity in terms of decision-making and taking risk
deliberately into account, are suppressed. Unfortunately, these are the very factors without
which wars cannot be won. It appears that a top-down, mechanistic and linear approach
648  U.S. Marine Corps: MCDP 1 Warfighting, 20 June 1997, pp. 78-79; Boyd, John: Organic Design for
Command and Control, May 1987, p. 9, Internet, accessed 26. 05. 2005, available at www.d-n-
i.net/boyd/pdf/c&c.pdf.
649  Pigeau/McCann, pp. 56-62 (quotation p. 57).
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resembling a monologue does not take into account situations in which commanders must deal
with a thinking enemy who reacts and adapts to every move.650 In order to elaborate on
command-by-evolution in detail we approach it from three different angles approaching C2 as
confidence and competence, coping and co-evolution, and creativity and change.
15.3.1 C2 as Confidence and Competence
In general we can say that the biggest heritage of the Second Wave in terms of command and
control is twofold. The first is a formal separation between those who lead and those who are
lead, which is expressed in a strict pyramid-like hierarchical design. The second comes as a
result of the first, since it is supposed that those on the top are more important than those
serving below. However, war as a complex adaptive system requires that much of command
must be delegated to lower levels in order to detect, track and exploit emerging opportunities in a
self-organising fashion. Conceptualising effects-based operations as a search process in a
landscape assumes that we see war in terms of networks. Consequently, we must become a
network ourselves, in which the emphasis shifts towards a horizontal focus. Thus power must be
distributed in a lateral way in which each boundary, cluster, and node interacts up to the moment
at which we engage with the enemy. We mentioned that it is impossible to control complex
adaptive systems; therefore we must refocus from command and control in traditional terms and
emphasis confidence and competence. This means that both superiors and subordinates are
able to work in an autonomous and asynchronous way in which boundaries are neither fixed nor
controlled, but adapt according to the requirements. Thus consensus does not come as a result
of a top-down monologue, but as a stop-and-go process that rests on trust and confidence. Both
superiors and subordinates know that despite the errors and blunders committed, everybody
wants to achieve the right thing. Humans are willing to learn and change views in order to adapt
to constantly changing circumstances. Confidence and competence come out of collective
experience that helps exercise disaggregated and asynchronous command procedures. Thus
information can find its way to those who need it even if they do not want to know it. The effects
landscape stands for a constant change with often surprising opportunities that require rapid and
immediate actions often carried out in novel ways. Armed forces have to move from a formal and
vertical to a more informal and horizontal organisational structure in which the emphasis is on
people who tend to become better subordinates and better superiors. Only those can learn from
their mistakes who have been allowed to make them.651 Command-by-evolution takes mission
command a step further and assumes that not only subordinates have the freedom to realise the
superior’s intent, but also the superior is ready to learn and adapt his intent to the battlefield
realities that come as the result of a continuous co-evolution with the enemy. This way it will be
possible to exploit emergening opportunities nobody could have imagined in advance, but can
serve equally well or even better than those, which were planned and formulated in terms of
650  Vego, Milan N.: Operational Command and Control in the Information Age, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue
35, pp. 101-103; MacGregor, Douglas A.: Command and Control for Joint Strategic Actions, Joint Force
Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, p. 28.
651  See also Atkinson, Simon Reay/Moffat, James: The Agile Organization, From Informal Networks to
Complex Effects and Agility, CCRP Publication Series, May 2005, pp. 172-188; Storr, Jim: A Command
Philosophy for the Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of Mission Command, in: Potts, David
(ed.): The Big Issue: Command and Combat in the Information Age, Strategic and Combat Studies
Institute, February 2003, pp. 77-93.
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desired effects. This two-way process of constant adjustment means that effects are achieved in
a way that exploits both effectiveness and efficiency as the two interrelated processes of
adaptation.
15.3.2 C2 as Coping and Co-evolution
Command-by-evolution exploits uncertainty in a novel way and calls for freedom and adaptability
at all levels. It acknowledges that the frictional, chaotic and complex reality of war requires only
general statements to be stated in advance in order to start activities rather than a detailed plan.
Thus only guidelines must be laid down in order to put the system into gear. As soon as the co-
evolutionary process with the enemy gains momentum, details that cannot be anticipated
beforehand will emerge anyway. A good example for emergence and self-organisation was the
1967 Arab-Israeli war in which for the Israeli side “only the first [day] was planned in any detail;
the rest was pure improvisation.”652 Israel achieved one of its most stunning victories over its
neighbours at a cost of roughly 680 soldiers killed, 2,600 wounded and 15 more becoming
prisoners. In contrast, according to various estimates the numerically superior combined Arab
forces suffered 21,000 casualties, a further 45,000 soldiers were wounded and 6,000 became
prisoners. Confronted by a much larger coalition and facing a three-to-one imbalance of forces,
Israel managed to win within six days. A successful mix of surprise, intelligence, guile, gamble,
determination and courage backed by a maximum independence of subordinate commanders,
mutual trust and appreciation in the form of an implicit brotherhood throughout the ranks resulted
in communication and comprehension, which are so necessary for flexibility in war.653 Israeli
units were able both to self-organise and exploit emergent windows of opportunities despite the
many blunders they committed during the operations. They probably did not achieve what we
would describe as desired effects, but were able to exploit those opportunities sufficiently to be
victorious in the end of the day. Command-by-evolution is an organic concept that does not over-
emphasise the role technology plays in war. It just reminds us that whatever the level of
sophistication of the employed technology, it equally opens up and shuts down possibilities. It is
as important to exploit advantages it offers as to understand the limitations it has. The very
process of co-evolution indicates the enemy to be composed of intelligent human beings who
are always ready to exploit vulnerable niches in order to turn initial disadvantage to their favour.
Thus in terms of command-by-evolution and the Organic Strategic Ecosystems, the Western
bias that emphasises technology and disregards men stands in sharp contrast to the inherently
human character of war.
15.3.3 C2 as Creativity and Change
Conceptualising war in the framework of a complex adaptive system requires seeing command
and control in terms of polarity. Even the proposed organic approach allows for conducting
command and control functions in a traditional top-down fashion resembling a monologue. The
closer we are to the region of stability, the higher their value. However, we must equally take into
652  Creveld (1985), pp. 195-203, 231, 252 (quotation p. 200).
653  Harbaki, Yehoshafat: Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six-Day War, Orbis, Volume 11,
Number 3, Fall 1967, pp. 677-691; Gallois, Pierre: 1967: The Triumph of Vertical Warfare, Geopolitique,
Number 22, Summer 1988, pp. 17-19; Khan, Farzana: The Arab-Israeli War, Pakistan Horizon, Third
Quarter 1967, pp. 267, 273; For quick statistics see also Wikipedia: Six-Day War, Internet, accessed 07.
03. 2006, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_war.
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account that as the dynamics of war unfold the co-evolutionary process with the enemy will shift
towards the chaotic area. Consequently, command and control in traditional terms become
increasingly vacuous. Approaches attempting to prioritise, centralise or distribute uncertainty
cannot cope with all the conflicting requirements and constraints soldiers face. Thus we must
both address and take advantage of the emergent and self-organising patterns displayed by war.
The most important message of the Organic Strategic Ecosystem is that victory in war requires
the harnessing of everyone’s intelligence throughout the ranks. It is probably too far to state that
if you order a soldier to do something, you have already failed as a leader, but we must
acknowledge that people are in general, ready and willing to work well, contribute their ideas and
take responsibility. The frictional, chaotic and complex reality of war demands everyone’s
contribution to solve emerging challenges and crises. Command-by-evolution indicates that self-
managed and autonomous teams can come up with smarter solutions to problems and achieve
a higher level of adaptability. It acknowledges that the higher the risk, the more we need the
commitment and intelligence of everybody. Emergence and self-organisation means that people
often get together in order to achieve more and not less. This way they develop a shared
understanding and behaviour to take required actions. Strategies developed this way are simpler
and more localised. They require a constant search for solutions, which come as a result of
intimate and local experience that can turn into system-wide coherence.654 Although these
activities indicate that organisations are able to tolerate a high level of messiness, they can
provide for an atmosphere in which freedom and creativity are the driving forces for achieving
sufficient local solutions. As the 1967 Arab-Israeli war showed if people can develop trust for
each other they also establish an atmosphere that is more creative and forgiving. Consequently,
local responsiveness can turn into higher general adaptability and agility.
15.4 March Up-Country
The effects landscape depicts effects-based operations as a migratory process on an imaginary
landscape. Based on the interaction with the enemy, the surface always changes and poses a
serious challenge both in terms of planning and adaptation. A good example for the combined
power of emergence and self-organisation can be found in Xenophon’s book. It describes the
march of a Greek expeditionary force of roughly 11,000 men fighting its way back from Asia
Minor to Greece 2500 years ago. Similar to the effects landscape, the ancient Greeks had to find
home in a mostly unknown terrain guided only by local information that required a constant
adaptation to changing circumstances and the exploitation of emerging opportunities.
15.4.1 Heading to the Black Sea
After the death of Cyrus who hired them, the Greeks found themselves trapped in a hostile
environment. Surrounded by enemies with most of their original generals and officers seized and
killed, having no guides to show them the way, and facing unknown territory they managed to
reach the Black Sea mostly intact. According to Xenophon 8,600 men of the original 10,700
survived despite the difficulties they encountered, which means a total loss ratio of 20 percent.
Emergence and self-organisation were manifest in all of their actions. As an example in book
654  Wheatley, Margaret J.: Finding Our Way, Leadership for an Uncertain Time, Berrett-Koehler Publishers,
2005, pp. 64-74.
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three Xenophon stated in the beginning of their long march that “let us not … wait for others to
come to us and summon us to the noblest deeds, but let us take the lead ourselves and arouse
the rest to valour.”655 During their march the Greeks routinely assembled to vote on proposal of
their elected leaders, erected boards and councils to debate and discuss issues such as
organisational modifications or suitable tactics. Having a flat-enough organisational design and a
horizontal rather than a vertical structure, the superiors always marched and fought alongside
their subordinates. As Xenophon emphasised “it is right to expect that you should be superior to
the common soldiers, that you should plan for them and toil for them whenever there be
need.”656 Whereas they achieved maximum physical flexibility by burning all their superfluous
equipment before the march, their command flexibility resulted from the ability to compensate for
the want of leadership and discipline. However, what made them really lethal is expressed in the
explicit encouragement of subordinates to come up with alternatives and suggestions at any
time. Xenophon always welcomed bottom-up initiative by assuring subordinates that “if any other
plan is thought better than mine, let anyone, even though he be a private soldier, feel free to
present it; for the safety of all is the need of all.”657 This adaptability was enforced by an
organisational design, which was regarded as a good-enough start. Xenophon emphasised that
“for the future, as we make trial of this formation we can adopt whatever course may seem from
time to time to be best. If anyone sees better plan, let him present it.”658 As a result, when the
Persian commander Mithradates seemed to be superior because of having mounted troops and
slingers, the Greeks were able to offset his advantage within a night by establishing similarly
equipped troops. They were also willing to use either superior enemy equipment such as Persian
arrows, or to innovate and build new ones. If the marching formation they originally choose was
not good enough, which became clear as soon as they started to cross rivers, they went over to
an even less structured formation that further delegated responsibility down to junior
commanders. Another good example for flexibility can be found in a dialogue between
Cheirisophus, the senior commander of the Greek army and Xenophon. During a battle with a
Persian army, the occupation of a mountain top was seen as crucial and Xenophon offered his
commander that “[i]f you choose, then, stay in command of the army, and I will go: or, if you
prefer, you make for the mountain top, and I will stay here.” Cheirisophus replied by saying that
“I leave it to you to choose which part you wish.”659 Thus Xenophon led the Greek forces and
when he was reminded by Soteridas, a common soldier, that he was riding on horse back while
others had to conduct a forced march, he dismounted and continued to march on foot. On
another occasion the generals collectively decided upon a proposition to cross a river. They
concluded that although it was a clever alternative its execution was rather impossible, which
eventually led them first into the country of the Carduchians and then to Armenia.660
655  Xenophon: Anabasis, Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 215-225 (quotation p. 225).
656  Ibid., pp. 226-231 (quotation p. 231).
657  Ibid., pp. 232-251 (quotation p. 251).
658  Ibid., pp. 252-253 (quotation p. 253).
659  Ibid. pp. 254-279 (quotation p. 279).
660  Ibid., pp. 280-289; Hanson, Victor Davis: Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western
Power, Anchor, 2001, pp. 1-5.
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15.4.2 Emergence and Self-Organisation
Information was allowed to flow directly upward in an unconstrained way as displayed by an
example in book four. By fighting their way through the mountains on one occasion, the Greeks
encountered a joint force of Armenians, Mardians and Chaldeans that appeared to be superior in
numbers. They were forced to cross a deep and fast flowing river, which was seen as a difficult
and dangerous undertaking. The situation came close to a disaster as the Greeks saw a river
difficult to cross, enemy troops intended to obstruct their crossing and ready to fall upon their
rear. However, by accident two young Greek soldiers discovered a save ford and since they
knew that soldiers were allowed to go to Xenophon “whether he was breakfasting or dining, and
that if he were asleep, they might awaken him and tell him whatever they might have to tell that
concerned the war.”661 They passed the information directly to their superior and this way the
cornered and desperate Greeks were able to slide out of the hand of their enemies. Later in
Western Armenia, they came under a heavy fall of snow that covered the bivouacked men. The
next morning soldiers were reluctant to get up. In order to show example Xenophon was the first
to get up and split wood. One by one soldiers got up and also started to split wood, build fires
and anoint themselves. On another occasion when they entered the country of the Taochians
they nearly run out of provisions and were forced to attack one of the strongholds that was built
on a steep hill. Every time when the Greeks attacked they were repulsed by stones rolled down
from an overhanging rock crushing the soldiers’ ribs and legs. As a result Greek troops sought
shelter in the cover of nearby trees. In order to solve the situation and to motivate subordinates,
the captains of the companies developed a scheme and led by example. In their run across the
stronghold Agasias, Callimachus, Arystonimus and Eurylochus “thus contending … captured the
stronghold, for once they had rushed in not a stone came down any more from above.”662
Despite the unknown terrain and hostile countries they marched through, the Greeks could
eventually reach the Black Sea. As described in book five they took counsel for themselves in
which the generals underwent an inquiry with reference to their past performance, and in case
misconduct was discovered, they had to pay a fine.663 Needless to say that such a bottom-up
evaluation of superiors by subordinates stands in sharp contrast with the current top-down one-
way evaluation scheme of subordinates by superiors found in most Western armed forces. In
other words, they conducted a thorough after action report in order to enhance their
effectiveness for the remaining part of their trip to Greece.
15.4.3 From Intelligence and Command to Intelligent Command
The example of the ancient Greeks shows that proper information coming through an emergent
and self-organising mechanism can successfully limit, but never eliminate the frictional, chaotic
and complex reality of war. Although the fog of war can occasionally be reduced to mist,
information will never be complete or absolutely perfect. In war we always deal with the likely
rather than the true. More information might create more predictability, but the bigger its amount
the greater the uncertainty, hence the unpredictability it contains. In any case we must deal with
war’s inherent unpredictability that often hinders both the formulation and achievement of
desired effects. In the last two decades we witnessed a steep increase in the performance of
661  Ibid., pp. 291-317 (quotation p. 317).
662  Ibid., pp. 318-361 (quotation p. 361).
663  Ibid., pp. 362-379, 447-465.
223
information technologies Western armed forces can field. However, the tempo of operations and
the demand for making split-second decisions has also grown. It appears that the weakest link in
this process is still the speed at which humans make decisions, which has not changed much
since the age of Xenophon. Another problem we have to accept is that despite the amount of
available information, it is often “trivial in quality and overwhelming in quantity.”664 Thus
contemporary commanders are confronted with two sorts of uncertainty in terms of information:
· The first type is due to the lack of accurate, useful and timely information, which has always
been part of the business of war.
· The second type is due to the overwhelming amount of information since advanced
technologies can both collect and communicate nearly anything and everything.665
Asymmetric wars are mobile in which both the deployment and employment of forces will
frequently change. Official channels of command and control can brake down and superiors will
often be unable to guide their subordinates who have to carry out actions with little time to
assess and prepare. As the ancient Greek example shows, fleeting and unique military situations
require a constant adaptation based on local information harnessing individual initiative and
responsibility. Information must often be generated and exploited on a local level in order to
achieve effects that might not always be predictable, but are good-enough to become both
effective and efficient at the same time.
664  Ferris, John/Handel, Michael I.: Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Military
Operations, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 40-49 (quotation p. 49).
665  Ibid., p. 52.
224
225
16 Military Effectiveness
16.1 Battles, Wars and Victory
The preceding chapters detailed the consequences of a conceptualisation of war as a complex
adaptive system in terms of strategy development, and command and control. This chapter
addresses such a conceptualisation from a military effectiveness point of view. As the Supreme
Allied Commander Transformation stated in an interview, the ability to assess effects is seen as
a significant detriment in military operations to come. Thus according to him we must become
able to “assess effects as opposed to counting things, today we count things.” 666
16.1.1 Effectiveness and Causality
Not only achieving desired effects is important in the conduct of effects-based operations, but so
is getting feedback. However, before proceeding further it is useful to elaborate more on the
example of the ancient Greeks. The most important message of Xenophon’s book, is that
mastering the challenges posed by war requires more than an exclusive focus on one particular
area in the continuum of war. Waging war does not mean that on occasion we cannot influence
the enemy and achieve psychological effects. Xenophon was also successful in conducting
psychological operations such as disfiguring the bodies of fallen enemies.667 Nevertheless the
Greeks took equally into account that war is a deadly contest in which they must be prepared as
much to destroy and defeat the enemy by the application of brute force, as to influence him
through various coercive means in order to come to favourable terms. Organic Strategic
Ecosystem emphasises war as a dynamically evolving phenomenon rather than a single
instantaneous event. Thus war is seen as a series of dynamic interactions in which the
belligerents attempt to gain advantage over time that might either accumulate or reverse into
balance again. War happens in the form of interactions of various sizes until one belligerent is
decisively defeated or decides to surrender. We made it clear earlier that in this process it is the
product rather than the sum of interactions that decides on the outcome. Wars can last until the
bitter end or stop before total destruction.668 In either case the relative ability to learn and adapt
expressed as military effectiveness appears an important attribute and refers to a gap in
operational capabilities over time. Consequently, military effectiveness is a crucial factor and
deserves a close examination. Regardless whether it is approached in quantitative or qualitative
terms, we have to deal with a multitude of factors that are very difficult to calculate. Any attempt
to describe it means that we limit our attention to certain features and do not focus on the full
range of possibilities. The results gained reflect as much practical benefits as a certain analytical
convenience. Although they always contain a set of indicators that appears to be strongly
interrelated, the insights gained are often narrow and highly inconsistent. War seen as a
complex adaptive system means, that attempts to get a grip on military effectiveness face the
666  Quotation in NATO Speeches: Press Briefing by Adm. Giambastiani SAC ACT on 12. 10. 2003,
Internet, accessed 21. 02. 2006, available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031112b.htm.
667  Xenophon, p. 263.
668  Smith, Alistair: Fighting Battles, Winning Wars, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 42, Number 3,
June 1998, pp. 301-305.
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problem of no clear causality, which can only be lessened, but never eliminated. Even if we can
establish a causal link between military effectiveness and the variables it explains, the only
possible way to do so is by restricting the dependent variables and more clearly defining what
sort of effectiveness we mean. Organic Strategic Ecosystem indicates that events in war can
have both systematic and accidental causes, which stand for identifiable causes and effects, and
phenomena humans cannot explain or understand based on analytical rationality. The result
being that any judgement regarding effectiveness colours as much the view of events as limits
the attention. Thus judgements always include certain aspects and exclude others. Assumptions
regarding military effectiveness are as much permissive as they are deterministic/heuristic.
Measures of military effectiveness often reflect the sum of individual aggregates rather than
collective characteristics. The inherent complexity of those characteristics is responsible for the
problems that make any description and assessment of military effectiveness very difficult.
Although military effectiveness is often seen as an implicit, unconscious phenomenon taken
mostly for granted, it cannot be addressed directly. Similar to any abstract concept, it is not a
concrete thing, but must be inferred from other clues. The more we move towards psychological
effects the harder it becomes to disentangle indicators and variables from each other.
Consequently, any attempt to address military effectiveness has to deal with collective
attributes.669 All these problems mean that assessing military effectiveness is context-dependent
and always influenced by certain cultural and societal attributes. According to the social wave-
front analysis the way we make wealth influences the way we wage war, which implies that the
low effectiveness of some armed forces in the second half of the 20th century were mostly due to
societal and cultural determinants. Indicators can include peculiarities such as over-control in the
form of the rigidly centralised command structure, the officer corps’s contempt for ordinary
soldiers and its distrust of a capable NCO corps. Impact of such societal and cultural deficiencies
is often seen as responsible for the humiliating defeats Arabic forces suffered at the hand of
Israel.670
16.2 Fighting Power
Effects can be achieved on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Whereas
psychological effects refer mostly to the strategic level, systemic effects address the operational,
and physical effects the tactical level of war. We also detailed that lower-level effects are easier
to achieve than higher order follow-on effects. Physical effects mostly in the form of destruction
are relevant only to the extent they contribute to changes in enemy behaviour; therefore they are
mostly of secondary importance. Psychological effects are very difficult to achieve due to the
inherent black box of the mechanism involved. Thus military effectiveness can theoretically be
measured on every level of war. However, we suggest to examine the issue of military
effectiveness on the operational level where it can be expressed by the concept of fighting
669  Liddel Hart, B. H.: The Ratio of Troops to Space, Military Review, April 1960, p. 9; Elkins, David
J./Simeon, E. B.: A Cause in Search of its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?, Comparative
Politics, January 1979, pp. 127-137; Schnaubelt, Christopher M.: Can The Military’s Effectiveness in the
Drug War be Measured? The Cato Journal, Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 1994, Internet, accessed 12. 05.
2006, available at www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjv14n2-5.html.
670  Harkabi, Yehoshafat, pp. 685-691; Lewis, Bernard: The Arab-Israeli War, The Consequences of Defeat,
Foreign Affairs, Volume 46, January, 1968, pp. 331-334.
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power, as in most cases wining wars comes as a result of winning battles. Although such an
approach only narrowly grasps the meaning of military effectiveness as it does not address the
relationship between political ends and military means, it conveniently provides for the fact that
normally battle is the real test of military effectiveness. This limited understanding does not
exclude that military brilliance often cannot compensate for political incompetence. The biggest
benefit of analysing fighting power is that we become able to explain the danger that comes from
confusing flexibility in war with the illusion of being flexible. This way we can build upon insights
gained earlier in the chapter detailing the importance of learning and adaptation.671 This narrow
interpretation does not exclude either, that low military effectiveness and disastrous battlefield
performance often come as a result of various societal and cultural factors. They root in the
absence of respect, trust and openness, and the lack of an implicit brotherhood among soldiers
at all levels. Competence at winning battles on the operational level is an important contributor to
victory in which aspects such as individual soldiering, battlefield behaviour, and organisational
efficacy play an important role.672 These factors together with societal and cultural determinants
emphasise first and foremost the human aspect of war, which requires solid and strong bonds in
combat units rather than the availability of advanced technology. In terms of fighting power, the
latter “only emerges as a powerful predictor of success when considered in a far more complex
and interactive model of training, technology, and terrain.”673 Fighting power indicates that
favourable technological disparity might erode over time.
16.2.1 Ancient Greeks, Modern Germans
On their march back home the Greeks kept winning as they consistently outperformed their
respective enemies, as did the Germans in World War II in a similar fashion. During the entire
war period soldiers of the Wehrmacht always outfought the opposing British and American
troops. This was true ”when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had
a local numerical superiority and when … they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority
and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.”674 Explaining such an outstanding
fighting power by single attributes appears to be too narrow and dangerous. Even if we take
various societal and cultural determinants into account, a German made neither a better soldier
than an American, nor is German national character more suitable to wars than the American.
The involvement of various difficult-to-conceptualise factors has lead many to state that the issue
of military effectiveness is nothing more than an ill-defined concept. War is a complex
phenomenon in which the multitude of factors does not make it possible to fully comprehend
everything that goes on. Organic Strategic Ecosystem indicates that any interaction with the
enemy directly results in causality brake-down and we face different levels of intensity and a
confusing interdependency. Consequently, the attempt to discuss military effectiveness even in
671  Record, Jeffrey: Sizing Up Military Effectiveness, Parameters, December 1988, pp. 25-29.
672  Atkine, Norville de: Why Arabs Lose Wars, MERIA Journal, Volume 4, Number 1, March 2000, Internet,
accessed 12. 05. 2006, available at www.meria.biu.ac.il/journal/2000/issue1/jv4n1a2.html; Biddle,
Stephen/Long, Stephen: Democracy and Military Effectiveness, A Deeper Look, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Volume 48, Number 4, August 2004, p. 527.
673  Reiter, Dan/Stam, Allan C. III.: Democracy and Battlefield Effectiveness, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Volume 42, Number 3, June 1998, pp. 260-263, 271-275 (quotation p. 274).
674  Dupuy, T. N.: A Genius for War, Macdonald and Jane’s, 1977, pp. 253-289 (quotation pp. 253-254).
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rough terms requires that we look across horizontal and vertical dimensions of activities.675 The
simplest way to define fighting power is seeing it as a process in which armed forces put
resources into combat. Probably the biggest similarity that connects the ancient Greeks and
modern Germans is that they both regarded themselves as members of a highly integrated and
well-lead team perceived by and large as just and equitable. This implicit brotherhood meant that
the best men fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the front. Military units were designed to produce
fighting men of high quality. In both instances fighting power came as a result of mutual trust,
delegated responsibility and independent decision-making. Both the Greeks and the Germans
did not attempt to prescribe detailed solutions in advance. Much was left to the intuition of
commanders and subordinates on the ground. This led to empowerment throughout the ranks,
and the emphasis on the means resulted in their unprecedented military effectiveness. They
displayed fearsome cold-bloodedness that ranged from utmost stubbornness in close combat, to
large-scale butchering of non-combatants. Similar to the ancient Greeks their modern German
equivalents were true professionals both in positive and negative sense. Their battlefield
performance during World War II was second to none regardless whether they were in the
offensive or the defensive or committed atrocities.676 However, even such a narrow
conceptualisation of military effectiveness aimed at the operational level of war demands a
warning:
· Fighting power depends largely on the humans involved and reflects the ability to prosecute
operations and employ weaponry. Thus it is a reflection of the quality of an army’s personnel
and includes aspects that range from battlefield performance to the accomplishment of tasks
on various levels and the way those tasks interrelate.
· Fighting power only expresses how successfully a military force operates on the battlefield
once it has engaged with the enemy. Numerous examples in history have shown that
outstanding effectiveness in battle can often be irrelevant for the outcome of war with the
opposite being equally true.677
16.2.2 Effectiveness and Technology
Fighting power is the expression of superior human qualities rather than outstanding military
technology. A good historical example for disappearing technological superiority, both in terms of
quantity and quality can be found in the first phase of British imperialism. Around the end of the
18th century some thousand British soldiers were able to defeat much larger Indian armies,
despite the fact that in war-relevant technologies India was superior to Europe. Indian steel was
not only better than British, but the steel making techniques in India were far more advanced.
Indian forces also had better artillery and musket barrels on their side. However, technological
675  Millet, Allan R./Murray, Williamson/Watman, Kenneth H.: The Effectiveness of Military Organizations, in
Millet, Allan R./Murray, Williamson: Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The First World War,  Allen  &
Unwin, 1988, pp. 1-2; Parker, Christopher S.: New Weapons for Old Problems, Conventional
Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States, International Security, Volume 23, Number
4, Spring 1999, p. 131; Creveld, Martin van: Fighting Power, German and U.S. Army Performance,
1939-1945, Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 13-16; Nielsen, Suzanne C.: Civil-Military Relations Theory
and Military Effectiveness, Public Administration and Management, Volume 10, Number 2, 2005, pp. 61-
84.
676  Millet/Murray/Watman in Millet/Murray, p. 2; Creveld (1982), pp. 163-166; Kanter, p. 79.
677  Millet/Murray/Watman in Millet/Murray, pp. 26-27; Pollack, Kenneth M.: Arabs at War: Military
Effectiveness, 1948-1991, CFR Book, 2002, pp. 3-4.
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inferiority did not hinder the British to expand their empire and extend their influence.678
Advanced technology, which can be regarded as an important common element of effects-based
operations makes it possible to destroy virtually any target. However, the combined effects of
stealth technology and precision weaponry appear to be less convincing in re-establishing
security or winning hearts and minds. Despite their superiority according to traditional measures,
Iraq reminds us that the ability to end wars does not come as a result of technological solutions.
We witness an emerging gap between advanced military technology and the gains we can
expect from its application in terms of influencing behaviour and psychological effects. It appears
that asymmetric wars require forces committed for the long term on the ground that are as much
capable in searching and destroying such irregulars as terrorist cells, as winning hearts and
minds of the local population. Enhanced destructive capabilities can improve fighting power, but
have clear limitations in terms of stability, order and security. War as a complex adaptive system
is composed of situations that can quickly switch from destruction to influence and vice versa.
The effects landscape indicates war to be an admixture of many unforeseeable physical and
psychological effects, which makes the outcome especially in terms of perception and behaviour
unpredictable.679
16.3 Feedback and Measuring
In simple English measuring indicates a process that points towards a comparison in which we
ascertain a certain quantity in terms of a given standard. The evaluation of the effectiveness of
Operations Desert Fox found that despite the obvious success of the bombing campaign, the
destruction of various sites never fully equalled with the destruction of assumed centres of
gravity. The damages claimed always reflect a combination of a thorough assessment and
empty propaganda. Assessing military effectiveness in a way that addresses the psychological
domain requires that we focus on perception and influence rather than on military exchange
rates based on technological prowess. However, we demonstrated earlier that this area is
extremely context dependent, which indicates that any approach to assessing military
effectiveness will always be full of controversies. The frictional, chaotic, and complex reality of
war indicates the existence of so many contextual factors that the relationship between the
action taken, the object selected, and the consequence in the form of desired effects will always
be hidden to a certain degree.680
678  Rosen, Stephen Peter: Military Effectiveness, Why Society Matters, International Security, Volume 19,
Number 4, Spring 1995, pp. 22-23.
679  Valentin, Marcel (Gen.): Military Effectiveness in the Face of Terrorism, Le Figaro, Monday 23 January
2006, translated by Leslie Thatcher, Internet, accessed 21. 03. 2006, available at www.truthout.org/cgi-
bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/48/17158.
680  Gove, p. 1400; Cordesman, Anthony H.: The Military Effectiveness Of Desert Fox: A Warning About the
Limits of the Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 26 December 1998, pp. 29-31; For an excellent review regarding the effectiveness of the 1991
Gulf War see Keaney, Thomas A.: Surveying Gulf War Airpower, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1993,
pp. 25-36.
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16.3.1 Feedback and Control
Western thinking is inherently linear and efficiency obsessed. This is manifest in its general
preoccupation with numbers, which are often regarded as the only reality instead as means to
look at reality. This preference is not surprising since numbers allow for management, something
that is seen in Western culture as very important: control. Numbers and metrics are regarded as
hard facts and number crunching as the primary means of control. Unfortunately, controlling a
complex adaptive system such as war is very difficult if not impossible. Fighting power and most
of its attributes depend on humans and express performance capabilities, which can never be
reproduced by simple measurement. Military effectiveness emerges as a result of qualities and
behaviours that are choices made by people on all levels. The Organic Strategic Ecosystem
indicates that military effectiveness comes as much as the result of satisfying the superiors’
needs as that of local knowledge and expertise. Any complex adaptive system lives on
feedback; therefore probably the biggest difference between feedback and measurement is that
the former is self-generated and depends on context. Feedback in a complex adaptive system
changes constantly over time as boundaries are never static, but permeable. It is not only
essential in terms of adaptation and learning, but also an important contributor to fitness.
Feedback indicates that instead of letting measures define what is meaningful, the emerging
meaning of our actions should define the measures.681 In other words, feedback is the essence
of a complex adaptive system and in the case of war it is present in the interaction of the
belligerents. It indicates that effects-based operations demand a conceptualisation in which the
means applied are as much important as the ends sought. Feedback also means that we can
never fully control events. As Clausewitz emphasised war is never “the action of a living force
upon a lifeless mass. … Thus [we are] not in control: [the enemy] dictates [us] as much as [we]
dictate to him.”682
16.3.2 Combat and Effectiveness
Military effectiveness grasped on the operational level as fighting power is not only manifest in
combat, but also determines its outcome. Thus the question of whether it is possible to quantify it
in order to make military effectiveness measurable arises naturally. In his attempt to identify a
useful theory of combat, Dupuy referred to Clausewitz and claimed that he had an analytical
approach to war and thought of combat in mathematical and quantitative terms. Certainly, it is
true that Clausewitz used a vocabulary, which was interwoven with terms and expressions
borrowed from various natural scientific disciplines. It is also true that Clausewitz referred to
various measures throughout his work such as scale, degree or quantity to which, according to
Dupuy, at least tentative values can be given and expressed as the Law of Numbers. This law
makes it possible for him to determine the outcome of battles, hence to measure fighting power
and military effectiveness. Without going too much into detail, for Dupuy fighting power (P) was
the product of the number of troops (N), variable circumstances that affect a force in battle (V),
681  Gove, p. 1400; Wheatley, Margaret/Kellner-Rogers, Myron: What Do We Measure and Why? Questions
about the Uses of Measurement, Journal for Strategic Performance Measurement, June 1999, Internet,
accessed 19. 05. 2006, available at http://www.margaretwheatley.com/articles/whymeasure.html;
Murray, William S.: A Will to Measure, Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp. 134-135; Janssen, Heidi J.
W./Toevank, Freek-Jan G./Smeenk, Belinda J. E./Voskuilen, Marion J. M.: Psychological Operations,
Considerations on its Measurement of Effectiveness, TNO-FEL Concept Paper, 09. 11. 2003.
682  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 86.
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and the quality of the force involved in battle (Q). Consequently, he claimed that fighting power
can be seen as a result of the following equation
QVNP **=
The equation also makes it possible to express relative military effectiveness in the case of two
belligerents. It can be expressed as a difference in the belligerents’ respective military
effectiveness where (r) identifies the red force and (b) the blue force
bbb
rrr
QVN
QVNP
**
**=
His approach is especially interesting from a complex adaptive system point of view, as Dupuy
explicitly emphasised the importance of a bottom-up, inductive process in approaching military
effectiveness. He assumed that this way it becomes possible to provide insights into the various
interactions of the variables and get to a reasonable quantification. However, even he had to
eventually admit that this quantification does not allow predicting the future with any accuracy.
The best the equation can provide for is the avoidance of dangerous assumptions and false
conclusions. Thus Dupuy could not address the multitude of factors such as leadership, morale,
cohesion, motivation, initiative, and trust, which are easily identifiable, but also frustratingly
intangible. In order to get a grip on higher order effects in the psychological domain, the best he
did was to suggest that the effects of intangibles should be determined by historical analysis.683
Thus even the attempt to assess military effectiveness in the internal and rather limited context
of combat expressed as fighting power, suffers from inaccessibility of reliable data. Assessing
effectiveness in a much broader context with its wider perspective pointing towards the political
interest of the belligerents is even less reliable and has, at best, a transitory value.
Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that measures of military effectiveness such as
battle damage assessment are normally related to physical activities since behavioural
characteristics indicating higher order follow-on effects are the most difficult to measure.684
16.3.3 Military Effectiveness and Wicked Problems
Complex adaptive systems are open ended, which makes the formulation of any outcome in
terms of desired effects extremely difficult if not impossible. As a result, the traditional planning
approach emphasising reasoning, rationality and analysis must often yield to a more organic
feeling approach of engagement, action and overcoming. In the framework of the proposed
683  Dupuy, T. N. (Col.): Understanding War, History and Theory of Combat, Leo Cooper, 1987, pp. 13, 21-
30, 51-61, 105 (Dupuy preferred the term combat power); Murray, Williamson: Thoughts on Effects-
Based Operations, Strategy, and the Conduct of War, Institute for Defense Analysis, January 2004, pp.
5-17; Burkett, Wendy H.: Assessing the Results of Effects-Based Operations (WBO): The Relationship
between Effects-Based Operations and the Psychological Dimension of Warfare,  U.S.  Army  War
College, 07 April 2003, pp. 10-17.
684  DuBuis, Edmond/Hughes, Wayne P. Jr./Low, Lawrence J.: A Concise Theory of Combat, Institute for
Joint Warfare Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, October 1998, Internet, accessed 19. 05. 2005,
available at www.militaryconflict.org/Concise%20Theory.htm; Low, Lawrence J.: Anatomy of a Combat
Model, Review Copy, pp. 18-23, Internet, accessed 19. 05. 2006, available at www.militaryconflict.org/
Anatomy%20of%20a%20Combat%20Model_1.
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effects landscape we conceptualised war as a large and interconnected network of various
objects. Due to epistatic interactions among them, we always have to juggle with conflicting
constraints. We addressed the dual nature of effects along two dimensions such as interactions
and couplings. Whereas interactions can be linear or complex, couplings can be tight or loose.
The four possibilities revealed that as outputs from parts of the network become inputs to others,
it becomes extremely difficult to define cause-and-effect relationships in a meaningful way.
Consequently, efforts to plan for effects and find methods of intervention in the form of courses
of action can become troublesome activities. In terms of the Organic Strategic Ecosystem, we
always have to expect waves of repercussion since influencing any given nod can induce severe
and unexpected effects elsewhere. Thus it appears that the three common elements of effects-
based operations reflect northing more than our arrogant confidence in detecting root causes.685
Most challenges posed by war cannot be solved through scientific analysis. War happens on a
continuum in which we always face ill-defined and inseparable problems. The lack of clarifying
traits in such wicked problems allows for resolution rather than solution – over and over again.
The following listing provides for a better understanding of the nature of such problems:
· Formulation – wicked problems cannot be formulated definitively and exhaustively since
formulating a wicked problem is a problem in itself. Setting up and constraining the solution
space, constructing meaningful measures of performance are at the heart of the problem’s
wickedness. Wicked problems are infinite. There are no criteria that tell when solutions are
found. Terminating works are rather due to external reasons such as running out of
resources rather than to internal reasons coming from the logic of the problem.
· Objectivity – wicked problems do not allow for objectively decisive criteria to define the
correctness or falseness of solutions. Thus solutions can never be true or false only bad or
good as they are influenced by the interplay of various cultural, social and political factors.
Wicked problems have no solutions that can be tested immediately or ultimately. Whatever
the solution to a problem we can be sure that it always generates unintended and undesired
consequences, which often outperform the desired effects we want to achieve.
· History – wicked problems mean that history matters. Every solution implemented has a
consequence that leaves traces we cannot reverse. Attempts to undo or reset past actions
poses a significant challenge as they also represent further sets of wicked problems. Wicked
problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions. Sometimes no solution can
be found, or the selected solution is just as good as any other potential solution. What
should be pursued, implemented and enlarged is a matter of subjective judgement.
· Uniqueness – wicked problems are essentially unique. They always yield a distinguishing
property of importance since there are no classes that allow for principles of solutions fitting
to all members of a class. Despite obvious similarities there is no certainty about the
particulars of any given problem. Wicked problems are always a symptom of other
problems. Addressing the problem at any given level can never be decided logically since
there is no natural level of wicked problems. Even systemic approaches and incrementalism
can make things worse, rather than better.
· Explanation – wicked problems can be explained in numerous ways since there is no rule
that determines which explanation is correct. Thus the choice of explanation is arbitrary and
685  Rittel, Horst W./Webber, Melvin M.: Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, Policy Sciences,
4/1973, pp. 157-158, 160-167.
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guided by attitudinal criteria since people generally choose those explanations that are most
plausible to them. Wicked problems stand for ambiguity of causal webs in which solutions
always point towards further sets of dilemmas. Actions always generate consequences and
the effects regardless whether desired, undesired, intended, unintended, good or bad matter
a great deal to those who are affected.686
16.3.4 Theoretical Biology, Fittness Landscape, and Iraq
The American led Coalition Forces entered Iraq in March 2003 forcing an end to Saddam
Hussein and his regime. After the war conditions for the Iraqi people were different from the
speculations before the conflict. Although no acute humanitarian crisis erupted, the coalition
forces encountered a situation characterized by decreasing civil insecurity and looting.687 This
facilitated an insurgency that grew in size and complexity over the course of 2004. At the
beginning of 2004 attacks numbered approximately 25 per day and then averaged around 60 by
the end of the year. Insurgents were able to increase activity around key events, for example,
the number of attacks reached approximately 300 on the day of election. Although Coalition
Forces continued to be the primary targets, Iraqi officials, foreign nationals and the country’s
infrastructure were not spared. The continuing attacks have undermined efforts to reconstruct
and stabilize the country and caused the death of more than 3,000 Coalition soldiers and
wounded 22,000 more. Whereas in November 2003 the number of insurgents was estimated to
be around 5,000, a year later their number doubled, and roughly 50 militant cells could be
differentiated enjoying increasing popular support. The number exploded a year later as the Iraqi
intelligence service director spoke of 40,000 full-time and 200,000 part-time fighters with no sign
that things would get better.688 The country can be characterised by continuing violence, non-
existing or shattered state institutions, a non-functioning economy, and a war-torn and
exhausted society. So far the Coalition has failed to reconstruct Iraq in political, economic, social
and security terms. Although these four areas interact in a complex and intimate way, requiring a
constant dialogue on a very broad basis, the occupants have increasingly withdrawn into a
physical and psychological bunker. Many signs indicate that the general “obsession with control
was an overarching flaw in the U.S. occupation from start to finish.”689 We indicated earlier that
control has relevance only to a small portion of the continuum of war, as the rest has much more
to do with coping. Although most objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom were not purely military,
they were relatively clearly stated. Thus objectives included the ending of Saddam Hussein’s
regime; the identification, isolation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the
searching, capturing and driving out terrorists from the country; the collection of intelligence
related to terrorist networks; the collection of intelligence related to the global network of illicit
weapons of mass destruction; the ending of sanctions and delivering humanitarian support to the
686  Ibid., pp. 160-167.
687 Iraq Reconstruction – Introduction, Internet, accessed 26. 01. 2007, available at www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/iraq_recon_intro.htm.
688 Iraqi Insurgency Groups, Internet, accessed 26. 01. 2007, available at www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm; U.S. Casualties in Iraq, Internet, accessed 26. 01. 2007, available at
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm; Hoffmann, Bruce: Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in Iraq, RAND National Security Research Division, June 2004, pp. 11-14.
689  Diamond, Larry: What Went Wrong in Iraq, Foreign Affairs, Internet, accessed 25. 01. 2007, available at
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displaced and needy citizens; the securing of Iraq's oil fields and resources; and the creation of
conditions that make the transition to a representative self-government possible.690 In terms of
biology the original evolutionary stable situation between the United States and Iraq changed
dramatically as a result of 9/11. However, because the war was waged in a symmetric, force-on-
force, firepower-centric manner, Iraqi resistance was smashed within weeks, and achieving the
highly ambitious objectives through the co-ordinated sets of various sorts of effects appeared
possible. The maximising approach of strategy development aimed at achieving centralised
effects seemed to be promising and realisable. Unfortunately, soon after the traditional war was
officially ended and victory of the Coalition Forces declared, the situation started to deteriorate
until it slid out of control. Although it became increasingly clear that realising the original
objectives was more and more impossible, there were no attempts to lessen control and lower
the initial ambition in order to adapt to changing conditions. In other words, instead of
establishing a mechanism that can increase the chance to discover new and exploitable
opportunities, the American led Coalition Forces shut down the possibility to discover and
expand on good-enough scenarios. Their rigid focus aimed at climbing hills on the landscape
identified for a given scenario before the war resulted in an alarming inefficiency. An abundance
of factors such as a serious legitimacy problem with the international community, the lack of area
and linguistic experts, the Iraqi’s distrust and deep suspicion regarding the occupation’s real
motives, their partial and puzzled understanding of democratic governance, and Western cultural
bias seeing democracy as a one-fits-all, prohibited successful jumps across the landscape and
the discovery of new and promising hills.691 It appears that the situation in Iraq is similar to the
situation we described earlier as the Red Queen in which the Coalition Forces must run faster
and faster in order to stay at the same place. Their average fitness level is constantly declining
and the chance for extinction, which equals defeat increases steadily. The Coalition is bogged
down so much and the number of conflicting constraints it has to manage, is so high that
whatever they do and wherever they look only vicious circles are available. In the fourth year of
the invasion there was not even a not-very-bad scenario in sight.692 Despite the abundance of
publications dealing with the advantages of network-centric warfare, effects-based operations
and similar concepts we have the impression that the West still does not possess the flexibility
and agility to respond to quickly altering challenges in an appropriate way. Its obsession with
efficiency, analytical rationality, technological focus does not make it possible to develop the
level of adaptability that is needed to evolve with a very complex situation such as Iraq. The
structures, models, Western armed forces employ are not fit enough to compete for survival with
a challenger that has less bureaucracy, but more ad hocracy. Both the situation in Iraq and the
lessons learned from evolutionary biology indicate that Western armed forces are extremely
specialised and occupy only a narrow field on the fitness landscape. Consequently, they do not
possess the ability to move constantly in order to find higher general regions. Based on their
causality sensitivity they are unwilling to employ trial-and-error mechanisms, which are so
important both for learning and adaptation. We demonstrated earlier that the more the situation
690 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Internet, accessed 26. 01. 2007, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/
ops/iraqi_freedom.htm.
691  Diamond, ibid.
692  Baker, James A. III./Hamilton, Lee H. et. al.: The Iraq Study Group Report, United States Institute of
Peace, 6 December 2006, pp. 9-27.
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becomes chaotic, the more we have to rely on decentralised effects that come as a result of
bottom-up initiatives. When we see Western militaries as species they do not have the means to
become truly networked in which they successfully subdivide into many local races that can
search and shuffle continually about the landscape. Although this way at least one local race can
find a higher peak and pull the entire species towards a better position, the fear that the average
fitness of the species as an immediate effect can decrease is all too great. Iraq has been so far a
good example that a complex problem ranging into many and confusing areas cannot be solved
in a way that attempts to simplify. As theoretical biology and the fitness landscape metaphor
indicate in theory, and the situation in Iraq in practice, in the case of too many conflicting
constraints no good solutions can be found. In other words, in Iraq we have to deal with chaos in
which every solution is just as good as any other solution.
16.4 Conclusion Part III
The 20th century was full of examples that as soon as a war started it tended to generate its own
politics based on its own momentum. This attribute rendered both the original political purposes
obsolete and erected new political imperatives. Consequently, any conceptualisation of war can
be scarcely more than an attempt to grasp a continual and kaleidoscopically shifting process.
War perceived in traditional, rigid and mechanistic terms resembling similarity with engineering
means that we emphasise the importance of a predefined end-state, top-down command and
control, and a slavish adherence to various measures. In the age of increased complexity such
an approach imposes demands upon Western armed forces they might not be able to meet. In
contrast, war conceptualised as an interactive process means that it must be defined as much by
political goals pursued by the military, as by acknowledging the limitations of militarily realisable
political goals.693 An organic conceptualisation takes into account that one at the expense of the
other can easily jeopardise success. Rigidity and blind adherence to predefined objectives can
result in mounting costs of money and men. An exclusive focus on the strategic level narrows
exploitable tactical options with the consequence that we become imprisoned in false hopes
chasing desired effects. War conceptualised in the framework of the Organic Strategic
Ecosystem indicates that Western political-military thinking is based on dangerous assumptions:
· Due to its inherent bias towards the instrumental dimension of war it cannot see and
address international security problems other than in quantitative and technological terms.
Traditional attributes of war such as uncertainty, risk and ambiguity increasingly disappear
from the vocabulary or are buried under empty concepts.
· This ignorance and the resulting mechanistic approach to war explains why a force
employment concept such as effects-based operations offering “quantitatively guaranteed
predictive capabilities with respect to human affairs“ could become an all encompassing
credo.694
693  Weigley, Russell F.: The Political and Strategic Dimensions of Military Effectiveness, in: Millet, Allan
R./Murray, Williamson: Military Effectiveness, Volume III: The First World War, Allen & Unwin, 1988, pp.
341-344.
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National Interest, Summer 1997, Internet, accessed 15. 05. 2006, available at www.clausewitz.com/
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Effects-based operations represent a dangerous simplification of war and the only logical
outcome of such an approach can be nothing else than panaceas that promise quick, easy and
cheap victories. Organic Strategic Ecosystem indicates war to be an open-ended dynamic
process in which the best we can do is to act on local information, learn from mistakes and hope
that a better mix of training, leadership, equipment and weaponry can result in victory. Better
military discipline contributes to better strategies, better command and control and higher military
effectiveness.
Figure 23: Causality, effectiveness and efficiency
Earlier we indicated that both effectiveness and efficiency refer to the relationship between
cause and effect, although they indicate different mechanisms as depicted in Figure 23.
Probably the biggest benefit that comes from the power of learning and adaptation is the ability
to harmonise effectiveness with efficiency. Although even the combination of both does not allow
for perfect solutions, it can guarantee that we do not fall out of alignment in terms of external
demand and internal variation. Being effective and efficient means doing the right things right,
and successfully combining the science and the art of war. Unfortunately, it appears that the
West tries to handle 21st century challenges with a 20th century approach. It still regards
important aspects of war such as strategy development, command and control and military
effectiveness as part of a larger symmetrical engagement. Asymmetric and low-tech enemies
since 1990 have shown that will, tenacity, skill and endurance can successfully oppose superior
Western firepower. It is not destruction in traditional terms, but time and commitment that will be
important factors of victory in the Third Wave. Consequently, enemies of the future will not see
victory or defeat in terms of decisiveness coming from a swift and crushing military success.
They see war as a prolonged stalemate, which drags on with the purpose to erode political
support in the West that can eventually turns technological weakness into an exploitable
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advantage.695 Organic Strategic Ecosystem indicates a continuous interaction of the belligerents
in which both sides are simultaneously attacking and defending. Their efforts are continuous and
disturbed only by few interruptions. The forces involved are dispersed in order to exploit open
areas containing good-enough opportunities. Similar to biological evolution, the aim is not so
much to seek a direct head-on annihilation of the enemy, but to confuse him through constant
learning and adaptation manifest in quick and fluid movements rather than precise
measurements. An organic conceptualisation of war means that we put emphasis on
improvisation based on bottom-up local knowledge and working without any direct assistance
from the top. Planning is seen as important, but not too important since success comes mostly
as a result of loosely organised, fairly autonomous and dispersed units that carry out individual
actions. The proposed Organic Strategic Ecosystem offers an enhanced conceptualisation of
effects-based operations. However, if we want to see war as an interactive process that requires
continual effort and commitment over a long period of time, we have to rethink in terms of
strategy development, command and control, and military effectiveness.
695  Murray, Williamson: Military Culture Does Matter, Strategic Review, Spring 1999, pp. 32-40; Scales,
Robert H. Jr.: Adaptive Enemies, Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat, Joint Force Quarterly,
Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, pp. 7-14.
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17 Conclusion
In the thesis we analysed a recent and very fashionable concept called effects-based operations,
which drives both the employment and transformation of Western armed forces. In order to
better understand effects-based operations we suggested using On War, Clausewitz’s epic work
as background. We made it clear that in terms of effects-based operations war is seen as a
management activity with a clear cut beginning and a definite end.
1) In the thesis we found that the concept is synonymous with the exploitation of technological
advantage and the efficient use of scarce resources, in which capital can mostly substitute for
personnel. It rests on scientific assumptions based on analysis and prediction with which it is
believed that destroying or influencing assumed centres of gravity or critical nods and elements
can yield cheap victories. We also found that there is a clear and distinguishable relationship
between 20th century strategic theories and effects-based operations. More specifically,
according to the three common elements of the concept such as the emphasis on causality,
technological focus and systems thinking, the concept belongs to the class of air force theories.
At the beginning of the last century the assumed technological superiority of air power to achieve
strategic effects on their own, motivated military thinkers to search for mechanisms that allow
victory without the involvement of irrational costs and losses. In the end and at least in theory, air
power offered a promising solution to protracted surface-oriented attrition and annihilation
warfare. Unfortunately, these basic assumptions have never been really validated in the wars of
the 20th century. It appears that most theorists have felt, rather than known, what air power can
achieve. Air-force theories were originally fed by the false hope that war can be taken away from
the battlefield. However, the airplane established only an additional area in the third dimension
fought with equal ferocity. Although air power’s maturity and independence was regarded for
many years as the driving force in strategic thinking, in the end it was on the battlefield where air
power ascended to equality with the other services. Consequently, any sober theory of warfare
must take into account that waging war is an act that has always been more than linking ends
with means in a simple deductive fashion, and detecting obvious causality at the strategic level
in the form of desired or decisive effects.
2) In the thesis we demonstrated that effects-based operations represent deductive reductionism
and causal laws attempting to predict certain desired effects. The supporting assumption is that
war displays order and equilibrium, the possibility for rational choice, and the ability to steer and
control events. In contrast, war outlined by Clausewitz stands for variety and novelty in which
despite our best effort to comprehend, certain properties remain unknowable to the human mind.
He emphasised that war is fought on a spatial and temporal continuum involving both the
material and non-material domains. War is as much a physical as a psychological phenomenon,
which spans over many layers. Although war can be described in general terms using causal
relationships, effects that go beyond the immediate spatial and temporal levels cannot be
predicted with any accuracy. Understanding war this way indicates that it is possible to only
predict some things, especially those that are local to us both in space and time. Clausewitz
suggested that everything in war is interrelated and all we can attain is nothing more than a
temporary and partial interpretation. In other words, we often confuse causation with correlation
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and simulation with prediction. Whereas the former refers to our preference for creating
retrospective validation to identify best practices, the latter points to the fact that even if we can
simulate something it does not obviously mean that we can equally predict its future. War
displays unpredictability in two ways: in terms of what we are trying to achieve (effect), and how
it becomes possible to achieve what we want to achieve (cause). Thus war stands for a general
unpredictability in terms of ends and means. Several different futures are possible and there is
not always time for mechanical, deductive systemic analyses aimed at detecting causality.
Probably the most important consequence of such an approach is that instead of focusing on
certain desired effects, we should rely on the ability to respond consistently to the unpredictable
nature of war. According to Clausewitz war cannot be waged based on single and prescriptive
models. It requires that we evolve rapidly in order to handle dynamic and changing situations.
3) In the thesis we found that in war we must be satisfied with understanding certain general
features in terms of correlation, rather than attempting to discover a mechanism that links
causes with effects directly. In contrast, effects-based operations as a theory aim at exploiting
causal relationships. Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that the
relationship between ends and means might be clear at the strategic level, but it becomes
considerably less clear as specificities emerge, and more ambiguous as the full range of military
options expands. Consequently, most assumptions of effects-based operations have no sound
foundation and can be applied only with limitations. The global War on Terror aimed at fighting
shadowy enemy organisations is the best example of an increasing difficulty to link military
means with political ends, and tactical actions with strategic objectives directly in order to
identify, penetrate to and destroy the very centres within enemy organisation. Coalition forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan have experienced the difficulty to circumvent the slow and painful
processes of attrition and annihilation with the aim to achieve quick and decisive victory in the
psychological domain to influence enemy thinking and behaviour. The various commitments of
the West since the 1990's have shown how difficult it is to save precious resources in terms of
time, money and manpower by collapsing enemies’ systems that exist outside the traditional
boundaries of a nation-state, from the inside-out. Information superiority and technological
sophistication are at the very heart of effects-based operations. However, they can best be seen
as enabler, but not as ultimate leverage; therefore the assumed advantages of effects-based
operations can often mean no advantage at all. War is full with emerging opportunities that can
only help explain qualitative behaviour, but never accurately predict futures in terms of desired
effects.
4) In the thesis we also demonstrated that effects-based operations as a concept is based on
deduction, analytical rationality and systemic thinking, which have clear limitations for war. The
focus on ends/means rationality does not encompass the Clausewitzian image of war,
emphasising a frictional, chaotic and complex reality sufficiently into account. We demonstrated
that although war might display direct causality, assumptions that rest on equilibrium and a
constant environment make up only a small fraction of war’s bewildering nature. Consequently,
any uncritical attempt aimed at detecting direct causality expressed in the form of desired effects
is scarcely more than a fallacy. We can say that at a first glance the concept of effects-based
operations appears to be weighty both in scope and insight as it draws on a diverse array of
scientific ideas in order to generate hypotheses about success in war. Although this eclecticism
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is admirable, it often indicates inconsistency and a vocabulary that has no sound foundation.
Despite claims that much of war can be addressed by deductive thinking, it is very difficult to
deliver arguments for why certain factors should be regarded as more important than others. We
demonstrated that even deductive thinking and analytical rationality do not make possible to
distinguish sufficiently among various alternatives and cannot satisfyingly explain the preference
for certain selected factors. The result is that many effects-based operations publications read
like an accumulation of disparate and scattered statements lacking a true theoretical basis in
which the central argument is nothing more than simple and uncritical descriptions of positive
findings.
5) In the thesis we proved that rigidity and blind adherence to predefined objectives can result in
mounting costs both in terms of money and men. An exclusive focus on the strategic level only
narrows exploitable tactical options. Consequently we easily become imprisoned in false hopes
chasing desired effects. The concept of effects-based operations is the best example that the
Western world cannot see and address international security problems other than in quantitative
and technological terms. Traditional attributes of war such as uncertainty, risk and ambiguity
increasingly disappear from the vocabulary or are buried under empty concepts. This ignorance
and the resulting mechanistic approach to war explain why a force employment concept such as
effects-based operations could become an important point of focus. We found that effects-based
operations represent a dangerous simplification of war and the only logical outcome can be
nothing else than a panacea that promises quick, easy and cheap victories. In contrast, in the
thesis we expanded on an organic image of war and emphasised the importance of learning and
adaptation, which make it possible to find a harmony between effectiveness and efficiency.
Although this approach does not allow for perfect solutions, it can guarantee that we do not fall
out of alignment in terms of external demand and internal variation. Being effective and efficient
at the same time means doing the right things right. We can successfully combine the science
and the art of war. In other words, we have to pay as much attention to the end sought as to the
means applied. Thus the three parts of the thesis stand for three sets of reasons for being
sceptical regarding the practical utility of effects-based operations and offers critical arguments
against such a conceptualisation of war.
6) In the thesis we addressed the fact that many proponents of effects-based operations related
the concept to complexity theory and suggested to see the enemy as a complex adaptive
system. War perceived this way opens the door for finding analogies with biological evolution,
which again challenges the assumptions upon which effects-based operations are built. An
organic image of war requires strategy development, which is different from the top-down,
mechanistic and analytically rational, and prescriptive model upon which the concept is built.
After our study of complexity theory we found that success in war equates to a phase transition
in which we do not settle into a stable equilibrium or fall entirely apart. Thus victory in war
requires a mix of strategies that are rigid enough to organise change, but not too rigid to prevent
change. War as a complex adaptive system indicates that often the central challenge in strategy
development is to manage change. Instead of focusing on certain desired effects we must
always be prepared to accept rapid and unpredictable changes that require various semi-
coherent strategic directions without a clear focus in terms of strategic effects. In a similar
fashion Clausewitz suggested that accepting surprise, making moves, observing the results and
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continuing with the ones that seem to work are inherent features of war. Consequently, any
conceptualisation of war can be scarcely more than an attempt to grasp a continuously shifting
process. Effects-based operations display war in a rigid and mechanistic Jominian way that
resembles similarity with engineering. The concept emphasises the importance of a predefined
end-state, top-down command and control, and a slavish adherence to various measures. As
military operations since the 1990's have shown, in the age of increased complexity such an
approach imposes demands upon Western armed forces they might not be able to meet. By
contrast war conceptualised as an interactive, open-ended process means that it must be
defined as much by political goals (effects) pursued by the military as by acknowledging the
limitations of militarily realisable political goals (means).
7) In the thesis we proved that simplified and superficial discourses can provide only for thin
explanations that possess limited power. It does not come as a surprise that most approaches to
effects-based operations point towards themselves rather than to any particular direction.
Although they might address important attributes, those attributes are nothing more than a
fraction in the multitude of factors characterising war. As Clausewitz emphasised, war happens
on a continuum and it is understandable that focusing only on certain factors is necessary for
analytical reasons. The logical consequence is a very narrow conceptualisation that does not
provide for developed and compelling explanations, but exhibits two interrelated methodological
problems. Whereas the first problem is that effects-based operations address war mostly on the
strategic level, the second is that the concept regards wars and operations as standard
phenomena. Although war is context-dependent, similar to the strategic bombing genre of
military thinking, the basic assumptions rest on a uniform class that have similar if not identical
attributes. Thus by focusing on commonalities war’s important variations are treated as
secondary. Instead of examining variations in terms of their appearance, the emphasis is on
apparent similarities. This appears to be plausible at first glance, but a closer examination
reveals it to be problematic. It obscures truly intriguing differences that might theoretically belie
the notion that wars and military operations should be analysed as a uniform class.
Consequently, if the West wants to maintain its position in the future it must develop an
appropriate conceptualisation of war and take the consequences in terms of strategy
development, command and control and military effectiveness fully into account. It must look as
much on past errors as present successes in order to avoid sweeping generalisations without
taking into account internal structures. Approaching war in terms of ends/means rationality can
easily result in a technology oriented conceptualisation such as effects-based operations.
8) In the thesis we demonstrated that an exclusive focus on the end, together with the emphasis
on advanced technology and systemic approach can give the impression that war is a
commodity that can be wrapped into catch phrases. Although effects-based operations do not
rest on complete or original arguments, the concept is often sold as a novel and revolutionary
employment of force. In his work, Clausewitz wanted to “iron out a good many kinks in the minds
of strategists and statesmen [and] to show what the whole thing is about and what the real
problems are that have to be taken into account in actual warfare.”696 In a similar, but more
limited fashion it was our intention to examine the utility of a recent and fashionable force
696  Quotation in Clausewitz, p. 78.
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employment concept, and to check its relevance in practical terms. In the end we delivered a
conceptualisation that attempts to find the oft missing link between the theory and practice of
war. Consequently, the thesis can be seen as a deliberate effort to merge insights from different,
but related fields of scientific thinking. War seen as a complex adaptive system negates the
possibility to establish a sort of military checklist offering the take-this-get-that simplicity of
effects-based operations. We displayed war as a phenomenon that allows for causal
explanations only with clear limitations. The biological analogy shows war to be a co-
evolutionary process that spans over many levels involving an abundance of factors. In other
words, we must always deal with circular causality, feedback and conflicting constraints, all
working against an effort involving deduction and analysis. The obvious similarity between war
and biological evolution has another important consequence: any theory can aim at explaining
real world phenomena, but in the case of war and its interactive character, a theory has only
utility if it helps determine to what extent past experience can be useful for current problems at
hand. Although it is always helpful to discern certain universals that can guide our actions,
turning those universals into fixed laws and values with the hope to detect causal relationships is
mostly impossible.
9) In the thesis we treated war as a context-dependent human phenomenon that does not
provide for blueprints to act. However, we also demonstrated that war seen as a complex
adaptive system provides for a comparative methodology in a dual sense. First it approaches
war as a phenomenon that moves back and forth from stability to chaos, and displays it as a
process that simultaneously occurs across various levels. The most important message of such
an approach is that in war success often demands the ability to learn from actual experience,
rather than the ability to formulate action based on past experience. Consequently, waging war
is as much a science as an art, which must be taken into account in every conceptualisation.
Given this research conclusion and the increasing popularity of effects-based operations, what
practical guidance can such a thesis offer? Conceptualising war as a complex adaptive system
indicates an inherent difficulty when attempting to turn the insights gained into actual policies,
programs and strategies. It does not offer clear and simple answers to the way armed forces
should train soldiers, write doctrines and develop leaders in the future. The 21st century and the
Third Wave have just begun and as one contemporary scholar emphasised “it is time to let a
hundred schools of thought bloom.”697 It is our hope that seeing war as a complex adaptive
system and expanding on the analogy between war and biological evolution will be one.
697  Quotation in Metz, Stephen: A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare,
Parameters, Winter 1994-95, p. 132.
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